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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the applicability of the Westminster system for the sovereign 
executives of India, Ceylon and New Zealand.  These three countries became 
independent in the late 1940s and though individually having different contexts share 
constitutional and institutional resemblances, thanks to their Westminster legacy, that 
allows a valuable and original triangular study.  The thesis analyses the crucial first 
decade of independence to assess the events, decisions and political environment of 
these New Westminsters and how the local executives adapted and reacted to the 
Westminster system in this constitutionally nascent era.  This thesis will examine and 
compare the three case studies from a common theoretical approach.  Firstly, each 
country’s cultural background and conditions will be analysed to comprehend not only 
the context in which Westminster functions, but also more importantly to understand the 
exercise of power available within the localised social and political arena.  The cultural 
conditions are crucial since they impact directly on the constitutional and political 
exercise of Westminster executive power and give an invaluable insight into how the 
ambiguous and flexible tenets of Westminster were interpreted in local contexts.  
Secondly, the concept of horizontal accountability and delegative democracy will be 
tested in the New Westminsters to see how well the purported checks and balances of 
the Westminster model operate on the executive level in the crucial nation building era.  
Prime Ministers are unquestionably important, but how well the Cabinet and the 
Governor-General (or constitutional President) operate as actors of accountability and 
how well all three actors conform to the Westminster cultural and institutional 
expectations of their office is also highly relevant.  The actions and inactions of these 
executive actors of this early era are fundamental to the future functions and 
expectations of their offices.  Finally, there will be an event or issue selected during this 
decade, which has path dependent resonance, since it would in future become critical to 
the operation or complexion of the country.   Often this event or issue had not yet been 
fully appreciated, but had been allowed to develop through the employment of 
Westminster flexibility and power demonstrating the importance of this critical juncture 
period.  The adaptable Westminster system was an essential element in the political 
development of these countries.   
 
 3 
Acknowledgments 
 
Throughout the long and often exasperating path to complete my PhD there have been 
many people that have greatly assisted to make completion possible.  Academics, 
officials, librarians, friends and family have all contributed to this all absorbing project.  
The academics at Victoria University of Wellington’s School of History, Philosophy, 
Political Science and International Relations, especially Professor Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay, Professor Stephen Levine, Professor Margaret Clark, Dr Pat Moloney 
and Dr Rod Alley have all given me the benefit of their notable academic (and life) 
experience.  The Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, Commander Peter Cozens 
(ret’d), has also been most generous in his intellectual and social support. 
 
I would also like to acknowledge in gratitude the scholarships and grants that I have 
been fortunate to receive and without which much of my research, especially overseas, 
would not have been possible.  Specifically I mention the New Zealand Vice-
Chancellors Committee (Claude McCarthy Scholarship), Education New Zealand (New 
Zealand Postgraduate Study Abroad Award), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(two MFAT Historical Research Grants) and the Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences at VUW for their PhD research grants. 
 
The kind and patient librarians at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London; the 
staff at the manuscript section of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New 
Delhi; the archivists and librarians at the National Archives and Alexander Turnbull 
Library (manuscript section) in Wellington; as well as the library staff at VUW’s library 
have all been invaluable in accessing the information required for this project. 
 
At a more direct level I would like to thank Miss Gemma Freeman for her editing 
labours, Pro-Chancellor Ian McKinnon for his many efforts on my behalf, Professor 
Elizabeth McLeay for her guidance and research assistance, Professor Nigel Roberts 
who had oversight of the thesis, Dr Margaret Hayward for her constant support, 
intelligence and humour and above all to Dr Paul Brooker for being such an excellent 
and diligent supervisor, who more often than not would go beyond what is expected of 
doctoral supervisors. 
 
 4 
Without my family and friends I could not have achieved anything since they have 
generously given me so many opportunities and support.   
 
This thesis is dedicated to my dear parents Dr Bala and Mrs Renuka 
Kumarasingham.    
 5 
Contents 
 
Abstract ii 
 
Acknowledgements iii  
 
Contents v 
 
Chapter One: Introduction and Theory 1 
 
India 1947 – 1957 
 The New Raj – A Tryst with Westminster? 
 
Chapter Two: Mixed Messages?: Indian Responses to its British Legacy 25 
 
Chapter Three: The Indian Version of First Among Equals 43 
 
Chapter Four: Federalism: A Paramount Mechanism 84 
  
 
Ceylon 1948 – 1958 
Ceylonese Surprises behind a Westminster Façade 
 
Chapter Five: “British is Best” – An Elite Faith 105 
 
Chapter Six: Executive Affairs – The Ceylonese Partnership of Convenience 121 
 
Chapter Seven: Communalism: A ‘Canker’ Ignored? 143 
 
New Zealand 1947-1957 
Westminster “Reforged” 
 
Chapter Eight: Westminster Beyond the Seas? 165 
 
Chapter Nine: The Executive Purity of the “Wellington Model” 183 
 
 6 
Chapter Ten: Unicameralism: The Strange Eventful Death of the Legislative Council 224 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Chapter Eleven: New Westminsters Compared 248 
 
Appendix 278 
Governors-General, Presidents and Prime Ministers of India, Ceylon and New Zealand 
of the Post-Independence Decade 
 
Bibliography 280 
 
 
 7 
1 
Introduction and Theory 
 
In June 1953 Elizabeth II was crowned Queen at Westminster Abbey as monarchs had 
done for over nine hundred years.  However, this crowning was made unique by the fact 
that the young Queen would be the first monarch to have the demonstrative title “Head 
of the Commonwealth” solemnly proclaimed soon after becoming Sovereign, which had 
been given to her by consent and not by hereditary succession.1  The Commonwealth 
was now actively part of the ancient ceremony, from having the Queen vow to serve it 
to having the emblems of the Commonwealth nations embroidered into her coronation 
gown. Crucially, the very evidence of the connection was made visible by the prominent 
appearance of Commonwealth Prime Ministers taking a leading role in the ceremony; 
among others were Sir Winston Churchill, Robert Menzies of Australia, Sidney Holland 
of New Zealand; and Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Dudley Senanayake of Ceylon.  
These men of varied lands and views represented the common constitutional heritage of 
their countries – they represented at Westminster their own Westminsters.  The Palace 
of Westminster became globalised and refounded beyond the British Isles, adapting and 
accommodating to the conditions of foreign lands. 
 
The Queen’s coronation marked the inexorable fusion of Empire to Commonwealth.  
The Indian subcontinent had gained independence and the Dominions became 
increasingly self-determining in their political and constitutional actions.  Events like 
the decision of India to become a Republic and remain in the Commonwealth in 1949 
and the passing of The Royal Titles Act 1953 formalised the evolution and 
constitutional divisibility of Commonwealth countries – and thus their legal separation 
and separate direction from Britain.  Despite such relentless change and rapid 
dissolution of Empire the British Westminster model of parliamentary democracy was 
transplanted and implanted across the globe: the speaker’s wig and mace remained at 
Parliament House even though at Government House the Union Jack was folded away.  
The Westminster system and model became one of Britain’s most famous and enduring 
                                                 
1
 Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p 263 
and Nehru as the leader of the only republic member of the Commonwealth at the time welcomed the 
Queen as Head of the Commonwealth, “Message from the Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru, to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 8 February 1952 in Documents and Speeches on British 
Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952, Nicholas Mansergh (ed.) Volume II, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1953, p 1292  
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exports.  As Graham Wilson has commented: ‘No other nation’s system of government 
– certainly not the United States’s – has been copied so extensively in such a wide 
variety of societies and continents.  The sun had set on the British Empire but not on 
Westminster-style government’.2 
 
Westminster Analysed 
The analysis and appraisal of the Westminster model and the countries that are 
identified as complying with the model’s features has been a well-ploughed field of 
previous research.  Majestic studies from earlier scholars like Sir Kenneth Wheare3 and 
Sir Ivor Jennings4 helped create an academic discipline from analysing the Westminster 
system and Westminster countries, which became an especially prominent and practical 
subject with the eventful and restless advent of decolonisation.   In regard to the 
Westminster system it has been recognised that ‘the powers of the Prime Minister or 
Parliament, the role of political parties, and all the other basic questions asked about the 
British political system could be studied in settings as different as Canberra, New Delhi 
and Ottawa as well as Westminster’.5   
 
It is true that these New Westminsters have developed what Wheare described as a 
‘constitutional autochthony’6, providing an indigenous form and response to ‘local’ 
needs.  Moreover, the flexibility of the Westminster system readily allows indigenous 
interpretations and modifications. Commenting on the various connotations and 
vagaries implied by the Queen’s title ‘Head of the Commonwealth’, a French language 
paper in Canada proposed that that it was ‘in the good British tradition; it is both 
efficient and devoid of logic’.7  The statement can be used on the Westminster system 
itself.  It is a hazardous enterprise to formulate a rigid and idealised Westminster model 
                                                 
2
 Graham Wilson, “The Westminster Model in Comparative Perspective”, in Ian Budge and David 
McKay (eds.), Developing Democracy, London: Sage Publications, 1994, p 189 
3
 For example Sir Kenneth Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960 and Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status, 5th edition, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1953. 
4
 For example Sir Ivor Jennings, The Commonwealth in Asia, London: Oxford University Press, 1951, 
British Commonwealth of Nations, 4th edition, London: Hutchinson, 1961 and Constitutional Laws of the 
Commonwealth, London: Oxford University Press, 1957   
5
 Wilson, “The Westminster Model in Comparative Perspective”, p 190 
6
 Autochthony comes from the Greek ‘sprung from that land itself’ see Wheare, The Constitutional 
Structure of the Commonwealth, p 89  
7
 Vernon Bogdanor, “United Kingdom”, in David Butler and D.A. Low (eds.), Sovereigns and Surrogates 
– Constitutional Heads of State in the Commonwealth, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991, p 37  
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since unlike other constitutional and political models the effort would be largely futile 
due to the variances and vague conventions that make the system.8   
 
Nonetheless, there are still obvious advantages in comparing countries with a common 
institutional background or heritage. In his comparison of the prime ministerial power in 
Britain and three other Westminster systems, Weller argues that each has a ‘similar 
political heritage, similar constitutional assumptions, and similar terminology. In each, 
Cabinet means the same thing and the roles of the Prime Minister are similar, although 
by no means identical.  As a result, the more subtle differences are easier to identify and 
their impact is easier to assess’.9 Weller continues that it is the nature of this unique and 
devolved political system that fosters such valuable appraisement since:  
 
The Westminster system has always been sufficiently flexible to allow 
multiple interpretations of what is proper.  There is no theoretical model 
to be adopted.  Rather the four systems have sufficient factors in 
common to allow them to be used to compare and contrast their 
procedures in such a way as to emphasise the importance of the 
structural and traditional as well as the changing balance of power.10   
 
 However, comparative studies of Westminster systems have concentrated on 
comparisons within two particular classifications or categories of examples. The first 
and more frequently explored is composed of the ‘white’ or ‘settler’ dominions, namely 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and sometimes South Africa.  Here the reader would 
be regaled by the experience of the Westminster model in traditional settings populated 
mainly by British who often saw their new home as ‘Better Britain’ where the political 
                                                 
8
 Although Patapan, Wanna and Weller ‘reject the notion of an idealised Westminster model as of limited 
analytical value,’ they identify in their table of beliefs the five main characteristics of the Executive in a 
Westminster system: 
• The head of state and head of government are two separate roles 
• Majority party control of the executive also described as the fusion of the legislature and the 
executive – with ministers drawn from the parliament 
• Concentration of executive power in prime minister and cabinet 
• Individual ministerial and collective responsibility to parliament 
• Partnership between ministers and neutral officials in which ministers have the last word. 
R.A.W. Rhodes and Patrick Weller, “Westminster Transplanted and Westminster Implanted: 
Exploring Political Change” in Haig Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick Weller (eds.), 
Westminster Legacies – Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific, 
Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2005, pp 2-6 
9
 Patrick Weller, First Among Equals – Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems, Hemel Hempstead: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1985, p 16 
10
 Weller, First Among Equals – Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems, p 17 
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system had been transplanted 11 in the new setting, replicating the British model with 
localised variations.  Such grounding would allow a study that not only shared 
constitutional familiarity but crucially cultural familiarity as well. For it shares a large 
part of the British historical culture, thanks to its lack of an indigenous historical culture 
that could replace or crowd-out the one ‘brought from the motherland’.  
 
The other category of examples is where the Westminster system had been established 
through imperial imprimatur, such as in India and Ceylon, thereby creating an 
implanted12 system that continued after the colony’s independence from the British 
Empire but without the same cultural familiarity as the other category experienced 
because it has an indigenous rather than British historical culture.  (Another issue is 
whether the cultural familiarity is absent at both elite and mass level, and if there is a 
degree of familiarity at the elite level, whether this assists or actually may hinder the 
adaptation of these institutions to a country that for the most part lacks cultural 
familiarity with them.)  Like the other New Westminsters, they have ‘similar starting 
points and sets of political institutions but different cultures’.13 However, in their case 
the cultural difference is more marked because they lack the cultural familiarity that the 
transplanted cases enjoy as cases of ‘settler’ New Westminsters. This marked difference 
in cultural backgrounds provides a strong analytical basis for categorising them 
separately from the transplant cases and as a category of their own – ‘the unfamiliar 
cultural context’, implanted category. 
 
The New Westminsters: A Triangular Comparison 
Notable studies have forged valuable research and documentation on transplanted and 
implanted countries and regions.14 Yet rarely have such studies compared and 
considered both the transplanted and implanted categories together.  The value of such 
analysis is that it allows a study of diverse countries and different cultural backgrounds 
                                                 
11
 This distinction is made in Rhodes and Weller, “Westminster Transplanted and Westminster Implanted: 
Exploring Political Change”, pp 1-12 
12
 Rhodes and Weller, “Westminster Transplanted and Westminster Implanted: Exploring Political 
Change”, pp 1-12 
13
 Rhodes and Weller, “Westminster Transplanted and Westminster Implanted: Exploring Political 
Change”, p 3 
14
 A very good Transplanted example is Patrick Weller, First Among Equals – Prime Ministers in 
Westminster Systems, Hemel Hempstead: George Allen & Unwin, 1985, which examines the premiership 
in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  While An example from Implanted 
literature is Amita Shastri and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (eds.), The Post-Colonial States of South Asia : 
Democracy, Identity, Development and Security, Richmond: Curzon, 2000 which looks at the major 
South Asian cases and their post-independent political development.   
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that are connected by ‘strong family resemblances’15 in their Westminster-system 
political institutions. This creates an analytical basis to compare not only countries with 
countries and regions with regions but also categories with categories.  The family 
nature of the Westminster system means that this can be achieved despite there being 
different upbringings within the wider family.   It also allows a study of the institutions 
and the cultural influences on institutions to assess how these Westminster ‘tools’ are 
used in practice.    
 
Their appraisal bears useful implications for this study, as it is also applicable to the 
comparative research of the Westminster model in implanted cases and in comparisons 
across categories. This is an important discernment since it is a comparative study of 
family resemblances and beliefs, which are evident in the countries chosen rather than a 
theoretical and definitional study of constitutions which is not easily or productively 
purloined from Westminster systems – added to this is De Smith’s withering reminder 
that ‘the comparison of constitutions by tabulation is perhaps the bleakest form of 
scholastic aridity…’16  The comparison will be two-dimensional in the sense of 
comparing and contrasting not only transplanted with implanted but also a British 
Westminster institutions  with an ‘autochthonous’ or ‘adapted’ Westminster institution 
– that is, a transplanted/implanted  ‘cultural’ comparison and a British 
Westminster/adapted Westminster institutional comparison.   
 
The adapted Westminster institutions favoured by many of the New Westminsters were 
normally a federal or quasi-federalised adaptation.  It involved not only regional 
governments but also the whole ‘package’ of institutional features that is virtually 
required by federalism: a written constitution that specifies the division of powers 
between central and regional governments, a relatively powerful judiciary to make 
binding interpretations of that constitution, a relatively powerful ‘regionalised’ upper 
house and potentially a quite powerful Head of State to deal with immediate federal 
crises. These federalised institutions were adopted by the majority of transplanted cases 
– Canada, South Africa and Australia – as well as by the key implanted case of India. In 
fact the institutional contrast could well be phrased as a British Westminster versus 
Federalised Westminster. However, India made a wider ranging adaptation of 
                                                 
15
 Rhodes and Weller, “Westminster Transplanted and Westminster Implanted: Exploring Political 
Change”, p 7 
16
 S. A. De Smith, “Westminster’s Export Models: The Legal Framework of Responsible Government”, 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1961, pp 9-10 
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Westminster that in addition to federalism introduced a presidential Head of State 
elected by the central and regional legislatures. So it seems better to present the contrast 
in terms of British-Westminster versus adapted Westminster, with the implanted case of 
republican and federalised India being a more ‘highly’ adapted Westminster than the 
transplanted cases. 
 
Similarly, the British Westminster institutions were adopted by implanted as well as 
transplanted cases, notably Ceylon and New Zealand. But this time it was the 
transplanted case that was more adaptive, as New Zealand introduced a unicameral 
system within a decade of its legal independence and also gave its Governor-General a 
wholly ceremonial role as head of state – producing a ‘simplified’ British-Westminster. 
(And New Zealand’s avoidance of a written constitution is better viewed as part of this 
simplification of Westminster rather than as part of the influence of a transplanted 
culture.) In contrast, Ceylon remained true to the British-Westminster bicameralism in a 
unitary state for decades after independence and departed from British-Westminster 
institutions only in having a written constitution. 
 
This study will therefore make a triangular analysis of the transplanted simplified 
British Westminster case of New Zealand with the implanted cases of British 
Westminster Ceylon and adapted Westminster, republican and federal India.   
 
The analysis will reveal that the cultural complexities of implanted cases include a 
factor that would have a large impact on the way in which the Westminster institutions 
were used – namely the different aspects of forms of British Westminster culture 
adopted by Ceylon and India. To use Bagehot’s distinction between ‘dignified’ and 
‘efficient’ parts of the British Constitution17, the Ceylonese political elite had adopted 
the largely symbolic, ceremonial culture that ‘dignified’ British institutions while the 
Indian elite had instead adopted the ‘efficient’ culture of values and attitudes involved 
in operating British institutions in a typically ‘Westminster’ fashion. Paradoxically this 
would lead to India’s republican-federalised adapted Westminster institutions being 
operated in a more ‘Westminster’ fashion than Ceylon’s British Westminster 
institutions, as the Ceylon elite was operating British institutions in an anachronistic 
eighteenth-century manner - such as in having a patronage-based Cabinet dominated by 
                                                 
17
 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution – With an Introduction by R. H .S. Crossman, Glasgow: 
Fontana/Collins, 1978, pp 61-68 
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its prime ministerial leader/patron rather than by collegial attitudes or values and in 
allowing the Governor-General to exercise much more power at times than has any 
modern British monarch.  
 
To some extent this different cultural ‘inheritance’ was in turn linked to the institutional 
and social background of the two cases. (For as Bagehot’s term ‘efficient’ implies, the 
operating culture is concerned with practical matters of day-to-day government and 
therefore must be closely ‘fitted’ to the institutional and social context of governing the 
country.) In Ceylon’s case the weak party institutions and apparent absence of any need 
for a power-sharing, careful handling of the communal divisions in Ceylon’s small and 
peaceful society had not helped the local elite to become ‘acculturated’ to Westminster 
collegiality. And in India the acculturation to Westminster cultural feature of 
collegiality was aided by the institutional background of a strong Congress party – and 
also by institutional and social complexities that made the Westminster cultural feature 
of flexibility seem very appropriate. Such flexibility rather than rule-bound rigidity 
seemed to the Indian political elite to be essential if the new country was to experience 
‘good government’, especially in light of its post-independence federalism and of the 
sheer complexity and volatility of India’s vast society – whose potential for communal 
violence had been displayed in the Partition massacres.    
 
In the case of transplanted New Zealand, there seems to have been a strange mixture of 
acceptance and abandoning of British culture that cut across the dignified-efficient or 
ceremonial-operational categories. This involved the preservation of such ceremonial, 
‘dignified’ features as parliamentary rituals and great esteem for the Queen as well as 
such Westminster operational, ‘efficient’ features as the collegiality associated with 
‘collective government’. But the local cultural adaptation of valuing ‘simplification’ led 
to the operational, ‘efficient’ downplaying of the Governor-General’s role of head of 
state as well as to the key institutional change of eliminating the ‘dignified’ upper 
chamber. As in the implanted case, the acceptance and/or abandonment of British 
culture was linked to the institutional and social background, as New Zealand was 
similar to Ceylon in having  a ‘simple’, unitary set of Westminster institutions and a 
small society with even less communal complexity or division than Ceylon’s – as the 
indigenous ethnic minority had apparently been ‘satisfied’ with the four Māori seats in 
parliament rather than power-sharing or a federalist control over Māori-predominant 
regions. In the New Zealand case the simplifying attitudes and values seemed 
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appropriate, and the Ceylon-like attraction to the ‘dignified’ culture of British 
Westminster did not extend to protecting such apparently ‘unnecessary’ institutions as 
the upper house.  If the country had not been developing a pair of strong party 
institutions, even the Westminster cultural feature of collegiality may have been in 
danger of a ‘simplification’ in the direction of institutionalising prime ministerial power 
rather than merely experiencing a transitory period of personalist government that is 
typical of democracies emerging from authoritarian or colonial rule. 
 
In fact another compelling reason to compare New Zealand with Ceylon and India is 
that these three countries are the only examples of transplanted and implanted 
Westminsters becoming sovereign, independent democracies in the same historical era - 
the late 1940s.  For the other transplanted cases had already become independent and 
the other implanted cases did not become independent until after the 1940s. (It is true 
that both Pakistan and Burma became independent in the 1940s but they were unable to 
complete a full democratisation in the years following independence and had declined 
into military dictatorships by the end of the 1950s.) India and Ceylon became 
independent in 1947 and 1948 respectively, with India going on in 1950 to become a 
Republic but retaining its other Westminster features. New Zealand achieved its 
constitutional independence, meaning a formalisation of its ability to govern itself 
separately of Britain, with the passing of the 1931 Statute of Westminster in its own 
Parliament in 1947 (in comparison, Australia had gone through the same constitutional 
process in 1942, during the war rather than in the aftermath of the war).  
 
In turn, this coincidence of independences provides an opportunity to apply Guillermo 
O’Donnell’s theory of democratising ‘delegative’ democracy to a mixed group of 
transplanted and implanted New Westminster parliamentary systems.  For the initial 
years of independent existence as a democracy is when a country is most likely to 
experience delegative democracy’s shift towards a personalist executive that has 
escaped from the usual forms of ‘horizontal’ constitutional accountability.18 In the 
Westminster, parliamentary case this would mean that the Prime Minister has escaped 
from the conventional accountability to the other parts of the executive, namely the head 
of state and the Cabinet, and had informally established a personalist of ‘presidential’ 
                                                 
18
 Guillermo O’Donnell, Counterpoints – Selected Essays in Authoritarianism and Democratisation, 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999, p 160 
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executive with the judicial and legislative forms of horizontal accountability seen in 
formally and rigid presidential systems like the United States of America. 
 
Finally, this initial ‘coming of age’ period of post-independence democracy may well 
have been a ‘critical juncture’ in what became a ‘path dependent’ influence on the 
country’s political and constitutional history.  As will be discussed later in this chapter a 
‘critical juncture period’ is ‘critical’ since it is often an initial point of institutional 
creation and experiment when various options and alternatives were available.  The 
directions taken at this juncture are important since it is often hard to change these 
directions over time once the impact is more pronounced.     
 
The likelihood of ‘path dependent’ effects is also a compelling reason for the historical 
analysis of each case separately in addition to its being included in a generalising 
comparison with other examples. For both these purposes, historical analysis and 
generalising comparison, the study will focus on the first ten years after independence, 
which is not only a substantial and feasible, though not overly long period to evaluate 
but also an accepted indicator of democratic maturity.19  
 
Political and Historical Focus: The Westminster Executive 
The particular feature that will be analysed here will be the powers of the Prime 
Minister and his [all men during the period selected] exercise of executive power under 
the auspices of the Westminster constitutional system.  The Prime Minister’s powers 
will be scrutinised in relation to those of the Governor-General (President in India post-
1950) and Cabinet. These are the years of development of national executive power, 
which independence had bequeathed and which now had the opportunity to reveal local 
cultural conditions, experience tendencies towards delegative democracy and make key 
decisions that would have a path-dependent effect on the country’s political and 
constitutional history.  The Prime Minister’s role in these years has a crucial impact on 
the office and his successors – this can be gauged from the powers and influence of the 
other key executive players such as the Head of State and Cabinet.  The early year 
                                                 
19
 Ten years can be seen as a significant time frame for democracies.  Stéphane Dion for instance argues 
that well established democracies can be adjudged to be those ‘with at least ten consecutive years of 
universal suffrage’. Stéphane Dion, “Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? 
Lessons from Quebec”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, April 1996, p. 269 and 
Sumantra Bose argues that in South Asia ‘political patterns which would dominate India, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka for decades to come emerged and were consolidated during the first decade’ following 
independence.  Sumantra Bose, “Decolonisation and State Building in South Asia”, Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, pp 95-96   
 16 
succeeding the end of the World War II and surrounding events in world politics in 
conjunction with their own independence allowed an extraordinary opportunity in 
power terms to these political executive actors especially the Prime Minister, which was 
facilitated by the latent ambiguities of the Westminster system and its application to 
these foreign contexts and conditions. 
 
The Prime Ministers of India, Ceylon and New Zealand during the time selected were 
called upon in exceptional circumstances to craft the powers of their office and 
manoeuvre the machinery of state.  The implanted and transplanted Westminsters 
functioned much the same.   The new leaders of the New Westminsters were endowed 
with the scope and arguably the demand to exercise extraordinary powers.  As Andrew 
Gamble argues that despite the ordeal and ideal that ‘the cabinet, the prime minister … 
[are] … subject to parliamentary scrutiny and approval’ the Westminster executive has 
always ‘retained its capacity for independent action, leadership and decision’.20   And 
this capacity was certainly on display in the post-independence era of these three New 
Westminsters. 
 
A Three Level Theoretical Focus on the Three New Westminsters 
This thesis will examine and compare the three case studies from a common theoretical 
approach.  Firstly, each country’s cultural background and conditions will be analysed 
to comprehend not only the context in which Westminster functions, but also more 
importantly to understand the exercise of power available within the localised social and 
political arena.  The cultural conditions are crucial since they impart directly on the 
constitutional and political exercise of Westminster executive power and provide a 
broad picture of the political environment to give an invaluable insight into how the 
ambiguous and flexible mantra of Westminster was interpreted in local contexts.  
Secondly, the concept of horizontal accountability and delegative democracy will be 
tested in the New Westminsters to see how well the purported checks and balances of 
the Westminster model operate on the executive level in the crucial nation building era.  
Prime Ministers are unquestionably important, but how well the Cabinet and the 
Governor-General operate as actors of accountability and how well all three actors 
conform to the Westminster cultural and institutional expectations of their office is also 
highly relevant.  The actions and inactions of these executive actors of this early era are 
                                                 
20
 Andrew Gamble, “Theories of British Politics”, Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 1990, p 
407 
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fundamental to the future functions and expectations of their offices.  Finally, there will 
be an event or issue selected during this decade, which has path dependent resonance, 
since it would in future become critical to the operation or complexion of the country.   
Often this event or issue had not yet been fully appreciated, but had been allowed to 
develop through the employment of Westminster flexibility and power demonstrating 
the importance of this critical juncture period.  The three level theoretical approach has 
obvious common elements and therefore are not exclusive of each other, but still form 
the structural division of the thesis and the basis for the three chapters on each country.         
The Three-Level Focus 
Cultural Conditions 
In Hall and Taylor’s well-known analysis of ‘political science and the three new 
institutionalisms’ it is pointed out that political scientists like to draw a distinction 
‘between “institutional explanations” based on organizational structures and “cultural 
explanations” based on an understanding of culture as shared attitudes or values’, and it 
is also pointed out that political scientists tend to define institutions and organisations 
much more narrowly than sociological institutionalists have done – political scientists 
have focused on the ‘formal rules, procedures or norms’ rather than including the 
‘symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates’ that are part of the sociological 
conception of institutions.21  A useful example of a political scientist’s narrower focus 
in their definition of the distinction between political institutions and political culture 
had already appeared in Orren and Skowronek’s suggestions about a ‘new 
institutionalism’ in studying American politics.  
 
They defined political institutions as being ‘purposive or intentional’ in the sense that 
‘the rules that compose them are constructed and reconstructed with reference to 
specific goals, thereby distinguishing the rules of political institutions from the more 
spontaneous regularities associated with political culture’.22 Thus institutions have an 
explicitly tool-like quality that is not found with political culture, which may 
nonetheless perform important functions – as the anthropologists and others have long 
pointed out – even though it has arisen spontaneously as operational, ‘efficient’ attitudes 
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and values or as ceremonial, ‘dignified’ symbols or the symbolic preservation of 
institutions that no longer serve their original purpose or any other operational purpose.  
Applied to institutional culture this can mean that there may be formal rules but no 
longer serve their original purpose or role such as perhaps the awesome formal power of 
the Sovereign (and their representative or parallel) and are no longer maintained by 
conscious intent.  
 
Difference between British ‘dignified’, ceremonial culture and Westminster ‘efficient’, 
operational culture 
The Westminster operational culture comprises the various attitudes and values that 
evolve spontaneously - without conscious purpose and specific reference to explicit 
goals - from the operation of Westminster institutions and regardless of the particular 
national or historical context.  For example, it may involve attitudes towards the office 
of Prime Minister as leader of the government or to the head of state as part of the 
executive that can be found in any country or in any era since the Westminster system 
was “up and running”.  In that sense Westminster operational culture should show as 
many family resemblances as Westminster institutions.  Of course these cultural 
features can evolve in diverse ways according to the particular situations that arise in 
particular countries in particular eras – and the path of evolution can take various twists 
and turns over time – but if these cultural changes go so far beyond the ‘Westminster 
mode’ as to change the operation of the institutions in a non-Westminster direction, they 
can be the basis for a claim that the system has gone beyond the usual range of family 
resemblances and has become a different form of parliamentary government.  For 
example, if the attitudes towards the Prime Minister or the head of state became too 
deferential, it could be argued that this Westminster system had moved towards prime-
ministerial rather than cabinet government or – as in the case of Ceylon – had reverted 
to something akin to the British system of the eighteenth rather than twentieth century.  
Therefore if political culture ‘spontaneously’ moves too far away from the Westminster 
model then the country is no longer a Westminster any more than if the institutions had 
moved by purposeful reference to specific goals away from the Westminster model.  
 
In contrast, British ‘dignified’, ceremonial political culture is simply the various 
attitudes, values and – especially – symbols that have evolved historically in the unique 
British context but are not necessarily part of the Westminster operational culture.  For 
example, the symbolic rituals of Black Rod pounding on the door of parliament or of 
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the new Speaker being dragged to his or her chair are parts of British historical culture 
that can be transplanted or even implanted in other countries but are not part of the 
Westminster operational culture. The New Westminsters all sought (including 
republican India) to take or leave what they wished from British Westminster 
ceremonial and operational culture as well as from British Westminster institutions, 
such as cabinet government and a non-elected head of state.  In the new contexts of both 
transplanted and implanted countries the executive actors were ‘individuals using local 
reasoning consciously and subconsciously to reflect on and modify their contingent 
heritage’.23  If the local reasoning was consciously reflecting and modifying their 
contingent institutional heritage, there was also subconscious reflection and 
modification of the cultural heritage – with an Indian rejection of the British ‘dignified’ 
culture, a Ceylonese rejection of key features of the British ‘efficient’, operational 
culture and a New Zealand ‘rejection’ of some features of both forms of British culture. 
Delegative Democracy and Horizontal Accountability 
The phrase coined by Lord Hailsham in 1976 ‘elective dictatorship’ that described the 
British parliamentary system could have been used much earlier and beyond the Palace 
of Westminster.  As this seasoned observer and participant diagnosed, under the British 
system you can ‘live under an elective dictatorship’, which is ‘absolute in theory, if 
hitherto thought tolerable in practice’.24  Hailsham pointed to not only the lack of 
judicial restraints on the sovereignty of parliament but also the fact that in practice 
parliament had been subordinated to Cabinet and indeed to a powerful minority in 
Cabinet: ‘the whole absolute powers  of Parliament …are wielded by Cabinet alone and 
sometimes to a relatively small group within the Cabinet’.25 If this is the elective 
dictatorship, it is a dictatorship of the executive. There is clearly no horizontal 
accountability of the executive to the judiciary or to the legislature. But as the 
Westminster system does not have a one-person, presidential executive, this still allows 
the possibility of a horizontal accountability within the executive that can prevent a 
personal, delegative democracy being set up by the most institutionally powerful person 
within the executive – the Prime Minister. 
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O’Donnell’s examination of democratisation and ‘delegative democracy’ executive 
power in democratising South America of the 1970s and 1980s has relevance for the 
situations in which the newly independent New Westminster countries found themselves 
in the 1940s and 1950s. In particular, he was referring to federal presidential systems, so 
his analysis is applicable to even the federalised adapted Westminster countries. Though 
there are obvious differences between the Latin American cases and the Commonwealth 
ones, the concepts involved help to comprehend theoretically the importance of context 
on leadership and executive understanding. O’Donnell argues that ‘Delegative 
Democracies are not consolidated (i.e. institutionalised) democracies, but they may be 
enduring. In many cases, there is no sign either of any imminent threat of an 
authoritarian regression, or of advances toward representative democracy’.26 
 
Such states often have to contend with ‘the deep social and economic crisis that most of 
these countries inherited from their authoritarian predecessors reinforces certain 
practices and conceptions about the proper exercise of political authority that lead to in 
the direction of delegative, not representative, democracy’.27  The political executive’s 
power, in this case the president’s, rests ‘on the premise that whoever wins election to 
the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the 
hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office … 
[the president is] ‘the embodiment of the nation and main custodian and definer of its 
interests.’ Intriguingly O’Donnell submits that though ‘presidentialism has more affinity 
with delegative democracy than parliamentarism’ nonetheless ‘if delegative propensities 
are strong in a given country, the workings of a parliamentary system could be rather 
easily subverted’.28   
 
Presumably, O’Donnell has in mind parliamentary systems’ vulnerability to what 
Hailsham termed ‘elective dictatorship’. In the Westminster system this vulnerability 
arises from what Hailsham described as ‘the absolute powers we confer on our 
sovereign body, and the concentration of those powers in an executive government 
formed out of one party which may not fairly represent the popular will’.29  Westminster 
executive governments often resemble O’Donnell’s ‘delegative’ presidents who ‘present 
themselves as above both political parties and organised interests’ and therefore see 
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other institutions like the judiciary and legislature as ‘nuisances that come attached to 
the domestic and international advantages of being a democratically elected president. 
Accountability to such institutions appears as a mere impediment to the full authority 
that the president has been delegated to exercise’.30 Though such beliefs are ‘not alien to 
the democratic tradition’ it is ‘less liberal’ as electoral contests become ‘strongly 
individualistic, but more in a Hobbesian than a Lockean way: voters are supposed to 
choose, irrespective of their identities and affiliations, the individual who is most fit to 
take responsibility for the destiny of the country’ this is arguably different in 
institutionalised democracies where ‘accountability runs not only vertically, making 
elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of 
relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that can call into question, and 
eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given office.’31 
(Within the South American context that O’Donnell has in mind, the key institutions of 
horizontal accountability are the federal Supreme Court and the houses/chambers of the 
federal legislature.) O’Donnell argues that the executive during the time of democratic 
regime building, has ‘the apparent advantage of having practically no horizontal 
accountability… [and] the institutions that make horizontal accountability effective are 
seen by delegative presidents as unnecessary encumbrances’.32  This can be directly 
applied to the cases of the New Westminsters during the time they became sovereign, 
independent democracies. 
 
Horizontal Accountability and the Legislature 
Hailsham’s argument that British Westminster lacks (what O’Donnell later termed) 
‘horizontal accountability’ to the legislature is confirmed by academic analysts of the 
Westminster system.  Arend Lijphart in his scrutiny of government forms in 
democracies has labelled the Westminster model as being a majoritarian system by 
making dichotomous contrasts of majoritarian and consensus models, including the 
executive. The key assessments that is relevant for a Westminster executive is the 
‘concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive 
power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions and the executive-legislative relationships 
in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power’.  
Lijphart also stresses the centralisation of power in government, cabinet dominance over 
the legislature and the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral house rather 
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than decentralised government and legislative power sharing between Houses.33 The 
significance of executive power is intrinsic to the study of any political system.  In the 
Westminster system it is of fundamental consequence.   
 
For all the emphasis that Westminster places on the power and premier place of 
parliament with the constant venerable adulation of parliamentary sovereignty; and with 
it the majesty and impartial permanence of the judiciary – it is the executive that is 
unquestionably primus inter pares over the other branches of state.  As R.A.W. Rhodes 
has observed on the parliamentary aspect the fact that ‘all prime ministers must give 
parliament “some attention” (emphasis in original) attests to parliamentary weakness, 
not strength.  So, key tenets of parliamentary democracy do not work as intended.  Such 
a mismatch between theory and practice will erode the legitimising role of 
parliament’.34  With the Westminster system the reality of power is often at divergence 
with the theory – as in the above case of theoretical parliamentary supremacy.  The 
reality is that parliament with its tight party control in Westminster system does not 
provide the horizontal accountability that it theoretically could.     
 
Intra-Executive Accountability 
However, any defender of the Westminster system would point out that it does provide 
a horizontal accountability within the executive that prevents the personalist rule seen in 
‘delegative’ democracies. In Hailsham’s terms, it prevents ‘elected dictatorship’ of the 
executive being converted into an elected personal dictatorship of the Prime Minister – 
into personalist rule by an elected dictator. As Lijphart describes, the presidential type 
of executive is a one-person type in which members of the President’s Cabinet are ‘only 
advisers to the president’ but Westminster and other types of parliamentary cabinet 
executive are a collective, collegial executive in which members of the Cabinet 
including the Prime Minister are ‘more or less coequal participants’ in executive 
power.35 In the Westminster system the only candidate for delegative democracy’s 
personalist rule – the Prime Minister – is joined by and is accountable to the collective 
Cabinet and the ceremonial-focused Head of State.  These two other actors are 
theoretically able to act as a check on the Prime Minister and thereby apply the principle 
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of horizontal accountability within the Executive as distinct from the one-person, 
presidential executive being accountable to the separate institutions of judiciary and 
legislature.  
 
O’Donnell argues that ‘accountability depends on the existence of state agencies that a 
legally empowered – and factually willing and able – to take actions ranging from 
routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to possibly unlawful 
actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state’.  He continues that for 
such checks and ‘accountability to be effective, there must exist state agencies that are 
authorised and willing to oversee, control, redress, and if need be sanction unlawful 
actions by other state agencies.  The former agencies must have not only legal authority 
but also sufficient de facto autonomy vis-à-vis the latter … these agencies can only 
rarely be effective in isolation’.  In Westminster systems and in this thesis it is the Head 
of State and Cabinet that are the ‘actors’, ‘agents’ and ‘institutions’ that act as the intra-
executive agencies of horizontal accountability which prevent personalist rule. 
Theoretically if these executive actors are ‘to be autonomous, institutions must have 
boundaries, these boundaries must be acknowledged and respected by other relevant 
actors, and still other actors must be available to defend and eventually redress those 
boundaries if they are transgressed’.36    
 
The accuracy and applicability of this principle horizontal accountability in Westminster 
systems has always been an issue of contention.  Westminster systems have always had 
difficulty in defining the powers and parameters of its institutions due to their 
predilection for custom and convention over precise constitutional articulation.  As shall 
be shown, New Westminster constitutions are ‘often adopted without much variation the 
institutional ensembles already familiar to them from the formal or informal empire to 
which they belonged’.  The New Westminsters ‘have looked to transplanted laws and 
constitutions to serve as engines of political and economic modernity, sparking 
persistent and often heated debates over the gap thus created between the pays légal and 
the pays réel.  This gap – long discussed by politicians, historians, novelists, and social 
scientists – between formal rules and what most people most of the time actually do, has 
                                                 
36
 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 
9, No. 3, 1998, pp 117-119 
 24 
raised never-ending debates as to whether it would be better firmly to establish the pays 
légal or organise political life around the pays réel’.37    
 
This concern is of crucial importance during the early years of independence, where the 
perimeters of institutions and power actors are especially ambiguous and more often 
than not without specific legal jurisdictional force.  The resulting situation is one of 
fluidity and uncertainty that leaves horizontal accountability in a potentially unstable 
and unsatisfactory state of effectiveness that in turn facilitates ‘high personalisation and 
concentration of power in the executive’.38 In a New Westminster this will likely take 
the form of a personalised concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister 
and a lack of horizontal accountability to the other components of the executive – 
Cabinet and Head of State. 
 
Horizontal Accountability of Prime Minister to Cabinet 
The tendency towards personal leadership is evident in any new democracy, whether 
after a process of democratisation or of decolonisation under democratic auspices.  In 
fact in the democratising aftermath of Germany’s defeat in the First World War, there 
was a call from Max Weber for a ‘plebiscitary type of leadership’ – a Fuehredemokratie 
(leader democracy) – that he initially envisaged would take prime-ministerial form but 
later envisaged as a strong presidential system.39 In a sense therefore he was the first 
theorist of delegative democracy, in both prime-ministerial and presidential forms, and 
is a reminder of how ‘universal’ a tendency it seems to be – to look for personal 
leadership rather than an institutionalisation of constitutional, horizontal accountability 
as well as vertical, democratic accountability. 
 
Schumpeter’s observations on the British political system and therefore the Westminster 
style of government have resounding implications for this study with its emphasis on 
leadership power.  Schumpeter noted that that the ‘British electorate, as in any 
parliamentary democracy, did not elect – and thus produce – a government’ since as he 
perceived it the electorate actually ‘devolves’ the ‘government-producing function to an 
intermediate organ, henceforth called parliament – and thereby allows parliament on 
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their behalf to form the government, which in turn acknowledges an individual leader 
with a leadership that is to some extent independent of mere party opinion’.40   
 
Schumpeter argued long ago that Cabinet is a ‘miniature parliament’ consisting not only 
‘of comrades in arms but of party men who have their own interests and prospects to 
consider’. So some de facto horizontal accountability to a ‘parliament’ may still exist in 
this miniature, intra-Cabinet form.  And as Schumpeter’s conception of parliament was 
as a chooser of governments, he was implying that the Cabinet could hold the Prime 
Minister accountable through its power to remove him from his post – a form of 
accountability that is rather different from the vetoing form of accountability found in 
presidential systems. 41 From the Prime Minister’s perspective the sword of Damocles 
hanging over him requires that he take careful note of the anticipated responses of his 
Cabinet colleagues to his actions.  As Schumpeter put it, the Prime Minister must ‘shape 
his program so that his colleagues in the Cabinet will not too often feel like 
“reconsidering their position” … [and] steers a middle course between insisting on 
discipline and allowing himself to be thwarted. He tempers pressure with more or less 
judicious concessions’.42 
 
Horizontal Accountability on Prime Minister to Head of State 
Ludger Helms has examined the powers of executive leadership in Presidents, Prime 
Ministers and Chancellors – Executive Leadership in Western Democracy.  Helms 
concentrates on the ‘politics of executive leadership’ since it is this, he argues, which 
‘matters significantly for the overall performance of contemporary democracies.’43  
Helms utilises the distinction of executive power from Harold Laski with his 
formulation of the ‘constitutional executive’ and the ‘political executive’44 – in the 
Westminster system this is a crucial and much lauded distinction theoretically though in 
practice the division is more nebulous.   
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De Smith used head of state versus government relationship as an example of the 
uniquely Westminster arrangement of constitutionally fusing the specifics of legal 
doctrines and the supple qualities of conventions, which he described as a ‘voluntary 
schizophrenia’, as ‘in the main the dichotomy of law and convention was preserved, and 
most of the really important conventions left to the interpolator’.45  He argued that the 
nature of the relationship between the Governor-General (or a ‘constitutional’ President) 
and their Ministers is ‘inherently unsuitable for codification, whether in the form of 
legally binding rules or as a set of directive gubernatorial policy’.46  The Head of State 
is ultimately the last check on the executive and is the guardian of the constitution in 
Westminster systems and can theoretically veto the ‘political executive’ though this is 
normally a dormant power, it is nonetheless a horizontal accountability power.47  
 
The crucial power of the Prime Minister over Cabinet or the Head of State can be seen 
as Poguntke and Webb argue ‘as the development of (a) increasing leadership power 
resources and autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively and (b) 
increasingly leadership-centred electoral processes’.  In any system ‘presidentialization’ 
meaning centralised and largely autonomous power is determined and ‘highly 
constrained by the formal configuration of political institutions.  In other words, 
different regime-settings provide institutions and actors with different power resources, 
thus constraining correspondingly the potential space for movement’.48  The 
Westminster model provides various actors with a great potential of increasing power 
autonomy over the others due to high level of flexibility and manoeuvrability.  The 
“regime-settings” available in New Westminsters in their early independence eras 
displayed a high potential for varying degrees for political actors to settle on the power 
continuum generally unencumbered by fixed and formal institutional expectations.  This 
time allowed the countries and their executive, particularly the Prime Minister, the 
ability to mould and establish constitutional traditions, which in turn fostered itself upon 
the nascent polity that surrounded the real and constitutional independence.  The new 
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executive political actors legitimately became the midwife to their newly christened and 
adopted Westminsters once delivered from the mother of Parliaments. 
 
Path Dependency and Critical Juncture  
A further reason for examining these countries during the period succeeding 
independence is the legacy that era has on further generations and whether the potential 
propensities outlined above establish themselves and create path dependence.  James 
Mahoney argues  
 
path dependence characterises specifically those historical sequences in which 
contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have 
deterministic properties.  The identification of path dependence therefore 
involves both tracing a given outcome back to a particular set of historical 
events, and showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences 
that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical conditions.49   
 
How great was the impact of the early years of independence and the leaders who were 
at the helm who presided over policy and their countries nascent institutions?  At the 
very least it can be argued that ‘periods of institutional genesis correspond to “critical 
junctures”’.  They are “critical” because ‘once it becomes progressively more difficult 
to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available’ and therefore 
at this time the ‘initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the 
same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse 
direction’.50  “Critical junctures” can be obvious such as independence in India’s case 
but are not always so.  As Paul Pierson argues ‘the necessary conditions for current 
outcomes occurred in the past.  The crucial object of study becomes the critical juncture 
or triggering events, which set development along a particular path, and the mechanisms 
of reproduction of the current path – which at first glance might seem commonplace or 
at least uninteresting’.51  New Zealand’s adoption of the Statute of Westminster is an 
example of a “commonplace” juncture that was not wholly appreciated then or now as 
one that ushered a series of considerable constitutional change.   
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The path dependent theory needs a starting point or ‘temporal location of initial 
conditions in a sequence’.52  In this thesis the ‘temporal’ point is the time of 
independence, when the sequence events and ‘critical juncture period’ begins.  The 
institutions implanted or transplanted are now under sovereign direction and ownership 
of the New Westminsters.  The machinery of power is available to its new masters – 
sometimes regardless of past practices.53  The potential for executive actors to utilise 
this era and uncertainty is palpable.  However, this does not mean that the actions of 
executive actors and the surrounding institutions are predictable.  There were many 
expectations and burdens on the new leaders and on the New Westminsters themselves.  
The new leaders often did not realise the strong possibility that the ‘implications of 
political decisions – especially complex policy interventions [e.g. Communalism in 
Ceylon] or major institutional reforms [e.g. Nehru’s acquiescence to federalism on 
linguistic lines] only play out in the long run.  Yet political actors, especially politicians, 
would often seem most interested in the short-term consequences of the actions [eg. 
New Zealand’s abolition of the Upper House as a party political point]; long term 
effects may be heavily discounted’ when analysing the past actions of the executive.54    
 
During a ‘critical juncture period’ like the years adjacent to independence there are 
times of ‘contingency’, which in path dependent theory ‘refers to the inability of theory 
to predict or explain, either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a 
specific outcome.  A contingent event is therefore an occurrence that was not expected 
to take place, given certain theoretical understandings of how casual processes work’.55  
Indeed as Pierson stresses ‘we should turn to history because important aspects of social 
reality can best be comprehended as temporal processes.  It is not the past per se but the 
unfolding of processes over time that is theoretically central’ because path dependency 
stresses ‘critical moments in politics, distinctive developmental sequences, and rigidities 
that make it difficult for social actors to escape from established paths’.56   
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Such periods can lead to a ‘lock-in’ of a given institutional pattern, ‘making it extremely 
difficult to abolish’ and some institutions are ‘especially capable of seizing 
opportunities provided by contingent events and thus setting into motions self-
reinforcing sequences that are path-dependent’.57  All the New Westminsters analysed 
developed their own legacies and mutations, many of which were not foreseen, and in 
certain extreme cases, were not wanted – and yet all these countries still live with the 
inheritance and consequences of that critical era.  As Pierson contends political history 
counts –  
 
To see where functional accounts might come up short one needs to look not just 
at the moment of institutional origins, or at a current institution.  Instead, one 
must consider dynamic processes that can highlight the implications of short-
time horizons, the scope of unintended consequences, the emergence of path 
dependence, and the efficacy or limitations of learning and competitive 
mechanisms.  This requires genuinely historical research.58  
 
Path Dependent Case Examples in the New Westminsters 
All three countries selected for this thesis display key aspects of path dependence that 
occurred in the ‘critical juncture period’ that followed independence.  It is not possible 
to examine every point of path dependence so one major issue or event was selected that 
continues to politically and constitutionally resonate consciously or unconsciously in 
the each country well after independence in the late 1940s.  The abolition of the 
Legislative Council, New Zealand’s upper house of Parliament, is an example of a 
‘critical’ event that was not greatly appreciated at the time, but in fact demonstrated the 
minimal forms of constitutional accountability in New Zealand and commensurate 
powers available to a New Zealand Prime Minister.  The issue of communalism is hard 
to avoid in today’s Sri Lanka and yet there were chances and opportunities to at least 
place institutional checks to mitigate minority fears when they were manageable and all 
groups participatory in the first decade following independence.  Instead politicians had 
‘short term time horizons’ and embarked on immediate political gain, which maximised 
the difficulty of reforming the situation.  India’s mighty polity is held together today by 
its unique federal structure, which resulted from various unintended forces such as 
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Partition and the Princely States, but also Nehru’s centralised leadership with the 
gradual formation of states on ethnic and linguistic lines during the early years, which 
remarkably accommodated India’s plethoric plurality. 
 
The subjects chosen above legitimise the description of the period as a ‘critical juncture 
period’.  However, it is well beyond the scope and objective of this thesis to examine all 
the consequences of this period.  Instead the main aim of the path dependent and critical 
juncture theory is to demonstrate the importance of this selected period as a continuing 
and relevant focus of analysis due to the significance of the events, choices and context 
of the post-independence decade.   
 31 
2  
Mixed Messages?: Indian Responses to its British Legacy 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru delivered to the Constituent Assembly a resonant and erudite speech 
to usher in India’s independence at midnight 14-15 August 1947: 
 
Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we 
shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially.  
At the stroke of the midnight hour, India will wake to life and freedom.  A 
moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the 
old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long 
suppressed finds utterance.  It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the 
pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and the still larger 
cause of humanity.59 
 
Nehru’s words articulated the momentous achievement of attaining independence from 
Britain after an often bloody and violent struggle of mass proportions, which only 
India’s unique cultural conditions could generate.   
 
Gandhi had mobilised the masses with unique dexterity and effectiveness and projected 
India’s pursuit for freedom to the world and thus became an international figure of 
influence and importance and for the majority of Indian people he was their supreme 
Mahatma.  Gandhi had long advocated the genius of Indian civilisation and sought to 
draw upon India’s ancient axioms and imbue them into the twentieth century as an 
answer to modernity and western civilisation.60  The ideas of this iconic sage were not 
restricted to merely to social topics such as the symbolic spinning of yarn but also to the 
field of governance.  Gandhi had a radical plan to completely disestablish the British 
centralised government and create localised “village republics” to provide “real” 
democracy.  Despite his extraordinary appeal in the country his wishes were not 
actualised.   
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Instead India retained the governmental essence and structure of the departed Imperial 
power system, albeit crucially with an Indian interpretation.  Nehru’s speech correctly 
emphasised a nationalistic and Indian cadence, but India’s political institutions would 
implant and borrow substantially from abroad – especially the Westminster system.  
Ten years after Nehru’s speech the first President of the Indian Republic, Dr Rajendra 
Prasad, told visiting Commonwealth Parliamentary delegates in New Delhi that ‘we 
have all derived from the British Parliament, and we still continue to derive inspiration 
from its proceedings, from its history [and] from its traditions’.61  However, 
constitutionally India borrowed more from Bagehot’s ‘efficient’, operational parts of 
Westminster institutions while conspicuously, as a Republic, eschewing British culture 
and the ‘dignified’ ceremonial trappings normally seen in the New Westminsters.   
 
Though it is not within the scope or intention of this chapter to detail India’s arduous 
freedom struggle, it is suffice here to point out that the long struggle for freedom that 
India’s political leaders entered in to naturally moulded their political beliefs and 
motives as well as the complexion of post-independent polity of not only India.  This 
was a world event especially for the vast territories and inhabitants that spanned most of 
globe and endured under some colonial yoke.  With the loss of India the British Empire 
was never, and could never, be the same again.  The Imperial ideal of timeless 
suzerainty over the subcontinent was destroyed, and the fall of Britain’s great empire 
now became inevitable.  As Jan Morris explains, ‘half the structure of Empire was mere 
scaffolding for the possession of India.  Many a possession now lost its point, and the 
British attitude to the world, governed so long by the great possessions of the east, 
slowly and painfully shifted.  “If India becomes free,” Gandhi told Roosevelt in 1942, 
“the rest will follow.”  So it was, and after 1947 the British Empire was in a constant 
condition of dismantlement’.62  This was a revolutionary event appreciated by India.  
India’s nationalist leaders’ long experience of incarceration, indignity and 
disappointment had fostered their ideals for governing the newly independent nation.   
 
But India’s indigenous leaders ‘believed wholeheartedly in democracy and 
parliamentarianism’.  In short ‘they wanted the British out, but were prepared to adopt 
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their institutions’ and the new constitution of India made a ‘sharp break with the British 
colonial past, though not with British political practices’ and institutions.63  Therefore, 
India did not actually launch into a completely new constitutional era at independence 
that was diametrically opposed the previous colonial condition and was not 
contemptuous of the constitutional theories of the preceding power.  Though India’s 
achievement of independence was a remarkable and groundbreaking event in 
constitutional terms it can be argued that India’s independence was another significant 
step in the evolution of constitutional representative government dating from such 
developments as the Indian Councils Act of 1861 and the Montagu-Chelmsford 
Reforms of 1919 and especially the Government of India Act of 1935.   
 
Aspects of this crucial Imperial inheritance or implantation will be discussed further 
below.  India had demanded and Britain had answered in staggered sequence with 
constitutional reforms that acculturated the concepts of parliamentary democracy, 
federalism (which was more a feature of New Westminsters; certainly not British 
Westminster) and devolved limited executive power to elected representatives.64  The 
size and importance of India, not only for the British Empire, meant that its path to 
independence would have massive and conspicuous influence.  Despite the imperial 
legacy, India’s virulent freedom struggle, bloody partition and Gandhian embrace meant 
that its independence could only be unique in the annals of the Empire – the constitution 
would be no exception.  India’s masses and nationalist leaders had insisted with 
dramatic effect since the 1930s the right to govern themselves – they eventually chose 
to govern the Westminster way.  India brought to the world the catharsis of 
decolonisation – and also with its nationalist credentials established Westminster 
parliamentary government as a model for new states in the Commonwealth since India 
was the first to gain independence from Britain in Asia or Africa and had no non-settler 
examples to emulate.  As was written in the Manchester Guardian ten years after India 
gained independence with the unravelling of Empire in the fore: ‘All that is happening 
in Asia throws a spotlight on the Parliament in Delhi as the one institution of the kind 
which is working in an exemplary way … Pericles said that Athens was the school of 
Hellas.  Mr Nehru without boasting may say that Delhi is the school of Asia’.65  
                                                 
63
 Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, pp 2-11 
64
 For a well documented study of India’s constitutional evolution during the colonial era see B. Shiva 
Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution – A Study, Bombay: The Indian Institute of Public 
Administration, 1968  
65
 Cited in W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament In India, London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1957, p 327 
 34 
 
India indeed had lessons for Asia, the world and the Westminster system.  But in 1947 
the great gamble of Attlee, Nehru and Mountbatten was far from promising an assured 
outcome.  One scholar contends that by at least four political theories on democracy 
concerning political culture, societal cleavages, socio-economic factors and class 
upheaval, India in 1947 had the conditions necessary to bring about the ‘demise of 
democratic institutions’ and yet stable Westminster institutions such as parliament, an 
independent judiciary, a robust electoral system and a federal structure today ‘remain 
intact – bruised and modified – but intact’.66  Despite such an appreciation of English 
political influence India’s incomparable social situation and the nationalist rhetoric from 
its leaders meant that India had to succeed and keep unified and provide for the 
aspirations of its people.  India was the audacious attempt of an adapted Westminster.  
Sir Anthony Eden commented after a visit to independent India during the Nehru era the 
excitement and gamble of adapting Westminster culture and institutions to Indian soil: 
 
Of all the experiments in government which have been attempted since the 
beginning of time, I believe that this Indian venture into parliamentary 
government is the most exciting.  A vast sub-continent is attempting to apply to 
its tens and hundreds of millions a system of free democracy which has been 
slowly evolved over the centuries in this small island.  It is a brave thing to try to 
do and is so far remarkably successful.  The Indian venture is not a pale 
imitation of our practice at home, but a magnified and multiplied reproduction 
on a scale we have never dreamt of.67    
 
Constitutionally, unlike Ceylon, they demanded and received the authority to convene a 
Constituent Assembly to achieve and formulate their own nationalist and political goals.  
Democracy needed to deliver and to assure the masses.  Constitutionally the Congress 
elite had ‘to counter persistent British claims of being paternalist, impartial benefactors 
who were better guardians of “real” Indian masses, and in particular of minorities, 
against a “microscopic minority” of privileged Hindu politicians’.68   The Gandhian 
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movements had engaged the masses to a degree that heralded the inevitability of Britain 
surrendering its greatest possession, but it also raised the expectations from its people of 
its leaders.  India now was an independent Dominion, though a Dominion like no other, 
not even like the South Asian cases of Pakistan or Ceylon.  Dominionhood was seen as 
an ‘imperialist device’ and a mere transitory step before throwing off even the nominal 
symbolic shackles of having the British Monarch continue as Head of State.   
 
Even before the formal handover in August the Constituent Assembly had resolved on 
22 January 1947 the objective to become an ‘independent sovereign republic’ and avoid 
any temptation to continue symbolically any ‘dignified’ ceremonial vestments of British 
constitutional culture, preferring instead to adapt the ‘efficient’ operational elements of 
Westminster culture.69   After centuries of foreign despotic rule and in the midst of 
anarchic disorder and terror following Partition it was not unnatural for India’s leaders 
to concern themselves with the issue of executive power over a teeming multitude and 
mixture of masses.  In Philadelphia, 160 years earlier, a similar Constitutional 
Convention gathered and considered such crucial matters.  A description of the 
American atmosphere in 1787 reflected the dilemmas in Delhi in 1947: 
 
Over the whole convention still hung the dread of future tyranny as well as of 
immediate anarchy.  The delegates were sure that unless anarchy could be 
avoided, an early despot was certain to appear, as in the classic pattern of 
republican failure.  They believed that anarchy could be at least postponed by 
the establishment of an adequate central government, but they could only guess 
what powers would make it neither too weak for security nor too strong for 
liberty.70  
 
India’s leaders and Constituent Assembly had an unprecedented and unenviable task in 
shaping their country through its Constitution and attempting to create an Executive that 
reflected the multiple needs of their new nation and wondered whether Nehru would be 
their Westminster Washington. 
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Constituent Assembly – Continuity or Change? 
The context with which the Constituent Assembly operated and its findings allow a 
useful analysis of India’s cultural conditions.  Nehru had always strived for a nation 
composed of different religions and ethnicities or as he phrased it a ‘composite 
nationality’.71  India would emerge in 1950 after the Constituent Assembly had ended 
its deliberation with a composite constitution – albeit with a Westminster institutional 
bias.  Indeed, India’s premier constitutional scholar, Sir Benegal N. Rau, who became 
the Constitutional Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, stated that ‘anyone whose 
official life has been spent mostly in the administration of justice and the study of 
constitutions is bound to have certain prepossessions, for in these spheres one sees 
English institutions and ideas at their best and is most conscious of what India owes to 
them’ and pronounced a perception common to those elite Indians in politics and 
government that ‘the English parliamentary system of government has become almost 
second nature to us’.72  Despite this, the emergence of a Westminster parliamentary 
democracy was not a foregone conclusion.  When the 296 members of the Constituent 
Assembly sat for the first time in New Delhi on 9 December 1946 they appreciated, as 
one of their members recorded, that it was ‘an event of unique significance, namely the 
commencement of the great task of framing free India’s constitution without outside 
interference or pressure’.73   
 
And yet the Assembly itself was in many ways ordained by the British – albeit as a 
response to prominent Congressmen like Nehru.  Important Britons like Sir Stafford 
Cripps had endorsed the idea in 1942 to the War Cabinet in London and when Labour 
was resoundingly elected in 1945 he helped establish a Cabinet Mission to India, which 
had the prime objective of assisting ‘the Viceroy in setting up in India the machinery by 
which Indians can devise their own constitution’ through a Constituent Assembly, 
which was convened by the Viceroy himself.74  The validity, powers, premise and 
fidelity of the body was questioned from the outset, especially with the boycott enacted 
by Jinnah’s Muslim League, which questioned (along with Winston Churchill), whether 
such a body was valid and technically the British had the power to dissolve it or even 
reject its conclusions.75   
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However, the creation of Pakistan and the Indian Independence Act passed by the 
British Parliament Westminster, which came into effect on 15 August 1947 settled the 
legality and authenticity of the situation, which the Constituent Assembly had assumed 
anyhow and this elite legislative body resolutely continued to deliberate and form a 
constitution for the new state of India (until the new Constitution was complete the 
Indian Independence Act resolved that the Government of India Act 1935 would remain 
the basis of government and thus India already had a parliamentary system before the 
Constituent Assembly determined so).76  In fact the Assembly members had to deal with 
donning two hats to signify their creative function.  As Austin states as ‘the Constituent 
Assembly, it drafted the Constitution during the afternoon, and in the morning, as the 
Constituent Assembly (Legislative), it was the Provisional, or Dominion, Parliament 
legislating for the new nation’.77   
 
The composition of the Constituent Assembly was determined through indirect 
elections in the provincial legislatures in July 1946.  The Congress and its supporters 
dominated the new Assembly, which was further augmented with Partition as the 
party’s presence was aggrandised from an already colossal sixty-nine per cent to an 
overwhelming eighty-two per cent majority once most of the Muslim League departed 
with the creation of Pakistan; it was no exaggeration to claim that ‘the Assembly was 
the Congress and the Congress was India’.78  According to one constitutional expert, the 
reality was that ‘Nehru, [Vallabhbhai/Sardar] Patel, Prasad, and [Abul Kalam/Maulana] 
Azad, in fact, constituted an oligarchy within the Assembly.  Their honour was 
unquestioned, their wisdom hardly less so…The oligarchy’s influence was nearly 
irresistible, yet the Assembly decided issues democratically after genuine debate, for it 
was made up of strong-minded men and the leaders themselves were particularly 
responsive’.79  Another South Asian specialist, Ayesha Jalal contends that the Dominion 
Government of Nehru and his Congress vanguard’s ‘inheritance of the centralised state 
apparatus of the Raj facilitated its task of shaping independent India’s constitution.  
Pandering to the values of consensus and accommodation as well as speech-making by 
a large number of members notwithstanding, the substance of the constitution was 
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decided upon by a small coterie of about a dozen individuals led by Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Sardar Patel’.80 
 
The Constituent Assembly, though highly representative on political, religious, ethnic 
and regional grounds was hardly a mirror of the masses in terms of political education, 
institutional cognisance and experience.   The favoured representatives that populated 
the vital and voluble Constituent Assembly had through their social stature, education 
and vocations notable, if not extensive, experience of British parliamentary theory and 
practice, which lent undoubted cultural flavour to the proceedings and gave as Jalal 
argues ‘short shrift to Gandhian ideas of self-governing village republics, other than a 
purely cosmetic gesture to panchayati raj [form of localised government]  in favour of 
strong central government of the parliamentary form.’81  The elite body rejected historic 
indigenous innovation in favour of a modified Westminster institutional structure.  The 
scholarly and influential K. M. Munshi, one of the seven members of the powerful 
Drafting Committee, eloquently expressed this preference for Westminster style 
institutions when he reminded the Assembly of India’s familiarity with British 
parliamentary government: 
 
We must not forget a very important fact that during the last one hundred years 
Indian public life has largely drawn upon the traditions of the British 
constitutional law.  Most of us, and during the last several generations before us, 
public men in India, have looked up to the British model as the best. For the last 
thirty or forty years, some kind of responsibility has been introduced in the 
governance of this country.  Our constitutional traditions have become 
parliamentary and we have now all our provinces functioning more or less on 
the British model.  As a matter of fact, today, the Dominion Government of 
India is functioning as a full-fledged parliamentary government.82 
 
Nonetheless, Rau, as Constitutional Adviser, was entrusted to present information on 
the constitution and constitutional practices from a wider pool than just Britain.  Rau 
visited the United States, Canada, Ireland as well as Britain in late 1947 to question 
Presidents, Prime Ministers, legislators, law experts and civil servants on their particular 
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constitutions and to assess their virtues and applicability for independent India.83 Along 
with those countries’ experiences Rau affixed the practices prevalent in polities such as 
France, Switzerland, Australia, South Africa and even the complex, but interesting 
multinational workings of Austria-Hungary under the Hapsburg Empire as examples to 
fill his thorough memoranda to Assembly members on their potential appropriateness 
for India.   
 
Indian forms of governance were largely ignored in this academic exercise or utilised to 
prove the worthiness and autochthony of parliamentary and especially cabinet 
government for India.  Indian historical culture, rather than British historical culture, 
was creatively used to justify Westminster institutions for India.  The sophisticated 
savant Rau was able to produce for local consumption evidence derived from the sacred 
texts of ancient India to lubricate his advocacy for the adoption and selective 
implantation of British practices.  From the Sukraniti, which dates from the twelfth 
century, Rau recites an ancient axiom that ‘without the ministers, matters of State 
should never be considered by the King, even if he is well versed in all the sciences and 
in statecraft.  A wise King must always follow the opinion of the members of the 
Council of Ministers’ and from the even older and more venerable Mahabharata from 
the second century A.D. he finds a verse which states that ‘the King must invest only 
that minister with jurisdiction who has lawfully earned the confidence of the Paura-
Janapada (roughly the ‘Assembly of the Realm’) and even finds supporting practices of 
the detailed official procedures on ‘motions’, ‘voting’, and ‘resolutions’ for instance 
from the medieval era of Emperor Asoka, which he claims anticipated ‘to an astonishing 
extent the rules of business prevalent in  the legislative assemblies today’.84 
 
During the debates over the office of president there were many debates and proposals 
on how to condition and constrain the head of state to avoid any possibility of a figure 
of Curzonian pretensions dominating the political landscape.  For instance the 
Constitutional Adviser recommended the establishment of a Council of State to assist 
the President in the use of his discretionary powers that were left to convention.  Rau 
makes a note of the need for a ‘Council of State’ which ‘is a kind of Privy Council to 
aid and advise the President on matters of national importance in decision of which any 
party bias has to be avoided.  The Council of State consists of the Prime Minister, the 
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Deputy Prime Minster, the Chief Justice of the Union, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, the Chairman of the Senate, the Advocate-General, every ex-Prime 
Minister, every ex-Chief Justice and a limited number of other persons appointed by the 
President in his absolute discretion.  It is a non-party Council of elder statesmen 
including judges.  Such a Council may be found useful in India in such matters as the 
protection of minorities, the supervision, discretion and control of elections, and the 
appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts’.85   
 
These discretionary powers of the Head of State articulated by Rau were unsurprisingly 
similar to those left to the discretion of the Governor-General under the 1935 Act.  The 
discretionary powers of the President with a formal Council of State to advise him in the 
employment of such powers struck at the heart of cabinet government in its attempt to 
create further horizontal accountability within the executive with its supervisory powers 
and competition with the Council of Ministers.   However, the Nehru-chaired Union 
Constitution Committee (with the support of the Patel chaired Province Constitution 
Committee) rejected such suggestions of the President having such constitutional 
discretions as redundant.  They also abandoned the need for a Council of State, 
believing that all the powers vested in the President should be exercised on the advice of 
his Ministers and not any other Council86 that could ‘curb the power of Cabinet’ as the 
sole artery of formal advice to the Head of State under whose seal executive power was 
imposed and thus maintained the ‘efficient’ Westminster institutional practice of having 
the Cabinet as the only important body of responsible advisers.87   
 
The Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly originally advocated an 
“Instrument of Instructions” for the President, similar to the instructions for the 
Governor-General under the pervasive 1935 Act.  The proposed Republican Instructions 
went further and delineated on the procedures to appointing the Executive.  The 
President was to be ‘guided by the Instructions’ and in constituting his Council of 
Ministers should 
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appoint a person who has been found by him most likely to command a stable 
majority in Parliament as the Prime Minister, and then to appoint on the advice 
of the Prime Minister those persons (including so far as practicable members of 
important minority communities) who will best be in a position to command the 
confidence of Parliament. 
 
The President would be supported by an ‘Advisory Board’ whose membership was to 
be of not less than fifteen members (including the Leader of the Opposition of any 
House) to advise on such issues as senior judicial, diplomatic and public service 
appointments.88  Assembly members also wanted the Constitution and further 
“Instructions” to make clear that the President would always act on the advice on his 
ministers.   
 
Both sets of “Instructions”, though not justiciable or enforceable and beyond the 
jurisdiction of the courts were later in 1949 thought to be unnecessary.  Ambedkar, and 
the Drafting Committee he chaired, reversed their original position in favour of such 
written conventions to stand closer to the Nehru-Patel view89, the Westminster view, 
that Cabinet was ‘collectively responsible to the House of People, answerable to the 
House in regard to the budget, all legislation and indeed every matter connected with 
the administration of the country.  There was therefore no necessity for setting out in 
detail in an article of the Constitution what the functions and incidence of responsible 
government would be’.  And when asked in the Assembly what would happen if the 
instructions were withdrawn and the President acted against the advice of his ministers, 
Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar conclusively answered of behalf of the Drafting 
Committee that ‘if a President stood in the way of the Council of Ministers discharging 
that responsibility, he would be guilty of violation of the Constitution and would … be 
liable for impeachment’.  This conventional Westminster view of executive 
accountability and responsibility was acknowledged and the proposals of having formal 
                                                 
88
 “Instructions to the President” in B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution – Select 
Documents,  
Vol. IV, pp 84-86 
89
 ‘…one is forced to deduce that Ambedkar and the members of the Drafting Committee, perhaps under 
pressure from Nehru or Patel [who were against the need for written instructions]’.  In Austin, The Indian 
Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, pp 138-139 
 42 
executive advice from statutory bodies in addition to the Council of Ministers and the 
idea of Instructions for President were quickly spurned.90   
  
As one would expect with such advocacy of analogous forms of Westminster, Rau was 
swift to negate the idea of village democracy or panchayat plan as it would be 
‘impracticable to endow them…with specific administrative or legislative or judicial 
function’ for the new Indian democracy and its constitution.91  Despite being the 
protagonist of swaraj that hastened the end of British rule, Gandhi’s alternative ideas 
for democracy did not manifest itself after independence. Regardless of the popular 
consciousness generated by India’s “tryst with destiny” the ‘Gandhian dreams of self-
sustained village reconstruction’ were not realised.92  In fact the Constituent Assembly 
endorsed their Constitutional Adviser’s aversion to Gandhi’s radical ideas and ‘at no 
time, significantly, did the Constituent Assembly ever consider instituting Gandhian-
styled non-party government, with a weak centre and power diffused among self-
governing villages’.93 Instead the strong traditions in British India of a powerful centre 
and Westminster parliamentary government were adopted with careful consideration by 
an Indian manned Constituent Assembly.   
 
As will be discussed in a following chapter, the Constituent Assembly’s deliberation 
was naturally conditioned by the violence and fear surrounding Partition as well as the 
assassination of their moral leader Gandhi and numerous other threats to the stability of 
the young nation.94  India’s decisions and circumstances were unprecedented.  Similar 
constitutional conventions had occurred in Canada and Australia, which created with 
localised participation and vagaries a constitutional structure based consciously on the 
Westminster parliamentary system, but, like India, with crucial federal adaptations.  
India’s elite had observed such self-determination in the transplanted settler colonies 
with interest.  However, India had crucial differences.  In addition to the vital social and 
demographic contrasts and the absolute antitheses that India’s freedom struggle and its 
liberating catharsis provided, against the loyalist constitutional gradualism of settler 
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colonies, India also made outward and symbolic constitutional changes to reject the 
‘dignified’ aspects of British Westminster culture.   
 
Unlike Canada and Australia, which never had any intention during that period of 
constitutional self-formulation of becoming republics or breaking from Westminster, 
India had decreed as such with immediacy.  At the very first session of the Constituent 
Assembly Nehru moved an Objectives Resolution.  Nehru’s resolution declared many 
key principles including un-Westminster constitutional platitudes that ‘secured to all the 
people of India justice, social, economic and political; equality of status, of opportunity, 
and before the law; freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, 
association and action, subject to law and public morality’ and ‘adequate safeguards’ for 
minorities and ‘depressed and backward’ classes and tribal groups’.  As well as other 
such pronouncements the resolution’s momentous and constitutionally definitive point 
was: 
 
This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim 
India an Independent Sovereign Republic…wherein all power and authority of 
Sovereign Independent India its constituent parts and organs of government, are 
derived from the people… 95 
 
Nehru’s resolution was not only adopted unanimously but its sentiments later became 
the basis for the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of India.  Therefore in 
contrast to London, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington or closer to home in Colombo, Delhi 
noticeably rejected the ‘dignified’ monarchical feature of British culture.  India for its 
adapted Westminster wanted the Bagehotian ‘efficient’ operating culture of the British 
constitution and not the ‘dignified’ and ceremonial aspects that were attached to the 
monarchy and colonial rule.96  Denying the British King’s sovereignty over India, the 
Constituent Assembly instead looked to Paris for constitutional comparison where 
Nehru’s mind could not help but go ‘back to that mighty revolution which took place 
over 150 years ago and to that Constituent Assembly’ that had met in comparable 
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radical circumstances’.97  India wished to become a republic within the Commonwealth, 
long before the idea became de rigueur and in the process shocked stalwart Dominions 
like Australia, New Zealand and even Ceylon and Pakistan.98  India wanted the 
legitimacy and clarity of sovereignty that Republican status sanctioned and which its 
people demanded – but at the same time India had a craving and institutional inclination 
for the parliamentary executive of the British type, which existed with individual 
mutations from Cape Town to Canberra.  British practice had the crown intrinsically 
linked to the system and this was replicated in theory across the Dominions.  Now with 
‘brazen assertion’ India wanted the system but not the crown.99   
 
Rau once again deftly delved into India’s ancient past to find an example of ancient 
Gupta Empire under Chandra Gupta I being in alliance with the republic of the Liccavis 
as ‘an instance of a republic in partnership with an empire’ to advocate both the 
retention of Commonwealth membership for India and the beneficial amenability of the 
Westminster institutional practices.100  India utilised its brief interregnum of 
Dominionhood in 1947-50 to formulate what was at the time a constitutional 
dichotomy.  India was ‘rejecting the imperial vice-regal style of government associated 
with the Raj’ but ‘nevertheless sought inspiration in domestic British political 
practice’.101  India may have been taking unprecedented action in having a President as 
head of state, rather than a Governor-General but even though it was symbolically 
different, the Indian leaders in reality wanted their head of state to act like a traditional 
New Westminster Governor-General with a mere change in ‘dignified’ nomenclature.  
As in other areas of constitutional government, the Indian elite accepted the 
Westminster ‘efficient’ institutions and operating culture – perhaps even unconsciously.  
Whatever else it was convincing enough for Eden to state on watching the Lok Sabha 
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that ‘he felt more at home during his witnessing of it [the Indian Parliament] than he has 
while attending that of the Australian parliament’.102  
 
Most members of the Constituent Assembly recognised, as Rau argued, that the type 
and form of the executive was ‘the most important question in the framing of the 
constitution’.103  India’s acculturated Constituent Assembly had resolved with relative 
alacrity the preference of having an adapted Westminster parliamentary system – with 
the substance and not the symbols; the Bagehotian ‘efficient’ without the ‘dignified’.  
They desperately desired to move out from the shadow of imperialism and consequently 
and naturally wanted to symbolically be a republic to project their independence and 
self-determination.  Unlike the United Kingdom and the Dominions across the seas 
India’s constitution makers were keen to articulate and stipulate the powers and roles of 
the executive to allay the fears of any new Indian viceroyalty or indigenous imperialism 
arising from the ashes of empire.  And yet the constitution makers also realised that 
considerable power would be required for the executive to maintain and govern the 
chaotic continent of India and its multifarious manifestations within its borders.  Strong 
and accountable government was desired.  Brass argues that this created ‘a basic tension 
in the post-Independence political order, arising in part out of features of the Indian 
Constitution itself, between authoritarian and democratic tendencies’.104   
 
India’s constitutional framers wanted accountable government but with executive 
flexibility, that is intrinsic within the Westminster system and its executive culture.   
The debates surrounding the offices and powers of the President, Prime Minister and the 
Council of Ministers specifically will be discussed and analysed in greater detail in the 
following chapter, but it is worth examining here some of the issues that were voiced 
concerning different forms of the executive that led to the acceptance of parliamentary 
executive heavily drawn from Westminster practice.  Rau’s questionnaire, which was 
later sent to the powerful Union Constitution Committee (chaired by Nehru) in early 
1947 had included not only Westminster executive practice, but also furnished the 
reader with contrasting executive examples from countries such as Switzerland and the 
United States of America.  The questionnaire105 included queries and questions 
concerning the nature of the executive, the selection and responsibilities of the 
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executive and also the relationship between the head of state and ministers, which he 
later expanded to compose a ‘Memorandum on the Union Constitution’106 and ‘Draft 
Clauses on the Union Constitution’.107  Rau, as has been seen above, argued in favour of 
cabinet government with a constitutional head of state.  In June 1947 the Union 
Constitution Committee in a joint meeting with the Provincial Constitution Committee 
(with Patel as chairman) endorsed the decision that India should have ‘the parliamentary 
system of constitution, the British type of constitution, with which we are familiar’ 
showing cultural inclination for Westminster institutions.108  A tiny portion of Assembly 
members did bring up alternative suggestions to have a fixed-term proportionally 
elected executive removable only by impeachment as in Switzerland and an even 
smaller number favoured the American presidential system, but these proposals never 
carried.109   
 
India’s elite representatives at this constitutional high table wanted a form of 
parliamentary cabinet government that was responsible to the legislature, drawn from 
the legislature and held a majority and thus the confidence of the legislature and as such 
conditioned by Westminster cultural attitudes and values.  In a process of conscious 
adoption and implantation, India’s constitution incorporated some two hundred articles 
of the Government of India Act of 1935.110  The Constituent Assembly chose 
Westminster style accountability over the stability theorised from the American and 
Swiss models.  This was not as a great a decision as it implies since the Congress 
Party’s indisputable dominance gave the Congress Governments easy numerical 
stability in Parliament that lasted well into the 1970s.  In answering criticisms in his 
capacity as chairman of the Union Constitution Committee on alternative forms of 
executive Nehru stated it raised ‘a very fundamental issue of what form you are going to 
give to your Constitution, the ministerial parliamentary type or the American type.  So 
far we have been proceeding with the building up of the Constitution in the ministerial 
sense and … we cannot go back upon it’.111   
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The crucial step now was to shape and address the powers of the executive actors under 
a parliamentary cabinet system that had only been functioning for a short while during 
the dying days of British rule.  The renowned constitutional expert Dr B. R. Ambedkar, 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee, expressed what he envisaged would be the 
general character of the Executive when he presented the Draft Constitution to the 
Assembly on 4 November 1948: 
 
In the Draft Constitution there is placed at the head of the Indian Union a 
functionary who is called the President of the Union.  The title reminds one of 
the President of the United States.  But beyond identity of names there is nothing 
in common between the form of government prevalent in America and the form 
of government proposed under the Draft Constitution.  The American form of 
government is called the Presidential system of government.  What the Draft 
Constitution proposes is the Parliamentary system.  The two are fundamentally 
different.  Under the Presidential system of America, the President is the chief 
head of the executive…Under the Draft Constitution the President occupies the 
same position as the King under the English Constitution.  He is the head of the 
State but not of the executive.  He represents the nation but does not rule the 
nation.  He is the symbol of the nation.  His place in the administration is that of 
a ceremonial device on a seal by which the nation’s decisions are made 
known…112 
 
This forecast would be tested very soon on the powers and responsibilities of the 
President and his ministers, particularly the Prime Minister, which would shape the 
polity and test the mettle of this ‘infant democracy’.113  Ambedkar argued that the Draft 
Constitution ‘in recommending the Parliamentary system of executive has preferred 
more responsibility to more stability’.114  India demanded a strong executive, one that 
was horizontally accountable daily in Parliament, but would this be a silent clause more 
honoured in theory rather than in practice as in the British fashion?  India would be 
shaped by the personalities and actions of its early senior constitutional actors that held 
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and wrought the great offices of state defining and sometimes blurring the perimeters of 
executive horizontal accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 49 
3 
The Indian Version of First Among Equals 
Just ten years before India attained independence Nehru anonymously penned an article 
under the pseudonym Chanakya: a fascinating self portrayal in a national publication 
entitled Rashtrapati.115  “Chanakya” waxed eloquently on the power of Nehru as he was 
rapidly gaining both popularity across the country and ascendancy in the Congress and 
as such ‘he is bound up with the present in India, and probably the future, and he has the 
power in him to do great good or great injury’.116  The danger was that Nehru could take 
advantage of his powers ‘sweeping aside the paraphernalia of a slow-moving 
democracy’ since he ‘has all the makings of a dictator in him – vast popularity, a strong 
will directed a well-defined purpose, energy, pride, organisational capacity, ability, 
hardness, and, with all his love of the crowd, an intolerance of others and a certain 
contempt for the weak and the inefficient … In normal times he would be just an 
efficient and successful executive, but in this revolutionary epoch, Caesarism is always 
at the door, and is it not possible that Jawaharlal might fancy himself as a Caesar.  
Therein lies danger for Jawaharlal and for India’.117     
 
This prediction of centralised abusive executive power by a Prime Minister should have 
been more considered in the debates over India’s constitution and political system, 
which instead focussed on the executive as a whole.  India was acculturated to the 
Westminster operating cult of flexibility in order to deal with its pressing institutional 
and social context, but this may have blinded the political elite from giving more 
attention and detail as to the relations and horizontal accountability of the President, 
Prime Minister and Cabinet.  This crucial intra-executive relationship was generally left 
to ambiguity, which the flexibility entailed, and as shall be seen in these early years 
often led to confusion and conflict.  India’s Constituent Assembly had resolved to have 
a parliamentary system largely fashioned by Westminster practices.  The constitution 
established a parliament comprising two houses.  The upper house, the Rajya Sabha (the 
Council of States) has a maximum membership of 250 of which, except for a maximum 
of twelve nominated members by the President, are elected by the various State 
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Legislative Assemblies.  This indirectly elected house is subordinate in power and 
substance to the Lok Sabha (House of the People).  The lower house has a membership 
of not more than 520 and is elected, in the traditional manner of Westminster systems, 
from country-wide electorates, won by a simple plurality by an adult franchise of all 
citizens over twenty-one.  Parliament was to have immense powers and act as the great 
forum of the nation.  Its first Speaker, G.V. Mavalanka, wanted Parliament to be an 
independent institution not to be seen as an extension of government or of party.  Nehru 
held this view as well and made considerable efforts to support the fiction of having an 
alternative ministry within the Opposition in parliament.  None of this, however, could 
hide the ultimate power of the central executive of which prime ministerial dominance 
was one of the central motifs.118   
 
For all the theoretical and philosophical polemics that pealed through the Assembly 
chambers the debates were just political and constitutional conjecture, and, though well 
argued, needed to be tried to be truly tested.  The high and erudite exhortations could 
only mean so much.  The executive was naturally the greatest concern as Nehru’s 
Chanakya prophesised.  The great offices of Governor-General (President from 1950) 
and Prime Minister naturally aroused the greatest anxiety and interest.  The very unique 
circumstances of India in every sense meant that there was an almost incomparable 
feeling of uncertainty.  The first years would be fundamental for the Indian Union.  The 
roles, powers and interactions of the Head of State and Head of Government would 
shape the Indian polity – though with the bloody and chaotic birth of India in 1947 
abetted by an anarchic colossal plurality of every variety nothing could be said with 
certainty.  The executive, naturally, had the power to mould India’s political future.   
 
The almost disregarded period of India’s Dominionhood 1947-1950 was, even without 
the mighty deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, a period of fundamental impact 
for India’s political institutions and the executive ones in particular.  This phase of well 
under three years demanded from the executive an appraisal of responsibilities, which 
was now totally theirs to define since India was now free of direct English tutelage; no 
more demonstrative cries to London’s India Office or the Viceroy’s Palace, instead the 
electorate of India became with suddenness the mercurial arbiter of political fortune.  
However, the largest electorate in the world still could not decide everything.  In fact 
not until 1952, when the first general election after independence was held, would 
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India’s mega masses be able to exercise their unique powers.  Until then the great 
mechanics and machinations of state lay in the hands of an infinitesimal proportion of 
the population. With such disproportional powers this cluster of notables needed to 
establish their executive power from the ashes of Empire.   
 
The demarcations of executive power were keenly fought out in the first ten, and 
especially five, years of independence.  This executive struggle and search for 
constitutional pre-eminence was unquestionably the preserve of the executive players 
conducted without the involvement or open knowledge of the electorate.  In India one of 
the lesser known, but nonetheless essential executive battles, which would establish the 
prominence of prime ministerial power, was the very real constitutional mêlée between 
Nehru as Prime Minister and the Heads of State, especially with the first president Dr 
Rajendra Prasad.  Though it is tempting in hindsight to see independent India as 
Nehru’s India, his dominance was not always in evidence, especially during the early 
when various political figures existed to exercise degrees of horizontal accountability.  
However, in the end he would solely emerge as the premier and unchallengeable agent 
of executive power.    
 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Even with its directives, principles and extravagant length, the Indian Republic’s 
Constitution still relied on conventions and personalities and thus operated very much in 
the Westminster way.  As Alexandrowicz explains, despite the Constitution’s written 
nature and record length ‘Parliamentary and Cabinet government in India in its entirety 
is inconceivable without conventional rules outside the body of the Constitution’.119  
The most imperative convention in the British system was the Bagehotian buckle of 
Cabinet fastening the executive with the legislature.  In India, unlike Britain and the 
settler Dominions, the Prime Minister and Cabinet were overtly mentioned in 
constitutional articles.  However, in spite of this there was still a very real constitutional 
ambiguity over the powers of Cabinet.  India as the first colony in Asia or Africa to gain 
independence had set a precedent without having a precedent.120  The man more than 
any other who characterised and moulded independent India was Jawaharlal Nehru, as 
Prime Minister for the first seventeen years of independence.  The executive could not 
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help but bear his indelible imprimatur.  Nehru was the central, though not until late 
1950 the undisputed, leader of India.  The formal powers endowed on the Prime 
Minister by the Constitution as distinct from Cabinet do not accurately describe his 
powers and influence.  As Brown expresses: 
 
Nehru, by virtue of his energy and ability, and his huge public repute within and 
beyond the Congress Party, used the potential available to him, dominating the 
Cabinet and the Lok Sabha.  Of course he had no predecessors on whom to 
model himself, and no precedents from within the Indian political system and to 
an extent made his own job.  Given his commitment to economic reform and his 
role in the new Planning Commission, his control over foreign affairs by virtue 
of being his own Minister of External Relations, and his sense of vocation to 
make profound changes in India, he worked like a human dynamo, and little in 
government escaped his notice and concern.121 
 
Therefore any examination of the executive during the first ten years after independence 
is inescapably entwined with the unique Nehru, who becomes naturally the focus on any 
analysis thereof. 
 
The Last Englishman to Rule India – Prime Ministerial Powers under Nehru           
Nehru in the autumn of his long years as Prime Minister, remarked to the economist 
Professor J. K. Galbraith, then serving as President Kennedy’s Ambassador to India, 
that he was the last Englishman to rule over India.122  His latest biographer in a recent 
article depicts the Trinity College, Cambridge man as ‘one of the last great Victorians in 
the British Empire’ and like Gandhi, an “Outsider” operating inside Indian politics.123  
The reasoning behind Nehru’s own admission and numerous historians latching on to 
his affinity with England was only partly social and seldom cosmetic deep.  In fact, 
unlike Jinnah in his Savile Row suits, Nehru was quick to dispense with any outward 
sartorial sycophancy of British culture, preferring Indian dress very early in his political 
career.  Intellectually, however, he gleefully drew upon Western thought and reminisced 
in his autobiography how he was pleasantly imbued at Cambridge with the cerebral cult 
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of Cyrenaicism.124  Nehru’s intimacy with figures such Albert Einstein, Bertrand 
Russell, Harold Laski and after independence even Sir Winston Churchill125 enhanced 
his reputation for being thoroughly at home with Western thought and practices.   
 
Occidental theories on government – especially parliamentary government – would be 
no exception, not unnaturally for a man who as a young Indian schoolboy in London, 
could, unlike any of his privileged English classmates, name the entire 1905 Cabinet of 
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, which incidentally contained Churchill, an old 
Harrovian like Nehru, who had become Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office.126  In 
fact like many members of the British Establishment with whom he fraternised in their 
drawing rooms Nehru felt ‘uneasy’ about America and in turn Americans believed ‘he 
was disposed to be somewhat contemptuous of them and the relative newness of their 
history and culture’127, which may explain why he gained little inspiration from that 
most famous Republic when creating the institutions for his own one.  Though Nehru’s 
rhetoric under British rule was stridently anti-colonial he was later as Prime Minister, 
imbued, instilled and impressed with Westminster institutions, albeit with necessary 
changes.  As W. H. Morris-Jones explains: 
 
Since history abounds in paradox, it should not be unexpected that the post-
imperial state is at once a reflection of and a reaction against the preceding 
imperial state.  The founding fathers, who then normally became the first rulers, 
of new successor states sought both to bring down and re-build, both to replace 
and to reproduce.  The past regime was anathema but at the same time a model 
worthy in some respects of preservation or imitation.  The rulers certainly were 
to be changed but the rules of ruling might be carried over.128   
 
Nehru, whether by boycott or being a guest at His Majesty’s Prisons, had avoided major 
experience, like most of the Congress hierarchy, of administrative governance.  Even 
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the interim government, which was formed in the run up to 1947, was constitutionally 
merely a refashioned Viceroy’s Executive Council.  Nehru, who by fortunate virtue of 
being Congress President at the time on the insistence of Gandhi129, was invited by the 
Viceroy, Lord Wavell, to become Vice-President of the Council which meant he was a 
de facto acculturated Prime Minister, though the Council was still formally presided 
over by the Viceroy.  Though responsible to the Viceroy and serving as individual 
members on the Council the members decided to act on issues collectively like a 
Cabinet.  Wavell himself agreed regardless of the legal position or previous practice to 
‘let the Interim Government function in accordance with the conventions of cabinet 
government as practiced at Westminster and in independent Dominions like Australia 
and Canada’130 though he did not agree to the Congress ‘unilateral’ demand that he put 
the Viceroy’s extraordinary powers in abeyance and become, in his words, a ‘complete 
cipher’.131  With the departure of Jinnah’s appointees on the Council and later Partition 
itself, Nehru left with greater freedom to act and function effectively as a Westminster 
Head of Government.132  The de facto Prime Minister was unanimously elected leader 
of the Congress Parliamentary Party and became de jure Prime Minister in August 
1947.   
 
As in the British system, which India draws natural comparison with; the Prime 
Minister has peculiar and exceptional powers.  By virtue of commanding the confidence 
of the lower house, the Prime Minister has immense powers and as in Britain this is 
especially so over patronage from the Cabinet down.  The Indian Prime Minister’s 
powers are arguably greater, since along with traditional judicial and public service 
appointments the Prime Minister is able, with the Head of State’s sanction, to appoint 
the Governors of States and due to Congress hegemony the Prime Minister also has 
direct influence on the selection of the Chief Ministers of States and their Cabinets.133  
One of the variances between British Westminster and the Indian Westminster is that 
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the Indian Prime Minister draws power directly by office from the Constitution rather 
than wholly by convention.  Article 75 of the Indian Constitution concerns the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet.  The Prime Minister’s appointment and in turn the selection of 
Ministers are stipulated with the clause that ‘The Prime Minister shall be appointed by 
the President and other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of 
the Prime Minister’.  Thus though Ministers are effectively appointed by the Prime 
Minister, the prevalent Westminster prerogative of the Head of State’s formal discretion 
over the Prime Minister’s own appointment was retained.  Though this is qualified with 
the emphasis on the prevailing Westminster convention of appointing a Prime Minister 
who commands the confidence of the elected lower House, which is fairly clearly 
enunciated in the same Article, stating that the ‘The Council of Ministers shall be 
collectively responsible to the House of People’, which also lends stress on the 
Westminster principle of cabinet collective responsibility.134     
 
However, there was unquestionably ample vagueness and imprecision to show the 
necessity of following the conventions of cabinet government as practiced at 
Westminster and the Dominions or New Westminsters when India’s Constitution was 
intentionally silent on such matters of executive governance and power.  As was 
discussed above in the first chapter, the framers of the Indian Constitution in the 
Constituent Assembly reserved elements of abstraction in part to keep flexibility to deal 
with the unknown that India fresh from Partition and its plethoric internal problems 
faced and also because this was the way it worked in Westminster and where the leaders 
of the Assembly ‘looked for inspiration and guidance’.135  The first ten years would 
demonstrate the difficulties and dilemma of that intentional graft of Westminster 
executive operating culture.   
 
However, with Nehru at the helm, India had in its first Prime Minister a man who 
strived to create and recreate his Westminster legacy.  Nehru’s attitude to his Imperial 
inheritance was crucial since his ‘was not a blind imitation, but a nuanced response’ 
accommodating institutions with ‘Weberian rationality’.136  As Brown argues, Nehru 
was ‘fashioned out of the urgent realities of India’s political experience’ and may have 
said like another iconic figure in history, Martin Luther, “Here I stand. I can do no 
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other”.137  Morris-Jones describes him as a ‘preacher-teacher’ who by virtue of his 
unprecedented position socially and politically was able to articulate and formulate 
India’s institutions of state.138   
 
Nehru, by the 1952 general election, held undisputed domination of Congress across the 
country and within Parliament.  As Weiner comments, Nehru’s strength was that ‘he 
was a far more popular leader in the country’ than anyone including Patel despite the 
Deputy Prime Minister’s control over the party organisation.139  Nehru had to wait for 
Patel’s death in 1950 to complete his command of Congress and intensify the lack of 
horizontal accountability on his power.  Patel had assisted, with support from other 
Hindu traditionalists, with the Congress High Command, the narrow election of his ally 
Purushottam Das Tandon to the Congress Presidency.  Tandon shared Patel’s Hindu 
chauvinistic views and Nehru very quickly voiced his displeasure of his assumption of 
the presidency of someone he considered anti-secularist.140  Nehru was openly 
dismayed with Tandon, but with Patel alive he could not easily displace him.  The victor 
of 1951 election to the Congress Presidency would have a powerful position as the 
country would be entering its first General Election within months of the Party vote.  
With Patel dead Nehru allowed himself to be nominated for the post to assert his 
political position and by not giving way and threatening his own resignation impelled 
the incumbent to resign as President.  The All India Congress Committee resoundingly 
elected the Prime Minister to replace Tandon.141   
 
Nehru did what he claimed he never wanted to do – hold the Prime Ministership and 
Congress Presidency, which he held for three years before handing over to a malleable 
successor who in turn was succeeded by Indira Gandhi, his daughter and heir to the 
Nehru legacy.  Nehru thus ensured to Congress that his imprimatur was acknowledged, 
his indispensability assured and the indisputability of his ascendance over the Party 
organisation at the forthcoming elections.142  Nehru never had serious problems with the 
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Party ever again in the ten years covered and even after 1957 the most serious example 
of discord was much later when he faced his first ever no-confidence motion after the 
debacle over the China war in August 1963.  The motion was easily defeated and 
anyway as all acknowledged there was never any serious threat to Nehru as Prime 
Minister or Congress supremo at any time after Patel’s death since as Brown argues ‘it 
was unthinkable that any other Congressmen would challenge him’.  The three General 
Elections during his seventeen years office – 1952, 1957 and 1962 – were effectively 
mandates in Nehru, who for example was so highly involved that he was personally 
involved in the selection and vetting of over 4000 candidates for the 1952 General 
Election.  Congress under his leadership secured massive majorities in these elections in 
the Lok Sabha of over seventy per cent and close to fifty per cent of the popular vote.143  
His power over the Party and popularity in the country was a reminder to any rivals 
within the executive of his secure position.  
 
It was only natural that Nehru and his relationships with institutions and political actors 
would dominate and permeate the first ten years of Independence.  The Cabinet would 
not and could not escape his omnipresence.  A study of Cabinet is primarily a study of 
Nehru who had social, party and institutional power.  Cabinet commanded no effective 
form of horizontal accountability post 1950.  Nehru, as well as being Prime Minister, 
also took on the portfolio of External Affairs and made it his exclusive domain.  
Interestingly, given India’s economic problems and Nehru personal interest in 
socialism, the Prime Minister also chaired the powerful Planning Commission set up in 
May 1950 as a body to advise on economic planning and development and had a small 
membership of initially six from private, political and public fields.  Such was the 
influence of this body which Nehru dominated that it excited the executive institutional 
jealousy of other organs of government.  In fact it caused the resignation of the first 
Finance Minister of India, the non-Congressman, John Mathai, one of the few 
independent voices in the Cabinet, just a month after its establishment due to the fact 
that he was merely an ordinary member despite being responsible for financial matters 
to the Union Cabinet and saw the contentious Commission as a threat to the Cabinet’s 
position and his within it.  Mathai and others worried that it was becoming a ‘Super-
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Cabinet’ in regard to economic affairs.144  In his June 1950 resignation statement 
Mathai complained that ‘Cabinet responsibility has definitely weakened since the 
establishment of the Planning Commission’ with the Members being treated like 
Cabinet Ministers and by ‘having the Prime Minister presiding over such a body, it is 
difficult to resist the Planning Commission developing into a parallel authority of equal 
standing with the Cabinet’, which he firmly and naturally opposed.145   
 
Nehru survived Mathai’s departure with ease and was thus able to effectively dominate 
economic and foreign affairs during his long years as Prime Minister with 
unprecedented institutional power for a New Westminster leader and showed that not 
even a finance minister had real horizontal accountability on him.  Cabinet looked to 
Nehru for absolute leadership and direction.  In fact the Prime Minister, being a pedant 
for democratic procedure, found this hard to balance against his impatient vision and 
understanding of what he wanted for India.  With Cabinet, the apex of executive 
authority in Westminster systems, Nehru had to 
 
curb his inclination to take all decisions and make out that they were the results 
of innumerable discussions.  He had to disown the eagerness of his colleagues to 
leave all making of policy to him and insist on the Cabinet seeming to function 
as a reality … But he himself found it no easy matter to function as merely the 
leader of a team … the Cabinet was gradually reduced to a collection of tame 
subordinates … In the framework of democratic institutions that Nehru strove to 
install in India, the weakest link was Cabinet government.  He insisted that all 
important matters should at some stage be brought up in Cabinet; there were 
numerous Cabinet committees and consultation was frequent; the deficiency was 
in spirit and animation.  But at least the procedures of collective policymaking 
were established, for life to be later instilled in them.  This was the work of 
Nehru, achieved against the drive of his own personality and despite the eager 
subservience of mouldering mediocrities who claimed to be his colleagues.146    
 
In the Indian context, using O’Donnell’s model, Cabinet had delegated its powers to the 
Indian Prime Minister.  Power was the Prime Minister’s culturally and institutionally.  
The death of Gandhi and Patel in the early years ended the triumvirate and India became 
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from the end of 1950 a ‘one man show’ with Nehru as its ‘thaumaturgic personality’.147 
It was not by accident that no one succeeded Patel as Deputy Prime Minister even when 
Nehru’s health was severely debilitated by health scares in his last years.148  Gandhi, 
though never a real threat to Nehru’s constitutional position as Prime Minister, was a 
powerful cultural factor and had the greater popular and messianic leadership that was 
still obvious in the remaining years of his remarkable life, which ended tragically in 
January 1948.  Before he died he transferred his following to Nehru as the Mahatma’s 
chosen heir.  For political and executive leadership, however, Nehru, to complete his 
suzerainty over the State, Cabinet and Party, had to wait for the temporal departure of 
his Deputy Prime Minister: the solid Sardar Patel.  
 
Cabinet Duumvirate by Concession 1947-1950 – Nehru and Patel 
On 15 August 1947, Nehru handed to Mountbatten, now Governor-General of the 
Dominion of India, an envelope containing the list of the first Cabinet, which was to be 
sworn in a few hours later.  It was empty!149  The excitement of the day created such an 
oversight but only two names counted – Nehru and Patel.  These were two very 
different men.  As Michael Brecher argues: ‘no two leaders of any Asian nationalist 
movement in the twentieth century differed more than the duumvirs of the new India – 
in background, education, temperament, ideology, sources of power, qualities and 
defects of leadership’.150  Nehru the refined patrician and worldly aesthete with lofty 
attachment to secularism and socialism and an aversion to petty politics was countered 
by a man in Patel with his dour manner and lowly background, but who was thoroughly 
at home in the orthodox Hindu milieu, with whom he saw represented India and the 
Congress Party, with which he was so involved at every organisational level.  Nehru 
and Patel tolerated each other politically since they knew India, Congress and Gandhi 
expected them to function well for the good of the country.  With the first Ministry of 
independence Nehru wanted to create, and was under pressure to form, a Cabinet that 
widely represented India.  The Cabinet contained prominent non-Congressmen like 
Ambedkar, S. Chetty, Mathai and S. P. Mookherjee as well as influential Congressmen 
like Prasad and Azad and yet ‘it was not the presence of these men which really limited 
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Nehru’s supremacy in the Cabinet.  It was Sardar Patel’s powerful personality that 
prevented Nehru from having that amount of freedom in the Cabinet which he came to 
have after 1950 [with Patel’s death]’.151   
 
Patel became Deputy Prime Minister naturally and chose the powerful Home Ministry 
and States Ministry to abet his clout.  They functioned in many ways as co-equals and 
many in Congress had not forgotten that if it had not been for Gandhi’s intervention in 
the 1946 Congress Presidential elections in Nehru’s favour, Patel could have become 
Prime Minister with his Party support, which Richard Sisson believes reflected ‘the 
ambiguity that existed with respect to the locus of ultimate political authority’.152  As 
everyone knew, ‘the duumvirate was the decisive fact of Indian politics from Partition 
until the end of 1950.  Though the procedures of cabinet government were followed, 
Nehru and Patel dominated the proceedings.  It was the same in Parliament, the 
Congress and the country at large’.153  They maintained amorphous spheres of influence 
with Patel’s fiefdom containing party, organisational and administrative matters while 
Nehru was largely ascendant in foreign affairs and constitutional matters.  However, all 
issues mentioned above still required at the very least the acquiescence of the other and 
acted as a democratic check on the other and a formidable form of horizontal 
accountability on the Prime Minister.  Areas of domestic and economic policy were 
constantly a ground of contention.  As Gopal argues: 
 
Their temperamental and ideological differences had been kept under control in 
earlier years by the transcendent leadership of Gandhi and by the common 
commitment to the cause of India’s freedom.  But now, with independence and 
the steady weakening of Gandhi’s authority, it was difficult for these pre-
eminent men, one with a massive hold on popular affection and the other with a 
sure grip on the Party, to work together in the unaccustomed field of 
administration.154  
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This naturally created tension, rivalry and bickering, which would lead to threat of 
political war between the two Consuls within months of taking power from the British 
over who was Caesar or at least labelled as such. 
 
The Nehru Version of First Among Equals 
The heated correspondence between Patel and Nehru between December 1947 and 
February 1948 demonstrated the larger complications over conventions and lines of 
power between a Prime Minister and Ministers.  Patel had long considered since joining 
the Cabinet that Nehru did not recognise his importance and was becoming increasingly 
dictatorial while Nehru believed that as Prime Minister he had seniority over his Deputy 
and had to be respected as such.  Matters came to a critical juncture in late December 
1947.  Nehru and Patel exchanged heated correspondence, which was in the Governor-
General’s knowledge and was usually and conspicuously enclosed to Gandhi as well, 
who was the recipient of their incessant arguments concerning constitutional 
frustrations.  Nehru on 23 December 1947, replying to Patel’s criticisms of prime 
ministerial interference into Patel’s domain, reacted by writing that ‘If I am to continue 
as Prime Minister I cannot have my freedom restricted and I must have a certain liberty 
of direction’ and with preciousness added that if this were not possible ‘it is better for 
me to retire’.155  Patel was not to be subdued by such prime ministerial emotions and 
explained: 
 
You seem to feel that my action in explaining what I consider to be probable 
consequences of any action taken by you regarding matters which fall within my 
ministerial responsibility or in venturing to question the propriety or soundness 
of any action which ignores or affects such responsibility results in restraining or 
constraining your liberty or your freedom which you consider necessary for the 
due discharge of your responsibility.  I am afraid I cannot subscribe to this view. 
 
Patel ended by dismissing Nehru’s resignation threat since ‘the question of your 
abdicating your functions does not arise at all’ and provocatively promised in the task of 
maintaining their relationship to ‘strain every nerve to help you in doing so but you will 
not, I am sure, want me to continue long as an ineffective colleague’.  Patel continued to 
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question the Prime Minister’s definition of the conventions surrounding their offices:  
‘[u]nder the restrictions [of] ministerial responsibility which you consider legitimate 
and which … would include even another minister’s encroachment [Patel was alluding 
to his belief that Nehru used more malleable Ministers to do his interfering], under your 
direction, on such responsibility, it would be impossible to continue’.156     
 
Nehru re-entered the constitutional clash over their definition of convention by writing 
to Patel on 11 January suggesting they ‘meet at Gandhiji’s place for a further talk on 
this subject’.157  He enclosed a fantastic letter he had written to Gandhi on 6 January 
that addressed his view on an Indian Prime Minister’s role.  Nehru, after dealing with 
‘relatively minor matter[s]’, stated that any differences between Patel and himself 
‘essentially relates to the functions of the Prime Minister.  It is something much more 
than a personal issue and it should be considered, therefore as a question of principle, 
whoever the Prime Minister might be’.  Nehru outlined his brand of New Westminster 
Prime Ministership and argued that ‘in the type of democratic set-up we have adopted, 
the Prime Minister is supposed to play an outstanding role.  This, I think, is important 
(again apart from personal factors) as otherwise there will be no cohesion in the Cabinet 
and the Government and disruptive tendencies will be at work’.  Nehru described the 
role of a minister, including his own experience as Foreign Minister, but asserted that as 
Prime Minister ‘I have a special function to perform which covers all the Ministries and 
departments and indeed every aspect of governmental authority’.  Nehru reminded Patel 
of this especial Westminster characteristic, stating that a Prime Minister has unique role 
and power and that ‘this function cannot be easily defined and the proper discharge of it 
depends a great deal on the spirit of cooperation animating all the parties concerned’.158  
 
 After describing a relatively minor topic of contention over Nehru’s involvement in an 
area Patel deemed his159, Nehru dramatically enquired of the Deputy Prime Minister the 
wider question of power in their executive eyrie: 
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Is the Prime Minister entitled to take such a step and who is to be the judge of 
this?  If the Prime Minister cannot even take this step and is not himself to be the 
judge of what is proper and what is not in such matters, then he cannot function 
properly or fulfil his functions.  Indeed he does not function at all as the Prime 
Minister should.  The mere fact that he is Prime Minister presumably leads to 
the conclusion that he is capable judging aright and carrying out the policy laid 
down.  If he is not capable of this, then he should cease to be Prime Minister.  
Indeed, this means abdication of his functions and cannot in future function with 
any effectiveness … If this view is correct, then the Prime Minister should have 
full freedom to act when and how he chooses…160  
 
Such a view could lead to the natural assumption that Nehru viewed himself as a 
delegated democratic Prime Minister with the power “to act when and how he chooses”. 
Nehru then speculated that Patel may have difficulty with his interpretation and the 
‘best way out these difficulties would be for some rearrangement in the Cabinet to be 
made which would cast the responsibility on one person more than anyone else’ and 
offered to go himself but added that ‘there can be little doubt that if either of us goes out 
at the present juncture it would create a sensation both nationally and internationally, 
and the consequences may not be good’.  However, he believed that ‘the Prime 
Minister’s function as defined above must be appreciated’.  After outlining his belief 
that Patel himself had made decisions in the States Ministry ‘without any reference to 
Cabinet’ he saw that if Patel did not agree with his Prime Ministerial definition then the 
only alternative would be for ‘either me or Sardar Patel to leave the Cabinet’.161  
 
Patel replied the next day and copied Nehru’s tactic of addressing his concerns to 
Gandhi directly.  After stating that he and Nehru had through their joint efforts 
weathered ‘one of the most critical phases in the history of any country or any 
government’ admitted that ‘we cannot carry this any further’ and acknowledged the 
‘strength of feeling and conviction behind the Prime Minister’s stand as regards to his 
own position’.  However Patel, without surprise, was quick to critique the Head of 
Government’s own job description though he tried to understand it ‘on the twin basis of 
democracy and Cabinet responsibility’ was still ‘unable to agree with his conception of 
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the Prime Minister’s duties and functions.’  Patel vividly continued the dangers of 
Nehru translation of prime ministerial power: 
 
That conception, if accepted would raise the Prime Minister to the position of a 
virtual dictator, for he claims “full freedom to act when and how he chooses.”  
This in my opinion is wholly opposed to democratic and cabinet system of 
government.  The Prime Minister’s position, according to my conception, is 
certainly pre-eminent; he is first among equals.  But he has no overriding powers 
over his colleagues; if he had any, a Cabinet and Cabinet responsibility would be 
superfluous.162  
 
Patel’s conception of Cabinet relied on the argument that ministers had the ‘entire 
responsibility’ of implementing Cabinet decisions in their own ministry and that ‘the 
Prime Minister should influence by way of consultation’ not by edict.  Patel believed his 
version ‘in accord with the UK practice’ showing the Indian leaders’ attachment to 
Westminster operational culture.163  The seventy-two year old Congress veteran 
concluded by telling his fifty-eight year old boss that ‘if anybody has to go it should be 
myself’.164   Nehru characteristically replied promptly the next day and contended that it 
was hardly ‘worthwhile my attempting to write another note on the subject.  Having 
indicated our respective viewpoints to some extent, the only remains is for us to discuss 
this matter with Bapu [Gandhi]’.  But Nehru could not resist in thrusting a parry at Patel 
at the end of his letter: ‘There is no question, of course, of the Prime Minister or anyone 
else being a dictator’ adding ‘so far as I know, the position in practice in the United 
Kingdom is in consonance with what I suggested’.  He concluded that they must settle 
these issues and ‘as soon as the opportunity arises we shall be able to fix up a meeting 
with Bapu’.165  In addition it is interesting to note that Nehru felt it necessary to 
admonish Ambedkar, as Law Minister, for speaking publicly against the Congress 
leadership and their slowness to accommodate the Scheduled Castes.  Just four months 
after his correspondence with Patel, Nehru told Ambedkar, a non-Congress Cabinet 
Minister, that ‘if ministers feel and speak in this way there is no Cabinet responsibility 
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left.  The Prime Minister might as well shut up shop’ reminding him that he was part of 
‘essentially a Congress Cabinet’.166  Though this was a strictly correct Westminster 
interpretation it did little to accommodate the irregular circumstances of the early years 
of cabinet government.    
 
The meeting with the Mahatma to debate the powers of a Prime Minister of India was 
never to happen since just over two weeks later on 30 January Gandhi, their political 
guru and arbiter, was felled by a Hindu assassin and waves of grief across the country 
drowned the immediate divergences within the Duumvirate.  In the four years that Patel 
was a Cabinet Minister he threatened to resign at least four times, interestingly he 
tendered his resignations to Gandhi thrice and once to the then Party President, 
Rajendra Prasad, but pointedly never to Nehru who as Prime Minister was ultimately 
responsible for the selection and removal of all ministers, which was one the few 
powers of the Prime Minister constitutionally codified in the 1950 text.167  After 
Gandhi’s death Patel continued to hinder Nehru’s sovereignty of political manoeuvre, 
but Patel’s own death would follow Gandhi’s in under two years.  A seasoned Indian 
Mandarin, V. P. Menon, who played a vital administrative role in the transfer of power 
and became a leading civil servant working with both Nehru and Patel, assessed the 
importance of their relationship as a form of horizontal accountability at a critical early 
stage: 
 
It was, indeed India’s good fortune that during the initial stage of freedom, the 
destinies of the country were jointly entrusted to Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel.  
One provided ideology while the other furnished realism … both Nehru and 
Patel were compelled to turn their searchlight inwards and think of the possible 
reaction to the other.  This avoided the two extremes; and in politics, the middle 
course is always the safest.  It is, in my opinion, the greatest tragedy that this 
combination should have lasted only for forty months after the transfer of 
power.168 
  
                                                 
166
 Nehru to Ambedkar, 27 April and 30 April 1948, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, 
Volume 6, pp 373-374 and 377-379 
167
 Gangal, Prime Minister and the Cabinet in India, pp 48-49.  Article 75 (1) of the 1950 Constitution: 
‘The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and other Ministers shall be appointed by the 
President on the advice of the Prime Minister.’   
168
 Cited in Venkateswaran, Cabinet Government in India, p 58 
 66 
Head of State 
In 1952 Sir Ivor Jennings’ peered into the executive sanctum of the Indian Union and 
noted with satisfaction the seeming faithfulness to Westminster norms in India despite 
becoming a republic.  He wryly commented that ‘true the Queen and the Crown have 
disappeared, but the Governor-General and the Governors reappear as President, 
Governor and Rajpramuks.  Quite often the draftsmen had difficulty in finding a phrase 
to replace “Crown”’.169  Though there is considerable validity to Jennings’ impression 
that India retained much of the prevailing Westminster ways without the symbolic and 
dignified parts, there are still essential difficulties in such an assessment.  The 
fundamental difficulty was more than a mere substitution of names at the executive 
table.  The dissolution of the centralised executive, almost despotic, power vested in the 
Viceroyalty was to be distributed between the new executive actors.  Executive power, 
regardless of constitutional stipulations and statutes, was fluid in this era.  Even the 
stopgap period of Dominionhood demonstrated executive ambiguity. 
 
The Indian Governors-General – Influence without Power 
The last Viceroy of India, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, at the invitation of the Indian 
Cabinet, became Governor-General of India (but not Pakistan as well, which he also 
wanted170), outwardly swapping the supreme plenipotentiary powers of a Royal Consul 
to become a constitutional cipher.  However, this was not quite the case.  As his official 
biographer records: 
 
The role of Governor-General in an independent Dominion can be as important 
or as trivial as that of the constitutional monarch on whose behalf he acts as 
Head of State.  Depending upon circumstances, the Governor-General may be 
little more than a decorative figurehead, opening bazaars and greeting foreign 
potentates, or a major force in the shaping of foreign and domestic policy.  
When he recently stepped down from a position close to that of absolute ruler, 
and his Government is preoccupied with enjoying and demonstrating its 
independence, it might be anticipated that he would rarely be allowed to trespass 
beyond formal.  Mountbatten believed that his relationship with Nehru was 
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sufficiently close to ensure that behind the scenes his advice would be asked for 
and sometimes heeded, but he neither expected nor desired that he would 
perform a more overt role.  He looked forward to with some satisfaction to nine 
months or so of relative tranquillity in which he would play the elder statesman 
and leave the hurly-burly of executive government to those who had fought so 
long for it.  Within two weeks it became apparent that no such dispensation was 
to be allowed him.171 
 
The extraordinary case of India warranted extraordinary uses of vice-regal power.  
Mountbatten was heavily involved in the negotiations with the Princely states and 
advocating their admission into the Indian Union.  Mountbatten’s defence background 
lent itself to his active role in the security of India such as with the refugee crisis that 
accompanied Partition and of course the enduring issue of Kashmir.  The violence that 
greeted Partition meant that the Governor-General for instance took the initiative of 
establishing an “Emergency Committee” with himself as chairman with the backing of 
Nehru and Patel.  This cabinet-authorised committee had ‘powers [that] could hardly 
have been more sweeping and Mountbatten … exercised them with a will’.172  Another 
extraordinary role for the new Governor-General was to chair the crucial Joint Defence 
Council to settle security issues between India and Pakistan.  As the last Viceroy and 
first Governor-General he was also instrumental in the allocation of assets of Imperial 
India between the two Dominions, which Nehru and Jinnah (now Governor-General of 
Pakistan) believed could be done by no other.173  Not unnaturally therefore given the 
situation and his experience Mountbatten ‘had clear ideas about his role as Governor-
General, though circumstances frequently forced him – not always unwillingly – to step 
beyond its limitations’.174   
 
The greatest potential for the Governor-General to use his powers of making the Prime 
Minister horizontally accountable to him was through his very intimate and close 
relationship with Nehru.  Though Mountbatten’s powers were not as substantial as he 
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later liked to claim, he did to a large degree hold the confidence of Nehru and Patel.175  
Mountbatten appreciated the massive burden on the shoulders of Nehru.  Mountbatten 
from his time as Viceroy was able to utilise his deep knowledge of personnel to 
influentially advise Nehru and Patel on key military, diplomatic, political (at central and 
state level) and civil service appointments.176  One of his greatest services to India and 
its constitutional health was to emphasise to the premier rivals in Cabinet, Nehru and 
Patel, the value of working together.  As was discussed above, the political relationship 
between these two dominated India till Patel’s death in 1950 and the friction between 
the two men hampered policy and decisions of the central government.   
 
The tension generated at this time was considerable and Mountbatten was able with the 
authority that no one but Gandhi could have over Nehru to reprimand his Prime 
Minister on his dealings with the Cabinet, thus offering a personalised and unique form 
of horizontal accountability.  After discussing Nehru’s inability to delegate or include 
ministers in key decisions such as Kashmir, the cousin of the last Emperor of India, told 
his Prime Minister that ‘apart from differences of outlook, ideology and temperament, 
needless friction was being caused between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime 
Minister on account of faulty procedure’.  Mountbatten continued about the Indian 
Prime Minister’s political high-handedness with boldness that few others would have 
attempted telling Nehru ‘what I had told Gandhi and Sardar Patel about his own 
shortcomings.  I told him that in my opinion not even Mr Churchill, in the heyday of his 
power, would have dared to ride roughshod over his ministers in the way that Pandit 
Nehru appeared to be doing…’ showing the lack of horizontal accountability in this 
crucial era.177 The Governor-General was also able to convince the Cabinet to make the 
unostentatious and security blasé Nehru move in to the grand former residence of the 
Commander-in-Chief, which became known as Teen Murti House178, though he did 
insist on taking out the air-conditioning of his bedroom during a power shortage (and 
even checked the power bills of the President and some of his ministers!).179  
 
                                                 
175
 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru – A Biography, Volume Two: 1947-1956, p 18 
176
 For example the Governor-General’s influence was crucial in regards to central-state relations.  See 
Nehru to Mountbatten, 6 November 1947, in Jawaharlal. Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Second Series, Volume 4, pp 472-473   
177
 Lord Mountbatten’s Record of Interview with Nehru, 5 February 1948, Selected Works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Second Series, Volume 5, pp 480-481    
178
 After his death in 1964 it became the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 
179
 Brown, Nehru – A Political Life, p 191 
 69 
Mountbatten’s unprecedented role and influence was one fraught with crisis and 
constitutional ambiguity.  Nehru was able to recognise Mountbatten’s role and even 
asked him to stay on further than was agreed.180  Mountbatten ‘was not indispensable; 
but he felt himself to be almost so; it was in part this apprehension of impending 
indispensability that led him to insist on quick retirement’.181  Nehru was generous 
enough to vocalise his earnest gratitude in a formal Cabinet Resolution in 
Mountbatten’s honour for an Englishman who operated in a time of ‘upheavals and 
great difficulties.  When all those who were concerned with the governance of India, 
Lord Mountbatten, functioning completely as a constitutional Governor-General, 
nevertheless helped greatly in lightening the burden and in helping to face and solve the 
problems that confronted the country.  His period of office has been memorable in the 
history of India and he will be remembered by the people of India with affection as one 
who cooperated in the great task of building a free India and who applied his great 
abilities and energy to this end’.182   
 
Mountbatten, in keeping entirely with his disposition, could not resist producing a 
memorandum or ‘political testament’ that he sent to Nehru, Patel and his successor C. 
Rajagopalachari183 on the eve of his departure, that contained a ‘ragbag of 
recommendations, almost all of them sensible and practical, which in their mixture of 
the significant and the trivial, the strategic and the tactical, are wholly characteristic of 
the author’.  As well as idiosyncratic Vice-Regal edicts on press conferences, holidays 
for ministers and air conditioning in Government buildings, Mountbatten also advised 
on cabinet reconstruction, economic policy, appointments of Ambassadors and 
Governors, that Nehru should drop the Foreign Affairs portfolio and was concerned that 
the new constitution ‘might be taken as a sacred text and thus be unnecessarily rigid’.184  
Whatever else, Mountbatten’s stature and experience made the post of Governor-
General a significant one and not cipher as in many New Westminsters like New 
Zealand.   
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There was therefore great interest as to who would and should succeed him.  
Mountbatten’s first choice was Patel185, which indicates that he wanted a powerful 
personality at Sir Edwin Lutyen’s Imperial Palace perhaps to counter Nehru’s political 
pre-eminence.  Interestingly, the man who did get the post and who also had 
Mountbatten’s approval, the prominent Tamil Brahmin and leading Congressman, C. 
Rajagopalachari hesitated before accepting the post.  Rajagopalachari believed that 
Nehru himself should become the King’s Representative with Patel as Prime Minister.  
To this private and extraordinary idea Rajagopalachari, presently Governor of West 
Bengal, argued, perhaps with an eye to Jinnah’s Pakistan, that Nehru would have 
‘greater power’ and the arrangement would be ‘of great international value [and] more 
efficient for internal affairs’.  Nehru’s brittle reply concluded against the suggestion by 
saying that ‘internationally it is bad, internally it is also unsuitable.  Temperamentally it 
could not also do’.186  Rajagopalachari finally acquiesced and became the first and last 
Indian to be Governor-General, an unlikely successor to a long line of proconsuls 
beginning with Warren Hastings.  Outwardly the change from a great-grandson of the 
first Empress of India to a Hindu teetotaller187 was striking.   
 
However, despite the outward contrast of these two Governors-General, both men were 
seasoned in the ways of India and more notable still was the confidence they inspired 
from the key political actors in the Indian executive.  Rajagopalachari, a South Indian-
trained lawyer and religious scholar with a savouring for Shakespeare was close to 
Gandhi not only in looks, but also in independence of spirit and action.  Nehru had 
certainly not recommended the appointment of a politically impotent or inept person to 
occupy the Governor-General’s throne.  Nehru believed Rajagopalachari’s ‘presence in 
Delhi will be a great help to all of us, and especially to me’188 and more than just a 
figurehead he was implored with the plea: ‘We want you here to help us in many ways.  
The burden on some of us is more than we can carry’.189   
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The new Governor-General like his predecessor was compelled to wade into areas, 
which in normal circumstances would be considered as impolitic of a traditional 
Westminster Head of State.  But these were not normal circumstances.  The threatened 
secession of the large princely state of Hyderabad from the Indian Union was an 
example that spurred the Governor-General to actions normally unbecoming of his post, 
though this was working in concert with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, not as form of 
horizontal accountability on those executive actors.  As Head of State, Rajagopalachari 
directly appealed and firmly stressed upon the eccentric and wizened Muslim Nizam of 
this predominantly Hindu state to join the Union or face the consequences.  His Exalted 
Highness was told that if he were not in agreement he would ‘force the Government of 
India to act on their own initiative’.  The Nizam’s intransigence led to the Governor-
General summoning the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to his residence 
where it was decided to occupy Hyderabad.  As Rajmohan Gandhi attests: ‘C. 
R[ajagopachari]’s active role over Hyderabad, exceeding the scope of a constitutional 
head of state, was a product of the peculiar Nehru-Patel-C.R. relationship.  C. R.’s 
views, and not just his signature, mattered to Jawaharlal and Vallabhbhai’.   
 
Indeed on other occasions the veteran politician would philosophically ponder his role 
and that ‘to sign assent when he did not agree was not pleasing for C. R.; at times he 
would enter next to his signature the words “Against conscience”.  Neither was it 
pleasing for Nehru or Patel when the Governor-General requested the Cabinet to 
reconsider a decision’, which showed symbolic elements of horizontal accountability on 
the elected executive.  These occasions were extremely rare, but demonstrated the 
regard he was held by his senior ministers.190   
 
With the Republic about to be inaugurated in early 1950, Nehru thought that 
Rajagopalachari should be transformed into the first President of India and that he could 
therefore continue a close and fruitful relationship with the Head of State.  However the 
relative freedom of selection that is afforded to Prime Ministers to directly influence the 
appointment of a Governor-General was not be repeated with the Republic.  Nehru 
would face not only one his earliest major rebuffs over an executive appointment, but 
was to be given a Head of State that for the first time truly tested the constitutional 
relationship between a Head of State and Prime Minister.  The tensions, interpretations 
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and emanations of this relationship would shape India’s executive practices 
permanently. 
 
The Prasad Presidency and the Search for Executive Norms 
Article 53 of the Republic of India’s interminable constitution proclaims that ‘Executive 
power of the Union shall be vested in the President either directly or through officers 
subordinate to him’; while Article 74 complements or mitigates this, depending on your 
executive vista, by explaining that ‘there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime 
Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions’, and 
thus hoped to give emphasis to the ‘efficient’ Westminster institutional convention of 
the Cabinet’s binding advice on the Head of State without overtly making that legally 
difficult point clear.191  There were also certain controversial emergency powers, 
especially Article 356 which gave powers of the Centre over the States.  These will be 
discussed in the path dependent chapter section below.  Despite the Constitution’s 
prolix nature and unprecedented length the section dealing with the executive of the 
Indian Union was relatively brief and lacking in definitive clarity while the rest of the 
executive section, as an eminent Indian Jurist argues ‘was wisely left to convention and 
Constitutional practice’.192  India sought to stipulate in writing Westminster institutional 
executive conventions, but consciously did not add explicit and absolute detail that 
could confine or clarify the powers and boundaries of the executive and its political 
components.  As Manor has commented, the framers of the Constitution enjoyed the 
acculturated familiarity and prestige of the British model and believed that their leaders 
would be like themselves – ‘restrained and responsible’.  As such they did not want 
their government to ‘be hemmed in by detailed rules which might restrict its flexibility 
… the result is a Constitution which says very little about relations between Presidents 
and ministers’.193  India may have been a Republic, but it was still an institutional 
Westminster mutatis mutandis. 
   
Therefore the executive terms accepted above although radiating from the 
Commonwealth’s first republic were almost as imprecise, misleading and vague as any 
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Westminster constitution on such critical subjects.  Dr Rajendra Prasad, the first 
President, was one of the first prominent politicians to question and then attempt to 
interpret such constitutional ambiguities.  However, with an inevitability that can only 
result from such constitutional vagaries and flexibility, his decryption of executive 
power came into conflict with other members of the executive, namely the Prime 
Minister himself.  Prasad had already noted his constitutional concerns when he wrote 
to Rau, in early 1948 as President of the Constituent Assembly, perhaps already with an 
eye for the powers of the Presidency of the Union that ‘in a country like England where 
the system has been in vogue for a long time, traditions and conventions have made the 
working of the Constitution efficient but we need some safeguard in India where we do 
not have the same traditions to begin with’.194  Unlike the regal processes that allow a 
Dominion Prime Minister to advise the appointment anyone they wish to the Governor-
Generalship, which elegantly evades the nuisance of elections or meddlesome 
involvement of Parliament, the President of India would require the sanction of electoral 
legitimacy albeit through indirect means.  The Head of the Indian Union would be 
elected in the first instance by the Constituent Assembly and subsequently by an 
electoral college composed of the elected members of both Houses of Parliament and 
the elected members of the State Legislative Assemblies.195   
 
As was mentioned above Nehru wanted Rajagopalachari to become President, who 
possibly would have been less trouble for the Prime Minister.  Prasad’s conservative 
Hinduism and penchant for making public such views irritated the stridently secular 
Nehru.196  However, Congress and the Constituent Assembly were behind Prasad.  
Nehru, as generally had been the way, believed he would get his way in bypassing his 
fellow Congressman Prasad for the Presidency.  Nehru pressurised Prasad that he 
  
. . . felt that the safest and best course from a number of points of view was to 
allow arrangements to continue, mutatis mutandis. That is that Rajaji might 
continue as President. That would involve the least change and the state machine 
would continue functioning as before . . . to push out Rajaji at this stage would 
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be almost a condemnation of his work. That would be most unfortunate . . . 
Vallabhbhai and I felt that Rajaji’s name should be put forward for unanimous 
election. I hope you agree. In this matter it would of course be fitting for you to 
suggest this, rather than any other person.197   
 
Just over a week later Prasad showed his mettle by informing Patel that ‘. . . there was 
much feeling among party members [in support of Prasad] and that 85 percent of 
members favoured my being President . . .’.198   Nehru had been prepared to go against 
such wishes of the Assembly199, but had overestimated his capacity to succeed.  
Rajagopalachari’s biographer believes the reason for the Tamil Governor-General’s 
disfavour with Congress and the Assembly was due to not only Rajagopalachari’s 
inability in Hindi and distance from Delhi, but especially due to his antipathy towards 
the “Quit India” Movement in 1942.  Rajagopalachari had instead called for 
accommodation with the British and the Muslim League during World War II when 
most of the Congress favoured active dissent.  His unpopular stance on “Quit India” 
tarnished his nationalist credentials in many nationalists’ eyes against the popularised 
jail terms under the British of Prasad and many others in the Assembly.200  In contrast to 
the practices in the New Westminsters, Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly, 
was unanimously elected by his peers to become the first President of the Republic 
much to Nehru’s chagrin.   
 
With Prasad’s election as Head of State the Prime Minister’s wishes were institutionally 
checked by political accountability that was absent under the Dominion interregnum.  
Prasad would have agreed with the analysis of scholars fifty years after he assumed the 
highest office who argued that Indian Presidency ‘has a residual identity separate from 
cabinet, parliament, and the civilian and military services – an identity beyond 
government and opposition, beyond partisanship, as representative of the interests of the 
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nation’.201  K. M. Munshi, one of Prasad’s great sympathisers, argued that the President 
should not be a mere figurehead but had to be the ‘one strong organ of State’ capable of 
dealing with crises and excessive prime ministerial power.202   The republican resident 
of Rashtrapati Bhavan203, no longer the residence of the Representative of the King-
Emperor, had every intention of exercising the full prerogatives available to a 
Westminster Head of State as well as teasing and trying the unwritten conventions 
surrounding the powers of his office that had been thought superfluous to bother 
committing to paper only months before.  This potential constitutional danger was 
noticed before Prasad’s inauguration by Jennings, who with validity pointed out the 
liable dilemma of the Indian situation: 
 
The Indian Constitution provides for an elected President who is apparently 
intended to be a Constitutional monarch without the trappings of monarchy.  
This is perhaps a somewhat hazardous experiment.  Constitutional monarchy has 
evolved in Great Britain by a long and at times stormy process of evolution.  It is 
easy to translate this system through the appointment of a Governor-General, but 
it may be less easy where an elected President, presumably a politician of some 
ambition, assumes royal functions.  We have trained our kings, and Governors-
General copy kings.  There is some risk that a President will desire to set his 
own precedents and the Council of Ministers will not always agree with him.  
Rather than accept allegiance to the former Emperor of India, the Constituent 
Assembly prefers to run the risk.204   
 
With this in mind, Prasad would hold true to his sworn oath to ‘preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution’205, or at least as he interpreted it. 
 
The Hindu Code Bill – President vs. Prime Minister 
Before becoming President Prasad told his countrymen in the Constituent Assembly that 
one could assume that  
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Although there is no specific provision in the Constitution itself making it 
binding on the President to accept the advice of his Ministers, it is hoped that the 
convention under which in England the King always acted on the advice of his 
Ministers would be established in this country also and that the President would 
be a constitutional President in all matters.206 
 
Rau also believed that ‘the relations between the President and the Council of Ministers 
shall, as far as possible, be the same as between the King and his ministers in England’ 
and though the President ‘will almost always act on the advice of Ministers’.  However, 
‘there will be a few matters in respect of which he will have to act in his own discretion.  
Even in the English Constitution, there are certain matters in respect of which it is a 
moot question whether the King is bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister’.207  
As Rau correctly analysed the relationship in the main is one of correct procedure, but 
there is also potential for personal discretion and thereby friction between executive 
actors.  As one scholar of presidentialism in South Asia has dramatically characterised it 
‘the President and his discretion are all that stand between order and chaos’ since the 
President is the final check on executive actions.208  For there to be order and not chaos 
the executive actors must know and understand the powers and limits of their own 
office as well as the others offices within the Executive.  Prasad noted that in England 
this understanding came ‘from the diaries of kings or their consultants and Prime 
Ministers and other documents which were later published and which described the 
points of dispute’ and recognised the importance of the first office holders in 
establishing precedents for future office holders.209     
 
For the Indian Republic these were obviously not available and ‘the debates of the 
Constituent Assembly, though useful for the purpose of ascertaining conventions, 
cannot be considered by themselves a sufficient source’.210  Prasad was quick to see the 
Presidential permeations all over the State, as the Crown had been, reading the 
Constitution literally to mean personal powers in the office of President.  Just as the 
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fascinating correspondence between Patel and Nehru over their powers between late 
1947 and early 1948 illustrated the wider difficulties in comprehending the conventions 
and powers between Prime Minister and Cabinet so would the astonishing frank 
exchange of enclosures and letters between Prasad and Nehru in September 1951.  
Prasad had cool, but largely correct relations with Nehru reminding the Prime Minister 
after less than a year as tenant of Rashtrapati Bhavan that all important Cabinet 
decisions must be communicated to him ‘before they are issued to the Press or 
otherwise published’211 and advised the Congress Prime Minister that Ambassadors and 
Governors should not attend or become delegates at Congress Party sessions.212  Prasad 
saw in the Presidency a greater policy and constitutional activism than had been 
contemplated by his Prime Minister, who wanted the more typically quiescent Head of 
State that existed in most New Westminsters.  As Prasad explained to the Deputy Prime 
Minister: 
 
I have, since coming to this office, been trying to feel my way as to how things are 
to develop . . .  Many things will develop in course of time by convention.  A 
reference to the constitution itself shows that there are at least 121 Articles in it 
apart from the schedules, in which the President is mentioned as having to do 
something or other. There is no doubt that in most of these matters he has to act 
according to the advice of the Ministers concerned but I believe the Constitution 
contemplates that it is open to him to advise ministers not on matters of detail but 
generally on matters of policy . . .  There are certain articles in the constitution in 
which I believe there is some direct responsibility and the President also has 
corresponding obligations both towards . . . officers and towards the Ministry as 
well as towards the people at large .213   
 
As a further portent of presidential intentions Prasad forewarns Nehru, addressing him 
as Prime Minister, not the informal Jawahahalji as had been the case previously, that 
though after reviewing a Bill for his urgent assent he did not ‘desire to do anything 
which may create any embarrassment to you or to the Government.  But I hope, you 
will concede that when I am asked to sign a document, I must satisfy myself and not 
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sign blindly…’214  Just two days shy of being President for a year Prasad produced a 
memorandum entitled On President’s Status vis-à-vis Council of Ministers.  Prasad 
believed it was his duty and constitutional privilege ‘to influence the Council of 
Ministers by his advice’.  Prasad grasped that as the very first President of India (and in 
the entire Commonwealth) he could shape the presidency in a way his successors could 
not. 
 
I am anxious that nothing that I might do during my term of office should be 
such as to create a wrong precedent or may become the beginning of an 
undesirable convention … I should not therefore like to do anything which 
would in any way fetter the discretion of my successors by becoming a 
precedent or convention.215 
 
Prasad would certainly cause a precedent, but not quite what he intended, as we shall 
see below.  Prasad contended that in contrast to his previous statements in the 
Constituent Assembly, the President was in fact attributed with not insubstantial powers 
that distinguish the Indian Presidency from the conventions surrounding the British 
parallel.  
 
The position of the President is different from the King of England, in that he is 
an elected person who has to justify his election whereas a hereditary king is 
there by right of birth.  Whatever the strictly correct legal and constitutional 
position may be, there is no doubt that in the case of an elected President, people 
do look upon him also as a person having some authority in the governance of 
the country, and he justifies his position only by tendering such advice and 
giving such suggestions to the Cabinet before it takes any decisions … If he 
does not get therefore an opportunity of influencing the decision beforehand for 
any reason, the President becomes only an ornamental figure-head without the 
authority of a hereditary king and a costly non-entity.216 
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Interestingly again in view of the debates of the Constituent Assembly, which had 
negated the idea, the new Head of State wanted ‘Rules of Procedure’ which would 
specify ‘all the details of how the President, the Ministers and the Cabinet are to 
function in the discharge of their respective duties’ and added the foreboding caveat that 
he wanted ‘the above instructions to be carried out by my office’.217  Prasad obviously 
did not see the President of India as being mere figurehead who sycophantically signed 
Bills on command from the Cabinet.  He had great expectations for the influence of the 
President over the governance and direction of the state.  The President hoped to share 
power with his ministers.  The contention would meet the opposition of his Prime 
Minister and Ministers.     
  
The real crux of constitutional conflict would erupt over Nehru’s legislative attempts to 
reform Hindu personal law concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, property and 
women’s rights with the Government’s Hindu Code Bill at the vanguard of a secular 
assault to eliminate, in the Prime Minister’s mind, the primordial atavisms that divided 
India.218  Nehru had long harboured the ambition of modernising India and saw reform 
of archaic religious practices which permeated and manifested into Indian society as his 
way to succeed.219  The Hindu conservative President and his inflated interpretation of 
his powers came in to direct opposition with his Prime Minister on the matter and 
intended to use all his official powers to halt the Bill.  His opposition to the Bill was 
more on policy and personal grounds than from a legal basis, though he chose to present 
them as a constitutional point.  The conflicts between the Head of Government and 
Head of State went to the heart of India’s Westminster Constitution and ‘were at once 
substantive, institutional, and personal’.220  The clash over this Bill had been brewing 
for months, but came to the fore in September 1951.  Prasad wrote to Nehru on 15 
September noting that he had given ‘public expression to my views’ on the Hindu Code 
Bill before becoming President and since it looked like Parliament was set to pass the 
Bill he wanted to let the Cabinet be ‘in possession of my views’ and ‘not be taken by 
surprise’.221  
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Enclosing a note for the Cabinet’s viewing he cautioned his Ministers that he may send 
a message to Parliament and expressed that his ‘right to examine it [Hindu Code Bill] 
on its merits when it is passed by Parliament before giving assent to it is there’ and 
ominously ended by saying that ‘he may take such appropriate action as I may feel 
called upon to avoid such embarrassment consistently with the dictates of my own 
conscience’.222  Replying on the same day, Nehru immediately and formally indicated 
that he would pass on Prasad’s note to the Cabinet with alacrity and starkly reminded 
the Head of State of the constitutional gravity of the situation:  
 
These are serious matters of great constitutional importance.  They might 
involve a conflict with the President on the one side and the Government and 
Parliament on the other.  They would inevitably raise the question of the 
President’s authority and powers to challenge the decision of Government and of 
Parliament.  The consequences would obviously be serious … in our view the 
President has no power or authority to go against the will of Parliament in regard 
to a Bill that has been well considered by it and passed.  The whole conception 
of constitutional government is against any exercise by the President of any such 
authority.223 
 
Nehru was quick to point out to the President that policy was the Government’s 
competence, not the President’s and that the Government in Parliament represented the 
people, despite Prasad arguing that in his opinion the public were against the Bill, which 
the Prime Minister hotly refuted.224  In a further letter on this constitutionally 
cacophonic day, Nehru warned the President that the Press seemed to have wind of 
these top secret emanations, which could cause grave damage if the spat between the 
two became public, and lectured the Indian Head of State that ‘they could only have got 
this information from Rashtrapati Bhavan’.225  Interestingly, despite Nehru’s hectoring 
on constitutional protocol and importance of confidentiality he himself was passing on 
copies of the letters, which Prasad was not informed, to at least Rajagopalachari now 
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reincarnated as Home Minister in the Union Cabinet on the death of Patel.226  The 
President and the Prime Minister did not greatly sympathise with the others view as the 
temperature continued to rise.227  
 
With a mere three-day break, the constitutional polemics resumed as the President 
repaired to the Viceroy’s old summer residence in Simla now rechristened as 
Rashtrapati Niwas.  Perhaps the vice-regal ghosts of Dufferin and Lansdowne inspired 
their Indian successor to renew the constitutional battle.  Pleasantries were quickly 
dispensed with as the President responded pluckily to the Prime Minister: 
 
It seems you are of the opinion that I have no right to inform of my viewpoint on 
a Bill before it or to examine it on its merits when it is passed by Parliament 
before giving my assent to it and my insistence might involve a conflict between 
the President on the one hand and the Government and Parliament on the other. 
No such conflict need arise if the Government and Parliament recognise well-
understood and well-known democratic limitations on their power also…228 
 
Prasad’s reading of ‘well-understood and well-known democratic limitations’ on the 
powers of the Cabinet and Parliament meant in his mind the ability of the President to 
question publicly and privately the policies of his Ministers who, as the Constitution 
stated in the British fashion, held ‘office during the pleasure of the President’.229   
Prasad continued and sought to justify his position by reminding the Prime Minister of 
his rights under the Constitution.  Prasad argued that ‘so far as our Constitution is 
concerned, it confers in unequivocal words on the President the right to address and 
send messages to Parliament … [and] … the right to declare either that he assents to a 
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Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom when it has been passed by Parliament and 
presented to him’.230  Prasad wanted to imply his right and his serious contemplation of 
sending a message to Parliament stating his objections to the Bill.    
 
Prasad sought to neutralise this constitutional dilemma by pleading the difference of his 
own position as President compared to the British King.  The President believed his role 
went beyond simply defending the constitution.  Though he hoped that in most cases 
there would be no difference in opinion within the executive and that though ‘the 
President will act in accordance with the conventions of British Constitution’ there will 
be occasions ‘requiring the President to take an independent line’ since this is possible 
because ‘the President, unlike the King of England, holds his office by virtue of 
election’.231  Prasad believed that he further insured his position by reminiscing from his 
days in the Constituent Assembly that ‘wherever the Constitution wanted that British 
conventions and practice should be imported and read into our Constitution, it has 
expressly laid it down … I am, therefore, of the view that the Constitution does not 
admit of a wholesale importation of all practices and conventions of the British 
Constitution’.232   
 
However Prasad wished to have the best of all constitutional worlds by stating that ‘the 
same conventions of the British Constitution which limit the King’s powers also limit 
the powers of the Government and the Parliament to sponsor and force such legislation 
without consulting the electorate’.233  This was also a reference to his conviction that the 
present Parliament was merely a ‘caretaker body’ since general elections by full adult 
franchise would not happen till 1952, though an analogous argument could be made of 
him as he had been elected by the very limited electorate of the Constituent Assembly 
and not the semi-direct election of the State Legislatures and Houses of Parliament that 
a President would normally be elected from.  Prasad by denying the legitimacy of the 
present Parliament and righteously claiming that it ‘would not be right to import and 
insist on some conventions and ignore others’ made the extraordinary suggestion that 
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‘the electorate, which is master both of Parliament and the President, should be given a 
chance to express itself on the merits of the Bill’ by means of a referendum.234   
 
This postulation would have pitted the President and Cabinet against each other in an 
executive internecine war over policy and would have brought the young Republic to its 
knees.  The President, thinking he was defending his rights and the Constitution, was in 
fact eroding the office’s prerogatives and discretions by disputing the powers of the 
Prime Minister, Cabinet and Parliament.  Prasad, though claiming to be, was not 
defending the Constitution but being obstructive and finicky over a Bill that pertained to 
policy not the mores, Westminster or Indian, of the Constitution. 
 
In the meantime Nehru was swift to enlist the learned opinions of the Attorney-General, 
M. C. Setalvad, and the distinguished jurist, who we have encountered above, Sir Alladi 
Krishnaswami Aiyar.  Aiyar explained robustly on 20 September 1951 that ‘the 
provisions of the Indian Constitution…makes it perfectly clear that the President is in 
every respect in the position of a constitutional monarch in England or his 
representative in the Dominions, namely, the Governor-General and that there is no 
sphere of his functions in respect of which he can act without reference to the advice of 
his ministers’.  Though admitting that the Indian Constitution ‘did not go into details in 
this regard’ Article 74 was ‘sufficiently clear’ that the President exercises his executive 
powers with the ‘aid and advice’ of his Ministers.  Aiyar accurately pointed out that ‘in 
not stating in detail the incidents of responsible government, our Constitution has 
followed the example of most Dominion Constitutions’.  The Madras based lawyer 
further illustrated his point that the President was bound by the advice of his Ministers 
by drawing on the constitutional canons of Asquith, Halsbury, Dicey and of course 
Jennings to defend cabinet government against Prasad’s arguments.235   
 
The Attorney-General, unsurprisingly, produced strong legal arguments to counter the 
President’s views on executive power.  After explaining responsible parliamentary 
government, as Aiyar did, he concluded that the ‘House of People thus controls the 
Council of Ministers and through it all the executive power of the Union which is 
nominally vested in the President’.  The Cabinet’s legal adviser went on that ‘the 
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supremacy of the legislature as representing the People would thus appear to be the 
basic principle of the Constitution’ and realising that he was echoing tenets of British 
Westminster culture argued ‘we have in the main adopted the British Parliamentary 
form of Government with its fundamentals of the supremacy of Parliament and an 
executive in the form of a Cabinet collectively responsible to Parliament’.236   
 
The Attorney-General informed his readers that in his mind there was little doubt, 
despite the phraseology, that the Head of State was bound to accept the advice of his 
Ministers and listed similar (if not identical constitutional phrases and practices) 
instances from the New Westminsters, though only the settler ones, avoiding any 
mention of the young South Asian Dominions of Pakistan and Ceylon.  The Attorney-
General cited Section 11 of the British North American Act 1867 which provides that 
‘there shall be a Council to aid and advise in the government of Canada…’; this similar 
provision in section 62 of the Commonwealth of Australia Act 1900 states that ‘there 
shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General’; and India’s very 
own colonial precedent Section 9 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which provides 
that ‘there shall be a Council of Ministers…to aid and advise the Governor-General in 
the exercise of this functions’ these replications for the Attorney-General made it ‘clear 
that our Constitution makers have, in framing Article 74, adopted a phraseology well 
understood and accepted in British constitutional law and history, as imposing on the 
constitutional head of the executive the obligation to act solely in accordance with the 
advice of Ministers responsible to Parliament’.237  The difference between the British 
King and the President of India in the Attorney-General’s view was not the same as 
Prasad’s creative observation.  In fact they could not be more different. 
 
The President under our Constitution has no prerogatives personal or otherwise.  
In this respect his position as compared to that of the British Monarch is weaker.  
His functions are to be found in the Constitution: in the exercise of those 
functions he is, in effect, directed by the Constitution to seek the aid and advice 
of his Ministers.  The fact that the President unlike the King is elected to his 
office for a term makes no difference to this position.  The election is merely a 
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method for the choice of the constitutional executive head.  Once he is chosen 
his functions are as limited and prescribed by the Constitution.238 
 
He went on that if the President did feel that he could not assent the Bill this would 
create a constitutional crisis since ‘the refusal to assent would, indeed, be tantamount to 
dismissal of Ministers’ and would ‘inevitably lead to the resignation of the Council of 
Ministers who have the confidence of Parliament’.239  
 
Both the Attorney-General and Aiyar at no point believed that the President was 
constitutionally correct.  Indeed they were both abundantly clear that Prasad was going 
against not only Westminster practice but more importantly the very spirit of their own 
Constitution.  Nehru, now abetted with patent legal and political support, replied to 
Prasad and while acknowledging the President’s rights to address and send messages to 
Parliament and his power to give or withhold assent, he stressed: 
 
These functions have, however, under our Constitution to be performed with the 
aid and advice of the Ministers.  Any action in these fields by the President 
without the concurrence of his Ministers would be foreign to the entire scheme 
of our Constitution and indeed render it unworkable.  The powers and position 
of the President in these matters approximate to those of the King under the 
British Constitution.240     
 
Nehru’s constitutional diagnosis had differed from Dr Prasad and the Hindu Code Bill 
illustrated a wider potential for executive conflict when executive actors are not 
cognisant of constitutional norms.  The problem in many ways was as Aiyar noted a few 
weeks later that ‘the President seems to read every Article of the Constitution which the 
expression “President” occurs as conferring powers upon the President in his individual 
capacity without reference to the Cabinet’.241  Aiyar reminded the Cabinet, most of 
whom had sat with him in senior positions in the Constituent Assembly, that they had 
expressly wanted flexibility and sought to avoid creating an American style presidency 
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and that any concession to Prasad on his interpretation of Presidential powers would 
‘upset the whole constitutional structure envisaged when the Constitution was passed’ 
and ‘make the President a kind of dictator answerable to no one and will reduce the 
Indian Constitution to a hybrid type which has its counterpart neither … in America nor 
the Cabinet type of government known to Britain and the Dominions nor to … France 
[under the 4th Republic]’.242   
 
Aiyar understood that India’s Constitution framers wanted a Head of State that was, like 
the King, above party politics and the symbol of the nation.  Looking at Britain he 
argued that ‘the Crown will have to be above party politics and if it exercises the power 
of dissolution or a power of veto without reference to the Ministry, it cannot but bring 
itself into the vertex of party politics.  This consideration will equally apply to the 
President under the Indian Constitution’.243  Referring to Article 111, which stipulates 
the President’s right to ‘remit a Bill for reconsideration’, Aiyar states that for a 
President to directly intervene in policy and active politics would be catastrophic and 
against the axioms of the office since the ‘President is not intended to be a revisional or 
appellate authority over the Cabinet’ and the power vested in the President under Article 
111 ‘is as much intended to be exercised on the advice of the Cabinet as any other 
power.  It is not intended to substitute the individual will of the President for the 
deliberations of Parliament or for the policy underlying a legislation deliberately 
adopted by the Government’.244 
 
Nehru, now with the strength of such opinion pushed his measures through, though he 
split the Bill, and waited for the democratic endorsement of the electorate with elections 
just months away, as Prasad had intimated, to pass the full legislative provisions.245  
With Congress elected to power in 1952 for the first time on a universal adult franchise 
and gaining 364 out of 489 seats, Prasad could no longer deny the Prime Minister’s 
legitimacy of position on the Bill.  Nehru considered the subsequent passing of the 
legislation ‘to be the greatest real advance of his career.’246  Policy aside, the Prime 
Minister constitutionally had established ascendancy over the Presidency and negated 
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any budding horizontal accountability on his powers from Rashtrapati Bhavan.  The 
President lost the prerogative to influence the Prime Minister.  Indeed there is evidence 
that Nehru valued the advice of the Vice-President and distinguished scholar and 
diplomat Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan more – though Prasad still had enough influence 
with the Congress Party to be re-elected in 1957.247  Prasad was not a President with 
authoritarian tendencies.  The problem was that he misconstrued the powers given to a 
Westminster head of state without comprehending the accompanying conventions, or at 
least comprehended them differently to his Ministers and Westminster precedents.  
Prasad’s motives were not to bring down the Government but to block legislation, 
which in his mind was highly controversial and damaging to the nation.  Indeed, as 
Austin contends ‘Prasad’s argument had some moral force’.  However: 
 
The point at issue was that he desired to use the power of his office either to 
force … Parliament to shelve the measure or, failing that, to veto it even against 
the advice of his Cabinet.  He was willing to endanger the Constitution in pursuit 
of his own point of view.  But more surprising was the way he misread the 
Constitution, misinterpreting the very evident intent of the Constituent 
Assembly, in an attempt to prove that he possessed the powers he desired.248 
 
Even after the fracas over the Hindu Code Bill the President was still not convinced that 
he was incorrect.  Though he remained President till 1962 and caused little 
constitutional trouble for the rest of his tenure he still was able to taunt the 
constitutional equilibrium by telling those assembled at a ceremony in November 1960 
to open the Indian Law Institute, ‘there is no provision which in so many words lays 
down that the President shall be bound to act in accordance with the advice of his 
Council of Ministers’.249  Prasad had lost the constitutional battle and by attacking the 
Government on insecure constitutional grounds rendered a great disservice to the 
Presidency of India and his successors – especially as a check on Cabinet.  The 
President of India was now rendered more a dignified part of the ceremony of state than 
an efficient guardian of the constitution and effective proponent of horizontal 
accountability on the Prime Minister and Cabinet.  Indeed Mrs Gandhi, perhaps 
remembering the hindrance that Prasad had caused her father, sought to eradicate this 
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conundrum surrounding presidential duty to acquiesce to the advice of Cabinet.  She 
attempted to put this convention beyond doubt with the 42nd Amendment to the 
Constitution in 1976.  Article 74 (1) now read: 
 
There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid 
and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in 
accordance with such advice [author’s italics].   
 
The Presidency proved its submissiveness to prime ministerial direction by not even 
attempting to defend the Constitution against Indira Gandhi’s Emergency powers that 
disabled Indian democracy. The Janata Government that followed after Mrs Gandhi’s 
draconian “Emergency” period removed almost all of Mrs Gandhi’s graffiti from the 
Constitution, but the 42nd Amendment was left unmolested.250  Now Presidents were 
unambiguously obligated to listen to the advice of their Ministers.  Now there seemed 
no hurdle to Aiyar’s reminder to the Cabinet: ‘In the felicitous language of…Bagehot, 
the King has no alternative to signing his death warrant if the Parliament chooses to 
pass a measure in that behalf’.251  The Indian Presidency would be no different. 
 
Nehru now had overwhelming delegated democratic power since he was without real 
horizontal accountability and was cursed with an inability to seriously delegate himself 
due to the impatience of his vision.  Nehru now became his own check since by the 
electoral victory of 1952 he had impressed his interpretations of governance on India 
and dominated or defeated the executive actors from the President to the Cabinet – and 
his only rivals for political leadership, Gandhi and especially Patel, had left the political 
scene permanently.  Austin argues that Nehru ‘set the tone’ as a ‘Nation builder, 
reformer, ardent democrat and flawed administrator’, who tried to do everything.  At 
least, however, despite many criticisms and invariable examples of Nehruvian diktat – 
 
The successes of the period were fundamental: power relationships were sorted 
out constitutionally; the parliamentary system became entrenched, democracy 
not only survived Nehru’s charisma, popular participation strengthened it … 
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This was no golden age, but the Nehru years set standards against which others 
would be measured – and many fall short.252 
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4 
Federalism: A Paramount Mechanism 
 
‘It seems doubtful whether India could have avoided it’ was Sir Ivor Jennings 
parsimonious admission on India’s federal structure before adding the real assessment 
that it is ‘not easy to seise [sic] the essential characteristics of Indian federalism’.253  
India’s federal system is unquestionably distinctive, which was not entirely appreciated 
at the time due to the organic and multi-dimensional constitutional inheritance from the 
colonial period and the critical crises that faced British India and independent India, 
which will be discussed further below.  India’s experience with federalism in the 
colonial period and especially after was in reality a calculated, but essential risk to 
answer the needs and dilemmas of cajoling, containing and coordinating a vast sub-
continent.  This gamble was one that continues to impact on India’s polity.  India’s first 
ten years of independence were a critical juncture period with the establishment of 
federalism being prominent.  India’s federal experience differed greatly from that of the 
settler-based United States of America with its foundation in largely homogeneous 
ethnic circumstances and jealous guarding of individual states’ powers or similarly the 
Canadian and Australian Commonwealth of colonial States or even the multi-linguistic 
Swiss canton system buttressed by referenda.254  Though not often attributed to the New 
Westminsters, some form of federalism is a feature to almost all the major cases such as 
Canada, Australia, South Africa and of course India despite the fact that ‘English 
political tradition looked with disfavour’ at stipulated federal elements in 
constitutions.255    
 
Constitutional scholars like Sir Kenneth Wheare described India as ‘quasi- federal’ 
since from a mechanical perspective the Centre had considerable powers of intervention 
in the affairs of State governments and therefore is more a unitary state with subsidiary 
features of federalism.256  As Brass asserts ‘though India is both a sub-continental state 
and the most culturally diverse country in the world today, the federal system adopted 
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has had from the beginning more unitary features than most other large federal systems, 
more notably that of the United States’.257  However, India’s political structure cannot 
be judged purely from a theoretical or constitutional perspective and though Wheare and 
others have illuminated mechanical differences, they have generally not emphasised the 
critical juncture of exceptional circumstances that moulded federal principles to adapt to 
the Indian environment.  India’s formation must be adjudicated by the contexts, 
conditions and culture (colonial and indigenous) that pressed upon the Constituent 
Assembly’s outcomes, which created a thoroughly unique polity.  India’s ‘bold 
experiment of combining democratic responsiveness to cultural differences with a 
federal conciliation of regional community, identity, and autonomy claims and a 
nationally concerted promotion of regional capability, has tendered to ensure a novel 
mode of multicultural development’.258  As Austin argues, India’s leaders were 
confronted with problems that they believed had not been encountered before by other 
federations in history and that the Constituent Assembly in fact ‘produced a new kind of 
federalism to meet India’s peculiar needs’.259   
 
This chapter does not seek to explain the almost exhaustless provisions, articles and 
amendments of India’s Federal Union, but it does attempt to examine the key 
characteristics of India’s federalism that demarcate it from others and more importantly 
continue to have path dependent impressions on India.  These key  federal 
characteristics are i) its distinctive origins from Partition and the Princely States ii)  the 
Centre’s  constitutional powers over the periphery and iii) its early accommodation of 
linguistic, ethnic and sectarian elements in first ten years especially through the States 
Reorganisation recommendations.  Despite many early predictions of India’s demise 
due to its massive divisions, the Indian state endures.260  This period was crucial for 
India’s endurance especially as it contained critical junctures for State formation like 
Partition, which would have not only an immediate social and political effect on the 
boundaries and social composition of India, but also through its impact on the counsels 
of the Constituent Assembly, which created a long-term effect making it culturally 
favourable to implement powerful constitutional provisions regarding emergency and 
central powers as well as India’s critical form of federalism.   
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As one of the leading scholars on India’s pluralistic polity, Jyotirindra Dasgupta, argues, 
India’s ‘political prudence, legal flexibility, institutional inclusion, and interactive 
opportunities incorporated in the federal design can account for an important measure of 
the durability of Indian federalism’.261  The above identifications are largely features 
that are generally associated with Westminster systems.  As Jalal states, India’s vastness 
may prompt the conclusion that the country’s ‘need for a federal system was more an 
imperative than a matter of political choice’, but this neglects the historic contentions 
over what federalism was and for whom would it represent and where power would 
lie.262  The genesis of Indian federalism is its peerless feature.  The federalism that was 
established formally within the first ten years of independence was the product of 
critical and often neglected circumstances that are crucial as a path dependent feature to 
comprehend modern India’s ability to survive and strive today.          
Princes and Partition – The Inimitable Origins and Formation of the Indian Federalism 
Over fifty years later the trauma and memories of India’s Partition still fuels heated 
political, historiographical, social and emotional debate in India, Pakistan and 
beyond.263  A reading of the voluminous literature on Partition, which is an academic 
genre in its own right, would give the impression that the reasoning, impetus and form 
of India’s federalism was crafted entirely with Partition in mind.  This is not entirely 
accurate.  As Ian Copland argues ‘Historians of colonial India have generally glossed 
over the long and complicated saga of all-India federation: partly one suspects, because 
it was long and complicated, but also because … this grandest of imperial projects had 
finally to be abandoned’.264  As was discussed in chapter two the Constituent Assembly 
were heavily and naturally moulded by the chaotic, violent and unstable atmosphere that 
the division of the Indian Empire bequeathed, however the ideas of federalism emerged 
much earlier from a most unlikely and neglected corner – the Indian Princes.   
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The Crown had always had special sway over Indian opinion, at least since Victoria’s 
proclamation welcoming Indians as equal subjects of the British Empire, which even 
inspired Gandhi.265  George V, their sovereign-liege, was especially keen to affirm this 
pledge to his greatest possession.  The King had visited India during his Royal durbar in 
December 1911 and wanted to provide some indication of his good-will to his Indian 
subjects.  The visit coincided with a Liberal Government in London.  Months later the 
progressive Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, supported by the Secretary of State for India, Lord 
Crewe, wanted more ‘devolution of power’ by giving the Provinces a ‘larger measure of 
self-government’.  To Curzon, an upholder of centralised power, the proposals, as he 
decried in the Lords, amounted to a ‘picture of federation or self-governing and quasi-
independent States’, of which he certainly did not approve.266  Much of Hardinge’s 
proposals and the King’s enthusiasm were to do with their concern for the Indian 
Princes.    
 
Modern studies of India have seldom given serious attention yo, let alone focus on, the 
Princely order and their kingdoms except as Kiplingesque footnotes on the ostentation 
and eccentricity of Indian Royalty.  This is despite the fact that the Princely States 
occupied in pre-1947 India two-fifths of the area and one-third of the population and 
contained States like Kashmir, which was bigger than France and Hyderabad whose 
income and expenditure in 1947-48 rivalled Belgium’s.267 The Princely States’ 
contribution to India either directly or by reaction had a major effect on the formation of 
the Indian Union.  It easy to forget that Britain held much of India through indirect rule 
over much of India through the concept of British Paramountcy (the Crown’s 
supremacy over the Princely States), which enabled the Viceroy to establish Residents 
in the Princely States to ensure the Empire’s requirements were met and the Princes 
gave their allegiance to the paramount power in return for measured local autonomy.   
 
Before the hegemony of Congress in the late 1930s the Indian Princes were a 
formidable power in terms of their influence and importance in dealing with the British.    
Especially after World War I where the Indian Princes had contributed men and money 
(and leadership, sometimes leading their brigades in Europe and the Middle East for the 
British side while the Maharajah of Bikaner even sat in the Lloyd George War Cabinet).  
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In response to such outpouring of patriotism to their sovereign-liege, George V, who 
had met most of the Indian potentates at his Royal durbar, sent in 1921 his brother the 
Duke of Connaught to establish in person one of the most unique legislative chambers 
in the colonial world: the Chamber of Princes.  As a result of the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms of 1919 the 120 member Chamber of Princes was inaugurated as an advisory 
body composed of the senior princes (108 Princes with a salute of eleven guns or more 
and twelve other Princes to represent the smaller States) and elected their own 
Chancellor – though the Viceroy was the presiding officer as the Crown 
Representative.268 
 
The importance of this aristocratic trade union constitutionally was that it was the forum 
for the Princes and their Dewans (Chief Ministers) to advocate their importance and 
protect their position.  One of the ways which they sought to do this was through the 
idea of federation with all of India, which they argued for in the late 1920s and early 
1930s.  They believed this would secure their autonomy by breaking the manacles of 
paramountcy and even enhance their reputation by propagating reform, which they did 
to a degree at the London Round Table Conference on India in 1930; their voices more 
authoritative on sympathetic ears like Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald and 
Conservatives like Stanley Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare since Gandhi and Congress 
did not attend.269   However, the capricious Princes themselves began to have doubts 
since many believed that joining formally with British India would spread the contagion 
of democracy to their own feudal outposts as well as concern over their financial and 
military independence not to mention having to work with an avowedly Republican 
Congress.   
 
In practical terms over 500 Princes used to having their own way struggled to create 
cohesion and unity of position, but nonetheless the position was crucial for the future of 
India.  The rise of Gandhi and Congress meant that the Princes’ eminence was 
weakened and in relentless decline, as Congress dominated the social leadership of 
India and became the constitutional channel with the British.  Nehru, Congress and 
Mountbatten at that final lap of Empire were concerned about the “Balkanisation” of 
India if, as predicted, the States declared independence when the Raj ended or even their 
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loose idea of federation, which would generate, in their minds, a nightmarish spectre of 
nebulous and discordant autonomy rendering India centrally ungovernable.  To Nehru’s 
consternation, large states like Hyderabad, Bhopal and Travancore seriously 
contemplated becoming separate Dominions, which was a serious possibility especially 
since a state like Hyderabad had its own army and a population larger than any of the 
existing Dominions.  Mountbatten, with his Royal charm, was able to convince the 
Monarchs that he could only transfer power to two Dominions: India and Pakistan.270 
 
One of the key reasons the Indian States were contemplating independence was because 
Nehru, Patel and Congress rejected the loose all-India federation proposed and instead 
wished to inherit paramountcy from the British and compel the States to join India.  
Mountbatten, with the gravitas of a blue-blood, assured his regally kindred Maharajas 
that paramountcy would lapse with Britain’s departure.  The collapse of British power, 
civil unrest, communal violence, and the lack of serious alternatives and the serious 
pressure from Attlee to Jinnah compelled the Princes to reluctantly sign Instruments of 
Accession, which merged them with the new Dominions of India and Pakistan and 
continued the administrative arrangements that had existed with the British, though 
many empathised with the Dewan of Indore who exclaimed that ‘he now knew what 
Dollfuss felt like when he was sent for to see Hitler’.271  
 
In return the Princes were guaranteed amongst other things a generous Privy Purse from 
the Government of India in perpetuity, free medical care, free electricity, the right to a 
military escort and the retention of their titles and in addition many were translated into 
the new order by becoming Rajpramukhs and Uprajamukhs (Governors and Lieutenant-
Governors) of the new States – often their old one.272  At 15 August 1947 with only 
three of the 562 States claims not acceded (two were major however: Hyderabad 
examined above which joined India though military intervention in 1948 and the 
quagmire of Kashmir) and Lord Listowel, Secretary of State for India, could rightly 
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claim that the success and the appeasement of accession had saved India from 
‘unimaginable disaster’.273   
 
However, within months of the transfer of power, Patel, with the full authority of the 
Cabinet ‘succeeded in imposing the Centre as a paramount power over the States’.274  
Indeed as a forerunner of President’s rule the new Government re-established 
Resident’s rule though renamed as Regional Commissioners – these civil servants 
imposed the New Raj’s doctrines immediately on its constituent units just as its 
predecessor had done.  For instance it imposed rules on Bharatpur, took direct control of 
Cutch and Manipur, forced the Maharajah of Alwar to step down whilst they 
investigated his alleged connection with Gandhi’s assassin and even told the Maharajah 
of Jodhpur to cut down on his consumption of whisky and women.275  Nehru had 
always attacked any contemplation of a lapse in paramountcy since he saw it as integral 
to maintaining the integrity of India.  Nehru and Congress believed that anything other 
than Paramountcy would catalyse the disintegration of India and as Rajagopalachari told 
Sir Stafford Cripps: ‘Paramountcy came into being as a fact and not by agreement, and 
on Britain’s withdrawal the successor authorities must inherit the fact along with the 
rest of the context’.276  The Princes had accepted, with their unwavering faith in the 
monarchical system, the words of the King’s Representative and yet the new ‘Indian 
Government virtually re-created for itself the powers of paramountcy without its 
obligations’.277   
 
The legacy of paramountcy enabled a strong Centre at the head of the States.  It is 
interesting to speculate if the Princes had been more united and pressed for their version 
of federalism i.e. a loose federation of autonomous states with a weak centre.  Copland 
hypothesises that if the Princes’ plan was established when they had the influence in the 
1930s, before serious communal disturbances, India could have been a different place.  
Aside from a having real power centred in the constituent parts, the Muslims might not 
have clamoured for Pakistan and the bloody Partition might have been evaded, since 
their interests may have been met by a strong provincial state system.278 Speculation 
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apart, India consciously inherited the centralised machinery of state from the British and 
in their belief required it to maintain India in the wake of communal war and division 
that surrounded Partition and gave yet another and even more powerful reason for a 
centrally focussed, though still federal, India. 
 
One of the rationalisations that Congress ‘coveted the strong central authority of the 
colonial state was to quickly snuff out any reassertion of the centrifugal tendencies’ that 
occurred during the last days of British rule.  As Jalal reasons, the ‘anguish of partition 
… provided the managers of post-independent India with powerful legitimisation to 
curb autonomists’.279  Partition was a powerful social context that figured prominently 
in the minds of the British and their successors and the political structure they crafted 
must inevitably be measured by those terrific experiences.  The process of Partition was 
‘not a simple geographical bifurcation of Indian territory but a painful surgical operation 
that entailed unimaginable human suffering and large-scale migration on both sides of 
the border’.280  The scope of this thesis does not extend to the social details of this tragic 
and colossal communal catastrophe that affected millions of people and provided a birth 
of explosive violence to India and Pakistan.  The focus on Partition is narrowed 
substantially to assess its constitutional impact as a critical juncture on India as a path 
dependent trait.   Gyanendra Pandey, a leading scholar on Partition, identifies three 
conceptions of Partition.  The ‘first partition’ is concerned with the demand and 
subsequent creation of Pakistan; the ‘second partition’ examines the division of Bengal 
and Punjab and the ‘third partition’ focuses on the social and migratory elements of this 
great upheaval.281  For the purposes of this thesis and its constitutional premise the ‘first 
partition’ is where the analysis will be centred due to the federal and constitutional 
outcomes there were generated by the creation of Pakistan and its Muslim basis. 
 
There is a long history of Muslim agitation for separate and special recognition in India, 
especially during the hegemony of the Islamic Mughal Empire over the subcontinent.  
However, the ‘idea of Pakistan itself, the proposal for a partition of British India 
between its Muslim-majority and its Hindu-majority provinces, had not had a long 
history’ since it began only in early 1940.282  The reasons behind Pakistan and the 
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personalities of Jinnah, Nehru and Mountbatten that dominated the discourse are still 
subject to controversy and polemics.  Some eminent historians see Pakistan as a Jinnah 
bargaining ploy to wrench concessions from the British and Congress283, while on the 
other side certain historians believe that Jinnah was only demanding equity and his 
hopes for an all-India Union were stymied by Congress intransigence, which along with 
British abandonment and lack of protection led to the inevitability of Pakistan.284  The 
debates do not greatly concern this thesis for it is the prospect of Pakistan or at least 
Muslim federated areas and later the advent of the separate Dominion of Pakistan which 
influenced the thinking and form of the independent Indian State.  At least since the 
March 1940 Lahore Declaration did the threat of Pakistan become publicly 
disseminated.  The All India Muslim League passed a resolution in answer to the 
demand for an articulation of the Muslim League’s objectives to constitutional 
settlement.  The “Pakistan resolution” stated  
 
that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the 
Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that 
geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so 
constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas 
in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and 
Eastern zones in India, should be grouped to constitute “Independent States” in 
which the constituent units will be autonomous and sovereign.285 
 
The “Pakistan resolution” was a dramatic one and ‘proved to be a turning point in 
Indian history’.286  Whatever the historiography and contentions over the exact meaning 
and intention of the resolution it cannot be denied that it publicly promulgated the idea 
to the British, Congress and Muslims themselves of “independent”, “autonomous” and 
“sovereign” Muslim areas.  This was well beyond the gentle regional government 
offered by the Government of India Act 1935.  Some scholars argue that the Congress 
successes in 1937 provincial elections that followed the Act made Jinnah ‘feel inclined 
towards the idea of a separate, sovereign Muslim state’.287   
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It is easy to forget that it was only in June 1947, just ten weeks before Independence 
Day that the formal constitutional partition of India was decided.  Fundamentally the 
real issue of contention between Congress and the Muslim League was the categorical 
refusal of Gandhi, Nehru and Congress to accept Jinnah’s proposition that the League 
represented all Muslims while Jinnah refused anything but parity of status with 
Congress, who he argued only represented Hindus and Hindustan, and wanted, amongst 
other things, to have a separate Constituent Assembly to recognise Jinnah’s “two-
nation” theory.288  The elections of early 1946 further aggravated the political divisions 
and accentuated the constitutional stands.  Congress secured ninety-one per cent of the 
votes cast in general constituencies while the Muslim League gained eighty-six per cent 
of the votes in the Muslim constituencies.289   
 
The results were seen as a plebiscite for Pakistan and the League could claim legitimacy 
as the premier, if not sole, representative of Muslim interests while Congress’s 
successes showed its dominance over the general population i.e. the non-Muslim parts.  
Later that year, with the results fresh in the Indian consciousness, the new Labour 
Government in Britain sent a Cabinet Mission to create the mechanics of withdrawal.  
The Cabinet Mission advocated a ‘loose-federation’ with the two major Muslim areas 
(in the north-west and north-east) being two of the federation units while the rest of 
India formed the third.  However, the proposals to maintain a united India collapsed due 
to both Congress and the Muslim League having suspicions of the other, especially 
Congress being concerned over a loose federation where the League would have 
command over two of the federal units, which would encumber its influence and 
constitutional ascendancy.290  Once again Congress, as with the Princes, was concerned 
about the potential dilution of central power by any disbursement of control to regional 
authorities.   
 
The Interim Government, as discussed above, which was constituted following the 1946 
elections, lacked any sense or purpose of unity as long as Congress and the Muslim 
League were compelled to fight for space at the Viceroy’s Executive Council table.  
Perhaps for such reasons, as well as the intransigence of Jinnah and the engulfment of 
communal violence, Nehru and Congress were able to admit and accept the prospect of 
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Partition soon after Mountbatten’s arrival in March 1947.291  Nehru and Congress have 
been blamed for not preventing Partition, still a painful laceration on the Indian body 
politic.  However as Bimal Prasad argues, if Partition had not been accepted – 
 
there was the danger that the British and the League’s bargaining strategies 
might result not only in one Partition, but open the flood-gates for several 
partitions in the future by providing for an extremely weak centre and secession 
at will of a unit of the federation … Nehru’s effort was directed towards 
preventing that eventuality and making clear the determination of the Congress 
to oppose it … Thus while Nehru, pitted against powerful historical and social 
forces, failed to prevent India’s Partition in 1947, he succeeded, of course with 
the help of the same forces, in scotching the move for sowing the seeds of the 
endless Balkanisation of India…292  
 
Nehru vehemently would not allow the lapse of paramountcy but appeased the 
operation of Partition – perhaps for different reasons but the same result.  The virtual 
and willing inheritance of paramountcy coupled with the constitutional catharsis that 
Partition generated allowed the Constituent Assembly to create a federal structure with a 
strong centre, which could never have been possible without the critical juncture and 
sequence of events that resulted from the Princes and Partition.  To understand the 
machinery of state and constitutional provisions that allowed for centralised power over 
the Indian Union such a backdrop is crucial. 
 
New Delhi’s Dominance - Central and Emergency Powers over the Indian Union 
The British constitutional legacy was not confined to decaying volumes of Dicey at 
Delhi Library.  It also more conspicuously impressed itself in the form of centralised 
power that had been the hallmark of viceregal rule, even with the introduction of the 
semi-federal 1935 constitution.  As well as the apparatuses of state the ‘spirit’ of power 
remained as Weiner states ‘the viceregal model is thus just as much a part of the British 
tradition as the Westminster model’.293  India accepted this retention of British colonial 
culture.   Contemporary constitutional scholar, K. Santhanam, usefully analysed just 
over a decade after independence that India’s was ‘a Federation in which the 
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Paramountcy powers which the British Government had over the Indian [Princely] 
States have been taken over by the Union Government and applied to all its units … so, 
it will be appropriate to call our Federation a “Paramountcy Federation”’.294  As was 
argued above the propinquity of Partition with the amalgamation of incongruous 
Princely States weighed heavily on the decisions of the constitutional framers in the 
Constituent Assembly and pushed them towards a flexible and centralised federal 
framework.   
 
The accomplishment of both tasks did not remove the fear of the disintegration of the 
new state.  Eliminating the proposal to use the term “the Federation of India” Ambedkar 
explained this to the Assembly that “Union” would be used instead of “Federation” to 
‘make it clear that though India was to be a federation, the federation was not the result 
of an agreement by the states [not just the Princely ones] to join in a federation, and that 
the federation not being the result of an agreement no State has the right to secede from 
it’.295  Ambedkar stressed in November 1948 with clarity of intention that ‘what is 
important is that the use of the word “union” is deliberate … because it is 
indestructible’.296  Unlike the relatively autonomous states that were represented in 
Philadelphia there was to be no United States of India.  The States had not ceded 
qualified powers to a central authority as in America.  Sovereignty and control was 
taken directly from the centralised colonial power and then devolved by degree from 
Delhi to the outlying units with parsimony especially since the nature and boundaries of 
these regional units were as yet uncertain coupled with the cumbersome integration of 
the Princely States.  The Indian Union operated as one observer describes as 
‘prefectorial federalism’ such as with the appointment of State Governors directly by 
the Centre as agents of the Centre.297   
 
Drawing from the Australian, Canadian and Government of India 1935 Act experiences 
the Indian Constitution’s seventh schedule established three lists of powers and 
responsibilities: the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List.   The Union List, 
the longest, includes usual central powers of defence, trade, currency and foreign 
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affairs.  The State List covers powers relating to issues such as agriculture and 
sanitation.  The Concurrent List has powers which can be exercised by both the Union 
and the States, ‘but when they conflict the former will prevail’.298  This ability of the 
Centre to “prevail” over the rest is not unusual.  As Austin argues ‘Central governments 
in all federations have means to make their will felt in the capitals of the country’s 
constituent units’.  However this ‘will’ is ‘unusually extensive in India’ because of at 
least four factors: ‘the country’s initial top-down federalism, anxieties about national 
unity and integrity, the policies, strategies, and machinery for economic and social 
development, and the desires of political parties and individuals to exert power 
nationally’.299   
 
Nehru was judicious on constitutional procedures and unquestionably diligent to include 
and inform the Chief Ministers of the policies and expectations of the Centre, seeing 
them as vital interlocutors of his vision to the masses.300  However, Nehru was very 
much a centraliser by personality, a characteristic he shared crucially with the Minister 
of States – Patel.  Nehru was fortunate that in his years as Prime Minister the Congress 
held sway in the Centre and the States, and importantly the Governors and Chief 
Ministers of these States were often trusted allies who shared Nehru’s national views on 
unity.  The peculiar and extraordinary circumstances of India’s beginnings in a period of 
communal violence, critical economic problems and grave uncertainty propelled those 
in the Constituent Assembly to entrust power to the Centre with an impatient visionary 
in Nehru at the helm.301  It cannot be ignored that the ‘Nehru years institutionalised 
centralisation’ with the Prime Minister as the ‘national nanny’.302 
 
Perhaps the most controversial element of the Constitution is Part XVIII under Articles 
352-360 – the Emergency Provisions.  Though the most controversial and prominent 
deployment of these powers happened after the first ten years of independence they are 
still vital to assess executive and central power.  The controversy of these powers arises 
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since many, like notable scholar Henry C. Hart, are of the view that ‘the fundamental 
law of India does, in fact, provide for constitutional dictatorship.  It does so, manifestly, 
through its Emergency clauses’.303  One of the contrasts with other federal New 
Westminsters is India’s explicit and ‘comprehensive set of provisions relating to 
emergency powers’.304  Article 352 addresses the ability of the Indian State to free itself 
from constitutional shackles and defend the country in times of war.  Article 355 gives 
the right of the Centre to protect every State against internal disturbance and external 
aggression.305  The most constitutionally crucial in terms of the Centre’s power over the 
Union is the maligned Article 356.   
 
This gives the Union Cabinet, through the President, the power to declare an emergency 
and dismiss the elected State Government on receipt of the State Governor’s report, 
which should “satisfy” the President that the normal constitutional processes have 
broken down.  Known as “President’s Rule”, Article 356 enables the Centre to assume 
full executive power and the power to legislate on any subject even on the State List and 
even includes provisions for ‘suspending in whole or in part the operations of any 
provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State’ (except 
those pertaining to the High Court), which can be read with Article 365 that allows the 
Union to invoke the above emergency powers on the controversial, but blunt, grounds 
‘where any State has failed to comply with, or to give effect to, any directions given in 
the exercise of the executive power of the Union’.306  To emphasise these unique 
Central unitary powers Ambedkar told the Assembly in November 1948: 
 
All federal systems including the American are placed in a tight mould of 
federalism.  No matter the circumstances, it cannot change its form and shape.  It 
can never be unitary.  On the other hand the Draft Constitution (of India) can be 
both unitary as well as a federal according to the requirements of time and 
circumstances.  In normal times, it is framed to work as a federal system.  But in 
times of war it so designed as to make it work as though it was a unitary system.  
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Once the President issues a Proclamation … the whole scene can become 
transformed and the State becomes a unitary State … Such a power of 
converting itself into a unitary State no federation possesses.  This is one point 
of difference between the Federation proposed in the Draft Constitution and all 
the other Federations we know of.307 
 
Some scholars have compared such emergency provisions to Article 48 in the Weimar 
Constitution which allowed Chancellor Hitler, through President Von Hindenburg’s 
acquiescent signature, the extraordinary powers to build a totalitarian state.308  To 
Ambedkar however the emergency provisions would be there only for the gravest 
emergency such as the menacing threat of invasion from Pakistan.  Ambedkar consoled 
the Constituent Assembly that with the Emergency provisions and their powers to 
override the States that ‘the proper thing we ought to expect is that such Articles will 
never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter’.309 Perhaps 
Ambedkar was thinking of the flexible and potential powers of the Crown to deal with 
emergencies though curmudgeonly utilised in the rarest instances.  However, these 
emergency powers were more often exposed than hidden.  In the first fifty years of 
independence President’s Rule under Article 356 was activated over a hundred times.310  
The Sarkaria Commission reported in 1988 that in examining seventy-five cases of the 
use of Article 356 only twenty-six were ‘inevitable’ while the rest had politically abused 
the provision of President’s Rule.311  One former Supreme Court Judge described 
Article 356 as method of ‘constitutional terrorism’.312    
 
In the first ten years President’s Rule was instigated four times.313  Though relatively 
small compared to subsequent eras the first application of President’s Rule in Punjab in 
1951 reeked of controversy and became a dangerous and lasting precedent of Central 
interference in troublesome States.  The Punjabi Chief Minister, Gopichand Bhargava, 
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was at odds with the Congress High Command over his administration of the State and 
Nehru and other Congressmen believed he was not handling well the sectarian tensions 
in this key State and were unhappy with the composition of his State cabinet.314  
Bhargava, though enjoying a majority in the Legislature was compelled to give way by 
the Congress Parliamentary Board with Nehru’s threat of resignation and allow the 
Governor to recommend the imposition of President’s Rule despite the claim that the 
constitutional machinery had broken down being an ‘official fiction’.315  Even Prasad 
questioned the validity of the application of President’s Rule in his name arguing that 
‘the Ministry has been functioning, and can function even now, with the support and 
enjoying the confidence of a majority of members of the Legislative Assembly.  Even in 
tendering his resignation the Chief Minister has not said that he has lost the confidence 
of the Assembly but only that he is tendering his resignation in obedience to a directive 
of the Congress Parliamentary Board’.316   
 
The “emergency” die had been cast and continues to roll.317  As President surrendered 
to pressure, realising that he had ‘no option but to accept the report and be “satisfied” 
that the situation contemplated in Article 356 has arisen’, he also meekly stated, as 
many of his successors would sympathise, that ‘I cannot help feeling that we have acted 
against the spirit of the Constitution although the action may be justified as being in 
strict accordance with its letter’.318  A “dead letter” it was not.  The Centre would 
actively rule over the States through political and legal mechanisms encased in the 
Constitution. 
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India’s Federal and Constitutional Responses to Plurality 
 
The strategy propounded in the fourth century Arthasastra – that subordinate 
rulers shall be preserved and respected in their customs and territorial 
jurisdiction if they acknowledge, via respect and tribute, the superior authority 
of a ruler of rulers – government the statecraft of subcontinental empires in 
Mughal and British times.  After independence, India’s federal system became 
its modern embodiment within the twentieth century subcontinental empire.319 
 
This historic legacy of governance imbued itself into its modern federal manifestation 
and acknowledged, as its predecessors had, the importance of localised and broad 
accommodation tempered by the indisputability of the Centre’s powers as the sovereign 
authority.   
 
A land the size, scope, diversity and complexity of India make it susceptible to multiple 
and cross cutting cleavages.  However, the exile of the most fervent Muslim elements to 
the new state of Pakistan removed a significant pressure of a rival “nation” within 
independent India.  The creation of Pakistan demoted and defused religion as the 
principle cleavage of Indian political life.  For example though Hinduism represented 
almost eighty-five per cent of the population it was difficult to mobilise politically since 
the secular orientated Congress under Nehru had always declined such strategies and 
more importantly Hinduism lacked organisational confessional cohesiveness since it 
was already dramatically divided and criss-crossed by multifarious ideological, 
linguistic, ethnic, regional and class loyalties and identities.  On the language issue, 
Hindi the major language of India only constituted around forty per cent (not to mention 
various dialects of Hindi) in 1951 and in this polyglot land any attempt of linguistic 
hegemony by one language was fiercely opposed, especially by non-Hindi speakers.  In 
fact English was directed by the Constituent Assembly to remain the official language 
of government and also for communication between the States for fifteen years while 
the major regional languages were used within their own provinces and were recognised 
as “national” languages with their inclusion into the Eighth Schedule of the 
Constitution.320  The most crucial political implication that arises from the above facts is 
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that the numerous ethnolinguistic divisions instead of causing the threat of 
disintegration of the Indian State, ‘contributed instead to political pluralism’ since, 
unlike its neighbours, no one ethnolinguistic group in India commands a majority.321 
 
This social truth enabled the national and unity thinking Union Cabinet and Constituent 
Assembly headed by Nehru to create a flexible federal structure which largely contained 
and accommodated the potentially divisive diversities of their new nation.  Atul Kohli, 
writing fifty years after independence, argues that there are two ‘variables’ that are 
important to understanding self-determination movements.  The first is the ‘level of 
institutionalisation of the central state’ and the second is the degree of accommodation 
from the central leaders to demands for self-determination.  Kohli believes that ‘the 
more the authority of the central state is institutionalised and the more accommodating 
the ruling strategy’ the more likely it is for success after a period of negotiation.  Kohli 
justifies this with the proposition that ‘a well-institutionalised state sets firm boundaries 
within which political movements must operate, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, an accommodating leadership provides room – of course, within limits – for the 
movements to achieve real gains’.322  India, as has been argued above had the strong 
centre with institutionalised power from its leader derived from the Constitution and 
also wanted to provide for the plurality of the country.  Though determined to maintain 
the territorial integrity of the nation the Nehru era was ‘a period when India’s central 
state was relatively well institutionalised and leadership strategy, though firm, was also 
flexible and accommodating to demands for self-determination’.323   
 
The Constitution as discussed above gave strong powers to the Centre to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the country as well as the political might to deal with any regional 
or communalist threats.  As well as those emergency powers, Articles 2, 3 and 4 gave 
the Parliament in Delhi extensive powers to organise and demarcate states as they 
desired, allowing the national legislature ‘by law to admit a new state, increase, 
diminish the area of any State or alter the boundaries or name of any State’ without the 
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need for any consultation or consent with the parties involved.324  The new Government 
inherited from the British a set of provinces that were multi-lingual and seldom 
conformed to ethnic concentrations.  Congress had always been committed to 
reconfiguring the States on more credible lines of language and ethnicity to reform the 
internal map of India.  However, with the trauma of Partition and the need for a 
centralised authority to maintain order and implement much needed India-wide 
economic planning, Nehru was reluctant to feed any fissiparous tendencies by 
redrawing the map.   
 
Nehru, though having sympathy, was worried that this would create secessionism and 
erode a national consciousness producing a ‘boiling cauldron of redistribution all over 
India’.325   Nehru and the Cabinet were forced to deal with demands, especially from 
linguistic groups, for separate recognition as federal units.  The first major agitation 
came from the Telegu speaking areas of South India (the second biggest language group 
in India after Hindi).326  In the early fifties they clamoured for their own state to be 
formed from the Telegu speaking areas of the former princely state of Hyderabad and 
the British created Madras Presidency.  In 1952 a fast unto death was begun by Telegu 
leader and Gandhian disciple Potti Sriramalu for the establishment of Andhra Pradesh 
as a Telegu State.  His subsequent death from starvation aroused riots and violence in 
Southern India and the State of Andhra Pradesh was conceded and formed on linguistic 
lines.  The action compelled the ‘frazzled’ Cabinet in New Delhi to rethink their 
intransigence towards the redrawing of State boundaries and similar agitations from 
other linguistic groups hastened the establishment of the States Reorganisation 
Commission in 1953.327   
 
The Commission reported back in 1956 and the States were realigned largely on a 
linguistic basis and the process continued with gradualism in the later Nehru years and 
beyond.  Importantly the Commission did not advocate any changes to the Centre-State 
relations provisions but predicted that the reorganisation would serve India’s “unity and 
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security”, which it did.328  The 1956 States Reorganisation thus tweaked and fine tuned 
Indian federalism to be better able to contain India’s pluralism without diminishing the 
Centre’s omnipresence.  The process also showed that local leaders wanted to retain 
both their cultural prerogatives and active membership of the Indian Union ‘in a manner 
that contributed to the durability of federalism’.329   As Manor argues, Nehru’s fears of 
the erosion of central authority and secessionism proved unfounded.  Though a country 
of India’s size and diversity constantly faced social pressures from various groups for 
recognition the fact was that like other cleavages in India ‘it quickly became apparent 
that the States Reorganisation had undermined and not intensified linguistic group 
assertiveness … Linguistic fervour waned.  Given such heterogeneity within linguistic 
states [such as subregional groups, castes, economic groups, sects etc], it would be 
impossible to generate the kind of state-level solidarity that was needed to develop 
secessionist movements.  It was this central reality that Nehru and writers who had 
foretold the balkanisation of India had failed to see before 1956’.330  
 
India’s form of federalism tended to localise and somewhat mitigate regional problems 
by segmenting them within the state arena.  India’s federal packaging combined with its 
multi-stranded pluralism is essential to maintaining solidity since they compartmentalise 
potential conflict to the regions with an omnipresent Centre to intervene if necessary.  
As Weiner states, India’s ‘social structure and constitutional forms thus combine to 
quarantine violent social conflict and political instability at the state level’.331 In 
addition, Nehru emphasised the importance of integration and cohesion and strove to 
establish the conventions regarding the appointment of State Governors the State 
concerned was always consulted despite being a Central non-elected choice and that 
‘only persons from outside the State were appointed’.332  Despite Nehru being initially 
and naturally concerned that he might be catalysing further partitions he eventually 
‘recalculated that the dangers of not devolving power to linguistic groups were greater 
than of doing so.  Fully in control at the national centre and widely considered to be 
India’s legitimate leader, Nehru set firm limits on what powers the newly constituted 
states would have and what would be controlled by New Delhi (which, by the way was 
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substantial)’.  The States Reorganisation took a ‘fair amount of the separatist steam’ out 
of movements emanating from the Tamil nationalists for instance who received a State 
largely based on linguistic lines in 1956.333     
 
Nehru and the Cabinet had not compromised the territorial integrity of India or 
weakened the power of the Centre in the Indian federal system – but had largely 
accommodated the plethora of social forces of plural India and upheld their ideal of a 
composite nation with a co-operative federalism protected and conserved by the Centre.  
This federal interpretation was ‘largely determined by … Nehru.  He was responsible 
for expanding and crystallising the role of the Centre’ and also providing assurance to 
the regions.334  Though not without its problems, India has achieved a consociational 
existence through its federal structure, which in turn required ‘the contribution of 
prudent and constructive leadership in the development of successful power-sharing 
system’ and Nehru, as Lijphart assesses ‘is an almost perfect example of such 
leadership’.335  Federalism, though far from perfect, was cemented in this period and 
was a lasting path-dependent influence upon India.  Though many today argue that 
India’s system needs reforms, ‘few would see any practicable alternative’ to 
federalism.336  The critical importance of India’s inimitable federal design was 
fundamental as a path dependent factor that has enabled India to function as a credible 
and cohesive entity to this day.  
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5 
“British is Best” – An Elite Faith 
 
In contrast to the fissiparous tensions that characterised the colonial experience in India, 
the small island of Ceylon seemed to gently and courteously accomplish its own 
independence with the minimum of fuss on 4 February 1948.  Ceylon’s cultural 
conditions at first seemed at variance with its vast northern neighbour.  Not only 
Britain, but the Ceylonese political elite also, sought continuity for the new Dominion.  
In fact many ‘dignified’ elements of British culture remained.  “God Save the King” 
was retained as the National Anthem, the Union Jack flew next to the Ceylon flag on 
public buildings, Imperial Honours were still bestowed (with great interest), Ceylonese 
debutantes were still presented at Buckingham Palace – and there were also key 
personnel who stayed in their posts and thus ensured a smooth and reassuring transition.  
Along with senior military, judicial and civil service personnel – the Governor of the 
Crown Colony of Ceylon, Sir Henry Monck-Mason-Moore, was retained and translated 
on independence into the first Governor-General of the Dominion of Ceylon.   
 
More importantly the first Prime Minister, D.S. Senanayake, and the Cabinet were 
seasoned politicians who were instrumental to the hand over of power and with their 
long governmental experience and participation (and education) were actively 
conditioned and acculturated in the constitutional conventions required in British eyes 
for a successful and peaceful political future.  The outward confidence and signs of 
peace, prosperity, bespoke suited patricians at the helm, and the amicability of the 
transfer of power disguised the vast heterogeneity of people and tensions that would 
radically test the country in the years to come.  The decade following independence 
demonstrated the constitutional and political pressures, which tested the wisdom of 
Ceylon being a model state.  Ceylon has for almost all its history been a multi-ethnic 
society.  According to the 1953 census there were eight million people that inhabited the 
island. The Sinhalese comprise about seventy per cent of the population and are mainly 
Buddhist, living in the south and centre of the island, while eleven per cent are Ceylon 
Tamils who are mainly Hindu, living in the north and east. The Ceylon Tamils are 
distinct from the Indian Tamils, brought in by the British to work on the tea plantations. 
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Other smaller groups include the Muslims and the Burghers, descendents of Portuguese, 
Dutch and British marriages with the Ceylonese.337 
 
The constitution that Ceylon received at independence was preceded by seven other 
constitutions drafted between 1801 and 1947, and was the ‘product of colonial legal 
evolution.’338  The importance of this point is crucial in viewing and analysing the 
impact and accommodation of the British system in Ceylon as an implanted 
Westminster.  Although British culture with its ‘dignified’ apparatus was foreign to the 
masses, it was familiar to and accepted by the political elite.  The constitution of 1947 
with few alterations was the product of the recommendations of the Soulbury 
Commission 1944-45 and hence the first constitution of independent Ceylon, which 
lasted till 1972, was generally known as the Soulbury Constitution.  As South Asian 
scholars have noticed, unlike India, Ceylonese ‘governments and legislators made no 
attempts, soon after independence, to frame a new constitution themselves.  During the 
first quarter-century after independence, the constitution under which the country was 
ruled was that written substantially by a British constitutional lawyer in the years 
leading up to the transfer of power.’339  Ceylon displayed the dignified tenets of 
Westminster, but would fail to grasp the mastery of the efficient parts of Westminster 
when it came to operation of executive power.    
 
How Ceylon and later Sri Lanka dealt with this legacy has been subject to enduring 
controversy.  In comparing the three constitutions that Sri Lanka has had since 
independence, one of Sri Lanka’s most prolific historians has noted that the ‘most 
striking feature’ of the Soulbury Constitution ‘was that it came closer to the 
Westminster model than most other Commonwealth constitutions’ and unlike India or 
Pakistan independence was legally conferred through ‘a mere Order-in-Council’ rather 
than through an Act of Parliament.340  Though the sovereign reality of Ceylon’s 
independence was in no way less than its larger South Asian cousins, there were distinct 
differences in the style and manner of independence such as the resistance to calls for a 
constituent assembly or any alacrity whatsoever towards republicanism or anti-British 
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sentiment from the political elites.  Ceylon aimed to be a truly British Westminster and 
not an adapted Westminster as was the case in most transplanted and implanted 
countries.  
 
One of the reasons Ceylon developed strong attachment to British culture and favoured 
the Royal Commonwealth was due to the fear of its large northern neighbour 
dominating the subcontinent.  For Ceylon and also Pakistan in this era, if India was not 
countered by the Commonwealth she would be unrestrained from pursuing hegemony in 
the region.  The Ceylonese Foreign Secretary, Sir Kanthiah Vaithianathan, said that 
‘Ceylon’s real interest in the Commonwealth was to have the United Kingdom’s 
support as a counterweight to India’.341   
 
The Soulbury Constitution succeeded the Donoughmore Constitution, which was in 
operation from 1931 to September 1947.  The key features of the Donoughmore 
Constitution was that it established (in the year that Statute of Westminster was passed 
in London) universal adult suffrage (Ceylon became the first Asian country to enjoy this 
boast342); abolished communal representation, which was replaced by territorial 
representation; transferred large control over internal policy to elected representatives of 
Ceylon; and established a system of executive committees.  Despite provisions for 
certain areas of legislative and executive power reserved for the Imperial power, the 
measures were substantial and as the Colonial Secretary eulogised at its passing in 1947 
it was an ‘experiment in adult suffrage and in responsible democracy, and it contributed 
much to the political maturity and drive for effective democracy of the people of 
Ceylon’.343  The Donoughmore Constitution determinedly rejected communal 
representation and did not suggest any alternative (such as federalism) to contain 
communalism.  This noble attempt to achieve national unity by means of constitutional 
reform that entailed the abolition of communal representation stirred growing distrust 
and resentment amongst the communities.  Interestingly, the Simon Commission and 
the Round Table Conference were formulating schemes for electoral and constitutional 
safeguards for minorities in India at the same period as the Donoughmore 
Commissioners were rejecting such a system of communal representation in Ceylon and 
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pressing for national integration and territorial representation.344 Significantly the 
minorities protested in the Legislative Council against the abolition of the electorates.345   
 
This distaste of the Donoughmore commissioners towards communal representation 
was completely in line with Westminster axioms.  However, the system of executive 
committees was not.  Instead of the ‘conventional’ quasi-cabinet structure, which 
aspiring local politicians sought and expected on the path to self-government, these 
bureaucratic-legislative committees of the unicameral State Council were modelled on 
the London County Council and were explicitly meant to give experience in 
administrative and political affairs, through the seven committees of this difficult and 
novel system.346  The Donoughmore Constitution was radical since it did not seek to 
replicate Britain’s model especially since there was a ‘non-existence of party system’, 
on which Britain’s was based.  The Commissioners could ‘detect few signs in the 
political life of the Island to make us confident that parties’ would function as in Britain 
and instead be based on ‘racial or caste divisions’.347  This contrast made the 
Commissioners agree that it ‘must be our aim not slavishly to follow the forms and 
practice of the British model which was not designed to meet conditions similar to those 
obtaining in Ceylon’.348  However, the Donoughmore Constitution rather than 
materialise to foster a national non-communal spirit in fact served to intensify elite 
domination as the only actors capable of grasping what was a still a foreign concept to 
most of the population.  The new constitution though hardly Westminster gave local 
leaders ‘positions of authority unimaginable in most of Britain’s colonial possessions’ 
since they were a trusted westernised elite long competent as servants of the Crown.349 
 
The Soulbury Constitution that followed was the result of a commission headed by Lord 
Soulbury in 1944-45 to consider a new constitution for the colony.  Britain after the fall 
of Singapore and the goodwill, wartime participation and effective delegations of 
Ceylonese politicians conceded that self-government would arrive after the war.  The 
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main constitutional tenets of the document which became with few alterations the 
constitution of Ceylon was universal suffrage; a bicameral legislature – consisting of a 
House of Representatives of 101 members of whom 95 were directly elected from 
territorial electorates and a Senate made up of 30 members – 15 elected by proportional 
representation by the Lower House and the rest appointed by the Governor-General on 
the advice of the Prime Minister; and the establishment of a Westminster Cabinet i.e. a 
parliamentary executive spawned from the legislature though selected by the Prime 
Minister and appointed by the Governor-General as the King’s Representative.   
 
Ceylon was a parliamentary unitary democracy and constitutional monarchy – a model 
of a British Westminster not of adapted Westminster, which had conspicuously more 
safeguards and was generally federal in character.  The constitution, as shall be shown 
below at the political executive level, had little to condition itself to the Ceylonese 
context.  The premise was that ‘the British and the Sri Lankan elites believed that the 
Constitution and political life would be animated and restrained by the customs and 
conventions which surround parliamentary democracy in Great Britain’.350  In the 
sixteen years of the Donoughmore Constitution, which criticised the absence of political 
parties and yet did little to foster their growth by concentrating power in committees, 
rather than a legislature – it had at least recognised the difficulty in the mere replication 
of the British Westminster model.   
 
However, the Soulbury Commissioners almost with resignation believed like the local 
elite that “British is best” and that it was the most suitable model for Ceylon.  The 
Soulbury Report could state that their British model inspired constitution was 
recommended because ‘the majority – the politically conscious majority of the people of 
Ceylon – favoured a constitution on British lines.  Such a constitution is their own 
desire and is not being imposed upon them’.  The report’s conclusion continued with 
what in hindsight seems like constitutional and cultural carelessness in the approach to 
applying the British Westminster model to Ceylon, hoping that the Ceylon elite’s 
cognisance and affectation of British culture would mitigate the paucity of political 
appreciation amongst the Ceylonese of the efficient operation of Westminster 
institutions: 
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The Constitution we recommend for Ceylon reproduces in large measure the 
form of the British Constitution, its usages and conventions, and may on that 
account invite the criticism so often and so legitimately levelled against attempts 
to frame a government for an Eastern people on the pattern of Western 
democracy.  We are well aware that self-government of the British 
Parliamentary type, carried on by means of a technique which it has taken 
centuries to develop may not be suitable or practicable for another country, and 
that where the history, traditions and culture of that country are foreign to those 
of Great Britain, the prospect of transplanting British institutions with success 
may appear remote.  But it does not follow that the invention of modifications or 
variations of the British form of government to meet different conditions 
elsewhere will be any more successful … At all events, in recommending for 
Ceylon a Constitution on the British pattern, we are recommending a method of 
government we know something about, a method which is the result of very 
long experience, which has been tested by trial and error and which works, and, 
on the whole, works well. 351   
 
The Soulbury Report thus concluded that since it worked well and for centuries in 
Britain it was more than good enough for Ceylon.  It was Britain or bust.  But beyond 
the minority of the charmed circle of the island’s political and social elite this was not 
accurate for Ceylon’s path to independence.  The constitution and the independence 
process had not captured the national imagination and thus its new negotiated 
constitution lacked populist and nationalist rapture to endear its contests to the wider 
population.  S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, a former secretary of the Oxford Union, 
acerbically captured some of that sentiment after he resigned from the first Cabinet: 
 
Then came freedom.  But how did freedom come?  It came not after a fight upon 
definite principled policies and programmes, but it really came in the normal 
course of events, that is, attempts to persuade Commissions sent from England 
to grant this little bit or that little bit extra, and, finally, in the wake of freedom 
that was granted to countries like India, Pakistan and Burma, our Soulbury 
Constitution was altered to extend to us the same type of Dominion Status. 
There was no fight for that freedom which involved a fight for principles, 
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policies and programmes which could not be carried out unless that freedom was 
obtained.  No.  It just came overnight.  We just woke up one day and we were 
told, “You are a dominion now”.352 
 
Cabinet – A Dignified Façade of Factional Operation 
On the day Ceylon achieved its independence from the British Empire the first Prime 
Minister of Independent Ceylon, D.S. Senanayake, broadcast proudly to the nation that 
‘for the first time for a thousand years we have today become a free and united nation’.  
Unlike the romantic nationalism that his counterpart, Nehru, had expressed in his 
address on India’s tumultuous and fierce road to independence just months earlier, 
Senanayake was purposefully moderate and reassuring.  With an eye to India no doubt 
the avuncular Ceylonese Prime Minister continued that with Ceylon’s path to 
independence ‘there are no refugees crossing Elephant pass, the Ceylon Light Infantry 
is organising a party to welcome its Colonel-in-Chief, and the only explosions we shall 
hear will be those of the fireworks.’  Senanayake accurately expressed Ceylon’s status, 
from his point of view, when he stated happily that independence ‘had been achieved 
without bloodshed and with no more controversy than was to be expected in so 
complicated and delicate a process as the framing of a new Constitution.  That we owe 
in part to the British people.  They have taken longer than we wished, and I for one have 
had to say hard things about them in the past, but they have lived up to the liberal 
traditions of a great people’.353  Senanayake was proud of the constitutionalist method 
of his country’s independence and concurrently the British Westminster system that this 
implied, rather than adapting for Ceylon peculiar circumstances.  Ceylon with pride and 
diligence maintained this constitutional concert.   
 
As the Prime Minister explained to his people, in language that the former colonial 
power could only approve of, ‘the King is no longer merely King of the United 
Kingdom, acting on the advice of his British Ministers.  He has also become King of 
Ceylon, acting on the advice of his Ceylon Ministers.  You will find that for the first 
time he and not the Governor or Governor-General is part of our Parliament and that 
executive powers are vested in him in order that they may be exercised by the 
responsible Government in office for the time being.’354  The close relationship between 
the Governor-General and Prime Minister and the executive powers vested in their 
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offices would be fundamental to all aspects of Ceylon’s post-independence politics as 
will be seen in chapter six.  This dualist relationship of duopolistic connotations would 
go far beyond the parameters of Westminster ‘efficient’ operating culture and 
overshadow the Cabinet – which, similarly, was not operating according to collegial 
Westminster values and attitudes despite its ‘dignified’ Westminster façade. 
 
[D.S. Senanayake was] to repeat the figure of speech so frequently used then, the 
architect of Ceylon’s freedom.  What he built, what he was responsible for 
constructing on behalf of the elite whom he represented so remarkably well, was 
a new façade with a burnished brass plate on the door: Free Ceylon.  It was the 
outward and visible sign of all the elite had been pressing for since 1910.  The 
structure raised by the British remained intact; inside there was some 
rearrangement.  A number of Ceylonese previously relegated to rooms without a 
view moved higher up; they could stride the corridors of power with more 
confidence and even peer out of the commanding heights of the structure.  The 
new façade was impressive; it delighted those who filed in and out of the 
building as the new VIPs … The Ministers in the Cabinet of 1947 could feel … 
that they had all they wanted and more.355 
 
Rather than feel some liberating cathartic desire to reform or recreate their implanted 
constitution, the new elite sought the Westminster embrace.  The early Cabinets of 
Ceylon showed a definite inclination towards doing things the “British way” in terms of 
ceremony and royalty the new Dominion showed the Bagehotion ‘dignified’ British 
culture par excellence.  A leading politician was able to impress Britain after 
independence with the assurance they should ‘think of Ceylon as a little bit of England’ 
and with foolhardy confidence gushed that ‘Ceylon will rival Australia as the first 
Dominion to rally to the side of the Mother Country’.356  Though not quite the feeling of 
the entire elite and Cabinet, it was not hyperbole either.  The Cabinets at least until 1956 
were dominated by the elite whose affluence, education and social backgrounds 
engendered them to find congruence with the British cultural way.  The Soulbury 
Report recognised this: 
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It must be borne in mind that a number of the political leaders of Ceylon have 
been educated in England and have absorbed British political ideas.  When they 
demand responsible government, they mean government on the British 
parliamentary model and are apt to resent any deviation from it as “derogatory to 
their status as fellow citizens of the British Commonwealth of Nations and as 
conceding something less than they consider their due”.  To put it more 
colloquially, what is good enough for the British people is good enough for 
them.357  
 
However, what the Commissioners and the elite blithely ignored was that what worked 
in Britain would not necessarily work in a country that lacked, for all its affection for 
British culture, a thorough working knowledge and participation of the ‘efficient’ 
mechanics of Westminster operational culture.  Ceylon enjoyed the trappings of 
monarchy, which had always been part of its culture.  D. S. Senanayake liked to claim 
that Elizabeth II was the latest in the long and ancient line of Sri Lankan monarchs.  Sir 
Ivor Jennings commented on the inference –  
 
A good deal of ingenuity is required to prove the apostolic succession from 
Prince Vijaya to Queen Elizabeth, but nationalist history is not less influential 
through being romantic as the story of King Arthur and the Knights of the 
Round Table.358 
 
The Ceylonese had a genuine affection for the Crown, but the Queen was always Queen 
of England to the masses.  The trouble was that the idea of the Queen of Ceylon was 
almost entirely an elite conception.  Though legally correct, it was difficult to explain 
that an English Queen was actively part of the Ceylon constitution and not merely taken 
from a book of fairytales demonstrating the dangerous fantasy of the Ceylonese elite in 
thinking they were some latter day Rajas of the Round Table.       
 
The first four Prime Ministers were all schooled at one of the two leading Colombo 
colleges, wealthy landowners, high caste Buddhist Sinhalese359 and all studied, with the 
exception of the first, at Oxford or Cambridge.  They all had gained their political 
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training through many years experience under colonial tutelage in the auspices of the 
pre-independence legislature and all except the relatively youthful Dudley Senanayake 
had also had extensive tenure as ministers during the Donoughmore era.  They all had a 
long apprenticeship in the legislature before gaining the seals of office as Prime 
Minister – S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike twenty-five years, D.S. Senanayake twenty-three 
years, Sir John Kotelawala twenty-two years and Dudley Senanayake the shortest, but 
still substantial period of sixteen years.360   
 
The Ceylonese Cabinets 1948-1958 also contained considerable common 
characteristics.  More so than Britain and the transplanted New Westminsters cabinet in 
Ceylon in these years was demographically ‘somewhat federal’ in deference to the 
plurality of the island. Though consideration was given to the heterogeneity of 
nationality, caste, religion and region the Cabinet was remarkably homogenous at least 
until 1956 in terms of wealth, high social status, elite Christian denominational or 
government secondary schooling and often further education in Britain.  Though till 
1956 there were generally nine low-country Sinhalese, two Kandyan Sinhalese, two 
Ceylon Tamils and one Muslim in Cabinet reflecting an element of composite 
arrangement the common elite social and economic background of these men belied 
their symbolic diverse representation.  An example of this exclusivity was of the men 
who served in the first Cabinet two were from Oxford, four from Cambridge, six from 
the University of London, four from the Ceylon Law College while all but one attended 
one or other of the country’s leading secondary schools.361  When D.S. Senanayake 
provided a memorandum on the high and ‘dignified’ cabinet doctrine of collective 
responsibility he furnished his paper, using the constitutionally ubiquitous Jennings’s 
assistance, with laudable examples from the administrations of such ancient 
Westminster luminaries as Viscounts Melbourne and Palmerston and the Marquess of 
Salisbury, which would have found resonance with most of his Cabinet colleagues – 
especially the Oxbridge ones.362  That said, no matter how often British Westminster 
traditions were voiced it was more to display erudition and comfort than to put in to 
practice or develop to meet the unique needs of the Ceylon polity. 
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The Ceylonese elite that composed the early Cabinets were very much like their 
transplanted cousins with the depth of knowledge, education of the British Westminster 
system and even the outward signs of dress and social niceties.363  They happily acceded 
to the implant and admired the felicity and authenticity with which the British had 
planted their own institutions in to Ceylon.  Sir Oliver Goonetilleke smugly proclaimed 
in the New York Times in 1952 that ‘Ceylon is the best job the Englishman has done 
anywhere in the world, almost better than in his own country’.364  For elite figures like 
Goonetilleke, there was truth to this sentiment.  Ceylon’s peaceful path to independence 
and readiness to accept Britain’s sponsorship was in contrast to India and Ceylon’s 
leading figures were happily cognisant of British Westminster, which they did view as 
merely continuing the colonial axioms. However, there were serious differences 
compared to transplanted countries with their well-established mechanics of a party 
system and the associated elite and mass awareness of how the formal Westminster 
institutions were ‘efficiently’ operated through informal conventions and an operating 
culture of attitudes and values that had evolved spontaneously or accidentally, but were 
as important to a Westminster system as the ‘dignified’, symbolic culture associated 
with its ceremonial rather than operational aspects.   
 
The Westminster fixation of centralisation coupled with the nascent, urban and elite 
dominated parties’ failure to extend organisationally around the country disabled the 
ability to spread institutions and endow local knowledge of government.  One scholar 
has labelled this a serious ‘failure of political integration’ and argues that the ‘elite/mass 
discontinuity, rather than the Sinhalese/Tamil discontinuity, is the principle cleavage in 
the polity in Sri Lanka’ of that early period.365  Due to the lack of cohesive national 
mass movement and fragmentary nature of existing associations most parties were 
formed in anticipation of the 1947 elections.  The Donoughmore Constitution’s State 
Council, as discussed above, did not engender cabinet or party loyalties or practices.  As 
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Jennings explains the constitution, which Ceylon had until 1947 ‘was designed to suit a 
legislature without parties and therefore actively discouraged then’.366   
 
Unlike Britain or India, the parties that gained power did not have experience, were not 
well established and lacked party discipline more functioning around leaders.  As such 
most parties at the time were ‘stamped by the idiosyncrasies of their dominating 
personalities’ since almost ‘no party institution is well enough established to resist the 
characteristics and peculiarities of its leaders’.367  The United National Party (U.N.P.) 
for instance was formed just a year before the out of the rubble of ineffective 
organisations such as exclusivist elite Ceylon National Congress and essentially became 
the Senanayake family party and was known as the “Uncle Nephew Party”.  The 
conservative and intensely moderate Ceylon National Congress was founded in 1919, 
but waited until 1942 to advocate independence.368  The Sri Lanka Freedom Party was 
very much the personal creation of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and it was only constituted 
in 1951 on his disgruntled resignation from the Senanayake Cabinet.369    
 
Most other parties were ‘based on either communal or social divisions, though some 
were little more than cliques led by dominant personalities’ and most, including the 
U.N.P., offered little in the way of a detailed manifesto instead in concentrated on 
personal attributes.370  Despite being led by Senanayake, the U.N.P. was unable to gain 
a majority in 1947 to govern alone, requiring support from minor parties including the 
Tamil Congress and Independents.  Cabinet therefore was more a grouping of factions 
surrounding the leader than the vanguard of the majority party as in most New 
Westminsters.  With minimal party institutionalisation Cabinet lacked the collegial, and 
yet disciplined attitudes and values of Westminster Cabinet culture.  
 
Cabinets and parties were during the ten years after independence a collection of 
discernible followings and loyalties.  Unlike India’s post-independence Cabinet there 
was no party oligarchy of well-established leaders.  The heterogeneity of Ceylon and 
cosmetic depth of the party system in the early years meant that the power and necessity 
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associated with cabinet membership was often used, though mindful of its powerful 
representative function in Ceylon, for personal interests of the leader.  As W. Howard 
Wriggins has stated –  
 
In a country where personalities play such an important role, cabinet loyalty had 
been enhanced where the widespread popularity of the party’s leader becomes, 
to some extent, a substitute for a party organisation and program.  No doubt in 
the three elections in independent Ceylon, certain M.P.s had been brought to 
parliament on the coattails of the three elected prime ministers.  This was true in 
the popular upsurge of emotion toward Dudley Senanayake in 1952 and 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1956.  There are relatively prominent men who are 
likely to be cabinet material in any event, but it is a significant fact that there are 
those who have entered parliament and even become ministers primarily because 
of their close association with the prime minister rather than from any other 
identifiable source of political strength.371 
 
With such use of patronage and personal followings the politics of Ceylon was more 
akin to eighteenth-century Westminster than the twentieth-century Westminster.  Two 
distinguished British visitors observed as much.  On the day of independence Patrick 
Gordon Walker wrote from Colombo to his Labour Cabinet colleagues that socially and 
politically ‘Ceylon is a mixture of feudalism and eighteenth century landed aristocracy’ 
with leaders who with their wealth, local power and influence were ‘comparable to a 
Whig landlord in George III’s time.  They have much the same attitude towards politics.  
Public life is riddled with affable and open corruption, moral and otherwise’.372  While 
ten years later the Conservative Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan recorded in his diary 
from Ceylon with perspicuity that ‘no regular Party system on modern British lines has 
developed’ and instead ‘in a curious way, the political life is more like that of Whig 
politics in the eighteenth century than one would suppose.  The leading figures have a 
“following” (like the Bedfords or the Rockinghams)’.373  Such analysis was in tune with 
the reality of the close confines of a parochial political class solidified by kinship and 
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patronage rather than party and professionalism.374  As one dissident Ceylonese 
communist stated in 1968, himself a cousin of Mr. Bandaranaike, the political power 
system in Ceylon was ‘a game of musical chairs by which a Bandaranaike (S.L.F.P.) or 
a Senanayake (U.N.P.) can alternatively come to power’.375   
 
Such politics is natural when the cabinet and party system is embryonic and as such 
Prime Ministers and leaders rely on followings, which in such a society as Ceylon is 
often family, rather than the Westminster leanings on cabinet and a rigid disciplined 
party.  The Westminster places the burden of power upon the Prime Minister with the 
expectation that he or she will be supported through a party system by a Cabinet of 
colleagues but this was not available in the early years in Ceylon as the party system 
was based essentially, as one substantial study puts it, on the premise that parties are 
based on ‘a group of ambitious men who have chosen politics as a vocation and who 
seek personal success’376, rather than the traditional disciplined loyalties of the 
twentieth-century Westminster model of  organised parties.  Ceylon’s Westminster 
system of Cabinet government functioned without the fundamental factor of an 
entrenched and comprehensive party structure instead relying on personalist factions.  
This in turn led to Cabinet as institution operating in a culture of attitudes and values 
that differed markedly from the Westminster model and was more like that of British 
Cabinets in the eighteenth century that predated the institutionalised party system that 
became a feature of most twentieth century Westminsters. 
 
Patronage and personalised power was the key in this era to maintain loyalty rather than 
party authority.  For instance even during the relatively tranquil and unchallenged era of 
the first Senanayake ministry, 23 of 101 members of the elected lower house held 
government office, which as Wriggins explains ‘is no doubt excessive’ for Ceylon’s 
size and yet ‘the extreme diversity of the island’s people, the multiplicity of interests to 
be represented, and the tendency for followers to rally around an individual  rather than 
a party suggests that it was an expedient  move at the outset’, which created a precedent 
followed by all his successors.377  In the U.N.P. and S.L.F.P. leaders emerge like in the 
old British Conservative Party, without any consultation with lesser and lower elements 
of the party.  Even the prominent smaller parties were very much the creations and 
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creatures of their leaders such as the Communists under Dr S.A. Wickramasinghe, Dr 
N.M. Perera’s L.S.S.P., S.J.V. Chelvanayakam’s Federal Party and G.G. 
Ponnambalam’s Tamil Congress.378    
 
This political tendency towards personalised, leader-follower factionalism often meant 
levels of disunity within the Cabinet and sometimes Parliament also especially after the 
death of D.S. Senanayake, whose stature as the independence leader clouded this 
feature.  Dudley Senanayake’s first ministry was occupied with rupture over the 
succession with Kotelawala and his supporters; Kotelawala’s abrasive personality 
angered many within the Cabinet; while Bandaranaike’s coalition Cabinet were highly 
restive and divided over the many controversial policies and domestic crises that faced 
his brief government.379  However, though Prime Ministers may have had to make 
concessions to groups at times, due to the absence of true party accountability theirs was 
a delegative democratic power direct from the people, which enabled them to go over 
the heads of their parliamentary colleagues and party members to the electorate, where 
they derived their real political power (they also became a prisoner of such expectations 
of the electorate especially over issues like communalism, which will be discussed 
below).  The system, which Westminster model assists, is leader-centric.  The patronage 
ridden and factional nature of Cabinet and Party Government during this era meant that 
in Ceylon –  
 
The role of primus inter pares is difficult to fill.  Power and deference tend to be 
drawn away from the equals into the hands of the outstanding leader, a fact 
which makes it all the more difficult to succeed to his place.  Disputes between 
colleagues could often be resolved only by the party leader himself.  He became 
the dramatic focus of organisational loyalty and public interest.  In all parties, 
whoever was conceded to be the leader was given a wide scope for policy 
initiative.  The rank and file did not presume to have views that counted; by their 
competition, members of the entourage, including cabinet colleagues, ensured 
that the prime minister had the last word.380 
 
This lack of Westminster culture of collegial attitudes and values based on shared 
institutional attachment to a party rather than personal loyalties to a leader meant a 
                                                 
378
 Jupp, Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy, p 100 
379
 See Wilson, “Ceylon Cabinet Ministers 1947-1959”, pp 14-44 
380
 Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, p 149 
 126 
higher level of political instability and difficulty to make strong political and policy 
decisions as will be shown in the following chapters.  It also meant that there was 
minimal horizontal accountability within the cabinet to prime ministerial authority.  The 
Ceylonese political leaders saw cabinet as place of patronage and were not acculturated 
to Westminster Cabinet collegiality that was even evident in Nehru’s India.  In the 
formative years of Ceylonese independence it was the relationship between the 
Governor-General and the Prime Minister, which formed the real and crucial focus for 
executive power and analysis.  
 127 
6 
Executive Affairs – The Ceylonese Partnership of Convenience 
 
The colonial legacy, the absence of institutionalised modern democratic like established 
parties and activist civil society of mass understanding meant that power was more 
often personalist and delegated.  Executive power in Ceylon in its first decade centred 
on, and was delegated to, the Governor-General and Prime Minister rather than the 
more traditional Westminster focus on Prime Minister and Cabinet.  The first decade 
following independence produced a unique relationship between the Head of State and 
Head of Government that dominated the deliberations of state like few other 
Westminsters.  Horizontal accountability existed on these political actors from each 
other, but seldom in the traditional theoretical Westminster sense.  A partnership arose 
and oscillated in power terms between the Governor-General and Prime Minister 
depending on the holders and political circumstances, but their political partnership 
always impacted on Ceylon’s Westminster executive more than any other. 
 
Head of State 
His Majesty’s Government of Ceylon took almost ostentatious regard to preserve and 
present to the world that it would be a Westminster system – and a British one at that.  
In fact along with all the ceremony, dress and panoply associated with royalty, the 
Governor-General was referred to, and not in jest, as Rajjuruwo 381 (Sinhala for King) 
while resident at Queen’s House, the palatial seat of the colonial rulers since Dutch 
times.  This was in contrast to Nehru’s India, which wanted to rapidly topple its 
Dominion status and embrace republicanism.  Indeed D.S. Senanayake would proudly 
claim to his fellow Prime Ministers that Ceylon was the oldest monarchy in the 
Commonwealth as George VI was the legitimate and constitutional successor of the 
Kandyan kings.382   As the prime author and authority on the Ceylon constitution, 
Jennings himself stated of the new constitutional structures, ‘what is provided, in short, 
is constitutional monarchy of the British type’.383  However, the constitution, unlike 
Britain’s, specified to a great detail the expectations and powers of the Governor-
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General as the King’s Representative and constitutional Head of State.  How much 
could the “British type” headed by the Governor-General function successfully in 
Ceylon and act, as in Britain, as the constitutional arbiter and guardian?  The 
expectation was that the Governor-General would follow the precedents in Britain of the 
Monarch.   Lest there be any doubt of that intention the constitution explicitly stated in 
Section 4(2) of the Ceylon (Independence) Order-In-Council, 1947 that 
 
All powers, authorities and functions vested in … the Governor-General 
shall…be exercised as far as may be in accordance with the constitutional 
conventions, applicable to the exercise of similar powers, authorities and 
functions in the United Kingdom by His Majesty.384   
 
During the period analysed there were three Governors-General – Sir Henry Monck-
Mason-Moore (1948-49), Viscount Soulbury (1949-54) and Sir Oliver Goonetilleke 
(1954-62).  Moore had been the last Governor and had a long career in the Colonial 
Service; Soulbury headed the Commission that bears his name and had been a British 
Conservative Minister before and during the War; while Goonetilleke was deeply 
involved in the transfer to power, and was the first High Commissioner to the United 
Kingdom, President of the Senate and Minister of Home Affairs amongst other high 
positions – they were thus all men with considerable experience who knew the country 
and its Constitution well.  The constitutional provision cited above sought to mitigate 
the nascent nature of the constitutional apparatus and the lack of familiarity and history 
of the conventions, which Britain, and not Ceylon, had evolved.  However, as one legal 
scholar noted, though the Governor-General of Ceylon was legally required to act in 
accordance with the constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom, he is still ‘the 
ultimate authority in a particular situation of what the conventions is, and the manner of 
its application’ and has the power to adapt to local situations since he only needed to 
follow British conventions ‘as far as may be’ and his actions could not be held to 
account by any court of law.385   
 
In many respects the powers, prerogatives and expectations of the Ceylon Governor-
General would be greater than the nominal ruler they represented at Buckingham 
Palace.  Even Dr. N.M. Perera, the erudite radical Marxist member for Ruwanwella, 
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who opposed the “sham independence”, recognised in the House of Representatives that 
the Governor-General ‘must … be a sort of beacon light that will shed lustre and light in 
our social and political life’.386  The Soulbury Constitution gave on paper substantial 
powers to the head of state vis-à-vis the executive and legislature.  Along with 
customary powers of a Westminster head of state, the majority of which are exercised 
on the advice of the Prime Minister, such as being Commander-in-Chief, summoning, 
proroguing and dissolving of Parliament and the appointment of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet as well as senior judicial, military and civil service officers, the Ceylon 
Governor-General had certain unique powers.   
 
The Governor-General was given the power through the Constitution to appoint half the 
Senate and most importantly six members to the House of Representatives.  Such 
provisions of selection were seen from certain angles as an opportunity to include in 
Parliament some of the country’s many ethnic, linguistic, regional, social and religious 
groups, since the traditional Westminster-derived electoral system could not otherwise 
deliver to the legislature representation of the these many interests on the island.  Sir 
Henry Moore, while still Governor, writing to the Colonial Secretary on the proposed 
Soulbury Constitution, believed that his future powers as Governor-General would 
mitigate minority qualms since there would be ‘much less of communal feeling if we 
could secure a reasonable representation of community interests in the Upper House and 
in the Cabinet’ and as such suggested that he receive ‘Royal Instructions on the subject 
in making his nominations to the Upper House, even if he is to exercise no discretion in 
the appointment of Ministers’.387  This clearly showed the veteran proconsul’s mind in 
regard to the Governor-General’s future powers.   
 
The Senate and the Governor-General’s discretion of appointments to that House and 
the nominated members to the lower house were hoped by officials like Moore to 
appease the eloquent, but aggressive demands from the Tamil leader, G.G. 
Ponnambalam, for protected representation of minorities arguing in reaction to the 
Westminsteresque Soulbury Constitution for “fifty-fifty”, the equal division of 
representation in the legislature between the Sinhalese and other communities.388  A 
previous Governor, Sir Andrew Caldecott, had argued that they should have Royal 
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Instructions, as in British India after 1935, which would allow the Head of State in 
appointing the Cabinet ‘to use his best endeavours, in consultation with the person 
likely to command a majority in the Legislature, to select those, including so far as 
practicable members of important minority communities, who would inspire 
confidence’.389  However, no such “Instructions” ever materialised and the Constitution 
did not provide such interpretations of emphasis in regard to the theoretical and 
practical employment of the Governor-General’s powers of appointment.   
 
Prime Minister 
Unlike most transplanted examples, the Constitution of implanted Ceylon explicitly 
mentioned the office of Prime Minister.  Part V of the Constitution expressly mentions 
members of the Cabinet and Parliamentary Secretaries, the Head of the Cabinet to be 
the Prime Minister, the observance of the principle of collective responsibility to 
Parliament, and for such members and Secretaries to hold office during His Majesty’s 
Pleasure.  The Order even stipulates that there must be a Minister of Finance and a 
Minister of Justice.  Other than the stipulation that at least two ministers, one of whom 
shall be the Minister of Justice, must come from the Senate the Prime Minister’s power 
of appointment and patronage is unencumbered constitutionally in the assignment of 
portfolios and personalities from parliament.390  Uncommonly, and most likely to do 
with Senanayake’s pledge to maintain Ceylon’s strategic and defence capabilities for 
British and Commonwealth interests,  the Constitution also instructs that the Prime 
Minister is in charge of Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of External Affairs.391  
 
If one can call that stipulation an adaptation to local conditions there were no other 
formal constitutional allowances for Ceylonese circumstances such as communal seats 
at the Cabinet table.  Though the first Prime Minister and most of his successors were 
very much in favour of the British system, the Ceylonese Prime Minister was certainly 
‘not under the same express legal obligations to follow British conventions, as the 
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Governor-General is’392 and thus not subject to such high constitutional horizontal 
accountability.  The Constitution established formally responsible cabinet government 
very much in the Westminster mould. However, this did change the crucial detail that 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet were institutions of government ‘which was alien to 
Ceylon in October 1947’, when D.S. Senanayake formed his first Cabinet.393  As has 
been discussed in the previous chapter, along with minimal analogous cultural 
education for the electorate to embrace and understand such theories and bodies, the 
whole experience of British rule had not even adequately prepared the colony to 
encompass Westminster cabinet government. The previous quixotic Donoughmore 
Constitution, as discussed above, did not provide for such political institutions, but had 
individualist ministries with key powers still held by colonial officials and the Governor 
himself, rather than a proto-executive or Cabinet-in-waiting.  Even Jennings weakly 
admitted that ‘it is not possible to change a tradition by Order in Council, but the new 
Constitution did its best’.394  
 
In many ways Ceylon’s independence was a personal transaction between the British 
and D.S. Senanayake.  After the marginalisation of Sir Baron Jayatillike in the late 
1930s, Senanayake became the premier politician on the island and with O.E. (later Sir 
Oliver) Goonetilleke as his able assistant, cannily negotiated the terms of independence.  
The British decided that with Senanayake at the helm they had a safe assurance of 
Ceylon remaining in the Commonwealth and access to the naval base at Trincomalee 
and Royal Air Force station at Katunayake, which were viewed by senior British 
military and political sources as highly integral to Britain’s defence planning in the 
uncertain post-war era.395  The British saw that ‘without Senanayake’s cooperation, 
power in Ceylon would undoubtedly fall into the hands of extremists and all that His 
Majesty’s Government and Ceylon stood to gain by the new Constitution would be 
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lost.’396  Senanayake’s sponsor Soulbury wrote to the Colonial Secretary for further 
concessions for Senanayake and argued that there was a danger of power leaving the 
pro-Britain, moderate, but ageing Senanayake and finding a home with the nationalist, 
leftist exponent of non-alignment that Bandaranaike represented and starkly warned that 
‘it would not be wise to exclude the possibility of finding him [Senanayake] in the same 
camp as Mr Bandaranaike being driven there in an effort to preserve his own 
leadership.’397 Senanayake implied this fear when on the same day he wrote that he 
could lose his majority to the leftist nationalists since ‘I am already being accused of 
having offered too much and asked too little’.398  In the end as in India, Pakistan and 
many of the future African states like Ghana, the British effectively entrusted the 
sovereignty to one man – D.S. Senanayake.  Gordon Walker, representing the British 
Government at the Independence Day celebrations, recorded pleasingly that 
‘Senanayake is in the genuine tradition of Dominion Prime Ministers: deeply committed 
to the British connexion’.399  
 
The First Era of Delegative Democracy 
With the undoubted kudos of achieving independence, Senanayake was a powerful 
Prime Minister.  The above fact was one of the main sources of Senanayake’s political 
powers – rather than being the leader of a political party as in most comparable 
situations in the Commonwealth, since his party, the U.N.P., unlike Congress for 
example in India, was not a well established or well-organised hegemonic political force 
with grass roots support.  But Senanayake, as he was to the British, was a reassuring 
politician to the masses and Parliament.  Irrespective of his constitutional status of 
Prime Minister he was “Father of the Nation” and drew confidence from that image that 
his successors could not, since they, more than he, required the powers of office derived 
from the Constitution.  But more importantly Senanayake was the first man invested 
with the powers over the new Dominion and thus he had the political ascendancy and 
delegated democracy from which he derived institutional security, which his successors 
lacked to such a degree.400   
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Senanayake was able therefore to be largely effective as he was the dominant 
personality and ‘he did not so much dictate as he arbitrated between the wings’, but 
with his ‘popular support and an appeal approaching charismatic … in the end he could 
always impose his will’.401    In the period of analysis Ceylon had four Prime Ministers 
– D.S. Senanayake (1947-52), Dudley Senanayake (1952-53), Sir John Kotelawala 
(1953-56) and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (1956-59).  The personalities of these holders of 
the premiership and their relationship with party and cabinet are highly essential in 
understanding the powers of their office in the institutionally nascent years after 
independence – and also demonstrate certain cultural characteristics that discriminate 
Ceylon from the other Commonwealth countries at the executive level. 
 
As discussed above, the vast majority of the Governor-General’s powers are subject to 
the advice of the Prime Minister, which is stipulated in the Constitution under Section 4 
(2).  However, there are some areas that allow certain manoeuvrability – the apex of 
these personal prerogatives is the appointment of the Prime Minister.  In the traditional 
Westminster system it is the two-party system that transacts the business of Parliament.  
The Queen’s role is to offer the premiership to the person who holds the confidence of 
the lower house.  In transplanted countries this is invariably the leader of the party who 
numerically controls a majority of seats over the opposition – with two parties this is a 
relatively automatic decision of simple arithmetic leaving little discretion or difficulty 
for the Head of State to decide on who to bestow a commission to form a government.  
In implanted countries the party system at the time of independence is relatively 
embryonic and far from two established parties – there is generally a plethora of 
factions masquerading as parties with little cohesion and discipline that is expected 
from their cousins in the settler Dominions.  Even India had at least the security of the 
Congress’s dominance until the present day, which made a simple choice for the 
President.  The nature of Ceylon’s party system as analysed above was characterised by 
the novelty, incidence and irregular nature of parties during the period of analysis were 
such that the Governor-General’s disbursement of the seals of office is not so 
explicable.  It did not help that none of the major parties, including the U.N.P., had any 
reliable or formal machinery of electing leaders, which added to the political ambiguity 
and uncertainty that surrounded the succession to D.S. Senanayake.402     
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Indeed Ceylon’s very first commission to become Prime Minister was offered by Sir 
Henry Moore to D.S. Senanayake despite the blatant psephological fact that his party, 
the United National Party, after the General Election of August-September 1947 did not 
hold an absolute majority in the House of Representatives.  However, Senanayake’s 
appointment to form a ministry was largely without controversy as Moore had 
commissioned the person best able to command the confidence of the House.  Such 
constitutional conduct from the Governor-General was in spite of the dissimilarity to the 
usual British experience, but was in line with Westminster conventions, which the 
Ceylon Governor-General was constitutionally bound to honour.  Remembering that in 
the respect of constitutional conventions Ceylon was quite a legal abnormality 
compared to the other Realms.  Jennings contends that though it is ‘entirely satisfactory 
… to have established the formal law as in Australia and to leave the conventions to be 
implied’, in Ceylon it ‘had to be established by law’ and thus the country was peerless, 
since its Constitution ‘specifically provides for the application of the constitutional 
conventions of the United Kingdom’.403  For all the implicit and explicit emphasis on 
Westminster conventions the quandary of their interpretation, and more importantly 
application, was prominent in this period from the Governors-General and Prime 
Ministers themselves. Those two offices had three crucial partnerships that 
demonstrated the flexibility and difficulty of Westminster conventions as well as the 
complexity and fluctuation of horizontal accountability in Ceylon.   
 
The First Partnership: The Soulbury Compact with the Senanayakes 1949-53   
Lord Soulbury, with his old friend “D.S.” safely ensconced at Temple Trees, the Prime 
Minister’s Official Residence, with meagre prospects of office under an unwelcome 
Labour Government back home, must have relished the vice-regal opportunity to return 
to the Island and succeed Sir Henry Moore, who stayed on for just a year, as Governor-
General in 1949.  Soulbury back in Ceylon could indulge, as he enthused, in his 
aesthetic savouring of Ceylon’s renowned ‘traditions of art and architecture and 
literature and thought that in bygone centuries made her people famous’. 404  However, 
if the masses and political elite thought that this bemonocled sartorial English aristocrat, 
with impeccable credentials for the post, would quietly spend his years on the island 
rummaging through the ancient ruins of Polonnaruwa and act from Queen’s House with 
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the impartiality and correctness as is the convention of that high office and as he himself 
stated ‘keep out of politics and refrain from any activities which may give rise to the 
suspicion of political influence…’, they were to be greatly mistaken.405   
 
Senanayake and Soulbury were very close since the days when the former Conservative 
Minister visited as head of the Commission to deliberate on Ceylon’s constitutional 
future in 1944-45.  They bargained well with each other during the Commission’s time 
and understood the importance of their political relationship as trusted allies and 
enjoyed their weekly informal meetings as Prime Minister and Governor-General.406  
They had an intimate relationship and though Soulbury was very much the junior in this 
partnership he was not an ignorant or insignificant partner.  As he himself stated of their 
political partnership: 
 
It was my duty in accordance with constitutional usage to accept and act upon 
his advice, but he was always ready to listen to advice from me, though of 
course he did not always take it nor did I expect him to … sometimes however I 
used to tell him that the only advice he really ought to accept was the advice that 
his doctor and I gave him…407 
 
Unquestionably the most important event of Soulbury’s tenure was the death of 
Senanayake and his role in the appointment of his successor to the premiership.  
Soulbury had a good relationship with the anglophile elite that dominated Ceylon at the 
time, especially due to his previous role in heading the Commission that had his name 
and his advocacy in the House of Lords and Whitehall for Ceylon’s independence.  In 
Soulbury they saw a true custodian of the constitution and a ‘dignified’ upholder of the 
“British way”, which they so readily empathised and mimicked.  Many also saw that at 
this stage only an Englishman, above the petty differences of the locals, could maintain 
standards and order.  And yet as James Manor argues, ‘the first major violation of the 
conventions of Westminster to occur in the island was the work of an Englishman’408, 
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none other than Herwald Ramsbotham, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., O.B.E., M.C., P.C., first 
Baron, later Viscount, Soulbury in the County of Buckinghamshire. 
 
On 21 March 1952 Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake suffered a stroke and fell from his 
horse during an early morning ride on Galle Face Green, and after being taken to 
hospital, died the next afternoon.409  Soulbury had only recently arrived in Britain, but 
hastened to return to Colombo, where the Chief Justice Sir Alan Rose, was Acting 
Governor-General, and under strict instructions from Soulbury that in the event of 
Senanayake’s death (unbeknown to most, the sixty-seven year old diabetic was dying 
before the incident) Rose was not to appoint a successor until the Governor-General’s 
return five days later.410  On his return the choices that lay before Soulbury for the 
office of Prime Minister were Dudley Senanayake, the late Prime Minister’s forty-one 
year old son and Minister of Agriculture and Lands and Sir John Kotelawala, Leader of 
the House of Representatives (a position locally regarded as de facto deputy Prime 
Minister – though constitutionally, like Britain, there was no official post of deputy 
Prime Minister), Senior Vice-President411 of the ruling U.N.P. and nephew of D.S. 
Senanayake.  According to certain sources Kotelawala, the most experienced member of 
the Cabinet after the late Prime Minister and who deputised for him in his absence, 
commanded the support of the majority of MPs of the U.N.P.412  While Dudley 
Senanayake seemed to have a ‘melancholy aversion to politics’ and was relatively 
inexperienced, critically he had the active support of his kinsman’s powerful Lake 
House press.413  Soulbury wasted no time on his arrival to carry out his duty – as he saw 
it.  Manor describes the controversial and rapid events: 
 
Lord Soulbury’s plane landed at 12.35 pm on 26 March and he drove straight to 
Queen’s House … He held no consultation of any substance with any Member 
of Parliament, and at 1.55 pm, less than an hour after the Governor-General had 
reached the residence, Dudley Senanayake arrived.  After a 45-minute interview, 
the latter proceeded to the Cabinet room nearby where he met for ten minutes 
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with ministerial colleagues.  He then returned to Queen’s House to accept 
formally the summons to be Prime Minister … By calling a man other than the 
one who could command the majority of the ruling party’s MPs, he [Soulbury] 
had breached one of the most fundamental conventions of Westminster.414 
 
Even a British Governor-General did not apply Westminster conventions.  Why had 
Soulbury done so?  Various sources believe that he was ‘completing his great 
transaction with D.S. Senanayake’, whom he greatly admired and was beholden to for 
his present post that was offered over a ‘long talk on the lake at Bolgoda.’415 The Prime 
Minister, advised Soulbury, whose appointment was directly recommended by 
Senanayake, that should anything happen to him he should send for his son to lead the 
government, rather than Kotelawala.416  Soulbury had always publicised how his old 
friend “D.S.” was almost ‘irreplaceable’417 and perhaps the son was as good a substitute 
as possible.  To many it seemed that Soulbury ‘had paid off his debt’ to D.S. 
Senanayake.418  Whatever the conjecture, the events were highly extraordinary and the 
massive controversy that was generated was warranted.  The action, with its lack of 
formal consultation and disregard for precedence and dereliction of the constitution 
itself was utterly against the Westminster system.  As Kotelawala threateningly 
reminded his constitutional head, the Governor-General, his constitutional duty was to 
appoint the leader who could command the widest support in House.  Before the 
appointment of the younger Senanayake but with rumours of the prospect gaining 
credence, Kotelawala stated unequivocally to Soulbury: 
 
If you should now contemplate to act on any other basis, it is my painful duty to 
have to point out that such an act would constitute a serious breach of 
convention, besides setting up an utterly unacceptable constitutional precedent, 
that the Governor-General can make or break an established political Party by 
exercising his discretion in any method other than the conventional practice 
referred to … [After his listing his senior positions as Leader of the House in 
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which capacity he had presided over the Cabinet in the Prime Minister’s 
absence, and as Deputy Leader] … I claim that there should be no delay 
whatever in my being summoned to form a Government.419  
 
Soulbury, by appointing Dudley Senanayake, who at 41 was the youngest Prime 
Minister in the Commonwealth at the time, left Kotelawala with few options.  He could 
have forced a caucus vote of confidence on the new Prime Minister, but such an action 
would cause undeniable rupture to the U.N.P., which on its own lacked an absolute 
majority as the party would be facing a General Election very shortly.  Open revolt was 
unquestionably difficult in the visible and genuine midst of peasant and parliamentary 
panegyrics in honour of the “Father of Independence”, whose son now carried the 
mantle.  Soulbury had also delivered the initiative to Dudley Senanayake.  There was 
one other option, Kotelawala, a seasoned member of the national legislature, who had 
held ministerial rank since 1936, may have contemplated appealing to Section 4 of the 
Constitution – which as stated above clearly commanded the Head of State to exercise 
power “in accordance with the constitutional conventions, applicable to the exercise of 
similar powers, authorities and functions in the United Kingdom by His Majesty.”  The 
unprecedented contention surrounding the appointment of Dudley Senanayake was 
clearly not in congruence with the conventions of the Crown and confirmed the lack of 
Westminster culture.420   
 
However, despite the potential case Kotelawala could have raised, there was no recourse 
to bring into question Soulbury’s actions since the same constitution ‘provided that no 
act or omission on the part of the Governor-General shall be called in question on any 
court of law or otherwise…’421  Therefore the very hopes of the Constitution on such 
questions could not be utilised, despite the intention that what were practices in other 
Westminster countries, were in Ceylon ‘laws and not conventions’ since as two eminent 
constitutional scholars wrote (before the incident) the country ‘had never known 
conventions so there was much to be said for giving the additional moral authority of 
legal enactment’.422  Kotelawala had no ability to legally challenge the Governor-
General’s astonishing use of legalised convention.  The injured politician eventually 
agreed to return to and serve in his relative’s Cabinet, but not before threatening to 
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withhold the U.N.P.’s funds, which he controlled as Treasurer, leave the country and 
amazingly demand to become Governor-General himself.423   
 
Soulbury himself seems to have tried retrospectively to find constitutional support for 
his remarkable actions.  Just two days after appointing Dudley Senanayake as Prime 
Minister he requested and received the same day advice from another of D.S. 
Senanayake’s great friends, the famous jurist and scholar Sir Ivor Jennings, then Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Ceylon.  Jennings, the shadow author of the 
constitution, had as well as by telephone conversations to Queen’s House defended 
Soulbury’s actions by privately writing to Governor-General’s office that ‘there is no 
obligation on the Governor-General to consult the Leader of the House or anyone else’ 
and went on to point out that there was no compulsion to act on any advice except the 
Prime Minister’s and further justified the delay in Soulbury’s duty to appoint a Prime 
Minister or even an acting Prime Minister.  Jennings continued (alluding to Kotelawala) 
that Soulbury did not have to consult ministers or party leaders and that ‘the Leader of 
the House has no claim whatever to the office of Prime Minister’ and then made the 
courageous, but highly contentious, offer, ‘if the Prime Minister thinks it would help’ 
Jennings was ‘very willing to write an article for the Ceylon Daily News’ to advocate 
the Soulbury-Senanayake position.424 Jennings arguably was colluding with or at least 
absolving Soulbury from his legally and politically unaccountable position. Such 
actions of all the main players evidenced degrees of constitutional inappropriateness and 
inability to commend the system to the country by blurring the constitutional 
responsibilities and roles of the executive actors.  The entire incident demonstrated the 
formidable difficulty in applying the legal and theoretical intricacies of Westminster to a 
foreign land and culture without judicial review of constitutionally defined duties of the 
executive.425  Dudley Senanayake’s first Government only lasted March 1952 – October 
1953, when he was succeeded by Sir John Kotelawala.  
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The Brief Second Partnership – The End of Soulbury and the Ceylonese friends Sir John 
and Sir Oliver 1954-56 
Kotelawala was reputedly the author of a highly controversial document called the 
Prime Minister’s Stakes 1952, which baldly attacked Lord Soulbury’s actions as 
Governor-General over the appointment of Dudley Senanayake as Prime Minister.  
Soulbury tried, again contrary to convention, to convince the Prime Minister to sack 
Kotelawala sacked from the short-lived Cabinet.426  When the younger Senanayake 
resigned a short time later over food riots Soulbury even questioned Jennings whether 
there was any constitutional way of denying the premiership once more from 
Kotelawala by arguing that the stressed Senanayake was potentially ‘unable to perform 
any of the functions of his office’ including the crucial advice of his successor.427  
Soulbury was naturally concerned with his own job security with the spectre of a new 
Prime Minister who reputedly believed that his meek kinsman Senanayake was ‘be[ing] 
misled by that b… Soulbury’ and was now was now the sole contender.428   
 
Soulbury was compelled to invite Kotelawala as Prime Minister in October 1953 and 
now the new Prime Minister could satisfy his enduring animus against Lord Soulbury. 
Lacking the democratic sanction of being elected the indigenous Head of State has 
ultimately little practical recourse to defend and decide his powers over the wishes of a 
determined Prime Minister who therefore can dissipate horizontal accountability on his 
office from the Governor-General.  Despite being a royalist, Kotelawala demonstrated 
this relationship when after just a month as Prime Minister he commanded the end of 
“God Save the Queen” being played and the Union Jack being flown on official 
occasions.  Lord Soulbury, his old nemesis, wrote that ‘he was very much peeved’ at 
this, to which the Prime Minister responded that there were 
 
… three points that the people of Ceylon are unable to understand.  First, why in 
this free land should there be a foreign Governor-General?  Second and third: 
why should there be an English flag and an English national anthem in free 
Ceylon?  The second and third have been suitably dealt with, which may kindly 
be taken note of.429 
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Soulbury, unsurprisingly, did take “note” and left the island not long after as Kotelawala 
had bluntly reminded the Head of State of the Prime Minister’s sole prerogative to 
advise the Queen on the appointment and dismissal of Her Representative.   
 
Sir John Kotelawala, now Prime Minister, wasted no time in informing the Queen on 
her first visit to Ceylon in 1954 of his wish to have his old friend Sir Oliver 
Goonetilleke as Her Representative, despite some reservations from public figures 
including a member of the Cabinet.430   The two were close socially and had served 
together under D.S. Senanayake for many years.  The former pugilist told Goonetilleke 
that ‘you are going to Queen’s House even if I have to carry you there’.431  Goonetilleke 
was another Governor-General who had high credentials to commend his appointment 
as the Queen’s representative.  He had served his country and the Empire with 
distinction.  This Sinhalese Christian, rare for his middle class origins, rose at a time of 
upper caste dominance to the top of the Colonial Service on the island and helped 
negotiate Independence.  His influence was enough for Jennings to laud how much 
‘Ceylon owes to Mr. [D.S.] Senanayake and to Sir Oliver Goonetilleke.  But for them 
Ceylon would still be a colony.’432  After the grant of Independence, Goonetilleke, 
always fearful of the electorate, was sent to the Senate as its President and served as 
Minister of Home Affairs in the first Cabinet and later returned to the Cabinet table as 
Finance Minister after an influential interregnum as Ceylon’s first High Commissioner 
to Britain.  A Knight four times over, who maintained the colonial livery, ceremonial 
sword and cocked hat of his English predecessors as well as the magnificence of 
Queen’s House, the first Ceylonese Governor-General was confidentially predicted to 
be ‘plus royaliste que la Reine’.433 
 
Kotelawala, perhaps conscious of his sticky relationship with Soulbury wanted a 
Governor-General that was completely on his side supporting him personally and 
politically.  Goonetilleke realised what was expected as one of the wiliest survivors in 
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Sri Lankan history.  Not only was he seen to be the government’s ‘principal 
propagandist’ he was a chameleon as can be indicated by the view, despite his 
anglophile ways, that he was someone who ‘if the Government found it politically 
expedient to create a republic Sir Oliver would find it expedient to become 
President’.434  Notwithstanding his long service to the state he was not a popular figure 
with the masses and his appointment was not greeted with the popular acclaim that one 
could expect for the first Ceylonese Governor-General.  In the beginning Kotelawala 
was commanded by his nominal superior to attend any public ceremony with the 
Governor-General ‘as some kind of insulation against catcalls from the crowds’.  
Kotelawala openly and readily relied on the advice of someone whose long public (and 
party) service equipped him to discuss public and political matters of great sensitivity 
while the Governor-General ‘on his part could deny nothing to Prime Minister 
Kotelawala because Sir Oliver’s elevation to the post of Governor-General was due 
entirely to Sir John’.435   
 
Kotelawala, with his effective dismissal of Soulbury and conspicuous selection of 
Goonetilleke was complying with modern New Westminster practice of pursuing the 
objective of having a not unsympathetic and beholden figure as Head of State.  The 
Governor-General, however, could not prevent a crushing electoral defeat in 1956 
though there were many rumours that ‘he would find some ingenious way of keeping 
Sir John in office’.436 Despite the constitutionally correct transfer of power, Ceylon had 
further and even more exceptional contributions to add to the annals of Westminster 
Governors-General. 
 
The Third Partnership – The Ceylonese Practitioners 1956-1959 
Goonetilleke’s biographer, a senior Colonial Office official, Sir Charles Jeffries, 
recorded the Governor-General’s candid view of the assertiveness of his role. 
 
Sir Oliver frankly admits that he did not feel it his duty to sit in an ivory tower 
and let the Prime Minister of the day take all the risks of governing a country 
that had just emerged from colonial status to independence and was the scene of 
many unresolved political and economic conflicts.437 
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Under the Public Security Ordinance, No. 25 of 1947, and the Army, Navy and Air 
Force Acts, the Ceylon Governor-General ‘is empowered, if he considers it necessary in 
the interests of public security and preservation of public order for the maintenance of 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community, to bring into operation, by 
Proclamation’ to deal with emergencies, such immense potential power is exercised as 
usual are ‘on the recommendation of the Prime Minister’ and require communication 
and continuance with and from Parliament.438  Most Westminster countries have such 
provisions – but seldom are such articles activated.  If ever such dramatic circumstances 
arise it is usually the Prime Minister who assumes the necessary powers – such as 
Churchill during World War II.  The Governor-General, however, like the King, is 
Commander-in-Chief – but as in Britain this had been inferred in Ceylon as a nominal 
role and symbolic title.  At the very end of our analysis of Ceylon – a decade after 
independence – a state of emergency was proclaimed in 1958 due to serious communal 
rioting between Sinhalese and Tamils which engulfed the island.  Rather than a 
Churchillian Prime Minister coming to fore to deal with the crisis it was the Governor-
General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, who effectively lead and dealt with the crisis.  As 
Wilson dispassionately and accurately describes the dramatic period, the Governor-
General – 
 
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke functioned as Commander-in-Chief, giving directions to 
the armed forces and civilian officials, shifting troops to troubled areas, using 
ships and aircraft to transport refugees, and acting as the national censor with 
regard to the publication of news in the daily press.  Evidence indicates that in 
the first few weeks of the emergency, the cabinet system broke down, ministries 
were unable to function, conferences even of ministers and the Prime Minister 
were summoned by the Governor-General at Queen’s House … Sir Oliver 
Goonetilleke had not only become supreme commander of the country’s armed 
forces but its sole administrative head.439 
 
In 1956 the U.N.P. had been heavily defeated and many expected that the radical and 
populist coalition under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike would establish a new and more 
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sympathetic resident at Queen’s House to replace the former U.N.P. minister.  However, 
the nationalist republican Bandaranaike kept the sly and experienced Goonetilleke on, 
and the Head of Government and Head of State carried on the tradition set by the first 
constitutional duo of lunching every Wednesday and would forge a new partnership. 
The constitutional chameleon Goonetilleke quickly adapted to the new regime and as 
the new Prime Minister generously explained to the House of Representatives in August 
1956: 
 
… I think it is a mistaken idea to imagine that the Governor-General’s post is 
purely a decorative post.  It all depends, of course, upon the individual who 
happens to be holding that post.  I think it is only fair on my part to say that the 
present Governor-General works pretty hard, and that he has placed his 
knowledge, experience and powers which he constitutionally uses at the full 
disposal – as indeed constitutionally should – of the present Government.  His 
Excellency has been most helpful on almost every occasion in assisting the 
Government, in so far as his functions are concerned, in carrying on the 
government of the country.  I think I would be less than fair if I did not express 
my appreciation and that of the Government of the very correct constitutional 
manner in which the Governor-General conducts his functions and for the great 
assistance the Government has received from him on many occasions in dealing 
with many problems…440 
 
Though he was not to know it at the time, the events of 1958 were to prove 
Bandaranaike correct when he mentioned that the office of Governor-General was not a 
‘purely decorative post’, as is often considered in New Westminsters especially the 
transplanted countries.  The Bandaranaike Government had brought in controversial 
legislation, which confronted the country economically and socially.  The energetic and 
experienced Goonetilleke was useful in such a climate because the new government 
‘was short of gifted ministers and needed Sir Oliver’s talents and personal intervention 
with civil servants, high military and police officers and press barons to acceptance for 
the new government.  Sir Oliver obligingly played this role’.441    The most 
controversial and powerful piece of legislation was the Sinhala Only Act, which made 
Sinhala the official language of the country – and legalised its ascendance in 
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government and education over English and Tamil.  This had caused disturbances from 
the Tamil areas and Tamil people, which prompted Bandaranaike to make a pact with 
leaders of the Tamil Federal Party allowing reasonable use of the Tamil language and 
other regional concessions, which in turn angered Sinhala nationalists and led to the 
bloody and chaotic riots that hit the country just ten years after gaining a peaceful 
independence.442   The events unleashed on the country a whirlwind of violence and 
disruption, but would also lead to an unprecedented activist role.   
 
The Fourth Partnership 1958-59 – An Emergency Makes the Governor-General Senior 
Partner  
Goonetilleke himself described the events as ‘a cataract of looting, hysterical public 
killings and rapings which ruined the fair name of Ceylon, known till then as the model 
country in Asia where the Queen’s highway was safe for anybody and where law and 
order prevailed’.443  There was very real tension and the Bandaranaike Government 
were very concerned about maintaining order and even more worried about containing 
and appeasing their constituents who were predominantly the Sinhala Buddhist masses.  
The Governor-General was very much involved with such policy and extraordinarily 
there is at least one recorded instance of him attending a cabinet meeting which he 
believed was his ‘constitutional duty to advise’ – and telling the Cabinet Secretary not 
to record his presence or his one hour monologue to his ministers on how to ‘frustrate 
the Federal Party’s [civil disobedience] campaign’.444    
 
As a contemporary Sri Lankan academic has stated, ‘the 1958 riots were the first major 
outbreak against the Tamils and in many ways a point of no return’.445  The country’s 
politicians and the country’s constitution were not prepared for such chaos.  
Bandaranaike seemed politically paralysed and weary of further raising the ire of his 
followers, many of whom were caught in blood-lusting madness.  Bandaranaike’s “wait 
and see” policy and continued inactivity in the face of the mobs prompted the Head of 
State to summon the Prime Minister and Cabinet and convinced them to advise him 
formally to proclaim a State of Emergency.  The Governor-General already had the 
documents waiting to be signed on the spot, which would create him formally and 
practically as the senior partner.  As a seasoned and consummate Whitehall and 
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Colonial Office Mandarin inquisitively commented on the exceptional circumstances 
surrounding the proclamation: 
 
Normally, in such circumstances, the declaration of a state of emergency, 
vesting executive powers in the Crown, as represented by the Governor-General, 
is made on the advice of ministers, and the ministers then proceed to manage the 
situation under the special powers delegated back to them by the Governor-
General.  But, in this case, the Prime Minister did not, either on the afternoon of 
May 27 or during the next few days, raise the question as to who should handle 
the emergency or give any sign of being ready to do anything about it … [H]e 
never gave his reasons for creating a situation in which the Governor-General 
became the virtual ruler of Ceylon…446 
 
Bandaranaike perhaps realised looking back that the State of Emergency during the 
hartal strikes of 1953, with its mass violence and arson, had compelled Dudley 
Senanayake to resign due to his inability to cope with the riots and the resulting 
personal opprobrium that stuck to him.  Whatever the political machinations, the 
champion of Sinhala nationalism, Bandaranaike, consciously abdicated his powers and 
prerogatives as Prime Minister since as Goonetilleke restrainedly admitted ‘he owed his 
position to a majority of Sinhalese votes cast a general election ran the risk of losing his 
place in public life’, which the unelected resident of Queen’s House did not face. 447   
 
A more critical account believes Bandaranaike was greatly responsible for the crisis as 
he had been ‘seeking to manipulate parochial sentiments for personal gain since the late 
1930s, and his actions since becoming Prime Minister had betrayed a particularly 
dangerous naïveté. He was naïve in thinking that his communalist election campaign 
would not generate invidious expectations among extremists and, when they then arose, 
in assuming that hesitation and inaction would not inflame them.  He was naïve in 
squandering his authority and above all, in his “kid gloves” response to dangerous 
provocations.’448   The burden or opportunity had fallen on the Governor-General who 
wasted no time in assuming direct management of the crisis and invoked the powers of 
what had been thought to be the honorific “Commander-in-Chief” aspect of his office.  
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As the colourful account of the journalist Tarzie Vittachi records the protagonist 
proconsul: 
 
… sitting at a desk with six telephones and papers on it.  He held a telephone to 
each ear.  He did not even look up as we [the press] entered.  We stood inside 
the door as he told the mouthpiece of one telephone – ‘sh-sh-sh-shoot them.’  
That settled, he cradled that telephone and said into the mouthpiece of the other: 
‘O.E.G. here.  Clear them out even if you have to sh-sh-sh-shoot them.’ 
[Goonetilleke then answered the journalist’s questions on the severity of the 
censorship and explained that such measures as detention without trial, 
suspension of habeas corpus and no bail were part of the Emergency 
Regulations.]  ‘By this time not even the most obtuse among us needed a 
diagram to know which way things were going.  But Sir Oliver couldn’t resist 
making the point clear by telling us: ‘Gentlemen. One favour. One personal 
request. When you report the news in future please don’t say that I am running 
the sh-sh-show.  I don’t want all kinds of jealousies to come up you know … 
That made it official.  Sir Oliver was running the show.449 
  
Regardless of personalities and domestic circumstances, the reality was that 
constitutionally the locus of power had moved from Temple Trees to Queen’s House – 
this position was contrary to Westminster practice and precedents and the Prime 
Minister’s abnegation represented ‘a complete misunderstanding of the constitutional 
situation … and without precedent in the recent history of constitutional government of 
this country or of the United Kingdom’.450  Soulbury and Goonetilleke were able and 
took in this critical era the discretion and powers available to them in the constitution 
much further than envisaged by Westminster and British standards.  Arguably they 
harked back to the colonial era, when as one crown servant commented at the time, 
when the ‘powers of the Governor constitute a “paternal despotism”, modified only by 
the distant authority of the Queen’.451 As one South Asian expert has argued, such 
actions from the office of the Governor-Generalship were shaped by the activist 
‘autocratic traditions of the colonial governorship out of which it had evolved’452, while 
                                                 
449
 Vittachi, Emergency ’58, pp 70-72 – This book itself was initially banned in Ceylon at the time of the 
“Emergency”, which led to its publication in London. 
450
 Wilson, “The Governor-General and the State of Emergency, May 1958 – March 1959”, pp 166-167 
451
 Sir James Emerson Tennent, Ceylon – An Account of the Island Physical, Historical and 
Topographical, Vol. II, First Published 1859, 6th edition, Colombo: Tisara Press, 1977, p 680 
452
 Manor, The Expedient Utopian, p 297 
 148 
other specialist scholars have noted that it had become an ‘established principle that 
under the Ceylon Constitution, the Governor-General is the authority in command of the 
armed forces at least in emergency.  His position here is unlike that of his counterparts 
in other Commonwealth countries…’ due to the latitude allowed to the holder in the 
constitution.453   
 
However, the Prime Minister ultimately has the power over the Governor-General’s 
powers.  Lord Soulbury remarked long after retiring as the Queen’s Representative in 
Ceylon that ‘under a constitutional monarchy the Prime Minister of a Commonwealth 
nation is more powerful than he would be in a Republic under a President.  If for any 
reason he wishes the Governor-General to be removed he has only to request the British 
Sovereign to recall him, and his request must be granted showing the insecurity of the 
office and lack of horizontal accountability.  A President however, is usually elected for 
a term of years, and though he may be uncongenial or uncooperative cannot be removed 
speedily or without a possible political upheaval’.454  This was not solely his 
interpretation – other Prime Ministers have believed this and even his predecessor, 
Dudley Senanayake, who as we have seen had reason to be well disposed to Soulbury, 
argued in the House of Representatives that one Prime Minister could not ‘tie down a 
future Prime Minister to the same Governor-General’ and continued that in his opinion 
a Governor-General could carry on for fifty years or a day if the prime ministers in 
office thought fit.455  Ceylon and later Sri Lanka’s flux and instability at the executive 
level and the blurred levels of accountability would prove disastrous in dealing with the 
country’s conspicuous ethnic tensions. 
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7 
Communalism: A ‘Canker’ Ignored? 
 
Few historians, political scientists or politicians ever imagined the vista of divisionary 
ethnic violence and rancour that has beset Sri Lanka with hectoring severity and 
international prominence for the past two decades, and which at present sadly shows 
little sign of subsiding.  The President of Sri Lanka, addressing the United Nations in 
1998 – 50 years after independence – noted on the country’s ethnic conflict between the 
Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority that ‘we have failed in the essential task of 
nation building’.456  And yet rather incongruously the Sri Lankan people enjoyed 
generous social welfare provisions in the country’s early years and right up till the 
1980s, which allowed ‘high rates of literacy, longevity, and good health, more akin to 
those found in the developed world’.457   
 
The failure, unlike India, to deal with communalism in this critical juncture period when 
the issue was manageable is a sad example that had unforeseen consequences.  
Politically, most observers have been struck by the generally peaceful and legal 
alternation of power between the two main parties and a healthy turnout from the 
electorate to deliver or depose a government through the ballot box.  However it is 
communalism that is the undoubted paramount issue that all Sri Lankan governments 
must contend and the resulting hostility has paralysed political and social progress, and 
it is this issue that is indelibly etched into Sri Lanka’s international image.  The issue in 
the 1940s and earlier was mercifully bereft of bloodshed, but nonetheless was a critical 
juncture on which in many ways the prospect and attainment of independence hinged.   
 
The inability of Ceylonese governments in the first ten years to deal effectively with 
communalism, especially by utilising some form of federalism or institutional guarantee 
to minorities had a ratchet effect458 for later years when such options were not so easily 
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available to deal with ethnic divisions.  The political leaders of this era showed a 
remarkable ignorance of communalism as a serious issue and with their commitment to 
short-term political benefit allowed communalism, bereft of real power-sharing 
strategies or institutional and constitutional accommodation, to fester and later reach 
almost uncontrollable levels of state management.  This era is therefore a critical 
juncture period in Sri Lankan history when the short-term decisions taken or not taken 
by Ceylonese leaders long-term had path dependent consequences that would make 
communalism the biggest issue facing Sri Lanka.     
 
The issue of communalism dominated the debate on the constitution.  D.S. Senanayake 
was able through his moderateness, diplomacy and grasp of the initiative able to 
convince his varied countrymen of the need for a united stance to gain sovereignty from 
the British.  Most of the Tamil and other minority elites were appeased and persuaded 
by Senanayake’s argument in 1945: ‘Do you want to be governed from London or do 
you want, as Ceylonese, to help govern Ceylon?’459  In a debate on ethnic distribution of 
seats he buoyantly claimed that ‘I don’t care if they’re all Tamils, provided they are 
elected as Ceylonese’.460  
 
Indeed, except in high rhetoric and political expediency the elites of all the communities 
which dominated the political arena had worked well together.  As K. M. De Silva has 
argued, for the outsider Sri Lanka in 1948 was in contrast to the ‘contemporary 
catastrophes in the rest of the former British possessions in South Asia…an oasis of 
stability, peace and order’.  The biggest issue of communalism, which eclipsed all other 
political issues, seemed solved with the fiery and eloquent leader of the Tamil Congress, 
G.G. Ponnambalam’s entrance into the first Senanayake cabinet, but this was not an 
institutional solution.461   Even before independence it was only on constitutional 
questions with implications for government where sharp communal lines formed within 
the elites in the State Council.  Indeed, two recognised Sri Lankan scholars, one 
Sinhalese and the other Tamil, concluded that voting on most other issues in the 1921-
46 period seldom produced clear communal divisions within the State Council and 
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therefore had relatively weak communal tension.462  Until 1931 Ceylon’s legislative 
bodies had always recognised communal representation for the varied communities 
resident on the island, including Europeans.   
Colonial Questions and Answers 
However, the Donoughmore Commission admitted that ‘not only is the population not 
homogenous, but the diverse elements of which it is composed distrust and suspect each 
other.  It is almost true to say that the conception of patriotism in Ceylon is as much 
racial as national and that the best interests of the country are at times regarded as 
synonymous with the welfare of a particular section of its people’.  Despite such an 
admission, the Commission saw communal representation as a ‘canker on the body 
politic … poisoning the new growth of political consciousness and effectively 
preventing the development of a national or corporate spirit’; it reaffirmed that there 
could be ‘no hope of binding together the diverse elements of the population in a 
realisation of their common kinship and an acknowledgment of common obligations to 
the country of which they are all citizens so long as there is communal representation, 
with all its disintegrating influences, remains a feature of the constitution’.463   
 
The Donoughmore Constitution’s abolition of communal representation, in spite of 
considerable local opposition and consternation, was true to the traditional Westminster 
way.  Ironically, the very act of eradicating communal representation catalysed 
communalism as a political force.  Whatever the date of the beginning of active 
communalism, the Donoughmore Constitution did not exterminate the issue or cause the 
national unifying political consciousness that it hoped to.  This hope of a national 
corporatist spirit, rather than narrow social and sectional interests, was essentially a 
Western British conception that was happily subscribed by the numerically insignificant 
Ceylonese elite.  Indeed the ‘rural masses understood best the language of religion, race 
and culture; Western style nationalism was to them an alien concept.  On the other hand, 
an all-inclusive nationalist movement, such as the one that emerged in Ceylon … was 
                                                 
462
 S. Namasivayam, The Legislatures of Ceylon, 1928-1948, London: Faber & Faber, 1951, pp 60-67 and 
I. D. S. Weerawardana, Government and Politics in Ceylon, Colombo: Ceylon Economic Research 
Association, 1951, p 139  
463
 Donoughmore Report, Cmd. 3131, pp 18-39 
 152 
both artificial and ephemeral.  It was not broad-based; instead it was confined to a 
narrow class of Western-educated gentry’.464   
 
It was this Ceylonese elite that dominated the political landscape and were drawn from 
all the communities.  And it was this Sinhalese dominated inter-communal elite that 
were the sole channel to Westminster and to whom independence was delivered.  The 
indigenous elite and the departing British official and their masters in Whitehall 
crucially rejected what they saw as the parochial atavisms that the communally minded 
masses held.  They were unrepresentative of their communities.  They naïvely 
calculated that the ad hoc community compact reached on gaining independence would 
create a civic nationalism, which would spell the subordination of sectional identity.    
 
The new oligarchy that succeeded the colonial power, euphoric at gaining 
independence, did not acknowledge the changing sensitivities of the society it 
now administered. It had striven for independence for all the country so that all 
could be equal with no need to pay allegiance to any foreign power—swapping 
the durbar for democracy. Exhilarated by the heady ideals of western democracy 
and its veneration of individual liberty, its leaders rejected the stagnant, divisive 
and archaic structure of the old native society. Independence, to their minds, 
would enable their society to enter a new Elysian era. But the modernisation of 
native political power generated its own tensions. The process of forming the 
new state stimulated parochialism, communalism and ethnic rivalry as groups 
competed for their share of the prize of sovereignty.465 
 
The Westminster urge for a secular constitutional framework was blind to the prevalent 
pluralism of Ceylon, which was buttressed by the local elite.  In most New Westminsters 
of the time, such as Australia, South Africa, Canada and India, there had been some 
form of federal adaptation.  However, the Ceylonese leaders showed blindness to such 
examples by thinking they could deal with their divisive polity purely by their 
leadership, preferring the centralised and unitary British Westminster as their model.  
The fragile compromise between Sinhalese and Tamil leaders was ‘based on certain 
implicit premises: the concept of a secular state in which all religious groups enjoyed 
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equal rights, and the gradual replacement of English as the official language by 
Sinhalese and Tamil.  Equal opportunities for both communities would thus be 
provided’.466  The cracks in this delicate unity widened when those elites in executive 
power showed complacency, insensitivity, or even ignorance of the growing tensions of 
their young democracy. The system of democracy implanted to Ceylon activated the 
existing community stresses. Nina Samarasinghe demonstrates that as independence 
dawned, few of the elite in power ‘had perceived or were willing to perceive the 
complex nature of the Ceylonese polity … The minorities would, it was thought, 
accommodate to a measured Sinhalese majority domination over the country. British 
officials shared the same delusion’.467 
 
This “delusion” existed and persisted despite evidence to the contrary.  The 
Donoughmore Commission, which had introduced universal suffrage to the island, 
which incidentally was opposed by almost all members of the State Council468, though 
able to constitutionally abolish communal representation, could not abolish 
communalism itself.  When the Soulbury Commissioners arrived in 1944 they, though 
seeing the agreed failure of the previous constitution to enliven a national polity, did 
little to constitutionally or institutionally answer the concern of communalism and 
instead hid behind the closed window of British Westminster.  The implantation of a 
cabinet-dominated British Westminster unitary not federal parliamentary model with its 
accompanied single member first-past-the-post majoritarian electoral system paid 
distressingly slight heed to local conditions.  Even the London Times declared 
accurately that the Soulbury Commission’s treatment of the very serious communal 
issues in Ceylon was ‘unimaginative’.469  This was as much to do with the narrow 
nature of the Soulbury Commission’s deliberations.  One political scientist characterised 
the process that brought the independence constitution as one that:  
 
… did not come out of a broad-based process of negotiation and bargaining 
between the various ethnic groups on the island.  Instead, it was based on 
discussions between the departing colonial administrators and the Sinhalese elite 
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represented by D.S. Senanayake and the all-Sinhalese Board of Ministers.  The 
first Sri Lanka Tamil joined the Board … at a very late stage in the negotiating 
process.  The negotiations were dominated by Senanayake … and no other body 
was invited to participate in formulating constitutional proposals.  Issues of 
particular concern in a multiethnic state – such as citizenship, franchise, and 
individual and group rights – were not discussed or agreed to by representatives 
of the country’s largest ethnic groups.  The issue of citizenship was left 
unresolved by the British as a concession to Senanayake.  Tamil protests were 
characterised as acts that would delay or obstruct “Ceylon’s march to 
freedom”.470 
 
Communalism was a dirty word in Westminster and as such was almost completely 
ignored in constitutional form and literature.  Sir Frederick Rees, one of the 
Commissioners, commenting that Donoughmore had abolished communal 
representation for territorial representation in a unitary state, admitted that the earlier 
Commission did not fully realise ‘the effect of a Western idea on a traditional structure’.  
Nonetheless, the Soulbury Commission rejected not only the Tamil Congress proposal 
for guaranteed representation for minorities, but also proposals from minority groups as 
diverse as the Ceylon Moors’ Association, the All-Ceylon Scheduled Castes’ 
Federation, the Catholic Union of Ceylon, the Ceylon Malayali Mahajana Sabha, the 
Ceylon Muslim League, the Dutch Burgher Union, the European Community and even 
the Central Fisheries Union of Ceylon, who all with different advocacy and method 
argued for separate and constitutionally provisioned representation in parliament.471   
 
The new constitution, which resulted from the Soulbury negotiations with its 
‘negotiated non-autochthonous nature’, with its elite espousal of western forms of 
democracy, rejection of communal issues, and absence of the mass struggle that 
established India’s leadership, naturally ‘did not capture the national imagination’.472  
The new constitution succeeded in establishing a generic majoritarian Westminster 
system that assumed that the minority were numerically large enough to resist 
dominance from the majority and yet the majority community could easily, and did, 
dominate in the post-independent era especially with the simple legal 
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disenfranchisement of 900,000 Indian plantation workers.  The ‘classic Westminster 
model’ in Ceylon with its aversion to ethnic realities left few guarantees to stem fears or 
promote power sharing.  Indeed after 1956, Sinhalese dominated governments were able 
with their two-thirds majority to simply override the constitution as if to prove the 
Soulbury Constitution’s assumptions wrong and realise minority fears.473  The system, 
as one constitutional scholar argues, was founded ‘assuming the possibility of 
communal harmony without supportive institutional processes … and did not recognise 
indigenous structures’.474 
 
One of the potential avenues for institutional protection of minorities was through the 
Soulbury-established thirty-member Senate.  The Governor-General was empowered by 
the Constitution to appoint Members to the Senate who had ‘rendered distinguished 
public service or be persons of eminence in professional, commercial, industrial or 
agricultural life, including education, law medicine, science, engineering and banking’ 
rather than on community lines.475  This meant in effect that it was rather more like 
Britain’s ‘dignified’ unelected and patronage filled House of Lords than a 
representational assembly to hold the executive to account.  One of the few changes 
from the Soulbury Recommendations the 1947 constitution was the removal the 
Governor-General’s power of appointing Senators at ‘his discretion’, which would have 
enabled the Head of State to potentially appoint minority Senators as Moore had hoped 
and quell minority fears.  Instead the amended subsection in the 1947 constitution 
stipulated that the Governor-General’s powers of selection ‘should be exercised on 
advice’, which in Westminster system translates, as Sir Ivor Jennings concedes, to the 
reality that ‘the Prime Minister now advises appointments’.476  
 
Similar expectations concerned the Governor-General’s ability to appoint six nominated 
members to the House of Representatives.  The Soulbury Recommendations hoped that 
these members would primarily secure representations of Burghers and Europeans, 
communities that would struggle to win an electorate seat.  Section 11 (2) of the original 
Order in Council in 1946 stated that the Governor-General could appoint new members 
                                                 
473
 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Ideology and the Constitution – Essays on Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
Delhi: Konrak Publishers, 1997 p 19,  Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age, p 169 ; de Silva, 
“Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic Rivalry: The Background”, pp 117-118 and Coomaraswamy, Sri Lanka – The 
Crisis of the Anglo-American Constitutional Traditions in a Developing Society, p 11 
474
 Coomaraswamy, Sri Lanka – The Crisis of the Anglo-American Constitutional Traditions in a 
Developing Society, pp 14-15 
475
 I.D.S. Weerawardana, The Senate of Ceylon at Work, Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1955, pp 2-3 
476
 Jennings, The Constitution of Ceylon, p 180 
 156 
‘after every general election to represent any important interest in the Island which is 
not represented or is inadequately represented’, which seems to indicate discretion and 
initiative to the Governor-General.  In 1954 this was amended and published in the 
Gazette to read that if after an election the ‘Governor-General is satisfied that any 
important interest in the Island is not represented or is inadequately represented, he may 
appoint any persons, not exceeding six in number, to be Members of the House of 
Representatives’.477  The key phrase ‘in his opinion’ was replaced by ‘satisfied’ to leave 
less personal discretion at the Governor-General’s hands.  Instead the amended section 
as Jennings again clarifies ‘is quite general and leaves the Prime Minister the discretion 
of advising the appointment of Members’.478   
 
The Senate was one of the few recommendations that the Sinhalese dominated Board of 
Ministers did not approve, seeing it as unnecessary and controversial.479  Perhaps due to 
this the Senate never performed any major constitutional role except as a place of 
patronage.  Prior to its establishment minorities had the ‘belief that it would effectively 
safeguard minority interests, a view which later events would prove wrong’ and was an 
ineffective institutional check.480  Anyway the Soulbury Report wanted a traditional 
Westminster upper house made up of eminent people not sectional and ‘hope[d] that the 
element of communal representation will not figure largely in the composition of a 
Second Chamber’.481  The Senate had no difficulty in passing the controversial 
communal legislation of the era and there were few tears at its abolition in 1972 when 
the country became a Republic.482  
 
In complete contrast to India but in harmony with British Westminster practice there 
was no Bill of Rights that could have allayed minority concerns.  The majoritarian 
Westminster executive’s actions were to be only counselled by an independent judiciary 
and section 29 (2) of the Constitution, which prohibited discrimination on religious or 
community grounds.483  And yet it when it was tested for example in 1953 once the 
Indian Tamils appealed their disenfranchisement to London as Ceylon retained the 
Privy Council as its highest court, the Privy Council ruled that this ‘did not conflict with 
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the non-discrimination clause, Section 29 (2)’ since the Law Lords believed it was the 
Government’s right to determine who and what constituted a community even though 
the Indian Tamils had been considered a community or race since at least the 1911 
census.484  A Bill of Rights was seen as highly unnecessary since the British (and 
importantly Jennings) and the local elite believed that Ceylon ‘would abide by the 
customs and conventions which had developed in Britain through practice and the 
common law to safeguard those rights’.485 As has been argued: 
 
… this proved an oversimplification of the problems that faced modern Sri 
Lanka. Its democratic and constitutional structures were ill-equipped to adapt to 
the divisive consequences of a multi-ethnic society with its pressures of 
regionalism, religion and especially language. The elite of Senanayake’s ilk 
would only be able to stem the tide of ethnic nationalism for so long, even 
though they believed they had secured independence for all and presided over 
the first years of prosperity and peace. The elites’ brand of secular nationalism 
proved incapable of gaining widespread support and reaching the lower strata of 
society. Here the real loyalty lay with kith and kin—an ethnic rather than 
national identity. Secular nationalism was elitist in conception. The elite and the 
British were unable to create a new political culture to acquaint average citizens 
with the demands and responsibilities of a pluralist democracy.486 
 
The British and their implanted constitution, with its inability to marry Western 
conceptions with Eastern realities, relied on the good will of the Senanayake leadership 
to maintain peace and harmony with the minorities, without the need for explicit 
constitutional safeguards.  Though this generally proved correct, subsequent 
governments and Prime Ministers and later still Presidents were under no such 
obligation as was later proved.  Senanayake had argued with the Colonial Office during 
the negotiations for independence that only ‘once the constitutional question is settled, 
communal questions will cease to be relevant’.487   
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This proved to be either a political prevarication to gain concessions or a naïve and 
disastrous expectation.  The constitutional infrastructure was not evident enough to 
relieve minority fears or secure their prominent participation and representation in the 
executive and legislature.  Continuing his exposition in late 1945, Senanayake stressed 
with comparison and conjecture that ‘nor can communal divisions be regarded as an 
argument against Dominion status.  They have not prevented the offer of that status to 
India, where they are much more important’.488  But the Indian comparison can only 
stretch so far since, as was discussed in the Indian chapters, the Indian leadership and 
constitution recognised the plurality of their polity and established constitutional and 
political mechanisms such as the establishment of federated states based on linguistic 
and ethnic lines and a Bill of Rights to accommodate such distinctions. 
The Ponnambalam Critique 
The main proponent of an alternative view was the Tamil Congress leader G.G. 
Ponnambalam.  The noted Tamil orator, known as the ‘pocket Demosthenes’489 outlined 
his argument to the Colonial Secretary in November 1945 for ‘balanced representation’.   
Ponnambalam believed, as did other minority leaders, that the proposed Soulbury 
Constitution with its basis on territorial representation, which would encourage 
communalism rather than end it and would give the Sinhalese ‘an overwhelming 
proportion of electoral power, even more than their numbers would warrant, and reduce 
all the other communities severally and collectively to political impotence’ and had 
‘failed to devise a scheme of representation of its own which would prevent the 
permanent enthronement of a racial majority in the seat of power’.490  Ponnambalam 
critiqued the British Westminster carbon copy since Ceylon was to him not England: ‘In 
England by reason of a common nationality, common political traditions and a common 
language, population is a satisfactory basis of representation; but in a country like 
Ceylon with the population divided by every form of heterogeneity, this basis of 
representation will lead to a negation of representative government’.491   
 
The solution in the Ponnambalam’s mind was that the ‘major community should be 
given a relative majority and not an absolute majority in the Legislature’.  This would in 
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effect mean “fifty-fifty” representation with the Sinhalese having half the seats and the 
rest filled by the minorities and mean in his belief that the Sinhalese would be ‘deprived 
of a primary motive to perpetuate communalism’ and end their potential ‘domination’ 
as a ‘permanent racial majority [that was] unalterable by any appeal to the electorate’.  
Ponnambalam questioned why Ceylon’s minorities received no ‘weightage in 
representation’ when this principle in plural societies has been accepted by ‘His 
Majesty’s Government’ in respect to the French Canadians under the Act of 
Confederation of North America, 1867, Muslims in Cyprus, Māori in New Zealand and 
Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and others under the Government of India Act 1935 and 
elsewhere in the Empire. 492    
 
The Cambridge-educated King’s Counsel did not leave his analysis to be focussed 
purely at the Legislature; he also contended that the executive strata could be the most 
dangerous, with Ceylon’s nascent polity and political juvenility exhibited in respect to 
party and mass participation.   Ponnambalam feared that the proposed structure left 
unaltered would mean that the ‘very apex of the Executive pyramid in the scheme 
accepted by the Commission is the Prime Minister who is without the check of a party 
system, but with the obvious backing of a pliant Sinhalese majority’.  The Prime 
Minister would have ‘unfettered control’ in the choice of ministers, allocation of 
portfolios and the power to ‘demand a dissolution on the threat of an adverse vote.  
Such conditions, Ponnambalam speculated, would mean a Prime Minister could become 
a ‘communal dictator’, with all ministers from the same racial group and all powerful 
since there would not be an effective opposition.493   
 
Once again Ponnambalam’s answer was to have mandatory balanced representation – 
‘composite cabinet’.  Ponnambalam rebuked the Soulbury Commission admission that 
the Cabinet should have minority representatives for not giving any method or formality 
of achieving this.  ‘In the circumstances of Ceylon minority representation in the 
Cabinet cannot be left to convention as in Canada or Switzerland’ Ponnambalam argued 
and contended that ‘only a mandatory provision in the Constitutional Instrument 
reserving for the minorities a specific proportion of the portfolios on equitable lines can 
secure for them this vital right’.  The Cabinet should ‘reflect the composition of the 
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legislature’ and Ponnambalam sought this implementation by i) the Prime Minister 
being elected by the House and thus enjoying its confidence ii) ministers being elected 
by the House on a system of proportional representation by means of the single 
transferable vote and iii) ministers from the minorities being selected by them in the 
first instance.494   After explaining the inadequacy of constitutional protection against 
discrimination and judicial infectivity, the controversial but erudite politician concluded 
that the Westminster assumptions were based on flawed ideals since the previous and 
current Commission supposes that: 
 
… all the conditions and prerequisites … thought … necessary for the successful 
functioning of English Parliamentary institutions are still non-existent.  It 
professes to appreciate the difficulty of applying the principles of Western 
Democracy to Ceylon.  It also admits that the prospect of transplanting British 
institutions to Ceylon with success may appear remote.  Nevertheless because it 
fears that modifications of the British form of Government may not prove any 
more successful it recommends for Ceylon a method of Government of which it 
“knows something about” and which is a “result of very long experience”.  The 
obvious reply to this is that the British method of Government of today is the 
result of the experience of centuries of its working by the British people and 
adapted to their particular genius.  To recommend such a Constitution for 
Ceylon in the face of the experience of the minorities for the last fourteen years 
in the anticipation that certain hopes and expectations will be realised will 
amount to the handing over of the future welfare of a large section of the people 
of the Island to the unfettered control of a permanent communal majority.495            
   
The Westminster constitution for Ceylon acted essentially as a facsimile of Britain’s 
with minimal modification.  As one recent Sri Lankan scholar has written of this 
implantation had crucial inferences for Sri Lanka’s ethnic ‘bifurcation’:  
 
From the point of view majority-minority relations this British modular form of 
the constitutional state had the following implications.  Firstly, the state was 
fashioned as a unitary one with centralisation of legislative, executive and 
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judicial functions of the state.  Any measure of decentralisation was to be found 
only within the system of local government.  Secondly there was no Bill of 
Rights or a Fundamental Rights Chapter in the Constitution.  Thirdly, and linked 
to the second was the absence of explicit provision for judicial review of 
legislation.496  
 
However, the British Westminster way was seen as the only way and the Soulbury 
Constitution and most local senior political leaders were ‘quite pleased with the 
centralised majoritarianism inherent in representative democracy’.497 Despite the social 
heterogeneity, lack of political party system, rising communalism, and substantively 
elitist conception of the state in contrast to the masses’ ignorance of western democracy, 
the Soulbury Commissioners adamantly believed that ‘Ceylon [was] well qualified for a 
Constitution framed on the British model’.498   
   
Ponnambalam’s advocacy generally fell on deaf ears.  Soulbury himself informed the 
Colonial Secretary that the Commissioners, on the Tamil Congress leader’s claim for 
balanced statutory representation, ‘found themselves quite unable to agree to that’.499  
Ponnambalam also refused to budge on “fifty-fifty” even when liberal Sinhalese State 
Councillors offered 60:40.  An authoritative scholar on the subject believes that his 
intransigence stemmed from his ‘unquestioned faith in the imperial government’ and 
that ‘Whitehall would stand by him’ over the heads of Senanayake and the Soulbury 
Commissioners.500  Instead Whitehall, as explained above, listened to Soulbury, 
Jennings and Senanayake and entrusted power essentially to Senanayake as was their 
policy in places such as India, Pakistan, Malaya and Ghana.  Though unquestionably a 
successful leader of the Tamils he by no means represented the panorama of Tamil 
opinion.  Old elite Tamils like Sir Arunachalam Mahadeva and others of similar ilk, 
comforted by their fellow cross-communal grandees supported Senanayake and his 
overtures, while others like future Federal Party leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, thought 
Ponnambalam more interested in merely integrating Tamil with the Sinhalese and a 
sectionalist not a Tamil nationalist.   
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Ponnambalam was viewed as ‘an opportunist’ who was seen after serving under 
Senanayake as ‘someone who would serve another Sinhalese Prime Minister to 
strengthen his own political power’.501  Ponnambalam, mesmerised by the offer of a seat 
in Cabinet took it gleefully, despite reservations from his northern constituents and in 
fact was able to gain irrigation and industrial development for the Tamil region.  It also 
allowed him the chance he always craved of being part of and influencing national 
affairs rather than being purely ‘cramped and cribbed’ by the tapered politics of 
regionalism and ethnicity.502  Ponnambalam’s actions and views showed that Cabinet 
inclusion was not for power-sharing, but for patronage accentuated by a negligible party 
system.  Like many Tamils, Ponnambalam saw cooperation with the Sinhalese and the 
U.N.P. in particular as the best opportunity to achieve Tamil objectives by influencing 
from the centre with positions of power, while others like Chelvanayakam, who 
founded the Federal Party in 1949, took a more contrasting approach by seeing a more 
self-determinist and less centralised unitary path for the Tamils with regional power-
sharing aspirations.       
 
Language, Federalism and Bandaranaike – Opportunity Lost?   
G.G. Ponnambalam’s greatest foe in politics was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and yet they 
were in many respects highly similar and equally capable and controversial politicians.  
These Oxbridge competitors wooed the legislature with their ‘sparkling verbal duels’ 
and extenuated communalism in their communities and ‘found it advantageous to 
exaggerate the threat which the other posed’.  The Governor in the late 1930s, Sir 
Andrew Caldecott, thought they were in some ways ‘covert allies’ due to their cordial 
personal relations, which in turn raised doubt as to their authenticity of their rhetoric 
that was seen by some as purely tactical to gain the support of their rural and lower class 
followers.503  Interestingly, in view of his later ethnically divisive actions as Prime 
Minister, it was Bandaranaike who early in his political career offered a more realistic 
and credible view and solution to Ceylon’s ethnic dilemma than Ponnambalam’s narrow 
“fifty-fifty” scheme, which along with his appeals to the British ‘created an 
unfavourable climate for accommodation’.504   
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Bandaranaike was one of the few politicians to assess the political reality of Ceylon’s 
social milieu and envisaged that the British Westminster style unitary state would not 
cater for a plural society.  In the years preceding independence he criticised the leading 
Ceylonese elite who saw the political vista ‘along the lines of British thought 
unintelligently and without any considerations of the particular conditions of the 
country’.505  Instead Bandaranaike’s early ‘understanding of indigenous social realities 
and his willingness to reject borrowed notions permitted him to move away from the 
model of a single nationality nation towards a pluralist and pyramidical solution’.  This 
was in contrast to the secularist, centralised, pan-Ceylonese nationalism subscribed to 
by the elite and evidenced by the British in their active disdain towards recognition of 
communal representation, which the Constitutions of Donoughmore eradicated and the 
Soulbury one readily upheld.   
 
The problem was that there was no true nationalism sought by the British and elites 
because they chose to see the ‘nation as a monolith rather than a federation of sections’ 
and that nationalism was quite invisible since ‘fundamentally, it was a Sinhalese 
nationalism.  But in their own mind it was equated with an all island Ceylonese 
nationalism.  The whole was unconsciously or consciously subsumed by the part’.506  
Bandaranaike realised and spoke of this in the 1940s and initially saw that the very real 
distinctions of the different communities could be tempered by a ‘pyramid of loyalties’, 
which ‘whilst uniting the Sinhalese, [would] work for the higher unity, the unity of all 
communities’; one experienced social scientist attests that such an arrangement ‘held 
out the best hopes of assuaging Sinhalese-Tamil conflict’.507  Interestingly, this was not 
dissimilar from the theories of the All-Ceylon Tamil Conference just earlier in 1937: 
 
The conception of corporate unity in the minds of the Sinhalese is in the nature 
of a merger, an absorption of the minorities in the major community.  A just and 
more correct idea of an united Ceylon is that of a rich and gorgeous many-
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coloured mosaic set and studded with the diversities of communal consciousness 
within a glorious one-minded solidarity.508  
 
Constitutionally Bandaranaike was the first major politician who provided a solution to 
provide and protect such pluralism.  In 1926, exactly thirty years before he split the 
country over the language issue, he advocated in Jaffna, the political heartland of the 
Tamils, federalism as ‘the only solution to our political problem’.509  Though federalism 
was and still is an issue in Sri Lanka trumpeted by and identified with certain Tamil 
parties, the idea gained its official genesis on the island from the upcountry Sinhalese 
Kandyan National Assembly in 1925.  In relation to their own unique history the 
Assembly volunteered that Ceylon was made up of many nations and that ‘the creation 
of a Federal State as in the United States of America … a Federal System … will enable 
the respective nationals of the several States to prevent further inroads into their 
territories and to build up their own nationality’.510   
 
However, federalism never gained significant Sinhalese support, who favoured the 
unitary centralised system bequeathed by the British, while the Tamil political groups 
themselves had not seriously considered the option until after independence, instead 
favouring power sharing at the central executive and national legislature.  Bandaranaike 
quickly scuttled his bold federalist solution ‘when he realised that it contravened the 
desire of most Sinhalese’511 and galvanised such populism towards the realisation of 
Sinhalese nationalism and concurrently its rejection and replacement of the concept of 
Ceylonese nationalism.  This was a missed opportunity of structural and institutional 
accommodation over twenty years before the critical juncture of independence.  The 
vacuum of power left by the British merely pushed the Sinhalese leaders to mimic their 
former masters’ culture and dismiss the idea of federalism.   
 
This despite the fact that almost all of the New Westminsters had in designing their 
constitutions accepted federalism, including their teeming neighbour across the Palk 
Strait, which had greatly helped provide a method of institutional inclusion for India’s 
plethoric peoples.  Indeed through degrees of territorial devolution, guarantees of 
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personal and individual liberty and facilitation of economic and culture intercourse 
India has accomplished much.  In contrast, today ‘it is increasingly evident that Sri 
Lanka’s unitarism is only a military reality…[while]…Sri Lanka’s much larger and 
potentially more fractious neighbour India has preserved its nationhood by following a 
federalist strategy’, which has been ‘successful in containing ethnic regionalism and 
promoting inter-ethnic cooperation’, unlike its island neighbour.512  
 
The electoral victory of a coalition led by Bandaranaike in 1956 was the great turning 
point not merely within our ten year focus but in Sri Lankan history.  This was the first 
time in the post-independent era in all of South Asia that the governing party had been 
turned out of office by the electorate.  In terms of communalism Bandaranaike’s 
massive victory was the harbinger of government-led linguistic nationalism, which for 
Ceylon is synonymous with ethnic nationalism.  This new Sinhalese-Buddhist 
nationalism rapidly brought down the curtain of secular non-sectional nationalism that 
elites like D.S. Senanayake had idealistically draped over the nation.  Sri Lankan 
nationalism became Sinhalese nationalism513 and vice versa, which had the consequence 
of making the ‘concept of a multiracial polity … no longer politically viable’ since for 
the majority of the country Buddhism and the Sinhalese language held greater emotive 
and populist appeal than the ‘meaningless abstraction’ of a multiracial polity, which 
subsequently led to the marginalisation of minorities from the institutions of state.514   
 
Consociationalist scholars like Ian Lustick have described such situations as ‘control 
democracy’ – a situation where ‘the majority group eschews ethnic compromise with a 
state’s minorities and instead controls the levers of power’, which means in the Sri 
Lankan case ‘the attempt to create a Sinhalese ethnocracy’.515  The ethnic partnership 
and participatory ethos of consociationalism and its stress on accommodation would 
seem to hold an answer indeed ‘given the plural character of Ceylonese society and its 
solid democratic traditions, at first sight the country seems to be a prime candidate for 
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the emergence of some kinds of consociational politics’.516  The advent of 1956 and its 
electoral demolition of the U.N.P.517 and especially the promulgation of the “Sinhala 
Only Bill” to make Sinhalese the official language518 catalysed the ethnic polarisation to 
another, more dangerous level than ever before.   
 
The possibility of consociationalist power-sharing became even more difficult with this 
pan-Sinhalese ministry.  If there had been any doubt before, Ceylon now clearly failed 
in the four power-sharing elements needed for successful consociationalist political 
accommodation and stable democracy in divided societies – i) grand coalition 
governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups ii) 
cultural autonomy iii) proportionality in political representation and civil service 
appointments and iv) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and 
autonomy.519  Post-independent politics would never be the same again – all the major 
mass parties adopted the rhetoric of Sinhala nationalism while the Tamil parties 
increasingly became adversarial and isolationist.  Like the lost opportunity of 
federalism, the inability to foster any positive, meaningful or enduring consociational 
partnerships between ethnic groups during the first decade was a major failing for Sri 
Lanka’s future with path dependent consequences.   As Wilson claims: 
 
In the 1947-56 phase, the language of politics had been on two levels.  On one 
level, the language of Sinhalese Buddhist chauvinism was used on most public 
platforms especially in the villages.  But in Parliament, in the committee rooms, 
in the cabinet … it was a sophisticated nationalism that was emphasised … The 
emphasis was mainly at this level as long as the new forces remained dormant.  
But with the upsurge in 1956, the political diction of chauvinism set the tone for 
all political groupings…520 
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Yet an authoritative account on communalism from the late 1960s concluded that 
separatism, unlike today, was for the Tamils not an objective, but that their aim in fact 
was to work within the Ceylonese polity.   Today, far from the violent secessionist 
tactics of the Tamil Tigers or the active discrimination and reprisals by the periodically 
anti-state Sinhalese J.V.P., the pre-1970s was an era when the communal struggle was 
more democratic.  Communalism of that early era was ‘fought out within the common 
institution of Parliament, where spokesman of both communities argue their causes 
within the same chambers, according to the same rules of procedure, and, although with 
declining frequency, often in the common language of English’.   During this time there 
was only trivial support from Tamils for ‘total political separation’ and negligible 
thought from the Sinhalese ‘to deny to the Ceylon Tamils membership in the Ceylonese 
polity’ – though the Indian Tamils were actively excluded.521  However, the reality of 
the unitary Westminster-sanctioned electoral system ensured the continuity and 
encasement of majoritarianism and exacerbated fraught rhetoric and tension on all sides.  
De Votta argues that in Ceylon’s implanted Westminster electoral system –   
 
where more than eighty percent of parliamentary seats were determined by 
Sinhalese constituencies and Sinhalese politicians were devoid of patron-client 
ties to the Tamils, successive governments were able to conveniently disregard 
legitimate Tamil grievances; on the other hand by being dependent on Sinhalese 
electorates for continued governance, the governments concerned had no choice 
but to pander to the majority community’s demands to perpetuate Sri Lanka’s 
control democracy.522 
 
This electoral truth has limited the scope and opportunity for any consociational 
cooperation.  The elites that have led the two major parties are hindered in any attempt 
to make concessions by the fact they effectively compete for the same electorate.  This 
has meant that despite the cleavages within the Sinhalese themselves, they can still ‘get 
an over-all majority for one group, which one might call “nativist” Buddhist Sinhalese.  
This fact bodes ill for consociational politics, since this majority segment can, if 
properly and monolithically organised, dominate the state through democratic means’, 
which is what has happened at times throughout Sri Lanka’s history.523   
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Perhaps the greatest opportunity lost was the failure to implement the terms of the 
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact in 1957.524  In reaction to the language provisions 
of the Sinhala Only Act many Tamil groups converged on Colombo’s esplanade to 
demonstrate against the government and its policies.  A programme of disruptive but 
non-violent, agitation was promoted by Tamil leaders to emulate Gandhi’s satyagraha 
to convince by extra-parliamentary means the Bandaranaike Government (the first 
Cabinet since independence not to have a Tamil) to accept the parity of Tamil to 
Sinhalese in official language policy.  Chelvanayakam was at the forefront of this 
movement, as was his Federal Party that, as its name implies, advocated for Tamil 
regional units to exist with certain autonomous powers within a federal state.  Though 
the Federal Party did not represent all Tamil opinion they did by their creation 
demonstrate a new approach to communalism, which gained considerable force and 
became the leading Tamil political and parliamentary organ until the 1980s.    
 
The Federal Party formed in reaction to Ponnambalam joining the Senanayake Cabinet 
had key objectives: the creation of a federal union of Ceylon – with two Tamil 
dominated provinces, along with seven remaining Sinhalese provinces; the curtailment 
of all state sponsored colonisation by Sinhalese into the Tamil provinces; the promotion 
of unity among Tamil speakers in Ceylon (not India), meaning Ceylon Tamils, Tamil 
speaking Muslims and the Indian Tamil plantation workers; and the parity in official 
status of the Sinhalese and Tamil languages.525  To defuse the mounting tension, rioting 
and vision of violence in the country Bandaranaike and Chelvanayakam met and forged 
an agreement in July 1957 to placate the political crisis.  The crucial tenet of the 
concord was a measure of devolution and autonomy through regional councils in the 
majority Tamil Northern and Eastern provinces, allowing the Tamils to federalise 
without open federalism.  These regional councils would have power over certain policy 
areas like agriculture, development and education.  Though not quite achieving parity 
across the country the Tamil language would have the status of an official language in 
the above provinces and “reasonable use” in Sinhala-majority areas.526   
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However, civil servants, jealous of their centralised power, obstructed implementation 
while certain ubiquitous Buddhist clerics and their laity joined in droves the Opposition 
U.N.P. who organised marches to protest the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, which 
they interpreted as an attack against the Sinhala nation and the first steps towards the 
break-up of the country.  Dudley Senanayake dramatically offered to ‘sacrifice my life 
to prevent the implementation’ of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact which he and 
J.R. Jayewardene saw as a template for ‘racial division’ and an ‘act of treachery’.527   
 
These reactions ensured the abrogation of the federalising pact in 1958 and contributed 
towards the massive communal violence that the island had never witnessed before in 
its modern history.  This is what happened on many further occasions, including 1965 
when the tables were turned on Dudley Senanayake, when the Opposition, now led by 
Bandaranaike’s widow with Buddhist and Sinhala nationalist support protests annulled 
any chance of his own pact with the Federal Party being implemented.  This 
demonstrates Ceylon’s political paradigm that once in power each of the two main 
parties will attempt to mitigate communal tension to maintain order and ‘yet each will 
beat the drums of communal nationalism when it is in the opposition’, which has almost 
had the effect of decimating any détente or constitutional accommodation that could 
have brought a meaningful settlement and only perpetuates instability, distrust and the 
‘control democracy’ due to the real fear of losing the support of the majority 
community.528 The careerist opportunism of senior politicians from both parties was of 
great detriment to finding lasting solutions to Sri Lanka’s problems and displays the 
path dependent concern that political actors will display ‘short term horizons’ in aiming 
for power since though ‘they may care about the future’ it is ‘short-term considerations 
[that] predominate’, meaning in Sri Lanka’s case securing the support of the Sinhalese 
masses.529   
 
The loose regional devolution attributed to the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, 
though described by Chelvanayakam as an ‘interim adjustment’530, was a real and 
creative response to tranquilise communal tension and maintain a unitary state.  Though 
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not quite federalism, the idea could have served to ‘compartmentalise friction’ and 
‘deflect hostility from the central government’ by giving community voice within the 
bounds of state.   Yet those who attacked the idea of federalism accusing such proposals 
as leading to secessionism have only hastened such ideas.  As De Votta argues ‘the 
irony is that these forces continue to clamour against the very mechanisms that provide 
the only viable alternative to maintaining their cherished goal – a united Sri Lanka.’531  
The attempt in 1957 was, judging from the hindsight of today’s troubles and extremist 
positions, which could have enabled democratic cohesion and sense of collaboration.  
As one international South Asian scholar has argued ‘the B-C [sic] Pact … provided for 
a generous degree of regional autonomy for Tamil areas within the existing framework 
of the unitary state.  It safeguarded the position of the Sinhalese while meeting the 
needs of the Tamils.  Had it been implemented, much of the tragedy that followed in 
succeeding decades would have been avoided’.532  Strong statesmanlike leadership was 
required and Bandaranaike, accused of being a ‘Donoughmore Buddhist’533, was unable 
to provide it.   
 
Prime ministerial power had diluted, if not washed away his original ideas of a country 
of communities through a federal structure by his espousal of exclusionary nationalism 
and irresolute political management.  His Damascene conversion or constitutional 
amnesia was costly to the country and to himself.  De Silva states in scrutiny of 
Bandaranaike’s earlier views on federalism and inter-communalism that it was a ‘grim 
irony that he should be called upon…to articulate the strong opposition of the Sinhalese 
to any attempt to establish a federal constitution’.534  S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was 
assassinated by a Buddhist monk in 1959, a conduit of the very nationalistic forces he 
had done so much to cultivate and represent and yet still could not ultimately gratify – a 
portentous lesson for all future leaders of Sri Lanka, whether they chose to read it or 
not.  From now on those attempting to reduce communal tension would seem to be 
swimming against the current of history.                              
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8 
Westminster Beyond the Seas? 
 
For most New Zealanders the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1947, well after 
all the other settler colonies of Britain, did little more than clarify the country’s 
parliamentary sovereignty, rather than usher in heroic independence and end the 
settlement’s colonial legislative immaturity.  However, New Zealand’s cultural 
conditions were more complex than they appeared.  James Belich, in the second volume 
of his monumental history of New Zealand entitled Paradise Reforged, argues that New 
Zealand’s record is a unique one based on fundamental links especially with Britain.  
Belich states that this settler colony engaged in the process of what he cleverly labels 
‘recolonisation’ to become a “Better Britain” and “neo-Britons”, a quest which he 
believes only ended in the 1970s, well after Canada and Australia had gone through 
similar relationships with Britain.  As Belich points out this does not simply mean New 
Zealand’s relationship with Britain was submissive, but more that there were key 
ideological, economic, cultural and social relationships that pushed this ‘periphery’ 
colony to naturally look to the metropolitan Old Country for inspiration and in turn 
propelled New Zealand into engaging in ‘inverse colonialism’, which often, and 
unintentionally, created distinctive and even unintended mutations from the original 
gene – Britain.535  New Zealand’s process of British and Westminster constitutional 
“patriation” would be no different.  New Zealand could not and did not provide a 
perfect clone, despite the hopes of its leaders; instead it was more a deceptive and 
shadowy South Pacific simulacrum – Westminster Reforged. 
 
J.C. Beaglehole, an earlier New Zealand historian, recognised that despite the country’s 
seemingly clear constitutional progression from colony to nation-state there was still 
much of interest for the ‘historian’s microscope’.  This captivating social scientist was 
able to peer through his unique lens and identify the fascinating development of New 
Zealand national identity through constitutional evolution, which can be viewed by its 
curious domestic institutional inoculations.  New Zealand has often been viewed as the 
model colony and later the model Westminster however this South Pacific Realm did 
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not grow meekly or completely with unquestioned Imperial injections and interventions.  
Without completely rejecting or accepting in Bagehot’s terms ‘dignified’ British and 
‘efficient’ Westminster remedies (both consciously and unconsciously), the New 
Zealand body politic was quite capable of being immune to such advice and by its 
constitutional and cultural features stood out from the other daughters of Empire.  The 
main finding of Beaglehole’s early analysis was the remarkable result that New Zealand 
‘managed to act as an independent nation without being independent.  It managed to act 
independently, even – so paradoxical, so subtle, is the growth of British children – while 
deploring independence’.536   
 
New Zealand’s constitutional and executive traits would be no different.  Despite one 
academic opening his analysis of New Zealand politics from afar that ‘New Zealand’s 
history is short and its inhabitants few’537 the history of constitutional government went 
through a gradualist progression similar to that of other settler colonies, while the 
influence of its citizens consistently belied the sparseness of the population.  Premiers 
and later Prime Ministers from Seddon to Savage were able to impress upon London 
New Zealand’s views well before the advent of formal legal independence in 1947.   
 
Very early in its history was the colony able to claim a ‘Constitution’.  The first 
document to claim this exalted status was the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, 
which replaced earlier statutory attempts.  This Act emanated, naturally, from the 
United Kingdom and its full title was: ‘An Act to grant a Representative Constitution to 
the Colony of New Zealand’.  The provisions of this Act established six provinces 
(which were abolished in 1875 establishing the country’s enduring enchantment with 
unitary government) and a central parliament named the General Assembly, which 
consisted of the Governor, an appointed Legislative Council and an elected House of 
Representatives.  With certain Imperial caveats the General Assembly was granted the 
ability to make laws for the ‘peace, order and good government’ of the colony.538  The 
Act established parliamentary government, but interestingly it lost the appellation 
‘Constitution’ after only a few years.539  Not for the last time would New Zealanders 
show suspicion at such attempts for such titles entering their political lexicon.  Perhaps 
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this aversion can be answered by Beaglehole, writing in the 1950s, that ‘the truth is that 
New Zealanders had little talent or desire for abstract constitutional thought’.540 
 
They may not have been inclined to enter the theoretical mêlée of constitutional 
sophistry, but they were quite adept at the ‘efficient’ practical application of 
constitutional abstracts to deal with New Zealand conditions.  New Zealand’s 
assumption of Dominion status in 1907 at the instigation of Prime Minister Sir Joseph 
Ward, brought the country in line with settlements like Canada and Australia but in 
reality little changed and despite Ward’s excitement, the new Dominion quickly forgot 
its new lofty status as the public, like the politicians ‘barely noticed’.541  Dominion 
status ‘was a change more in nomenclature’ than anything else since New Zealand 
political and constitutional practices, as well as outlook, went on as before.542  This was 
exemplified at the end of World War I when at the Paris Peace Conference New 
Zealand was admitted in its own right and signed and ratified Versailles as well as 
entering the League of Nations on its own.  Rather than excite the passions of attaining 
national identity, the senior members of the Reform Government like Sir Francis H. D. 
Bell and W. Downie Stewart were quick to raise panic at any thought of independence.  
Prime Minister and Ulsterman William Ferguson Massey assured the members across 
the House of Representatives that ‘I have never liked the arrangement which was made 
in connection with the League of Nations.  There was one dangerous feature in it.  I did 
not agree with everything that has been said, that in signing the Peace Treaty we had 
become independent nations’.543 
 
Resistance to other constitutional matters was no different and New Zealand’s attitude 
was unique in the world and the Empire itself since, as Sir Geoffrey Palmer assesses, 
‘reluctance to take power when it is offered is not often met within constitutional 
history’.544  While the other Dominions manned the bellows, with Britain, which 
enthused the winds of change for constitutional independence within the 
Commonwealth they became in Angus Ross’s memorable phrase ‘gentle zephyrs before 
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they reached New Zealand shores’.545   However, it is too easy to chastise the local 
leaders for their resistance to constitutional and national independence of this defensive 
Dominion.  They in fact were very accurately reflecting the wishes of their voters – 
regardless of party affiliations.  Though a ‘dutiful daughter dominion’ New Zealand’s 
leaders in the early twentieth century ‘were at once true interpreters of New Zealand and 
staunch Imperial statesman’ and as such ‘their loyalty … was neither blind nor 
dumb’.546  As one modern scholar has observed, the pre-1935 leaders displayed an 
instinctive realism which served the country’s needs and mood at the time and was 
certainly the rational choice for New Zealand.547   
 
New Zealand’s economic and security interests were indelibly linked with Britain and 
its Empire and New Zealand’s leaders protected this relationship.  In the constitutional 
realm New Zealand’s Westminster transplantations outwardly were normal for a settler 
colony, but the country’s constitutional practices and powers were not simply a 
miniature Westminster as will be discussed below.  New Zealand as much as she 
mimicked the ‘dignified’ parts of the British constitution was constitutionally governed 
by the ‘facts of the local situation, and the conventions built up locally in the past … 
dictated events’.  The powers of the Houses of Parliament, the Cabinet, the Prime 
Minister and the Governor and later Governor-General were formed through a process 
of ‘autochthonous evolution’548, which would solidify as strong executive power 
emanating from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.  New Zealand, despite seeming to 
abhor constitutional developments faced in the post war era a vast array of 
constitutional changes that would formalise and simplify ‘efficient’ executive 
dominance centred in the Cabinet room.  While culturally New Zealand would look to 
Britain, its institutional development and practices were from its own soil.  Thus New 
Zealand would have a recolonised constitutional structure with a hybrid of cultural 
dependence and indigenous institutional self-determination.  This would become the 
actuality, whatever the formal and ‘dignified’ garb of the constitutional niceties.  The 
juxtaposition of ‘dignified’ constitutional formality with ‘efficient’ executive power 
realities along with the paradox of dependence and independence is neatly illuminated 
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with the issues generated by the adoption of the independence enacting Statute of 
Westminster in 1947, which ended New Zealand’s parliamentary infantilism. 
 
The Statute of Westminster – To be or not to be Independent? 
Not all constitutional developments within the Empire can be characterised as young 
cubs of settler colonies prizing concessions from a weary British lion.  In fact as John 
Darwin has stated ‘Dominionhood was not the most that the Dominions could extract 
from the grudging Imperial centre: it was the most that the internal politics of the 
Dominions themselves would permit’.549  The Statute of Westminster was meant to be 
something important.  The Statute of Westminster 1931 was not in itself a remarkable 
piece of legislation, but it did for the Dominions have symbolic value of legitimising 
their legislative sovereignty, which, basically, in practice had been exercised anyway.  
Emanating with wistful impact the former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour now returned 
as an Earl and Lord President, and with his aristocratic nonchalance composed a 
declaration for the Imperial Conference 1926 which at essence provided for the 
Dominions and the United Kingdom to be: 
 
autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way 
subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, 
though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.550 
 
The Statute recognised the equality of the Dominions and established legally their 
independent powers without hindrance and also, crucially in the cultural sense, at the 
same time maintained the ‘dignified’ Crown as the common constitutional denominator.  
It was promulgated to erase any doubts over their legal powers and addressed the 
demands of the campaigning Dominions Canada, Ireland and South Africa.  The Irish, 
predictably, welcomed the new legislation.  As P. McGilligan told the Dáil with 
colourful candour in July 1931, the Statute of Westminster’s adoption meant that ‘the 
[British] King acting on the advice of the British Government can no more contract for 
the Irish Free state than can the King of Italy or the Mikado of Japan’.  For the Irish the 
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fundamental rationale was ‘that there must be uprooted from the whole system of this 
State the British government’ and though the British King would remain, he ‘is a King 
who functions entirely, so far as Irish affairs are concerned, at the will of the Irish 
Government’.  The Statute of Westminster was pushed and passed since Ireland ‘had to 
get completely rid of any power, either actual or feared, that the British Government had 
in relation to this country’.551  In contrast George Forbes told Britain and the Dominions 
words that any New Zealand Prime Minister would have echoed until the 1970s on the 
country’s attitude towards constitutional change: 
 
New Zealand has not, in any great measure, been concerned with the recent 
development in the constitutional relations between the members of the British 
commonwealth of Nations.  We have felt that at all times within recent years we 
have had ample scope for our national aspirations and ample freedom to carry 
out in their entirety such measures as have seemed to us desirable.  We have 
valued and still value our close connexion with the United Kingdom and with 
our sister Dominions and we should have been well content to allow 
constitutional relationships to settle themselves in the time honoured way, in 
accordance with the necessities of the position and the requirements of the 
time.552  
 
The New Zealand attitude towards the Statute and constitutional development was at 
one extreme while Ireland was another – both were, by the flexibility and fluidity of 
Westminster words, correct despite their contrary interpretations.   
 
The authoritative scholar on the Statute of Westminster generously described New 
Zealand’s reception as ‘lukewarm’.553  In fact New Zealand did not see any need for this 
‘poisonous document’554 as Prime Minister Gordon Coates described it, while Sir 
Francis H. D. Bell, his predecessor and the first New Zealand-born Prime Minister 
referred to that ‘damned Statute of Westminster propaganda’555, which both believed 
                                                 
551
 Speech by P. McGilligan, Dáil Eireann, July 16, 1931 in Speeches and Documents on the British 
Dominions 1918-1931 – From Self-Government to National Sovereignty, pp 240-242 
552
 George Forbes’ introductory speech at the Imperial Conference, October 1 1930 in Speeches and 
Documents on the British Dominions 1918-1931, p 209 
553
 Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status, p 227 
554
 W. David McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907-1945, Wellington: New 
Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2007, p 122 
555
 W. Downie Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis H. D. Bell, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C., His Life and 
Times, Wellington: Butterworth & Co., 1937, p 262 
 177 
would lessen the bonds of Empire that upheld their country’s defence, financial and 
cultural needs.  Significantly, for the Statute of Westminster to become law it needed to 
be adopted and ratified by the local Dominion parliament rather than imposed by 
Downing Street diktat.  This condition was largely a New Zealand initiative with the 
help of the other recalcitrant Dominions of Australia and Newfoundland to deny 
application of the Statute until their local Parliaments assented, which was explicitly 
stated in the Statute itself.556    New Zealand’s reactions were predictable in light of 
their previous aversion to constitutional change despite the other Dominions adopting 
the Statute almost immediately.  Even Australia relented in 1942 faced with British 
reversals in the War, the Japanese spectre and Curtin’s Labor Government, and unlike 
their neighbour across the Tasman they already had a firm written constitutional 
structure with detailed federal and centre provisions.557 
 
In 1935 New Zealand elected their first Labour Government  under Michael Joseph 
Savage, which has been rightly viewed as one of the most influential and radical 
Governments in New Zealand history.558  New Zealand’s new Government made up of 
trade unionists of varying socialist hues promised change from the conservative rural 
farmer dominated regimes of the recent past.  Domestic transformation was immediately 
evident and even in the Imperial preserve of foreign policy did New Zealand dare to 
challenge the Conservative Baldwin-Chamberlain Governments.  The Savage Ministry 
was ideologically part of the left with the appropriate international socialist vision of 
world order and justice.  The Labour Government did not hesitate to have different 
opinions with the Conservative Government in London.  On crises like the Italian and 
German intervention in Spain, Japanese aggression in Manchuria and especially the 
appeasement of the Hoare-Laval deal in response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, 
the Labour Government informed London that it could not support such proposals.  At 
the League of Nations, New Zealand’s representative William Jordan and at the 
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Imperial Conferences, Savage and Walter Nash voiced an almost unrepentant view 
against the appeasement of the time.559   
 
However, despite such independence, Labour was not rejecting the Empire and 
Commonwealth and there was no thought that Labour would not support Britain in the 
event of war.560  When war did emerge Savage himself pronounced a position and 
initiative, without any legal or diplomatic pressure from Britain, which all his 
predecessors would have supported.  Savage professed that the cultural obligation and 
determination would be clearly understood in New Zealand more than elsewhere since – 
 
for almost a century, behind the sure shield of Britain, we have enjoyed and 
cherished freedom and self-government.  Both with gratitude for the past, and 
with confidence in the future, we range ourselves without fear beside Britain.  
Where she goes, we go, where she stands, we stand.  We are only a young 
nation, but we are one and all a band of brothers, and we march forward with a 
union of hearts and wills to a common destiny.561 
 
However, in spite of such stirring and sincere words from Labour, which were 
supported by the conservative National Party562, there would be no great impetus 
towards constitutional initiative – quite the opposite.  Constitutional development was 
viewed across the political spectrum as disloyalty to Britain, not as a necessarily 
rational or natural step.  Many would have echoed Sidney Holland who was proud to be 
‘a Britisher through and through’ and culturally viewed anything remotely anti-British 
as disloyal and wrong.563   As one legal scholar has noted of New Zealand: ‘legal issues 
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relating to sovereignty were dealt with at a more figurative, even emotional, level’.564  
The difference was that unlike India, but like the elite in Ceylon, the emotion was 
directed at promoting the relationship with Britain, not hiding or ridding it.   The 
situation was as Beaglehole recounted before 1947, continuing the favoured family 
metaphor that:  
 
New Zealand got responsible government, got control of its natives, got control 
(very largely) of its governor, became a titular Dominion, was dragged into 
Dominion status, stood by and saw the Statute of Westminster passed.  But, once 
it had got essential control of its own internal affairs, it was not really interested 
in constitutional evolution; or rather its interest was that of a rigid disapproval.  
It is a “Dominion” in spite of itself.  It has not pursued, with passionate 
experimentation, the idea of equal nationhood; in the Imperial family it is the 
daughter-nation that preferred not to smoke and drink with its emancipated 
sisters, that shuddered a little and drew its garments somewhat closer when 
Canada and South Africa began to saunter on the boulevards of the world … 
New Zealand, in fact, psychologically has remained a colony…565 
 
This reluctance to “saunter on the boulevards” of constitutional progress was evidenced 
in New Zealand that despite having elected one of the most transformative governments 
in its history and even in the Commonwealth, it was only with miserly unwillingness 
that acceptance of the Statute of Westminster occurred and even then a whole twelve 
years after Labour came to power.  Labour preferred to dress the Statute in traditional 
loyalist dress long out of fashion in most of the Commonwealth instead of procuring the 
latest independent haute couture from say India’s cutting edge constitutional designers.  
New Zealand was the very last of the Dominions to pass the Statute of Westminster, 
sixteen years after it was available.  In an era where even the importation and sale of 
Lone Ranger comics was banned as a bad influence on the public566 it is difficult to 
imagine the conscious effort in New Zealand to import in vogue constitutional creations 
from afar.  Ironically New Zealand became “independent” the same year as India, 
though it ‘had not quite reached the Rubicon of nationhood that India had just months 
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earlier’.567  New Zealand’s constitutional culture towards Britain was in contrast to 
India’s.   
 
On 23 February 1944 Sir Cyril Newall, the Governor-General, gave the Speech from the 
Throne and informed the New Zealand Houses of Parliament that his Ministers 
proposed  
 
to place before Parliament the question of the adoption of the Statute of 
Westminster, the enactment of which would bring New Zealand in line with the 
other self-governing Dominions.  The adoption of this measure will remove 
doubts in the eyes of foreign powers regarding the Sovereign status of New 
Zealand, and will at the same time have the practical effect of removing existing 
legal drafting and administrative difficulties both in New Zealand and in the 
United Kingdom.568 
 
This wording and legislative statement of the Labour Government’s was not only far 
from a proclamation of independence it was also with heavy anxiety and dislike at the 
highest political level that it even made it in the Governor-General’s speech.  The Head 
of the Prime Minister’s Department and of External Affairs, Alister McIntosh, confided 
at the time to senior civil servant and then New Zealand High Commissioner to 
Canberra, Carl Berendsen: ‘We are in a great fuss here over the adoption of the Statute 
of Westminster … The Prime Minister [Peter Fraser] immediately got cold feet and 
wanted to cut all reference to the adoption of the Statute from the Governor-General’s 
speech.  We managed to hold him in, on the understanding that he would not be 
expected to bring down any legislation until after he had been to the United Kingdom 
and discussed the question of consequential constitutional amendments with the British 
Law Officers’.569   
 
Fraser probably only acquiesced to the Speech and the Statute because doubts were 
being raised during wartime as to New Zealand’s international status.  As civil servants 
were concerned that  
                                                 
567
 Kumarasingham, “The ‘New Commonwealth’ 1947-49: A New Zealand Perspective on India Joining 
the Commonwealth”, pp 444-445 and 452 
568
 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (henceforth NZPD), Vol. 264, p 7, February 23, 1944 
569
 Sir Alister McIntosh to Sir Carl Berendsen, 25 February 1944 in Undiplomatic Dialogue – Letters 
Between Carl Berendsen & Alister McIntosh 1943-1952, Ian McGibbon (ed.),  Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1993, p 68 
 181 
 
so long as New Zealand continues to delay the adoption of the Statute, the non-
expert in other countries will tend to be doubtful of our international status as 
compared, for example to Australia and Canada.  In October, 1943, for instance, 
in a United States Senate debate on participation in post-war organisation, 
Senator Gillette objected to the use of the words “free and sovereign” nations to 
define those countries with which the United States could join in the 
establishment and maintenance of international authority on the grounds that 
they might exclude the Dominions.  New Zealand was specifically mentioned as 
a country with limitations.570    
 
However this embarrassment was largely confined to the senior colleagues in 
Wellington.  As was written at the time of the Governor-General’s speech the country’s 
diffidence to the empowering Statute, which ‘was not altogether surprising; for the time 
lag was great, the terms of the Statute, even if one remembers them, are not in 
themselves remarkably enlightening, and important as any act of parliament, it precise 
significance has a habit of evading recollection.  Nor, we must admit, was this particular 
statute very highly esteemed in New Zealand when it was first enacted’. With the above 
in mind it is perhaps unsurprising that further delay occurred and New Zealand’s 
‘legislative inability’ continued till 1947.571  Once again combined with an aversion for 
constitutional change, the alarm of appearing disloyal, which potentially could 
jeopardising economic and defence interests, was a significant cultural factor in 
ossifying resistance.   
 
The Scottish-born former trade unionist, Peter Fraser, told the House as Prime Minister 
that New Zealand did not want to pass the legislation during wartime since “Lord Haw-
haw”, the Germans and the ‘Japs’ might use New Zealand’s adoption as ‘propaganda’ to 
herald the end of Britain’s influence since it could be used to suggest the unthinkable 
‘severance from the Old Country’.  New Zealand and its government thought this 
despite Britain never suggesting such a hypothesis, and even the Conservative Lord 
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Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, ‘did not … think there was much in 
it’ when he was consulted on the matter at New Zealand’s initiative.572  Fraser did want 
to allow ‘ill-founded accusations that Labour was anti-British’ to gain credence by 
passing the Statute during wartime573 despite eminent New Zealand academics correctly 
observing at the time that ratification would not have any harmful effect with Britain.574   
 
Indeed, ‘despite having social and political credentials that might seem to question the 
long-established tenets of New Zealand traditions, the New Zealand Labour Party was 
just as strong as the conservative and traditionalist pro-Britain National Party as 
upholders of the Commonwealth.  Labour was more progressively Commonwealth, 
while National held to the older virtues of Empire and Imperial dependence’.575  Fraser 
especially realised the importance of the Commonwealth and its centrality to New 
Zealand self-interests.  Labour was culturally just as royalist as the National Party and 
firmly believed in the ‘dignified’ apparatus of being a loyal British Westminster.  The 
New Zealand Labour Party’s version of independence was one that was ‘moderated by a 
fundamental commitment to the Commonwealth’ and in these years and for many 
beyond ‘both National and Labour in New Zealand stood for alignment with Britain on 
the great issues of the day’.576  Fraser and New Zealand’s attitude towards independence 
can be perceived from his speech to an international audience at the San Francisco 
Conference in June 1945: 
 
To us of the British Commonwealth it is very difficult to distinguish between 
self-government and independence, for to the self-governing sovereign States of 
the British Commonwealth, self-government is independence and independence 
is self-government … We British peoples have learnt that, as well as being 
independent, we are interdependent, and that the future of the British 
Commonwealth depends upon our interdependence and co-operation.577 
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In August 1947, just days before India gained independence, Sidney Holland, Leader of 
the Opposition, was discussing his private member’s bill to abolish the Legislative 
Council (which will be discussed in detail in a following chapter) the Prime Minister, 
who agreed with the National Party leader on abolition, provided in answer a largely 
unforeseen disclosure of constitutional significance.  The Evening Post reported that ‘a 
surprise development occurred in the House of Representatives last night when, during 
the second reading on the Legislative Council Abolition Bill, the Prime Minister (Mr 
Fraser) introduced an amendment proposing that prior to any change being made in the 
Constitution of the Legislature, the Statute of Westminster be extended to the 
Dominion…’.578  To clean up its legislative home, New Zealand wanted to get rid of the 
upper chamber, but since she did not formally have the ability to do so herself asked 
Britain to help with the renovations by passing at New Zealand’s request the New 
Zealand Constitution Amendment Act.  While Britain passed the laws, New Zealand 
adopted the Statute of Westminster and officials in Wellington believed this ‘will will 
completely remove these doubts and establish fully the competence of the New Zealand 
Parliament to deal with its own Constitution’ and end its colonial image.579  
 
Civil servants and Government members clearly wanted to make it clear that the 
adoption of the Statute was merely for legalistic reasons to provide legislative 
competence to make constitutional amendments and erase doubts internationally rather 
than an Act to break constitutional and cultural ties with the United Kingdom.  A paper 
from the Prime Minister’s desk assured its readers: 
 
New Zealand has for long taken an independent and fully sovereign part in 
British Commonwealth and in international affairs.  At the same time we have 
maintained our intimate association with the United Kingdom and with the other 
members of the Commonwealth.  Not only the day-to-day actions of the 
Government and the attitude of New Zealanders to the two Great Wars, but also 
the actions of private individuals and groups, show that this recognition of 
independence and inter-dependence is part of our national way of thinking and 
feeling.  No definitions or statutes can affect this practical position: they cannot 
take away New Zealand’s independent status, nor can they reduce our desire to 
remain associated with our friends and kinsmen.  It is, however, a frequent 
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occurrence – especially in countries which share the British legal tradition – that 
contemporary legal forms lag behind the actual facts.  Often this does not 
matter; but from time to time it is necessary to bring the law up-to-date – not to 
alter the contemporary state of affairs, but merely to ensure that the law more 
accurately describes it.580 
 
Fraser assured both sides of the House of Representatives that he would not engage in 
any legislation that ‘would do anything to lessen the ties’ and believed instead that the 
Statute ‘will strengthen the ties between the various parts of the Commonwealth and 
ourselves in New Zealand and the Mother-country’.581  However, not all were becalmed 
by the Prime Minister’s hopes.  Frederick Doidge, National MP for Tauranga, and later 
External Affairs Minister and later still High Commissioner to London, thought the 
Statute represented ‘a legal bill of divorcement’.  Doidge spoke for certain MPs when 
he argued against passing the Statute of Westminster by citing Ireland’s remarkable 
behaviour being attributable to having passed the Statute, which he continued could 
only encourage Pakistan and India to leave and even imaginatively argued that the 
economic crisis in Britain made it inopportune to request the legislation.  For this 
former employee of the Beaverbrook press, New Zealand’s ‘loyalty to the Motherland is 
an instinct as deep as religion’ and postulated to his fellow parliamentarians that there 
‘are a few “crackpots” who want to see the liquidation of the British Empire and who 
welcome this legislation because it will help that way’.582   
 
Other indicative opinion emerged, including that of Dr Martyn Finlay, Labour Member 
for North Shore, and future Attorney-General and Minister of Justice in the third Labour 
Government, who spoke in favour of the Bill and endeared himself to the House by 
stating that ‘we love the British because the British love us.  That spirit transcends all 
written documents’, while former law professor and future Education Minister and 
Speaker Ronald Algie, National Member for Remuera, though in favour of the Statute 
of Westminster, was concerned that it would encourage Russia to claim separate 
representation for the Soviet States and thus increase communism’s international 
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clout.583  With the benefit of hindsight one cannot help but agree with noted legal 
scholar J. F. Northey that the debates over the Statute of Westminster ‘contain so much 
evidence of a gross misconception of the purpose and effect of the Statute’.584  The 
Opposition, though containing distress from speakers like Doidge did not oppose the 
passing of the Bill especially since, it was argued, it was necessary  to give the New 
Zealand Parliament competence to pass National’s proposal to abolish the Legislative 
Council.585 New Zealand’s reaction was culturally, however, an autochthonous one as 
will be seen later in chapter ten. 
 
All these responses evinced from leading New Zealanders demonstrated at the political 
level an emotive reaction towards constitutional change.  Unlike India these passions 
were directed at maintaining the status quo culturally and for some constitutionally.  
Fraser and his official and political supporters strained every nerve to couch the 
constitutional change as one that merely brought the country in line with the other 
Dominions and that it only eradicated doubt as to the ability to amend the constitution 
and New Zealand’s international status – rather than a move that signified independence 
from Britain.  Symbolically in the year the legislation was passed, instead of breaking 
with Britain the New Zealand Cabinet agreed to Attlee’s plea for help during its 
financial crisis and sold its primary produce to Britain below world rates and even 
continued rationing to maximise exports to “Home” which in 1947 still received more 
than seventy-six per cent of New Zealand’s exports.586 As one member of the 
Legislative Council exclaimed when the legislation finally passed – ‘this day will not be 
in future celebrated as the 4th July is celebrated by the first of the family which broke 
away’.587   
 
And yet in modern times many consider that New Zealand had in fact formalised its 
independence when the Statute of Westminster received the Royal Assent from Sir 
Bernard Freyberg, their war hero and Governor-General on 25 November 1947.  Dr 
Michael Cullen, like Fraser, Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Leader of the Labour 
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Party, told the House on the 150th Anniversary of the House of Representatives first 
sitting in 2004 that New Zealand became sovereign and independent with the adoption 
of the Statute of Westminster.588  Michael King, a popular historian, stated the same in 
his widely read history of the country589 while leading current affairs publication, the 
Listener, very recently even advocated that 25 November should become a national 
holiday as it was the day ‘we gained full independence by ratifying the Statute of 
Westminster in 1947’.590 
 
However, in the 1940s New Zealand did not see the Statute of Westminster as 
something which ‘cut any Gordian knots’ because ‘knots there may be, but they can, it 
seems, be untied as they have been so far untied, by political manipulation that is 
independent of strictly legal status within the Commonwealth itself’.591  As Berenson 
expostulated ‘we had all the self-government we wanted … We didn’t see the need for 
any Statute of Westminster.  We were doing all right without it’.592  New Zealand had 
always carried out its own constitutional wishes even if that meant going against the 
Sovereign’s Representative who also represented England culturally and 
constitutionally593 or doing what they liked domestically on electoral and institutional 
matters such as the abolition of the provinces and the “country quota” (these issues will 
be discussed in the next chapter).  However, they did accept a Commonwealth 
recommendation in 1948 on nationality and citizenship, which the other Realms had 
urged, which now allowed New Zealand to issue its own passports and grant its own 
citizenship status for the first time.  Though many New Zealanders, including their 
parliamentary representatives, preferred to state themselves “British” over “New 
Zealander” for many years afterwards.594   Culturally and sentimentally, however, His 
(and later Her) Majesty’s Government in New Zealand was always careful to avoid 
conspicuous change to their ‘dignified’ relationship with Britain.  As Sir Cecil Day 
from London’s Cabinet Office, who had worked at Government House, Wellington as a 
junior official from Britain, told Sir Alister McIntosh privately –  
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In my time, New Zealand Governments avoided action in the belief that public 
opinion would interpret the step as weakening the links with the Old Country 
and so would be opposed to it.  Actually I imagine, few ordinary citizens in New 
Zealand knew at that time what full adoption of the Statute involved.  Some who 
did thought it would be absurd for the little country to parade its independence 
in this way.  Up to the middle of 1935 when I left, New Zealand hadn’t got used 
to “Equality of Status”.  It was only later that the idea lost its strangeness, 
following upon the many New Zealand ventures in the field of independent 
international action.  Sentiment excepted, there does not seems to me to have 
been at any time since the Statute of Westminster was passed, any particular 
reason for avoiding its adoption.595 
 
Most New Zealanders, if they troubled themselves over the intricacies and vagaries of 
the Westminster system, would have agreed with the T. Clifton Webb, National 
Member for Rodney, (who like Doidge would later become K.C.M.G., Foreign Minister 
and High Commissioner to London) when he stated with a degree of weary resignation 
to accept the symbolic burden which the Statute of Westminster placed.  Since Britain 
had no objection he had ‘decided, not with any great enthusiasm – I have no emotional 
enthusiasm for it, but I have less emotional opposition to it – I repeat that I have 
decided, after weighing up the pros and cons as I have done, to give my support to the 
Bill’.596  Fraser received, no doubt with pleasure, a personal telegram from his old 
friend Bill Jordan who informed his master that he had ‘attended House of Lords today 
on passing through all stages of the New Zealand Constitution (amendment) Bill.  Your 
remark that if passing of an Act would weaken the ties between New Zealand and other 
parts of the Empire you would have nothing to do with it, was heartily applauded.  
Lords Addison, Salisbury, Samuel and Simon all spoke in support of the Bill and 
expressed admiration for what has been done by the people of our Dominion’.597  
Interestingly of the grandees that ‘heartily applauded’, Viscount Simon598 exclaimed 
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with kindly puzzlement that ‘It is most remarkable that ever since 1857, ninety years 
ago, such has been the contentment with which New Zealand has lived under its 
existing Constitution that it has never even asked this Parliament to alter it’.599   
 
As Beaglehole vainly reminded New Zealanders: ‘We do well to be vigilant about our 
constitutional rights and our constitutional duties, but this is not to presuppose that the 
constitution is some silk-wrapped mystery, laid in an Ark of the Covenant round which 
alone the sleepless priests of the Crown Law Office tread with superstitious awe’.600  
The reality was that since well before 1947 New Zealand could and did actually do what 
they wanted especially by simplifying the constitutional structure without lengthy 
deliberation.  In fact, as shall be shown, New Zealand Prime Ministers and Cabinets 
with their unquestionable primacy over all others in the New Zealand political system 
were quite prepared to privately play by their own rules and established their own 
culture of operating British Westminster institutions, often contrary to the conventions 
and norms they ostensibly admired at the Palaces of Westminster and Buckingham. 
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9 
The Executive Purity of the “Wellington Model” 
 
New Zealand political scientists are very fond of quoting Arend Lijphart’s assessment 
that the country was the ‘purest example’601 or even the ‘perfect example of the 
Westminster model’.602  The crucial aspect from his analysis to this study is the 
concentration of executive power resident in the New Zealand system.  However, when 
compared to other Westminsters, New Zealand stands out for many reasons.  Most of 
the New Westminsters of this era have either federalism or some regional government 
such as Canada, Australia, India and South Africa; and all of these countries have 
written constitutions, in many cases with rigid and entrenched provisions, as well as 
upper houses.  Though the executives of these countries, as expected in Westminster 
systems, have considerable power, New Zealand’s central executive alone was 
unfettered by federalism, bicameralism or a single formally printed document 
establishing its powers which gave the New Zealand executive ‘unbridled power’.603  
Sir John Marshall, a former Prime Minister and one of the country’s longest serving 
cabinet ministers mentions at the start of a book on the reform of parliament that unlike 
most countries, New Westminsters included, constitutional documents and even those 
governing elections such as the Electoral Act 1956 (which he framed as Minister of 
Justice) can be changed by revealing the myth of entrenchment in New Zealand:  
 
our constitutional laws are contained in ordinary statutes capable of being 
amended or repealed by a majority vote in Parliament.  It is therefore not 
legislatively difficult for a Government to make constitutional changes.  Even 
the entrenched sections of the Electoral Act covering the length of the 
parliamentary term, the age and method of voting, the membership of the 
Representation Commission, the number of electorates and the tolerance in the 
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size of electorates can always be amended or repealed by first repealing the 
entrenching section which is not itself entrenched.604     
 
In Leslie Zines’s estimation, in comparison to other settler Commonwealth nations this 
small country was an ‘executive paradise’ since 
 
New Zealand stands out as having the simplest constitutional framework – no 
federal system, no entrenched restrictions on power, no Upper House, and a 
system of responsible government that generally ensures ultimate control by the 
Executive of the Legislature.  There is, therefore, nothing in the way of 
constitutional checks and balances…605  
  
So to redefine Lijphart’s appraisal, New Zealand had the “purest” executive of the 
Westminsters in the sense that the power of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was largely 
unobstructed by real checks and balances, and not the most institutionally or structurally 
representative of the Westminsters.  New Zealand’s Westminster system 
institutionalised delegative democracy for the executive.  Only the relatively short 
parliamentary term of three years seemed a check on power.  Though as Sir Robert 
Muldoon, perhaps New Zealand’s most infamous practitioner of prime ministerial 
executive power submitted: 
 
I can have an idea while shaving, have it endorsed in Cabinet that morning, put 
it into the House in the afternoon and have it become law by midnight.  While I 
have that power – and I should – it needs to kept on a three-year leash.606  
 
Like the British system, as opposed to the New Westminster system, New Zealand’s 
executive has faithfully and culturally clung to conventions rather than legal documents.  
And yet it differs still.  Without calculated or nationalistic intention New Zealand has 
developed, as Elizabeth McLeay has termed, a ‘Wellington model’ of executive 
government with ‘distinctive constitutional characteristics’ that arose due to ‘the largely 
uncodified nature of the cabinet system of this small state’ and in terms of horizontal 
                                                 
604
 Sir John Marshall, “Introduction” in The Reform of Parliament – Papers Presented in Memory of Dr 
Alan Robinson, Sir John Marshall (ed.), Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 
1978, p 10 
605
 Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth, p 47 
606
 Cited in Gerald Hensley, Final Approaches – A Memoir, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006, 
p 231 
 191 
accountability this meant that ‘Prime Ministers in particular have a great deal of 
flexibility in how they construct their cabinets and, indeed, exercise power over these 
cabinets’607 and within the executive over their nominal superior the Governor-General 
and colleagues in Cabinet. 
 
The crucial power that the New Zealand executive carried until the advent of the Mixed 
Member Proportional system in the 1990s became cemented in the 1947-57 period 
when the two-party nature of New Zealand politics became entrenched and solidified 
the political executive’s power over the legislature and the other institutional actors.  
For New Zealand Prime Ministers this was the real beginning of delegative democracy.  
New Zealand’s single member plurality elected House of Representatives was made up 
of just eighty seats.  The only deviation from traditional Westminster lower house was 
the fact that it contained four seats reserved for Māori elected from their own roll since 
1867.    Noted Māori scholar, Ranginui Walker, describes this as ‘token’ representation 
especially when compared to the late nineteenth-century Māori ideals of having a 
separate ‘Māori Parliament’ to deal with Māori issues and lands that would offer with 
the settler dominated House  of Representatives a ‘conjoint administration’ under the 
‘law of God and the Queen’ for New Zealand, which never eventuated as a credible 
entity or challenge to the established power structures of the colonial institutions.608  
Though the Māori seats often helped sustain a Government, especially Labour, they 
rarely had the ability to interfere or influence executive power and therefore do not 
figure in this appraisal of executive institutions.   
 
If there was a check on executive power it was convention.  New Zealand had 
developed its own conventions, and though very influential, conventions by their very 
nature are malleable in the hands of those who hold power.   This largely ignored era 
was pivotal in establishing conventions on dictatorial executive power and in 
demonstrating the ease with which personalist power was wielded by Prime Ministers 
of both Labour and National variety.  Both Fraser and Holland did this to at least the 
extent of their counterparts in South Asia in the post-independence decade. 
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Head of State 
New Zealand, as was analysed in the previous chapter waited sixteen years, after all the 
other Dominions, to cross the constitutional bridge to independence which the Statute of 
Westminster engineered.  Surveying the constitutional innovations to the office of 
Governor-General in the 1970s and 1980s, the legal scholar F. M. Brookfield 
commented that though New Zealand had been slow to adopt the Statute of Westminster 
they were ‘slower still … to bring the Governor-General’s office up to date’.609  The 
Letters Patent of 1917 and the Royal Instructions which accompanied them which 
govern the powers of the Queen’s Representative in New Zealand (which were virtually 
the same as those issued in 1907) meant that ‘from 1907 to 1983 the content of the 
instruments creating the gubernatorial office and the standing instructions of the 
exercise of its powers remained virtually the same…’.610  Alison Quentin-Baxter, Legal 
Consultant to the Prime Minister’s Department, had quite a job in examining the 
existing and archaic Letters Patent and advocated many changes and recommendations 
which became the basis for the Letters Patent 1983.611  However, for the purposes of 
this study, the Letters Patent of 1917 from George V to “Our Right Trusty and Well-
beloved Cousin” in Wellington were those which by end of the selected period in 1957 
had been functioning at Government House for forty years and were almost forty years 
away from a substantial overhaul. 
 
The vice-regal position in New Zealand has been sardonically described by Sir Arthur 
Gordon, one of its early incumbents, as doing nothing more than ‘performing the 
functions of stamp’.612  Though Governors and later Governors-General did perform 
other functions, the comment warrants reflection.  Despite all Premiers and Prime 
Ministers until very recently having reverential regard for the Sovereign in person and 
being ready to perform and display every loyalty to the Monarch and the Monarchy this 
is not the attitude that the New Zealand Head of Government confers to the Sovereign’s 
representative.   
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There is an almost inevitable temptation to construct a picture of the Governor-General 
of being analogous to the Queen in terms of constitutional and political power.  Modern 
political scientists generally adhere to Andrew Ladley’s description of New Zealand 
being a ‘localised monarchy’ meaning the ‘constitutional domestication of the United 
Kingdom Crown in New Zealand’.613   New Zealand Governors-General eventually 
became viewed in David Lange’s characteristically picturesque phrase as ‘the Queen in 
drag’614 or at least were expected to be.  The reality, as always in politics, is not so neat.  
The powers may have been localised, but the conditions, the culture and the 
constitutional circumstances and surroundings make it quite impossible to simply 
duplicate the Royal person to be accurately transplanted or implanted to her New 
Zealand Realm.  The Governor-General does not have the advantages of being a 
Monarch such as the hereditary security of the position which insulates the Head of 
State from political pressures and preserves independence of experience and knowledge, 
especially when one considers that during Elizabeth II’s reign she has already been 
served by thirteen Governors-General and thirteen Prime Ministers in her New Zealand 
Realm to date.   
 
The truth is, as Bogdanor assesses, ‘in Britain, the Sovereign is a working part of the 
constitution in a way that he or she cannot possibly be in an overseas realm’.615  The 
same can be said in reverse – the Governor-General’s involvement and role in the daily 
mechanics of the New Zealand system could not be realistically performed by the 
Queen on a long-term basis outside the United Kingdom.  The Governor-General in 
New Zealand is not a working part of the constitution like the Queen is in Britain.  The 
Crown is constitutionally divisible, but for practical purposes the Queen is not.  In Sir 
Zelman Cowen’s appraisal, a former Australian Governor-General, with the divisible 
Crown there is a ‘shared monarchy’, where the Queen acts in a ‘different capacity in 
each realm’.616  The same can be said of Governors-General who have quite different 
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expectations and roles in the respective realms where the office is required.617  For all 
Commonwealth Governors-General the responsibility ultimately lies with them since 
notwithstanding being the Queen’s personal representative the Governor-General ‘does 
not seek instruction from her, but acts on his own authority, informing her when 
appropriate of what he has done’.618  Therefore the Governor-General is a ‘free-agent’ 
of the Queen in theory but not so free of the ‘local’ agent in reality.  
 
New Zealand’s circumstances were and still are quite different for a Head of State to 
operate compared to Britain, which became evident very early on.  Writing on the 
nineteenth century era of responsible government in the colony, D. K. Fieldhouse has 
articulated the autochthonous realities of the New Zealand executive situation that still 
resonate today.  Instead of having to abide by all the Royal Letters of the law it was the 
political coarseness of power on the ground that counted. 
 
In every case it was the facts of the local situation, and the conventions built up 
locally in the past, that dictated events.  The Governor had less share in actual 
government, and was certainly less well informed on ministerial policy, than the 
Sovereign in Britain … It was … predictable that the colony would develop, not 
into a constitutional monarchy of the British type, in which both monarch and 
upper house would retain at least some constitutional significance, but into a 
special form of quasi-monarchical system, in which the upper house became a 
nonentity or ceased to exist, and the Governor became a figurehead with purely 
decorative functions.  And this, indeed, has proved to be the special 
characteristic of ‘Dominion Status’ in New Zealand – a unicameral legislature 
with the greatest possible concentration of power in the hands of the ministers of 
the moment.619  
 
With attitudes ranging from contempt to considerateness, one attitude is constant: New 
Zealand Prime Ministers have not been prepared to accept the Governor-General as a 
check on their executive power.  New Zealand’s most prominent public law specialists 
argue that the modern view that the Governor-General ‘represents a substantial check on 
the excesses of executive government … is … wrong’, articulating a contemporary New 
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Zealand convention on the limitations of the Governor-General’s power.620  The 
Governor-General holds office at “the Queen’s pleasure” and therefore is beholden to 
the local Prime Minister who directly advises Her Majesty on the appointment and term 
of office leaving the Governor-General’s position and tenure potentially insecure and 
subject to political pressure.621   And yet in New Zealand’s small unitary and unicameral 
system untroubled by rigid and written constitutional devices it is the Governor-General 
that stands alone on the last legal check on executive power.  Analysts of New Zealand 
often argue that Australia’s 1975 constitutional crisis over Sir John Kerr’s dismissal of 
the Whitlam administration would be highly improbable to occur in New Zealand since 
there is no federal or strong bicameral system as in Australia, which created the political 
and constitutional uncertainty that pushed the Governor-General to action.622  However, 
the federal and strong bicameral elements of the Australian system are there to be a 
check and perform institutional accountability on the executive, represented at the top 
by the Governor-General.   
 
New Zealand’s political system has even fewer forms of institutional and horizontal 
accountability, which theoretically places greater potential for the Governor-General in 
the absence of such institutional factors to be a check on the executive as the lawful 
guardian of the constitution.  As will be discussed below this was the view of Governor-
General Sir Cyril Newall during the Fraser era.  Though generally unappreciated in the 
remote Realm with its “executive purity” it ‘would be more consistent with his role in 
public life and his oath of office to recognise that the Governor-General protects the 
constitution, and that he alone is eligible to provide a measure of oversight in the 
otherwise self-regulated executive government’ prevalent in the simple and 
institutionally uncluttered case of New Zealand.623  Though Dame Catherine Tizard 
states the ideal that a Governor-General ‘is the person who gains by successfully 
passing the parcel’ the preservation and protection of the constitution is ultimately the 
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Governor-General’s responsibility and duty, especially in the institutionally simplistic 
and unwritten New Zealand Westminster system, even if it means an undesirable 
confrontation with the responsible advisors to the Crown.  As Brookfield argues: 
 
While the notion of a nominal Head of State who keeps entirely free of political 
involvement may be adequate when times are normal, a stronger doctrine may 
be needed when they are not.  After all, New Zealand may not always be 
governed by politicians who are on the side of angels and it may well be 
governed (not to say governed well) by those who in good faith confuse the 
preservation of their political power with the national interest.  Whatever the 
ensuing unpleasantness, we may need the Governor-General’s intervention 
yet…624 
 
New Zealand, just as it had resisted constitutional change with the Statute of 
Westminster at the 1926 Conference, also resisted the proposal from the other 
Dominions that they themselves initiate and recommend who was to be their Governor-
General rather than the British Secretary of State.  Another important change emanating 
from the other Dominions at the conference, from which New Zealand recoiled, was 
that the Governor-General should represent just the Monarch and the British 
Government, who would be represented by the British High Commissioner – it was not 
till 1941 that this culturally permissible but constitutionally undesirable duality ended.  
The Governor-General ceased to be an agent of the British Government, instead 
becoming an agent of the New Zealand one.  This reluctance to take on the prerogative 
of choosing the Head of State should not be viewed as political impotence on the part of 
the New Zealand executive.  Even though New Zealand Prime Ministers knew they 
could appoint a “local” if they so desired, they did not.   
 
New Zealanders it seemed preferred British aristocrats, preferably with a military or 
agricultural background.  When New Zealand-raised war hero Lord Freyberg was due to 
retire members of the British establishment suggested in official circles in Wellington 
(not London) to replace him included Lord Tweedsmuir (novelist and at the time 
Governor-General of Canada), Admiral Lord Fraser, Sir Denys Lowson (Lord Mayor of 
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London) and Viscount Knollys – with not a New Zealander in sight.625  Sidney Holland 
even cancelled a Cabinet meeting to rush to the airport to plead with the Lord 
Mountbatten, former Viceroy of India, with his impeccable credentials in New Zealand 
eyes, to become Governor-General of the Queen’s most southern realm, though the 
offer was declined with courteous alacrity.626   
 
However, when the head of the Prime Minister’s Department notified the incoming 
Prime Minister in December 1949 that in New Zealand ‘the Governor-General is not 
informed of Cabinet proceedings.  In the United Kingdom, and it is understood also in 
other Commonwealth countries, the King or his representative, as the case may be, is 
kept advised.  He receives copies of Agenda, of papers and of the Minutes of the 
Cabinet discussion.  It is for consideration whether or not some such regular advice 
should not be instituted here’ the normally exuberant Holland displayed reluctance 
evident in all Prime Ministers on such matters and allowed the matter to be dropped.627  
Bagehot’s dictum of the Monarch’s right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn did 
not seem to happen for her representative in New Zealand.  The political reality was 
quite askance from that English theory as Sir John Marshall observed with his high 
level and long political experience: 
 
[T]he Governor-General’s right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn are 
not exercised in any formal or regular way.  The Prime Minister does not report 
regularly to the Governor-General as the British Prime Minister reports to the 
Queen.  In 20 years as a Minister, I seldom attended at Government House for 
consultation, even less for encouragement and never for warning.  Even when I 
was Prime Minister the consultations with the Governor-General were 
infrequent, although our relationship, socially and on state occasions, was 
cordial.  The Governor-General presides at the meetings of the Executive 
Council each week when he is in Wellington, but these are formal meetings for 
the signing of Orders-in-Council and the making of Regulations on the advice of 
the Ministers concerned … the convention that the Governor-General acts on the 
advice of his Ministers is firmly established in New Zealand.628 
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Even the Executive Council meetings where the Governor-General had at least had the 
chance of meeting some of his Ministers for Orders-in-Council there still applied the so 
called “one-cigarette” rule, where His Excellency ‘signed papers, chatted to the Prime 
Minister for as long as it took to smoke a single cigarette then let the politicians go back 
to running the country’.629  
   
New Zealand Prime Ministers of this delegative democracy era enjoyed and often 
respected the inhabitants of Government House but did not brook interference in their 
realm of executive power.  For Prime Ministers, as responsible government developed 
in New Zealand, the Sovereign’s representative ‘ceased to fulfil the positive role laid 
down for him by imperial authority, and had become, in all important respects and 
under normal circumstances, no more that the titular head of his government’.630  The 
first New Zealand born Governor-General was Sir Arthur Porritt who took his 
commission in 1967, twenty years after the adoption of the Statute.  Porritt, who had 
been part of the Royal Household as Sergeant-Surgeon to the Queen proclaimed when 
he returned home that ‘all New Zealanders are born “Queen’s Men” with a deep respect 
and warm affection for Her Majesty’.631  In this era in the executive arena New Zealand 
Ministers may well have been culturally disposed to be the “Queen’s men”, but they 
certainly were not culturally, politically or institutionally the “Governor-General’s 
men”.  The executive, including the Queen’s Representative, were compelled by 
convention and reality to be the “Prime Minister’s men”.   
 
In Britain the monarchy as R. Quentin-Baxter states ‘is always at the centre of British 
political and constitutional life’ and though ‘there is no essential difference between the 
Queen’s powers and those of a Governor-General: the difference lies in their 
relationship with their respective governments’.632  In New Zealand government of this 
era the Queen, as a ‘dignified’ part of constitutional pageantry, is culturally inviolable 
while her representative became institutionally irrelevant.  The decorated soldiers, 
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noblesse oblige aristocrats and former British politicians that arrived on New Zealand 
shores soon found the impotence of their vice-regal position and were reduced, like 
Gordon before them, to often learning of the executive actions of their Ministers like 
everyone else ‘from the morning newspaper’.633     
 
The Forgotten Newall Doctrine 
With the end of their double role in 1941 Governors-General ceased symbolically to be 
an agent of Britain, but instead became an agent of the New Zealand Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.  The New Zealand executive now determined their nominal superior and the 
country’s constitutional guardian without the vexations of elections or the rigour of 
transparency.  There was only a mirage of consultation with the Palace and rarely, if 
ever, with anyone outside of Cabinet.  As much it was nationalistically unpalatable for a 
Labour Prime Minister like Norman Kirk in the 1970s to return to having wealthy 
British aristocrats as Governor-General, at least they would be from his perspective 
independent of party bias, which he suspected that New Zealand’s first resident 
Governor-General Sir Denis Blundell had with the National Party.634  Indeed Kirk had 
‘great respect and affection’ for former Governor-General Lord Ballantrae for example 
who was ‘completely non-political’ and even mended the bellows when he visited the 
Māori-speaking monocle-sporting Ballantrae in Scotland, who was remarkably the third 
generation of his distinguished family to serve as the Sovereign’s representative in New 
Zealand.635   Kirk’s attitude, as Leader of the Opposition, was primarily targeted at the 
Governor-General’s neutrality according to his private secretary – 
 
He is … far from happy that the Governor-General, Sir Denis Blundell, was 
appointed under a National Government and that he and Jack Marshall 
[presently Prime Minister] are lifelong friends.  He thinks aloud about the 
possible implications and whether there is any way the situation can be changed.  
Perhaps Blundell’s term could be cut short, and “Charlie Boy” – Prince Charles 
– could be persuaded to take over as Governor-General.636 
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The crowning verification that the person occupying Government House was an agent 
of the Prime Minister was in 1977 when National Prime Minister Muldoon felt brazen 
enough to recommend to the Queen the appointment of long-time National leader and 
former Prime Minister, Sir Keith Holyoake, despite him still being an MP and Cabinet 
minister.  The selection aroused the suspicion that the appointment was as act of 
recompense to a mentor who had helped Muldoon’s career so much.637  The move was 
unprecedented and was not greeted with enthusiasm in the press or by the public and 
met with understandable consternation by the Opposition, who almost totally boycotted 
Government House and threatened to advise the Queen to recall Holyoake.638  The 
Queen herself was reputedly chary of what could be naturally construed as a political 
appointment and though there were examples of such appointments in other 
Commonwealth countries it did, thanks to Holyoake’s obvious and close party and 
government associations create, the constitutionally detrimental impression that the 
Governor-General of New Zealand was ‘in the pocket of the government’.639 
 
The above illustrates the constitutional vulnerability of a Governor-General, when 
viewed or constructed as a mere pawn in the Prime Minister’s hands.  This is especially 
pertinent when one remembers the relative “purity” and power of the Westminster 
executive in New Zealand, unchecked and untroubled by the constitutional apparatus 
prevalent in other New Westminsters.  As the most recent analysis of the Governor-
General attests: ‘once seen as an instrument of imperial will, the Governor-General is 
occasionally now seen as a constitutional safeguard against executive despotism’ who 
can ‘intervene to preserve the constitutional order itself’.640  They are, to use Dame 
Catherine Tizard’s more homely analogy ‘constitutional mums’.641   
 
Though easy to ignore, the powers of the Crown are legally real despite the convention 
that they are exercised on the advice of elected and responsible ministers.  In reflection 
of those powers, that redoubtable and mercurial colonial statesman Sir George Grey 
campaigned in his latter years for ‘an elective governorship’, though this distinctive 
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proposal was not well received in Britain or New Zealand.642  The Letters Patent 
stipulates that the Governor-General ‘may exercise all powers lawfully belonging to Us’ 
over the legislature giving a Governor-General their constitutional authority.643  The 
Governor-General was granted from Clause V of Royal Instructions the potentially 
intimidating, but clear power to reject advice of the Cabinet if the situation justified it. 
 
In the execution of the powers and authorities vested in him, the Governor-
General shall be guided by the advice of the Executive Council, but if any case 
he shall see sufficient cause to dissent from the opinion of the said Council, he 
may act in the exercise of his said powers and authorities in opposition to the 
opinion of the Council, reporting the matter to Us without delay, with the reason 
for his so acting. 
In any such case it shall be competent to any Member of the said Council to 
require that there be recorded upon the Minutes of the Council the grounds of 
any advice or opinion that he may give upon the question.644  
 
 
Therefore though in quarantine the Governor-General had the power to intervene and 
reject the advice of his Ministers.645  However, the practice in New Zealand has rarely 
excited such impressive interpretations either from the Governors-General themselves 
or the elected members of parliament.  It would be a mistake though to completely 
negate those powers since the Instructions ‘leave him free in law to act or not to act, in 
opposition to the advice of the Executive Council or of individual Ministers’.646   
Speaking from experience Lord Cobham asserted that in New Zealand’s constitutional 
order ‘to relegate the Governor-General to the status of a mere powerless figurehead is 
to place the whole Constitution in the power of a possibly unscrupulous administration 
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… I contend that it is still part of his powers, and his bounded duty, to see that the 
traditional usage of the constitution is observed’.647 
 
What is involved in being a “constitutional mum” and what exactly is the “traditional 
usage of the constitution” in New Zealand?  The one commonality of all Governors-
General in the Commonwealth is that despite the varying degrees of legal definition 
there is an ambiguity that surrounds the practical and real powers of the position.  In the 
New Zealand position Sir Denis Blundell noted in the 1970s the reality that his office 
was governed by convention and yet he had ‘never seen them collected in any 
writing’.648  New Zealand still looked through dust coated tomes of English legal 
doyens Dicey, Anson and Jennings or even letters in The Times between British 
establishment figures like Viscounts Samuel and Waverly for constitutional guidance in 
dealing with their local circumstances, despite the limited comparability.649  However, 
one of the Blundell’s forerunners outlined a brief, but constitutionally rich note and 
doctrine on the New Zealand Governor-General’s constitutional role, which others had 
hoped for.  Marshall of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Newall is one of the country’s 
most unknown Governors-General: Dame Silvia Cartwright’s overview of her office 
and thirty-three predecessors neglects Newall completely.650  And yet Newall was the 
first Governor-General to be solely the agent of the New Zealand when he entered 
office in February 1941.  Newall, who had just taken part as Chief of the Air Staff with 
the Battle of Britain not only applied his military knowledge to helping New Zealand’s 
war effort, but also to largely unknown stratagems of defending the constitutional rights 
of the Governor-Generalship from prime ministerial assaults. 
 
Newall’s term which announced and then led to the adoption of the Statute of 
Westminster contains one of the last attempts of a New Zealand Governor-General to 
assert his prerogative and right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn and therefore 
act as a “constitutional mum” though, as will be shown below this was not the 
“traditional usage” of a Governor-General’s actual powers within the New Zealand 
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executive.  Nearing the end of his term Newall recorded in writing a clear and 
constitutionally correct, but practically difficult in New Zealand’s executive 
environment, interpretation of a Westminster and Wellington model Governor-
General’s duty: 
 
The Governor-General, as the King’s Representative, has the right to consider the 
propriety of exercising his constitutional authority or discretionary powers to refuse 
assent to a course of action advised by his Ministers in two classes of cases: 
a) If he thinks that such a course of action offends against the law of the 
Constitution and is illegal.  In such cases it is proper for the Governor-General to 
obtain the advice of the Law Officers and if they advise that the proposed course 
of action is illegal then it is his constitutional duty to refuse assent. 
b) If he thinks that the course of action, while not offending against the letter of the 
law, is such as to offend against the spirit of fundamental principles of the 
Constitution. 
In such cases it would also be within his discretion, as the ultimate guardian of the 
Constitutional Government of the country, to refuse his assent, but before making a 
decision to exercise his discretion, he should satisfy himself, not only that he could 
find alternative Ministers prepared to accept responsibility for his decision and to go 
to the country in support of it, but also that they had sure prospect of winning the 
General Election and continuing in office.  Otherwise, the Governor-General would 
have exposed the country to the turmoil of a General Election for no purpose and he 
would have gravely impaired the prestige of the Governor-General’s office.651 
 
This was an attempt to institutionalise the role of the Governor-General with the 
‘efficient’ purpose of defending the constitution.  Newall had every intention of 
complying with his own dictum and could rely on the ancient statutory and royal 
powers to defend his bold statement – though it is not clear who this declaration was 
intended for, whether for posterity, Prime Ministers or future proconsuls it was a rare 
clarion call of a Governor-General’s constitutional powers over the New Zealand 
convention of being a mere “stamp”.  Newall’s construal may well have been based on 
his largely overlooked, but constitutionally eventful tenure.  Though Newall’s term is 
slightly before the focal period of this thesis there are crucial constitutional practices 
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which shaped the office for decades to come, since his example was rarely honoured by 
his successors except in avoidance. 
 
In 1941, early in his term, Newall was asked to remit the orders to flog four escaped 
prisoners who had assaulted prison guards.  The Cabinet recommended the Governor-
General remit the sentence since it was against flogging despite it being legal and the 
sentences were upheld in the Court of Appeal.  Newall protested that he could not 
therefore sign since there were no ‘mitigating circumstances’ and he had not been 
properly consulted.652 It was an occasion, which as Keith Sinclair argues was ‘probably 
the last on which a Governor-General did not act on ministerial advice’.653  Fraser told 
the Cabinet from overseas that they ‘should on no account accept the Governor-
General’s refusal to act of ministerial advice’.654  As Gavin McLean recounts Newall 
‘stuck to his guns’ and eventually Nash, the acting Prime Minister, demurred  and 
Cabinet gave in, since with an election coming soon they did not want a ‘public scrap 
with the Governor-General’.  The solution was that the Government publicly announced 
it would abolish flogging, making it acceptable to Newall to sign the remission orders 
and thus both parties ‘saved face’.655   
 
Newall was also a stickler for protocol reminding ministers not to broadcast policy or 
personnel information which had not passed through him first.  Newall was quite 
prepared to upbraid Fraser in the middle of the burdens of his war leadership that 
ministers must submit their resignations in person since they ‘were the King’s Ministers 
and that, it was a matter which required something more that an ordinary typewritten 
advice to the Governor-General to accept their resignations’.  Fraser even apologised 
and assured the New Zealand Commander-in-Chief that ‘the necessary precautionary 
measures have been taken to ensure that there will be no recurrence of this unfortunate 
oversight’.  It is also worth noting that the King was informed directly by Newall about 
every change in his New Zealand Ministry and acknowledged so.656   
 
Perhaps the most fascinating  and central example of Newall’s doctrine of being able to 
question a Government’s ‘course of action, while not offending against the letter of the 
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law, is such as to offend against the spirit of fundamental principles of the 
Constitution’657 was over the abolition of the “Country Quota” in 1945.  The “Country 
Quota”, which had been part of the New Zealand electoral system since the 1880,s 
added a fictitious amount (then twenty-eight per cent) to the rural population to balance 
it against urban centres.  The quota worked ‘to the prejudice of the largely urban Labour 
Party’ while it continuance favoured the farmer dominated National Party, who saw the 
rural sector as the backbone of the country.  Fraser caustically described the quota as the 
‘vermiform appendix of Toryism’ and wished its replacement with the ‘principle of one 
man, one vote’.658  The Labour Government had been concerned over its chances of 
winning the 1946 General Election and saw the benefit of getting the Electoral 
Amendment Bill 1945 through to help its chances of staying in power since it would 
eventually create six more urban seats to the loss of the same number of rural 
electorates.  National vigilantly opposed the Bill through thirty-four divisions and 
compelled the Labour Government to use parliamentary tactics of urgency and 
closure.659  The Bill eventually passed the gauntlet of the House of Representatives at 
almost 3.30am 3 November 1945 where ‘every clause was challenged by the 
Opposition’.660  The abolition of the “Country Quota” now is almost completely 
forgotten, despite it arguably being the most radical change to the electoral system of 
New Zealand till the adoption of proportional representation fifty years later.  And yet 
for such a significant change to the electoral dynamics of the country the Labour 
Government ‘had no mandate for changing the electoral laws’.661 
 
A few days after the Bill cleared, an editorial in the capital’s morning daily speculated 
on the Governor-General’s role and responsibilities: 
 
It is of importance that the heavy responsibilities attached to the high office of 
Governor-General should be clearly understood.  The office is part of the 
constitutional system of the country, the appointment to it being made on the 
recommendation or with the consent or approval of the Government of the day.  
Certain powers are attached to the office, among them being the signing of Bills 
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which have been passed by Parliament, and requiring the Governor-General’s 
signature as the representative of the King.  It can be assumed that these powers 
would not have been granted unless it had been contemplated that they might be 
used on occasion as the interests of the community might demand.  It is 
considered by those affected, or likely to be affected, by the amendment of the 
electoral law now under review, that such an occasion has now arisen.  What 
apparently is being sought is that the Governor-General by virtue of the 
authority he holds should abstain from placing his signature to the measure 
amending the electoral laws until the people as a whole have been consulted as 
to the changes proposed. 
 
The aptly named Dominion newspaper was calling upon the constitutional guardian to 
act to preserve to use in Newall’s words ‘the spirit of fundamental principles of the 
Constitution’.  Whatever the arguments for and against the “Country Quota”, the 
abolition of it would significantly alter the existing constitutional and electoral status 
quo in the country.  Newall in the proceeding days had received representations from 
the New Zealand Farmers’ Union.  The issue gained widespread public attention and the 
Farmers’ Union and interested parties raised the princely sum of £250,000 to ‘fight 
abolition’.662  Their President, W.W. Mulholland, believed the Electoral Amendment 
Bill ‘gives grave affront to a great many loyal and industrious subjects of His Majesty 
the King in New Zealand’.  Mulholland wasted no time in putting an extraordinary 
option before the Governor-General: 
 
If your Advisors are unwilling to have the legislation delayed, and the question 
thus decided, we would respectfully ask Your Excellency to cable His Majesty 
appealing to him to intercede with his New Zealand Government to follow the 
constitutional practice in regard to major changes in national policy, and to put 
the question before the electors at a General Election in which this matter is 
made a major issue, before proceeding with the Bill.663 
 
To this and similar letters Newall’s Official Secretary sent a standard courteous, correct, 
but ultimately negative letter: ‘…I am directed by His Excellency to inform you that the 
matter raised therein does not appear to fall within his constitutional authority as 
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Governor-General, but that your communication has been forwarded to his Responsible 
Advisers for their consideration’.664  However, despite it seeming as if the Governor-
General was avoiding the issue or pouring cold water on the farmers’ concerns, Newall 
did in fact act behind the scenes.  The day after receiving the Dominion President of the 
Farmers’ Union Newall met the Prime Minister to acquaint him of his misgivings over 
the proposed alterations to the electoral system.   
 
Newall was concerned as to sign ‘any measure which might not be in accordance with 
the wishes of the majority’.  Fraser replied that ‘if the people so wished they could turn 
them out at the next election’: the mantra of all New Zealand Prime Ministers when 
having to put through difficult policy.  He attempted to mollify the Air Marshall that his 
concerns ‘would always receive his personal and careful consideration and that he 
would refer them to his colleagues and the Government’ and both the Head of State and 
Head of Government appreciated the ‘seriousness of the matter’.665  On the same day a 
telegram warned Government House that ‘revolution’ would occur if abolition 
proceeded and warned the King’s Representative that ‘we will fight if you sign’.666 
 
On 6 November 1945 Newall did in fact communicate with the King’s Private Secretary 
and apprised him with resigned accuracy of the constitutional tensions and issues in 
George VI’s realm beyond the seas. 
 
The provisions of the Bill, which had not previously been communicated to the 
people, were in my opinion designed by the Government with the intention of 
securing their return to Parliament in November, 1946, having in mind the swing 
of public opinion against them at the last General Election.  It has been most 
sternly contested by the Opposition at all stages in its passage through the House 
and has roused angry protest throughout the Dominion not only in the Press 
(which is almost exclusively anti Labour Party) but by the very great majority of 
people in the rural districts and by many thousands residing in the cities…The 
Electoral Act has been in existence since 1881, and the country quota (although 
it has been altered on two occasions) has come to be regarded more or less as 
part of the Constitution.  Notwithstanding the unpopularity of the Bill, however, 
it does not seem to infringe the Constitution Act and the Government are strictly 
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within the letter of the law in enacting such legislation without prior reference to 
the people.  I discussed with my Prime Minister the representation made by the 
New Zealand Farmers’ Union and suggested that in view of the strong objection 
to the Bill and the fact that representation in Parliament was the most prized 
possession of people under democratic governments he might consider 
withholding it for the General Election in November, 1946, or alternatively that 
he make it the subject of a referendum this year.  Neither of these proposals he 
has seen fit to adopt and I am left with no option but to assent to the Bill when it 
is submitted to me.  This I intend to do.  I do not propose to make any formal 
representations to the King in the matter, but as the Bill has aroused such intense 
feeling and bitter protest throughout the country I feel that His Majesty would 
like to be acquainted with the circumstances.667 
 
Newall had exercised to the full his right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn and 
he stayed true to his doctrine and demonstrated throughout his tenure that a Governor-
General is the custodian of “the spirit” of the constitution that should not be ignored by 
the elected executive.   Though his objections over the “Country Quota” were ultimately 
to no avail he reminded his “responsible advisors” of a Governor-General’s 
constitutional importance, though not quite achieving the centrality of the King in the 
British system.  Though New Zealand Governors-General ‘send regular private letters’ 
to the Sovereign as shown above it was becoming implicit ‘that the actual 
responsibilities of constitutional head of state lie with the Governor-General’.668  Fraser 
was able through his reply to Mulholland on Newall’s behalf to outline the 
constitutional position in New Zealand with technical and practical reality:  
 
It is noted that you ask His Excellency to request his Advisors to reconsider their 
decision to pass the Electoral Amendment Bill at this time.  As you are aware 
this measure, which the Government regard as one of major importance has now 
passed the House of Representatives and it is the intention of the Government 
that it should proceed through the remaining Parliamentary stages.  Your request 
to His Excellency to prorogue Parliament and hold an election is also noted.  In 
this connection I have to advise you that such action on the part of His 
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Excellency in the present circumstances would be quite unconstitutional since 
the Electoral Amendment Bill is in no way contrary to the laws of New Zealand, 
nor does it violate the spirit of the Constitution.669      
 
Newall had little left of his term after this constitutional scuffle and a barony awaited 
him on his return to the “Old Country”.  This forgotten Governor-General had 
attempted to forge a greater institutional ‘efficient’ role as defender of the constitution 
and a sense of constitutional purpose to his high office, but his successors were not 
generally inclined to withstand the inexorable flow in New Zealand of political and 
constitutional primacy to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.   Those who immediately 
followed him to become the first Governors-General of the independent realm of New 
Zealand favoured a more observational, passive and culturally simplified role to 
following the often politically uncomfortable, but constitutionally courageous and 
ultimately correct, clauses of the “Newall Doctrine”.  This was in spite of the crucial 
constitutional and cultural developments that occurred in the decade that followed the 
adoption of the Statute of Westminster.   
 
Fraser’s announcement that Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg VC would 
succeed Newall was hugely popular.  An appointment described by Fraser’s biographers 
as a ‘political master-stroke’ due to Freyberg’s childhood experience of New Zealand 
and more popularly the fact that he was a ‘legend amongst his troops’ as the man who 
had led so many New Zealand servicemen and ‘a close personal friend’ of the Prime 
Minister.670  As will be discussed below Freyberg though naturally involved in helping 
with the “Defence of the Realm” was conspicuous by his constitutional inactivity and 
acquiescence to prime ministerial command despite there being huge developments in 
this period.  These included the succession of a new Sovereign, the abolition of the 
upper house of Parliament and the more publicly prominent 1951 Waterfront strike and 
the unprecedented snap election that it catalysed under Fraser’s successor, the first 
National Party Prime Minister Sidney Holland.   
 
Freyberg’s successor and fellow Lieutenant-General was the Eton and Sandhurst 
educated Sir Willoughby Norrie, who had been Governor of South Australia since 1944. 
Despite humourlessly telling New Zealand audiences fresh from his tenure in Australia 
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that he was a Kiwi now and no longer ‘Sir Wallaby Nirrie’671 he still struggled with 
Māori pronunciation and was helped by Prime Minister Holland to say “my-right-eye” 
when attempting the name Maraetai.672    Sir Willoughby’s term 1952-57 was, as the 
chronicler of the invaluable history of the vice-regal office ‘free of political 
controversy’.673  This is another way of saying that Norrie, like his immediate 
predecessor and most of his successors, kept to the New Zealand convention of 
constitutional non-intervention.  The highlight of his term constitutionally, but more 
culturally was the Royal Visit of Elizabeth II in 1953-54, the first reigning monarch to 
visit the New Zealand islands.  However, Holland was the local personality that 
attached himself visibly to the Royal personage, prompting the renowned candour of the 
Duke of Edinburgh to exclaim ‘what, you again?’674, while Norrie correctly observed 
protocol and allowed the Sovereign he represented to be the focal point.   
 
Holland was not as diligent on protocol and let slip with irreverence the ‘efficient’ 
reality and power of the Prime Minister over the ‘dignified’ mythical powers of a 
Governor-General as the startled British High Commissioner, Sir George Mallaby, 
observed. 
 
At the state luncheon given in honour of the retiring Governor-General Sir 
Willoughby Norrie, he [Holland] included in his speech a remark on these lines: 
“I have, of course, sent a report to the Queen about you, Your Excellency, and I 
don’t think you would be altogether displeased if you could see what I wrote.”  
This piece of rather childish arrogance gave great offence.  Who was Mr 
Holland to report on the Governor-General and how could he have the 
impertinence to imply that it was in his power to confer favours?675   
 
Viscount Cobham came near the end of 1957 and had a wealth of ancestral connections 
to New Zealand.   Cobham was faced at the end this thesis’s period, but the beginning 
of his, with the potential of a hung parliament in 1957, which exercised the New 
Zealand political brain on parliamentary arithmetic to a degree not seen again till the 
MMP era.  The new Governor-General enlisted the help of none other than Sir Ivor 
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Jennings on what to do in the small political arena of New Zealand if a government 
could not be formed.  Suggestions included offering ministerial posts to the Opposition 
or as Sir Robert Menzies advised: ‘tell Sid [Holland] to offer the Speakership to a 
member of the Opposition’.676  Jennings, mindful of the Byng example, told New 
Zealand’s Governor-General that ‘it is safer to take advice than to reject it’.677 Lord 
Cobham was grateful for advice and hoped he would not ‘make a bloomer’ over the 
political situation.678  In the end the Governor-General was saved from having to make 
any arduous decisions since Labour came out of the 1957 election with a bare, but 
workable, majority and Government House could continue the convention of non-
intervention.     
 
Cobham, who had toured the country representing the M.C.C. in his youth, was fond, 
like many of his countrymen and class, of cricketing metaphors, telling a youthful 
Hastings audience that ‘a Governor-General is a person rather like a wicket-keeper; he 
is definitely part of the game, but he is seldom noticed until he makes a mistake’.679   
However, it would be more accurate to describe a New Zealand Governor-General’s 
role as a keen observer and dedicated enthusiast of the political game, not a player or 
even an umpire though at least comforted with a premier seat and view from the 
Members’ stand, a regular invitation to the after-match function and even a 
commemorative photo with themselves and the country’s political first XI at the 
beginning of the parliamentary innings.  The inability to activate or project the 
Governor-General’s legitimate constitutional powers meant the incapacity and 
impotence to provide an effective form of executive horizontal accountability, which 
allowed the Prime Minister and Cabinet to have undisguised supremacy over the state. 
 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 
The Royal visit of the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh to New Zealand in 1953-54 
aroused a level of national fervour previously unknown for a public occasion and 
provides an example of New Zealand’s early deference to the British Monarchy while at 
the same time demonstrating the shallowness of the Crown’s political power.  It is 
believed that three in every four New Zealanders saw their Queen and thus completed 
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the cultural compact with Britain discussed in the first chapter, an event described even 
today as the ‘most elaborate and most whole-hearted occasion in New Zealand 
history’.680  Constitutionally the Queen would open Parliament on its centennial in 
1954.  The twenty-seven year old Queen told to the collective enchantment of her 
government and loyal opposition: 
 
A hundred years ago, when the people of New Zealand gained for themselves 
the right of responsible self-government, it would have required a prophetic 
imagination to have foreseen the possibility of the present occasion.  But in 
these hundred years New Zealand has grown to be a sovereign and mature 
State… 
 
Prime Minister Holland replied with enthusiasm that he hoped the New Zealand 
legislature would ‘prove worthy of our Queen’ as all New Zealanders wanted to express 
in person ‘their feelings of loyalty and devotion to their Sovereign, and their enthusiasm 
and love for Her’.  New Zealand was a country, stirred Holland, ‘patterned on that of 
Britain, the alternative to which is system that is foreign to our way of life’.  The Leader 
of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, Walter Nash, concurred that ‘we on this side of the 
House are of one mind with the Prime Minister in his remarks about he visit of Her 
Majesty the Queen’ who ‘is an example to us all, and who does more to maintain our 
system of democracy more than any man or woman can really understand’.  Nash 
gushed that ‘we have had no threat of dictatorship in this country and there never will 
be so long as we have our form of government, and persons like Her Majesty, reigning 
in the way she does’.681 
 
All the Queen’s New Zealand parliamentarians were in Nash’s panegyric phrase “one 
mind” in praising the symbolic visit and participation of their monarch and also the 
‘dignified’ Westminster system she represented.  However, despite the no doubt 
genuine affection for the Queen, the fact was that the Queen reigns, but it is the Prime 
Minister who ruled New Zealand through delegated democracy in a way a British Prime 
Minister could not.  The Queen was in her glamorous appearance and regal coronation 
robes the ceremonial part of the constitution that added allure and pomp, but the 
substance of power lay elsewhere.  The Queen “an example to us all”, for whom the 
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assembled politicians felt “love” and hoped to be “worthy of”, had no ability to directly 
determine or initiate policy.  The Queen was a powerful cultural symbol, but not a 
powerful institutional actor.  The Monarch was relegated to the visible ceremonial and 
dull bureaucratic custom.    
 
New Zealand’s constitutional documents in true British Westminster fashion centred 
almost entirely on the Crown and did not trouble to mention or even name the office of 
Prime Minister or Cabinet the body that he headed.  Despite their conspicuous absence 
it was the Prime Minister and Cabinet who exercised with complete confidence the full 
powers entrusted to the Crown, which was delegated to them to employ.  Sir Kenneth 
Keith reflected after a quarter of a century of Queen Elizabeth’s reign over the New 
Zealand Westminster system, which  
 
has its Marquess of Queensbury rules, and public opinion as the referee.  But … 
the question whether New Zealand can continue to depend on the extent that it 
has on customary restraints and on the good sense and tolerance of those with 
the powers.  Formal restraints should perhaps be more seriously considered than 
they were in the 1950s and 1960s.  Very broad powers have been conferred on 
the government and while, as New Zealand’s first Prime Minister [Henry Sewell 
in 1864] said, “All Governments intend to use arbitrary power with moderation”, 
we might, like him, lack confidence in the strength of purpose of government to 
resist the temptation to use the power improperly in certain situations.682 
   
Prime Ministerial and Cabinet Power in and over New Zealand 
New Zealand is a country with a small population and parliament.  In political terms up 
until the late sixties the House of Representatives had just eighty seats including the 
four reserved for Māori.   With the full establishment of the two-party system in this 
1947-57 era, which first witnessed the alternation of power between Labour and 
National, a government could be formed with less that fifty seats.  Keith Jackson has 
calculated the compact and restricted nature of cabinet government in New Zealand.  
The British ‘inner’ Cabinet is around twenty, which is roughly the same size as New 
Zealand’s Cabinet.  However, the range and avenues of choice and scale of parliament 
is markedly different.  In Britain the choice is 20:315 (average size of the majority party 
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in the House of Commons excluding those available for selection from the House of 
Lords) while in New Zealand it is approximately 20:45.683   
 
There is undoubtedly an intimacy within the New Zealand political system not seen in 
other traditional Westminsters, which allows a greater personalisation of executive 
power, where the executive can be more than twenty-five per cent of the elected 
legislature.  The compactness of the political executive and limited pool of actors to 
populate it lends credence to McLeay’s words that ‘New Zealand’s political executive is 
essentially government by amateurs’ since ministers are rarely experts in their portfolios 
or policy areas.684  
 
Roderic Alley has argued that in the political context ‘within a small, relatively intimate 
country, pragmatic adoption of unwritten constitutional rules has allowed a free rein to 
the executive.  Unlike their Australian counterparts, New Zealand Prime Ministers have 
been unbothered by the uncertainties and restraints imposed by bicameralism and 
federalism’.685  A more blunt assessment by Richard Mulgan, which adds tight party 
discipline and the first-past-the-post electoral to Alley’s statement, utilises Hailsham’s 
evocative phrase to identify New Zealand as the model of ‘elective dictatorship’.686  
According to Stephen Levine, New Zealand’s parliamentary democracy is ‘structurally 
very simple’ due to the ‘Westminster system in its New Zealand form’ as ‘a unitary 
state, a unicameral parliament [with] an unwritten constitution’, which ‘offered too few 
checks on executive power’.687   All of these elements became especially evident within 
the 1947-57 period.  The executive cosiness and compact political surroundings, along 
with a relatively minimal, but concentrated bureaucracy meant more things reached the 
Cabinet and Prime Minister than in most Westminster countries. 
 
The modern functioning and systematic methodology of Cabinet began in these years 
through two crucial developments.  At the beginning of the period the Cabinet Secretary 
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was for the first time in early 1948, over ninety years after the position was established, 
permitted to formally attend Cabinet by right and was instructed to keep a full record of 
Cabinet proceedings so ‘that some check would now be kept on important decisions in 
Cabinet and, in particular, action on important matters when required’.  Previously 
Prime Ministers or a senior minister noted decisions and officials were rarely in 
attendance for many years despite the long history of Cabinet.  There is precious little 
official or archived material of the pre-1948 era since it was previously ‘the custom for 
the Prime Minister to either take these records with him when he left office, or 
alternatively to have them destroyed or disposed of in some other way’.  It had been 
common for papers to be seen as the personal property of ministers or burnt as for 
instance happened in 1935 when government papers of the past forty-four years were 
nihilistically incinerated.688  Secondly for the first time and at the end of this thesis’s 
period, when a change of government occurred in 1957, the defeated National 
Government agreed to leave a complete set of cabinet papers to be held by the Cabinet 
Secretariat for the incoming Labour Government; this practice was thankfully followed 
by successive administrations.689 
 
To indigenise Robert Chapman’s description that New Zealand had ‘fortress 
Cabinets’.690 Cabinets were a political pa and citadel of executive power with the Prime 
Minister as chief or te ariki due to the jealous concentration and defence of power from 
any opponents or institutional intruders.691  McLeay asserts ‘because Cabinet occupies 
central stage in the political system, the political actors who comprise it profoundly 
affect the perceived legitimacy of New Zealand parliamentary government’.692  And the 
premier political actor within the Cabinet is the Prime Minister, who holds real power 
due to the centrality, focus, patronage and decision-making capabilities of the position 
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and is the potential source of the personalist power of delegated democracy.  In its 
faithfulness to British culture Prime Minister and Cabinet are ‘creatures of convention’ 
since even the Prime Minister’s power to be chief adviser to the Governor-General is 
not stated in the Letters Patent.693  And yet the cemented New Zealand convention and 
interpretation of Westminster practice is that the Governor-General ‘must follow the 
Prime Minister’s advice, and not be without guidance’.694  The sheer reality is that the 
Prime Minister who commands the House of Representatives holds the immense powers 
invested in the Crown since they are solely the exclusive and responsible adviser to the 
Governor-General in the exercise of executive power.  
 
The New Zealand Prime Minister heads the executive, approves the legislative 
programme, decides how many ministers will be inside and outside Cabinet, 
allocates portfolios to those ministers, sets the agenda for Cabinet, and, as the 
chair of both Cabinet and Caucus, is the final arbiter on all decisions.  The Prime 
Minister decides who will chair cabinet committees, and usually personally 
chairs the important Policy and Strategy cabinet committees and the Honours 
and Appointments Committee, the later of which provides for considerable 
patronage powers.  As well, Prime Ministers are ex-officio members of all 
cabinet committees.695 
 
The above contemporary assessments of New Zealand Prime Ministers and Cabinets are 
based on past practices.  However, modern accounts of prime ministerial and Cabinet 
dominance have generally neglected the authoritarian and confident use of executive 
power in the 1940s and 1950s, which saw two of New Zealand’s most powerful Prime 
Ministers as well as a raft of radical constitutional and political change.  The centrality 
of executive and prime ministerial power became activated and real in 1947-57 era 
when the modern two-party system became firmly established with the alternation of 
power allowing for the entrenchment of tight party disciplined governments to supplant 
parliament as an independent arbiter and any revival of the short lasting administrations 
of the colonial era; conforming and symptomatic of the traditional Westminster 
characteristic of executive dominance over the legislature.   
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The shrewd leadership and dominance of Peter Fraser over policy, party, parliament and 
country provided an example for Sidney Holland to arbitrarily utilise and manipulate 
New Zealand’s simplistic Westminster constitutional structure for political profit.  
Theirs was a telling example for their successors and a telling illustration of the political 
executive’s powers over all other branches of state.  Labour ended its first and longest 
hold of the Treasury benches in this time and then ushered in the first National 
administration.  Both parties consciously or unconsciously conceded and delegated real 
power to their leaders when they gained office to enhance the “purity” of power of the 
political executive over other political actors and therefore further contribute towards 
the weak horizontal accountability of New Zealand. 
 
Fraser’s Legacy and the First Years of Delegated Democracy 1947-49 
By 1947 Labour had been in power for twelve years, seven of which were under Peter 
Fraser.  Fraser was the transitional figure from pre to post independence who was at the 
helm when New Zealand became an independent country in law that formalised his 
potential for delegated democracy power.  As Beaglehole stated, books detailing New 
Zealand’s involvement in the Second World War are invariably centred on Fraser and 
he speculated that ‘a book about the Labour Government between 1945 and 1949 would 
have to be largely about Peter Fraser too: about the decline and fall of a great man, 
mortally weary, who saw control slipping away from him…where control had been one 
of the main sources of strength … [but] still … an adroit [and] masterly politician’.696  
Fraser had been worn out by the strains and responsibilities of war leadership, but his 
capacity for keeping power had not dimmed.697  Labour may have limped back in to 
office after the 1946 election, but there was still never any doubt that Fraser was in 
charge and with the all or nothing feature of the standard Westminster electoral system 
the Labour majority of four (helped by the four Māori seats) was more than enough 
even compelling Fraser to label it ‘a clear and definite mandate’.  This slender majority 
of the ageing Government was whittled down further as death and decay ravaged the 
Labour, especially front, benches giving the impression of a government ‘living from 
day to day’. 698   
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However, though Labour had only two years left after the ratification of the Statute of 
Westminster and did not bestow any great legislative pearls as compared to the bounty 
of policy produced in its earlier terms, the impressive power of Peter Fraser remained 
and would be a substantial legacy not only to the Labour Party, but their opponents as 
well.  Though somewhat unkind to describe the last years of the first Labour 
Government as ‘rotting out of office’ A. R. D. Fairburn considered Fraser a ‘demagogue 
with a remarkable understanding of power politics’ who was still in his last years ‘the 
most intelligent and able politician in New Zealand history’.699    
 
In an innovative analysis in the study of New Zealand political science, Simon 
Sheppard ranked the country’s Prime Ministers.  Of the thirty selected, Peter Fraser 
commanded second place beating his predecessor Savage in to third place and 
conceding the top spot to New Zealand’s longest serving Head of Government Richard 
Seddon.700  Former minister and prime ministerial biographer Michael Bassett in his 
study of New Zealand’s leadership ‘give[s] the prize for New Zealand’s greatest 
twentieth-century Prime Minister to Peter Fraser’.701  Fraser’s high and exalted status in 
New Zealand political history owes much to his reputation and conduct overseas 
especially as a war leader and Commonwealth elder.  His not inconsiderable 
involvement with the establishment and purpose of the United Nations entitles him to be 
labelled by some as the ‘only New Zealand leader with a plausible claim to be 
recognised as an international statesman’.702  Fraser was able to gain this international 
reputation and ability through his mastery of the domestic scene.   
 
This highly intelligent and largely self-taught man was through his dour cunning 
determination able to concentrate power in his own hands through his ascendance and 
political longevity.  Many shared Leicester Webb’s analysis that ‘Fraser liked power, 
fought hard to win it, and towards the finish clung desperately’ and this complex man 
with ‘a high moral sense’ was ‘capable of intolerant and arbitrary action when he was 
convinced that what he was doing was in the national interest or that those who opposed 
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him were acting from bad motives’.703  He worked extremely hard as politics was his 
life and had a ‘perverse’ expectation for his officials to share these demanding traits.704  
He was full of paradox, as Leslie Hobbs recounted – 
 
Fraser was a complex man.  A humanitarian who did a tremendous amount for 
the poor and the sick, he was at the same time ruthless, even unscrupulous, in 
securing his political aims.  He was an intriguer, a shameless user of other 
people, and at the same time a zealous trustee of the social betterment ambitions 
of the most liberal spirits in his party.705  
 
Whatever his aims it can be agreed that Fraser was a master politician who was 
correctly viewed as commanding the New Zealand political scene while Prime Minister.  
In Cabinet, with the obvious exception of his loyal deputy and eventual successor, 
Walter Nash, ‘he tended to ride roughshod over them’.  As Sir Alister McIntosh recalled 
he himself felt more ‘a glorified Private Secretary than the Permanent Head’ and all in 
the Parliament Buildings knew that ‘Fraser did not like to delegate, especially to his 
officials.  His Cabinet colleagues, too, knew better than to act on any important question 
without his knowledge or authority’, showing the lack of horizontal accountability on 
the Prime Minister.706  Cabinet, party and official colleagues  remember a Prime 
Minister who could be ‘ruthless, calculating, cynical and insensitive and often insulting 
when dealing with others’ who was ‘vindictive, bad tempered and sadistic bully’, while 
one former minister thought ‘Machiavelli had nothing on him’.707  Fraser was Minister 
of Police throughout Labour’s fourteen years, with his unique powers of knowing the 
activities of all, which fuelled the suspicion of clandestine information networks and 
even his own side believed he was not ‘averse to using police information as well as 
other sources to keep tabs on supporters of doubtful loyalty’.708    
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Caucus was no different, where he was ‘undoubted master’ and was in last years a ‘stern 
and scolding party disciplinarian’, treating backbenchers as them as a headmaster would 
over schoolboys often with ‘a rod of iron’ and even the Opposition leaders warned their 
members to use ‘commonsense’ and avoid a ‘head on clash with the Old Man’.709  
Though outwardly ‘allowing the letter and trappings of caucus democracy, Fraser, with 
cunning sagacity, was in practice an autocrat who largely destroyed its spirit’710 so that 
they became ‘tame affairs’, where backbenchers were subject to ‘abusive’ comments if 
they erred from the expectation ‘to be seen but not heard’.711  Fraser’s insistence on 
seeing everything and deciding everything was infamous, showing his personalist 
tendencies.  Fraser the political carnivore was even specifically requested at a 1948 
Cabinet meeting to directly endorse the assignment of fountain pens to his ministerial 
colleagues and civil servants.712 
 
Fraser was able to act the way he did, in these last years of 1947-49 especially, because 
of his supremacy over the New Zealand executive, which offered few effective or 
volunteering forms of horizontal accountability.  Fraser’s innate authority and 
conspicuous political skill and ability over party and parliament meant that he was in a 
position unchallengeable as Prime Minister until the citizens could pass judgment at 
election time.  Through his actions and by his abilities he generally proved himself 
worthy of his powers even according to his detractors.  In the pursuit of power even 
Fraser put forward a referendum on conscription to ‘sideline the government’s wider 
difficulties’ despite his party’s and his own background attempting to curry  a patriotic 
favour in the Cold War climate with the electorate and to foil the looming spectre of 
National triumph at the 1949 elections.713  
 
Fraser and his exhausted and decomposing government could not escape defeat in the 
face of National’s vigour and fresh appeal.  Fraser, like many who hold such power, did 
not last long after losing power – though he stayed on and would die as Leader of the 
Opposition in December 1950.  The King pronounced on Fraser’s death that ‘His 
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services to New Zealand as her Prime Minister during a critical period of her history 
and in the councils of the British Commonwealth will long be remembered with 
gratitude’.714  The new National Cabinet respectfully adjourned on receipt of the news 
of the death of their old adversary and Sidney Holland no doubt contemplated the same 
thoughts as the King, but for himself perhaps also considered Fraser’s delegated 
democracy legacy of concentrated executive power readily available to a New Zealand 
Prime Minister.715  Whether he did or not, Prime Minister Holland actively pursued a 
doctrine of wielding immense political power as the successor to the Fraser legacy.  
   
The Holland Hegemony 
Sidney Holland is one of the most neglected New Zealand Prime Ministers, despite 
being the first National leader to become Prime Minister as well as presiding over some 
of the most striking constitutional events during almost eight years at the nation’s helm.  
Though admittedly, there are few credible political biographies of New Zealand Prime 
Ministers, the reason for Holland’s almost complete absence could be to do with the 
portrait of him as an uninstructed and undistinguished mind not given to intellectual 
diversions and a rather imperfect grasp of urbanity with a limited outlook that did not 
stray beyond the Canterbury plains.  A contemporary account brazenly called him a 
‘cockily pugnacious figure’ who was ‘almost Neanderthally[sic] slow’.716  Regardless 
of the critiques Holland must be more prominently housed in the gallery of major New 
Zealand politicians since despite what the critics cry he did by his actions and coarse 
political dexterity compel since he left a definitive mark on the political canvas, 
whatever the merit of his artistry.  “Gentleman Jack” Marshall who served under him 
initially under the rather unique title “Minister Assisting the Prime Minister” had a more 
measured drawing of his former master: ‘He was an ordinary man with extraordinary 
qualities.  He was not a humble man, he had an air of confidence, but there was no 
arrogance in him.  He understood the average man and his needs, his hopes and his 
aspirations, in a way that made him a man of the people’.717  While former long serving 
civil servant Bruce Brown adds to this impression by arguing that Holland ‘was a 
shrewd judge of the opinions and prejudices of the average New Zealander of this time, 
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probably because he shared them.  He was no intellectual but had a sharp, shrewd, 
basically provincial cast of mind’.718 
 
Holland did, however, possess the acknowledged skill of political and personal 
buoyancy and energy, which put him in favourable contrast to the atrophying previous 
administration.719  He was ‘a practical man of action, not given to contemplation’ who 
was able to identify with the electors and they with him.720  His victory in 1949, for he 
was largely responsible for the revival of the National Party, had a ‘tame inevitability’, 
which Holland’s minimalism and efficiency had much to with. 
 
Perhaps Sidney Holland was such an effective leader because of his basic 
simplicity.  To him the slogans which more complex men will use with a certain 
interior reserve and scepticism were perhaps heart-felt realities, as heart-felt as 
the simple enjoyment of power.  The self-made man, private enterprise, the 
Empire (no Commonwealth for him!), the Old Country, the Queen: he like his 
party, may well have been almost wholly inspired by these uncomplicated 
generalities.721  
 
Holland’s simple and energetic attitude extended to his views on the constitution.  The 
former Canterbury businessman was thoroughly deferential to the Monarchy and British 
culture as discussed above.  Holland no doubt wrote with sincerity to George VI when 
he wished on behalf of the new government that he ‘beg respectfully to tender to Your 
Majesty most loyal greetings, to give an assurance of unswerving devotion to Your 
Majesty’s Throne and Person’ and (using the now politically incorrect title of 
Dominion722) promised ‘to affirm the determination of Your Majesty’s Government in 
New Zealand to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the administration of the 
Dominion and the advancement of the welfare of Your Majesty’s subjects therein’.723   
 
At international conferences he would speak ‘without subtlety or finesse’ to express the 
‘uppermost feelings in his head loyalty to the U.K….’ a position that often embarrassed 
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his Commonwealth colleagues.724  However, as has been argued above, Holland though 
culturally deferential to the Monarchy and British did not see any need to be so 
deferential to Westminster axioms.  As will be analysed in detail in the following 
chapter one of the first actions of this conservative administration was the abolition of 
the Legislative Council in 1950-51.  The Prime Minister accomplished the end of New 
Zealand’s upper house with negligible thought or consultation, but with considerable 
vigour and cunning.  Holland’s path dependent action changed forever the complexion 
of Parliament, eradicating another, albeit weak, check on prime ministerial power and 
going against the theory and practice of Westminster parliamentary government, which 
almost without exception contained second chambers at the centre. 
 
Holland’s abolition of the Legislative Council was not the only rapid and vigorous use 
of his constitutional powers inherited from Fraser.  The new Prime Minister had even 
more power concentrated in his hands than his commanding predecessor.  Holland was 
in command of a party which delegated more power and freedom to its leader than 
Labour and which had a very comfortable majority in the House of Representatives.  
The new Cabinet was bereft of ministerial experience except for a few, including 
Holland, who had brief and unsuccessful membership of the constrained War 
Administration, which lasted only a few months in 1942.   Unlike Fraser the new Prime 
Minister did not take on External Affairs which went to Doidge, despite McIntosh’s 
‘fears’.  Doidge also took on tourism, which was more in keeping with the new 
minister’s talents according to senior civil servants.725   
 
As in Britain the other key ministry second only to the premiership is the Finance 
Ministry.  Unlike Britain, where convention would debar such personalist concentration, 
the New Zealand Prime Minister combined these great offices of state and thus gave 
himself massive power over the country well before his similarly powerful successor 
Muldoon did the same; they both incidentally also shared a love of flowers that showed 
a rare delicate side seldom in evidence with their normally aggressive political 
machinations.726  Holland, the first leader of a National Government who held the post 
                                                 
724
 Mallaby, From My Level – Unwritten Minutes, p 146 
725
 McIntosh to Berendsen, 10 December 1949 in Undiplomatic Dialogue – Letters Between Carl 
Berendsen & Alister McIntosh 1943-1952, p 192 
726
 Gustafson, The First 50 Years – A History of the National Party, p 40 and p 56.  Another example is 
George Forbes who had also briefly held both offices. 
 224 
until after the 1954 election established his political power over his inexperienced 
Cabinet with his direction and control by holding these two towering posts.727   
 
This was especially important in micro-executive polity of New Zealand when even the 
repair of the swimming bath at Waitaki Girls’ High School required Cabinet 
approval.728  Even Fraser did not have such policy clout as Holland since he had to defer 
to the experience and position of Nash who held the finance post for almost all of 
Labour’s fourteen previous years in office.  Holland had no rivals and was surrounded 
by subordinates and not equals, though in his last years he would later face the 
impatience of the Deputy Prime Minister Keith Holyoake.729  As the history of the 
National Party stresses due to Holland’s visibility and direct influence, with his 
seventeen years as party leader, he was as Prime Minister ‘assertive in getting his own 
way’ and ‘with justification was regarded by some inside and outside the National Party 
as a tough, decisive, even dogmatic autocrat.  Certainly Holland dominated caucus and 
Cabinet’.730  
 
Strike and Snap 1951 
Holland was able to gain immense power constitutionally and politically with one of the 
most controversial episodes in modern New Zealand history: the 1951 Waterfront Strike 
and snap election that directly followed.  Despite an aversion to reading books, Holland 
was a skilful politician fully capable of utilising the vast powers available to a New 
Westminster Prime Minister, especially in an executive system as “pure” and potentially 
dictatorial as New Zealand’s.  The formidable industrial dispute that engulfed the 
country erupted in February 1951 after months of simmering tension.  It is not within 
the scope or purpose of this thesis to examine in detail the Waterfront Strike except 
from the constitutional angle as opposed to the prominent social slant.   
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The last years of the Labour Government were faced with vehement strike action, which 
was proving highly disruptive to the country’s export driven economy.  The new 
National Government initially endeavoured to settle with the infamous Federation of 
Labour strongman Fintan Patrick Walsh, but had less success with the militant and left-
wing orientated Trade Union Congress, which was dominated by the Waterside 
Workers’ Union known as ‘Wharfies’ or ‘Watersiders’ led by Walsh’s great rival the 
formidable Harold ‘Jock’ Barnes.  The crisis flared in February 1951 when the ship-
owners refused the fifteen per cent wage rise demanded by the Watersiders, while the 
Watersiders refused arbitration and refused to go back to work until their demands were 
met, prompting a lockout; their places later taken by servicemen.  The ports became 
stricken with confrontation that threatened the economic well-being of the country and 
the effectiveness of Holland.   The Government and many in the country perceived the 
industrial dispute as a challenge to their constitutional powers to govern and were quick 
to articulate that the Watersiders were supported by Communist dictums, an argument 
that gained unfortunate credence due to the Cold War fever.731  
 
Rising inflation and disgruntled farmers compelled the man who held the Prime 
Ministership and Finance portfolio to act.  Even before February the Government had 
prepared legislation to deal with the crisis.  In September 1950 the Cabinet, with the 
assistance and attendance of the Legal Draftsman, prepared Emergency Regulations 
‘empowering the Government to declare the waterfront strike a “declared strike”, 
authorising the suspension of the Waterfront Industry Award, empowering the Services 
to assist in such manner as they may determine in connection with the strike, providing 
for the sequestration of Union funds and for the appointment of a receiver, imposing 
restrictions on publication of information, display posters, etc., authorising action to 
deal with picketing, and prohibiting contributions to either the Waterside Workers’ 
Union or to members of that Union’ unless the watersiders returned to work at all ports, 
though these were not activated in their entirety till the 21 February 1951 State of 
Emergency.732   
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The Government, which had accused its predecessor of using wartime powers in 
peacetime now themselves utilised the draconian Public Safety Conservation Act 1932, 
which had been brought to statute by depression era disturbances.  The Act gave power 
to the Government through the Governor-General to declare a State of Emergency if 
public safety was ‘imperilled’ by disorder and gave the fantastic power to make any 
regulations by Order in Council including suspending ‘the right of trial by jury’ and 
‘any existing Acts of Parliament’; even still Cabinet wondered if the 1932 Act was 
‘altogether adequate’ to deal with the unrest.733  On meeting the Prime Minister the 
unionists thought the regulations were ‘fascist in origin and not in keeping with New 
Zealand traditions’ and blamed Holland personally as the ‘man responsible for the 
introduction of these regulations’, who they believed had ‘politically committed suicide, 
or will commit suicide if the regulations continue’.  The Watersiders promised to do 
everything their power ‘to combat the regulations’.734  Holland did not sympathise and 
the man of action acted with velocity.   The Waterside Workers’ Union was deregistered 
and its funds confiscated, but that was not all.   Belich lists just some of the powers 
actually (not just theoretically) used – 
 
Free speech was restricted; personal mail was opened; such actions as giving 
food to strikers’ children were banned; the watersiders were falsely accused of 
being communist-inspired “traitors”; and anti-communist hysteria was 
deliberately encouraged.  In an almost hysterical national radio broadcast, 
Holland made his claim that “a very determined effort has been made to 
overthrow orderly government by force”.735  
 
Beaglehole was not surprised by Holland’s reactions since his Government’s ‘naïve 
brutality’ for power could be explained by ‘how famished for power’ they were with ‘an 
innocency of experience’.736  However, Holland was far from naïve in his pursuit for 
power and readiness to exploit legislation and centralised power.  The Prime Minister’s 
shrewdness allowed him to satisfy his political wants of destroying the Watersiders and 
increasing his power by tweaking and twisting sleepy Westminster conventions.  The 
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ambiguities of Westminster power restrained only by gentlemanly conventions were 
ripe to exploit the virtual redundancy of horizontal accountability in New Zealand to 
deal with the problem facing any personalist ‘elected dictatorship’ – the vertical 
accountability to the electorate – by creating a crisis and electoral opportunity that 
would subvert the normal process of electoral accountability. 
 
The Parliamentary Opposition was ineffective in the face of the Government’s overt use 
of power.  The aged Walter Nash had only just taken over the leadership of the Labour 
Party and in the hysteria Holland and the pro-government media generated he was 
attacked as an appeaser when he pronounced to a large crowd that ‘we are not for the 
waterside workers, and we are not against them’, which his biographer believes dogged 
him for the rest of his life and which he was never allowed to forget.  Nash’s attempt to 
calm the situation made him look as if he was committing ‘treason’. 737  Labour was 
hamstrung not only by their union connections and denigration in the media, but also in 
their inability to persuade the Prime Minister to allow Parliament to meet so they could 
debate in the national legislature the conduct of the Government and the crisis in the 
country, showing the constitutional inability of the Opposition to hold the Government 
to account over executive actions.  As Bassett argues the use of such power without the 
necessity of Parliament was extraordinary: 
 
Nash was painfully aware of the disadvantages under which the Labour Party 
was operating, hence the reason for his frequent requests that Parliament be 
assembled.  In most countries where provisions existed for taking of emergency 
powers it was mandatory that Parliament be summoned, so that government 
actions could be subjected to careful public scrutiny.  No such requirement 
existed in the Public Safety Conservation Act 1932, so Holland continued to 
refuse Nash’s requests, thereby depriving the Labour Party of its most effective 
public forum.  In fact, Parliament did not meet until 26 June 1951, which was 
almost the latest possible date in the year which it could assemble.738 
 
Holland with his strong-arm tactics was defeating the unions by suffocating them 
through the emergency powers and media hype.  Holland, known by his detractors as 
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the “Senator for Fendalton”, was using McCarthy Cold War tactics in portraying the left 
leaning unions as traitors in that uneasy immediate post-war period.   The unwitting 
Nash did not know it but Holland was calculating how to increase his power in this 
climate of panic and appeal to the country to reap full advantage of the crisis with a 
snap election.  Marshall was asked by Holland to secretly investigate his options in June 
1951. 
 
[T]he Prime Minister asked me, in the strictest confidence, to advise him on the 
constitutional position, in advising the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament 
for the purpose of holding a general election.  I got the books from the 
parliamentary library, personally and without reference to the librarian … Our 
secret plans had not been detected.  On the contrary, on 4 July Mr Nash moved a 
motion of no confidence and challenged us to go the country on the strike issue.  
I had briefed the Prime Minister on the procedure, and advised him that the 
Governor-General would, undoubtedly, accept his advice if he sought a 
dissolution of Parliament.739  
 
Holland was delighted and accepted Nash’s unsuspecting challenge.  Holland called on 
Freyberg a little over a week later who received the news ‘in considerable shock’ and 
‘without warning’ due to the increasing political remoteness of Government House.  
Holland and Marshall had obviously consulted the Governor-General’s powers and 
precedents without personally bothering the man who held the office.  Freyberg would 
be no Byng740 and readily provided his assent without condition or clamour to the 
dissolution request despite Parliament having a year and a half to run; just as he had 
allowed the Emergency Regulations to be carried out in his name.741   
 
Perhaps Sir Bernard’s job was made easier since just a month earlier he had been raised 
to the peerage as Baron Freyberg of Wellington personally endorsed to Attlee and the 
King by a grateful Holland742, despite most peerages coming at the end of a Governor-
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General’s term.743  Therefore despite having the secure confidence of the House of 
Representatives on the 11 July 1951, the day the Watersiders gave in, Parliament was 
dissolved prematurely for the first time since 1887, the Government appealing to the 
country with the vivid slogan “Who is going to govern the country”. 744  In a political 
environment of grateful public, defeated unionists, ineffective Opposition and a 
satisfied Governor-General, Sidney Holland knew the answer.   
 
National increased its majority to twenty holding fifty of the eighty seats and winning 
fifty-four per cent of the votes cast, a record not beaten till the 1990 election by the 
Bolger Government.  The country had not asked for, ‘though it was quite pleased to 
sanction, the stroke of cunning that bolstered the government with the premature but of 
course successful 1951 election’.   Holland’s gamble had paid off and now more easily 
than ever could rule with a ‘rod of iron’.745  Holland would go on to win the 1954 
election and reluctantly retired near the end of 1957, though consoled with a G.C.B. and 
a place in Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio in Keith Holyoake’s brief first 
administration.  Holland left an indelible legacy by exercising prime ministerial power, 
with such dextrous skill that it overshadowed his lack of sophistication.  Holland 
aggravated the partisan card and in so doing sowed the two-party system and 
demonstrated the full powers available to a New Zealand Prime Minister.  However, his 
most audacious exercise of power in constitutional terms was not his critical handling of 
the Waterfront Strike and the following snap election of which there are comparable 
examples throughout the Westminsters, but instead was the abolition of the Legislative 
Council. 
                                                 
743
 For example Freyberg’s immediate predecessor (Newall) and successor (Norrie) became peers only 
after their return to England. 
744
 Martin, The House – New Zealand’s House of Representatives 1854-2004, p 241 
745
 Oliver, “Sir Sidney Holland”, p 5 
 230 
10 
Unicameralism: The Strange Eventful Death of the Legislative 
Council 
 
The ‘commonplace’ and seemingly ‘uninteresting’ passing of the Statute of 
Westminster in 1947 was in fact a ‘critical juncture’ in path dependent theory that 
ushered in a new era of ‘triggering events’ that included substantial constitutional 
change and the rise of personalist power.746  Though not generally appreciated the late 
1940s and 1950s was an era that had critical path dependent features where significant 
events and actions happened that would shape the New Zealand executive polity for 
decades.  The opportunity and subsequent abolition of the Legislative Council is a 
prime example of a personalist and constitutional action that demonstrated the power of 
the executive.  
 
The Legislative Council like the other parliamentary institutions owed its existence to 
the imperial instruction that was the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852.  New Zealand 
like other settler colonies was determined to transplant British parliamentary institutions 
to their nascent polity.  Crown, Lords and Commons would find home in New Zealand 
though not as they knew it in Britain.  Like many British colonial legislatures the 
Legislative Council that came to life in 1854 suffered the delusional expectation of 
replicating the hereditary and ancient House of Lords.  Not that the hereditary principle 
could be transposed to the settler colonies747, but the principle of having a permanent 
upper chamber that could and would independently defend the tenets of the constitution 
and British traditions, and be less swayed by the populist pressures of the elected lower 
chamber was clearly in mind and aimed for.  Instead of peers New Zealand would have 
life appointments to the Legislative Council appointed by the Crown on advice of the 
Prime Minister to provide permanence compared to the changing membership of the 
House of Representatives and Government House.   
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However, from the onset the upper chamber became more a convenient storage house of 
political patronage than a place of independent views, which was extended further when 
in 1862 all limits on its membership were removed, allowing the elected executive even 
more power to impose its views upstairs further eroding the independence and 
effectiveness of bicameralism as a check on the executive.  Thirty years later in 1892 
this political fact was further emphasised when life appointments were abolished and 
replaced by seven-year terms, which gave an ability to reward party figures (or exile 
them) by keeping Councillors even more ensnared with the power to reappoint or allow 
their membership to lapse.748  The House’s powers were surrounded, like the House of 
Lords, by ambiguity and grandiose false expectation.  As Keith Jackson states the 
Legislative Council’s constitutional position was from the very beginning devoid of 
institutional certainty: 
 
In the founding Constitution for New Zealand, the powers of the Legislative 
Council were left studiously vague.  Presumably, however, these would include 
the right to initiate legislation (both public or private), to revise and reject 
legislation previously adopted by the lower house, and to initiate parliamentary 
inquiries.  Although there were no formal limits to these upper chamber powers, 
it was assumed that British practices would prevail….749 
 
Bicameralism was long held to be the accepted governing practice in the Empire and 
later the Commonwealth and beyond.750  However, the Legislative Council had long 
ceased to be an effective part of the New Zealand Parliament.  Attempts at reform had 
floundered, including a proposal for an elected upper house due to apathy and political 
disinclination.751  As Leslie Lipson remarked on the forgotten chamber ‘shadows cannot 
command respect’.752  Like the majestically gilded chamber of the House of Lords the 
august and imposing surroundings of the Legislative Council belied its impotence 
against the dominance that resided in the rough forum that is the House of 
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Representatives.     New Zealand, a state that claimed to be the loyalist of the loyal to 
Britain did not feel the need to copy Imperial Westminster or even the New 
Westminsters by maintaining the traditional Westminster parliamentary trinity of the 
crown and two houses of parliament.  New Zealand’s abolition of its upper house was a 
critical juncture that was almost unprecedented in the Westminsters753 since it ushered 
in without thought or pause unicameralism that signalled and accentuated with path 
dependent volume the dominance of executive. 
 
An Expedient Institutional Target for Party Games  
Since at least the time of Sir George Grey there had been calls to abolish the Legislative 
Council with its unpalatable elements of political “nomineeism” that destabilised any 
institutional independence and publicised cost for a chamber that did not seem to 
function even as a revising chamber.  In the period 1936 to 1950 the Council only 
amended just over nine per cent of bills from the lower house and could not claim a 
single bill that originated in its chamber becoming an Act.754  The fact was that by the 
1940s the limited efficacy of the Legislative Council made it a dumping ground for 
party supporters rather than a vigorous upholder or contributor of parliamentary 
government.  The Labour Party, since its inception in 1916, and been committed to 
abolition of a Council that ‘served as a haven for political derelicts’.  A sympathetic 
newspaper The New Zealand Worker stated the Labour position in 1934: 
 
From a Labour standpoint, the Upper House is an utter superfluity, and no true 
democrat could approve of the existence of a legislative chamber which is not 
responsible to the electors for its actions, and at the same time is empowered to 
tamper with, mutilate and even reject legislation which the elected 
representatives of the people passed … With the advent of a Labour 
Government, the people of New Zealand would not have long to wait for the 
complete abolition of this rankly obsolescent institution whose exit from the 
political stage is much overdue.755 
 
However, once in office Labour just a year later after the above article was written, did 
as their predecessors and commandeered the Council as a place of party patronage.  In 
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fact their diligence with “nomineeism” was more pronounced than earlier governments 
since they held office continuously for fourteen years 1935-49.  National Party policy 
papers show that the Opposition thought ‘the Labour Party came to regard the 
institution as a superannuation scheme for Party supporters, and during its term of 
office, it packed the Chamber with Labour supporters.  The Council lost its character as 
an impartial body whose purpose was to consider legislation and to improve it where 
possible.  Bluntly, it became a useless appendage’.756  Holland as Leader of the 
Opposition since 1940 was very fond of quoting Savage, Fraser and Nash that Labour 
had previously supported abolition.757  The credibility and impartiality of the 
Legislative Council was suspect according to Holland when in the late 1940s of the 37 
members 22 were miners, watersiders, Union Secretaries or ex-officials of the Labour 
Party and nine defeated Labour MPs.758 
 
Costing over ₤30,000 a year and an easy target to strike at and embarrass an elderly 
government, Holland cleverly used the Legislative Council as a convenient example to 
portray to the electorate Labour’s profligacy, inefficiency and bias.  Labour had only 
just returned to the Treasury Benches with a four seat majority in the 1946 election, 
even after the abolition of the “Country Quota”.  Holland and his party naturally greedy 
for power saw what would normally be a dry constitutional topic and turned it into one 
of high party politics.  The National Party used the issue of abolition ‘as a convenient 
stick with which to hit a flagging government’759, especially when the maintenance of 
the Legislative Council as constituted carried little public support and Labour was 
hardly ideologically committed or enamoured with its existence anyway with many 
Labour MPs sympathising with the Opposition’s fervour, increasing tension with the 
Government’s tight majority.760   
 
New Westminster conservative parties, could normally be relied upon as ardent 
defenders of traditional institutions, especially ones like the Legislative Council which 
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was, though inadequately, modelled on that most uniquely English of parliamentary 
institutions the House of Lords.  Yet Holland, who like Churchill preferred Empire to 
Commonwealth, wanted abolition not reform.  Holland had decided to press the issue by 
producing a Private Members Bill that advocated complete abolition.  Abolition of 
second chambers of that era usually were preceded by revolution, coup or regime 
collapse such as in Hungary (1945), Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958) and Cuba (1960) and 
were carried out by radical leftist parties.761  The New Zealand National Party was 
anything but a junta of radical leftists, but New Zealand without such dramatic 
circumstances was the Westminster that once again proved to do things rather 
differently and accomplished fundamental constitutional and parliamentary change.   
 
Holland preferred instant eradication of a traditional component of a Westminster 
Parliament, rather than modification or even incremental change.  Holland and his 
shadow Attorney-General, Clifton Webb wanted to achieve abolition of the Legislative 
Council immediately and only then deliberate whether an alternative was necessary.  
Webb argued amazingly that ‘if we find we have a made a mistake and that there is a 
need for a Second Chamber, it will be an easy matter to arrange for one…It will not be 
much of a confession of error to make’.762  Essentially the position was abolish now and 
reflect later.  This was party politics not constitutional deliberation and as such when 
reviewing the events and debates you cannot escape the conclusion of the ‘degree of 
constitutional naїveté [that] is breathtaking and probably could only occur in a small 
state lacking a history of thoughtful debate on constitutional issues’.763      
 
Keith Jackson, the authority on the Legislative Council, asks the valid question of why 
Holland ‘chose abolition in preference to reform?’ and how he was able to impress the 
idea upon Parliament? 
 
There appear to have been three main reasons.  Reform lacked the dramatic 
impact of abolition and would have failed in the primary purpose of 
discomforting the Government.  The dissidents favoured abolition and no Party 
member would be likely to support a National Party scheme for reform.  And 
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lastly, reform was impracticable as a policy.  Abolition, therefore, provided a 
simple direct challenge to the Government which would be difficult to avoid.  
There can be little doubt that Holland himself, a wily political tactician, 
sincerely believed that the upper house was useless and not worth replacing, but 
it is doubtful whether many members of his own party shared his belief.  So for 
most National Party members it was acceptable only as a temporary expedient 
which went against their true beliefs.764  
 
However, Fraser, himself a shrewd and more experienced political operator, had an 
answer for the National Party and its leader, which would surprise and gain the impetus 
from National and hopefully delay and even deflect the issue of the Legislative Council.  
Fraser responded to Holland’s August 1947 “disloyal” initiative for abolition by 
responding with his own “radical” constitutional change.  The Prime Minister reported 
that he was in favour of a single house, but that prior to any constitutional change it was 
necessary that ‘the Statute of Westminster be extended to the Dominion’ with the 
‘desirability of making the House of Representatives the sole legislative chamber’.765  
Abolition would require, Fraser argued, requesting the Imperial Parliament to do so, as 
New Zealand did not technically possess this sovereign right, since it had not passed the 
1931 Statute of Westminster due to constitutional lethargy and political animus.  As was 
discussed in depth in an above chapter New Zealand members of parliament from 
across the House of Representatives including Fraser and Holland did not in any way 
see the Statute of Westminster as giving independence from Britain, but at its most 
generous it was viewed as nothing more than a piece of parliamentary housekeeping to 
bring New Zealand in to order with the other members of the Commonwealth.   
 
Like the issue of adopting the Statute of Westminster, the idea of abolishing the 
Legislative Council was more to do with party politics and personalities than sober and 
reflective constitutional symposia.  Fraser, though far from being an absolute advocate 
of the Statute of Westminster, forced the Empire loyalist National Party to delay their 
abolition proposal so as to debate the complex legal issues and merits of parliamentary 
independence and though neither side gravitated to it with enthusiasm it gained valuable 
delay for the Government.  Holland and Fraser would have agreed with this Public 
Service explanatory note on the Statute: 
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Will Adoption of the Statute of Westminster Weaken Imperial Ties?  The 
answer is unhesitatingly – No.  The tie between Britain and New Zealand will be 
confirmed and strengthened.  It would be a sorry day if the New Zealand people 
were told that their relationship with the people of Britain might be weakened 
merely because New Zealanders desired that legislation on New Zealand affairs 
passed by their own representatives in their own Parliament should no longer 
run the risk of invalidation and annihilation by means of a British Act of 
Parliament which was quite unsuited to the needs of New Zealand today – over 
eighty years afterwards.766 
 
Though they were not culturally weakening ties in Britain they were by their advocacy 
and eventual abolition of the upper house weakening the institutional loyalty with the 
mother of all Westminsters.  The eventual adoption of this powerful and significant Act 
in November 1947 was almost ignored, but for all its cultural distaste to many it 
allowed Holland to rejoin his task of attacking the Government and abolish the Council, 
which the now independent legislature was empowered to do.   
 
Fraser once again cleverly instigated a largely time-wasting activity of establishing a 
Joint Constitutional Reform Committee of both houses in early 1948.  Though the 
Committee received much information about Commonwealth and international 
practices, heard from scholars and interested parties, the process was not taken seriously 
and was seen by the House of Representatives members from both parties as ignorable, 
especially proposals from the Council itself for reform.  The MPs followed their 
leaders’ instructions again and thereby displayed petty politics rather than acting 
seriously as constitutional arbiters. 
 
… the Committee itself could not decide on a recommendation, and it appears 
from the debates which ensued that Members did not avail themselves of the 
material placed at their disposal; nor did they undertake the admittedly arduous 
task of forming a balanced opinion.  The Committee of the Legislative Council 
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did submit a list of recommendations, but the Select Committee of the House [of 
Representatives] did not even submit counter proposals.767 
 
Reform proposals from the Council, calls for a referendum on the issue and claims for 
careful consideration were blithely ignored.  Holland was very careful to ensure his 
position on the matter was maintained.  Writing to fellow National members of the Joint 
Committee he recognised that the Committee itself was established for political and not 
constitutional reasons.  
 
The setting up of a Select Committee is merely a dodge to side-track the Second 
Reading of our Abolition Bill.  To have us on a Committee is tantamount to 
using our Members to now examine our own policy which we have already done 
and to try and find some alternative to it.  If the Labour Party had been in our 
position I think they would have refused to sit on such a committee and perhaps 
we should have done the same – but perhaps we are just as well to know what is 
going on, on the Committee, but I am in no mood to help in the framing of an 
alternative to our own policy plank.  Setting up the Committee is only a dodge to 
beat us and we shouldn’t allow ourselves to be so used. 
 
Holland instructed his party colleagues to ‘just sit in and listen’ and to avoid 
cooperation with the Opposition on the matter.768  Fraser succeeded in delaying the 
issue until the 1949 election for he, like Holland, did not want a referendum, which was 
unlikely to bring abolition, but which could have embarrassed the government by 
supporting a modified upper house that would not only would rob him of patronage, but 
a reformed upper house could feel strengthened to act ‘as a brake’ on future 
legislation.769  However, the activities of both party leaders did succeed in giving the 
Legislative Council greater attention than it had commanded for years.  Yet this was 
almost wholly unfavourable attention and would become an issue at the election on 
1949, which ushered in the first National Government, was ravenous for executive 
power and intent on clearing any institutional hurdles to its dominance.    
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The Holland Deception – Unicameralism Unleashed 
An interesting facet of Sidney Holland was his surprising skill as an amateur magician, 
which amused all from kids to kings.770  His greatest political trick was to make the 
Legislative Council disappear on 1 January 1951.  The success of his sorcery was such 
that no one really knew if the upper house would reappear or not and nor did anyone 
exactly know how the trick was performed and able to deceive almost everyone.  The 
National Party 1949 election material contained direct reference to its objective of 
abolishing the Legislative Council, but also gave ambiguous promises for an 
‘alternative’.  After stating that the ‘The National Party is composed of people who are 
unswervingly loyal to their King and Country, and who desire to promote a strong and 
united British Commonwealth and Empire’ the party’s manifesto stated: 
 
The Legislative Council as at present constituted has failed in its purpose as a 
revising Chamber and should be abolished.  As the Government, the National 
Party will examine the possible alternatives to provide for some form of 
safeguard against hasty, unwise or ill-considered legislation.771 
 
New Zealand was being told that a National Government would eradicate the 
Legislative Council and would then search for ‘possible alternatives’ rather than the 
other way round.  Holland’s successful advocacy that derided the almost indefensible 
Legislative Council as it was ‘presently constituted’ allowed him the crucial advantage 
of satisfying the abolitionists in his party as well as the bicameralists with the vague 
undertaking to examine alternatives for a new upper house.  Before taking office the 
National caucus discussed abolition and due to Holland’s dominance and the Legislative 
Council’s ineffectiveness and an overwhelming eagerness for power, the caucus agreed 
in favour of the abolition as an advantage over Labour.  Marshall, who could be counted 
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as a bicameralist, recorded in his notes of the meeting that ‘those who favour bicameral 
system support abolition of the present Legislative Council’ presumably because they 
naïvely believed they could replace it afterwards.772  The ‘dissidents in caucus’ were 
mainly lawyers and had to be satisfied with the circumlocutory path of looking for 
alternatives.773   Holland politely acknowledged proposals for reform and the need for 
an upper house from certain MPs and party members, but shrewdly never committed to 
do anything other than consider them.774 
  
Just over month after finally gaining the seals of office the fresh National Government, 
true to Holland’s enthusiasm for abolition, set to work to truncate parliament, which 
now as Prime Minister he had the power to achieve.  The new Prime Minister asked his 
largely inexperienced Cabinet on how they should effect abolition, already realising that 
‘further appointees’ would be required.775  Now as Prime Minister Holland, if he ever 
lacked it, he had the confidence to fully press his point that abolition would happen first 
and consider alternatives later.  The leading bicameralist, Ronald Algie, questioned this 
constitutionally hazardous method. 
 
Mr Algie stated that while he accepted the general view that the present Second 
Chamber as at present constituted should be abolished, he still considered that a 
Second Chamber was necessary and would have preferred that the constitution 
of the new Chamber had been settled before action was taken to determine the 
present body. 
 
In the discussion certain members expressed the view that the Second Chamber 
should be maintained as part of the New Zealand Constitution, that this should 
be established before the present Second Chamber is abolished, and that it was 
important that the Constitution impose checks upon any future Parliament which 
may seek, by constitutional amendment, to destroy the present system of 
representative Parliamentary Government.   
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To this reasonable proposal Cabinet minutes nonchalantly record the defeat of Algie’s 
suggestion since ‘on the other hand, the majority felt that action should be taken 
immediately to determine the present Second Chamber’,776 which show that Holland 
personally dominated Cabinet. 
 
Holland now met a suspicious Parliament to defend abolition without setting before it 
any concrete alternative.  Holland told the House that the Legislative Council was a 
‘costly farce’ made up of a clear majority of people that ‘had publicly proclaimed their 
opposition to the policy of the present Government’, which could only succeed in the 
years 1935-39 in initiating the Alsatian Dog Bill (which lapsed) and nothing after that 
and concluded that there ‘is no further justification for its retention’ though in 
presenting his catalogue of the Council’s crimes he still needed reminding on its 
history.777  Labour, who had made no move in their manifesto to defend the Upper 
House, nonetheless saw that Holland was attempting constitutional deception by 
pledging to search for an alternative once abolition was complete.  Holland’s when 
accused by Labour of promising an alternative.  He retorted: ‘No, I did not promise an 
alternative.  I promised to search for an alternative’.   
 
Fraser contended then that Holland was stating ‘not what he promised the electorate’ 
and wanted the Prime Minister to say truthfully that the Government ‘is out to abolish 
the second chamber and that it does not believe in anything but one chamber’ with no 
intention of getting an alternative adding correctly that ‘the proposal is revolutionary 
and unique in the British Commonwealth’.  Holland’s short and indirect responses 
allowed Fraser to conclude that the House had ‘a confession that the statesmanship of 
the Government has failed.  They cannot suggest any alternatives to the Legislative 
Council as they led the electors to believe they would’.  As such Fraser considered the 
abolition itself to be in National Party policy words, ‘hastily considered’.  Holland did 
not ever respond to the accusation that he wanted New Zealand to become a unicameral 
state.  The Prime Minister left the replying to these charges to his staunch ally and now 
Attorney-General, Clifton Webb, who argued that it would be difficult to find an 
alternative so quickly and the Government ‘did not feel justified in putting the country 
any longer to the expense of maintaining an institution that has outlived its usefulness’ – 
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using a common New Zealand ploy of advancing financial considerations over 
constitutional proprieties.778   
 
Parliament was debating party politics not conspicuous constitutional arguments over 
the pros and cons of bicameralism.  Holland was able to convince his party and 
parliament that he was only getting rid of a “useless appendage”, but not necessarily 
saying this would be permanent.  As he slyly told National supporters in 1949 ‘first we 
should abolish the Legislative Council and then run along without one and see what 
need there is in the future, if any, for a Legislative Council’.779  As Andrew Stockley 
remarks –  
 
What is perhaps most remarkable in retrospect is not so much the role played by 
party politics and the consequent lack of reasoned discussion of the issues but 
rather Holland’s ability to keep abolition and Unicameralism distinct.  The vast 
majority of his own party and the preponderance of public opinion seemed to 
favour bicameralism.  Yet despite this New Zealand became and has remained a 
unicameral state.  The irony perhaps is that no decision was ever made for New 
Zealand to become unicameral.  It just happened.780 
 
In the Second Reading of the Bill, Holland argued that he was not breaking any British 
traditions, but instead was making Parliament more ‘efficient’ by ridding the country of 
the appointed appendage.  The Prime Minister stated that if a satisfactory alternative 
could be found he would put it to the people rather than just introduce it before giving it 
to the country for consideration.  The Treasury benches scolded forth that Labour had 
themselves at times in its history advocated abolition.  Fraser rebutted that Labour was 
not in favour of the Legislative Council and that they were different from National since 
‘we did not propose to abolish the Upper House before finding an alternative’.  Holland, 
in giving what he believed were generous assurances, ominously warned the House that 
‘if we wanted to, we have the power.  We could extend this Parliament – its life – for 
ten years.  You cannot stop us.  No one can stop us if we make up our minds’.781   
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Holland was reminding the elected representatives the powers of a modern New 
Zealand Prime Minister.  Despite the partisan bravado in the debating chamber all either 
seemed to recognise the Prime Minister’s power and futility in resisting it or did not see 
the merit in defending the continuance of the Legislative Council.  Perhaps the job was 
made easier by the fact that the Superannuation Act, which gave a pension to all MPs, 
was passed a few years earlier by Labour and thus further eroded the need or interest in 
the Legislative Council as a paid retirement home for those tired of heady passions of 
the House of Representatives.782  As Algie later remembered with concern ‘it is worthy 
to note that the Second Reading was carried on the voices and without a call for a 
division’ giving the country conspicuous unicameralism with the greatest ease and 
minimum of trouble.783   
 
And yet for all Fraser’s wily dissections of National Party policy the country got 
unicameralism without serious constitutional debate.  Not even a division was required 
to usher in this constitutional revolution, which would be a critical juncture with path 
dependent consequences demonstrating the ease of prime ministerial power and 
constitutional dismantlement.   No one in the House of Representatives ever directly 
interjected, as future National MP and minister Dan Riddiford would have wanted, ‘in 
favour of a second chamber as a necessary safeguard against a single assembly seizing 
excessive power, and against the further danger of an ambitious politician, through his 
dominance over his party, virtually becoming a dictator’.784  Riddiford wrote this piece 
just after the constitutional dramas of 1951 with the waterfront strike, emergency 
regulations and snap election, which some argued could have been prevented or 
mitigated by an upper chamber that had only recently vanished.785 
 
Holland was able to deliver abolition by prime ministerial patronage in stacking the 
upper house with a “suicide squad” or as Fraser called them the ‘Guy Fawkeses’.786  
Holland was fortunate that ten vacancies became available in March 1950 including the 
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Speaker allowing the Prime Minister to put in his own men.787  Holland discussed in 
June 1950 with Cabinet the need for ‘a sufficient number of new Councillors to ensure 
passage of the Government’s legislation, and the gentlemen who might be appointed.  It 
was decided that twenty-six councillors be appointed for this purpose’, but before the 
Cabinet could discuss the mechanics of the very political act of appointing the “suicide 
squad” the Cabinet Secretary was asked to absent himself from this crucial meeting.788  
Though Jackson has argued that no formal pledges were required789 from the new 
councillors to ensure abolition, Holland in fact did write to the prospective councillors 
who were obviously National supporters, that ‘It would, of course, be a condition of 
appointment that you would implement the Government’s policy, including the 
abolition of the Legislative Council’.790  The appointment of twenty-five members was 
the largest example ever of “swamping”, which allowed the Government in Holland’s 
eyes to get out of ‘an intolerable situation’ of having members who were ‘politically 
opposed’ to his Government.791   
 
Though the very simple bill of abolition contained a clause that the Crown was not 
liable for giving compensation to any ex-Councillors, Holland did sweeten the deal for 
those who were to vote themselves out of a job.  Councillors were allowed to keep their 
generous first class travel privileges for life, were paid £300 p.a. for the balance of their 
term which they would have served if abolition had not happened and would retain their 
use of the General Assembly Library.792  Also Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister at the 
Commonwealth Relations Office confirmed from London that ‘the King has been 
pleased to approve of the recommendation of the title “Honourable”… for life’793, 
which had long been a sought after adornment of being a Legislative Councillor, while 
William Polson, Holland’s friend and the last Leader of the Legislative Council, became 
Sir William not long after abolition.   
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F. G. Young of the Opposition irreverently asked Polson whether the Legislative 
Council could have a secret ballot on abolition, since Holland had wanted such ballots 
imposed on the trade-union movement and if so Young, who was against abolition, 
speculated the Bill would fail since he questioned how deep abolition was in the 
Government councillors hearts.794 The new councillors however did as they were told 
and after further strengthening of four members and encouragement did ‘indeed all 
faithfully discharge their duties’ and voted themselves out by 26 votes to 16 on 22 
August 1951 though unlike the lower chamber there were five divisions and lengthy 
debate.795   
 
The Clerk of the Parliaments presented the Bill in person, banged the doors and bowed 
at the bar of the House: a highly unusual act, but a highly unusual occasion.796  At its 
final session on 1 December 1950, before it would cease to exist on 1 January 1951, 
Marshall recorded that he escaped the lower house and ‘went and sat quietly, and a little 
sadly, in the public gallery of the Legislative Council Chamber.  There was no one else 
there.  I was the only one who came to the bedside, as the tired, dispirited and 
abandoned institution faded out, unhonoured and unsung’.797  
 
The Early Consequences and Realities of Abolition 
Lord Cooke, arguably New Zealand’s greatest jurist, in an article on the republican 
debate argued that it would be a ‘constitutional revolution’ if the House of 
Representatives were to pass a bill abolishing the monarchy since not only would great 
change ensue but ‘arguably it would also be illegal’ since it could be disputed whether 
Parliament was competent to completely abolish a fundamental component of the 
legislature, which the Crown undoubtedly is.798  In the same piece, but in a less well 
known passage he also queries the legality of abolishing the Legislative Council as a 
constituent part of Parliament like the Crown, though admittedly less prominent legally 
and factually.  The former President of the Court of Appeal though not disagreeing with 
the ‘pedigree’ of the New Zealand legislature’s powers to change ‘internal details’ of 
Parliament again intimated his constitutional concern over abolition though he was ‘not 
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aware that the validity of the abolition has ever been seriously questioned’.799  Cooke 
concedes elsewhere from a legal perspective that in regard to the Legislative Council’s 
abolition ‘it has been assumed that this was valid.  If not, the Courts have long since 
acquiesced in a legal revolution’.800  
 
Legal or illegal the Legislative Council disappeared and ‘abolition bears testimony to 
the power that can be wielded by a determined party leader’.801  In an international 
overview of unicameralism Louis Massicotte believes that the ‘circumstances that led 
New Zealand to become the first country in the Commonwealth to opt for 
unicameralism for its national legislature owe little to the tireless efforts of reformers, 
and much to a single individual, National Party leader Sidney G. Holland’.802  The 
abolition had path dependent and delegative democracy overtones for the state of the 
New Zealand Westminster system and showed the ability of a political leader to make a 
critical juncture.  The New Zealand Westminster was the model elective personalist 
dictatorship.  Holland, due to his overt loyalty to the Queen and Britain, did not appear a 
dictator, but behind the deference to the British façade was able to wreak havoc on the 
political system and establish major deviations and mutations to New Zealand’s 
Westminster system. 
 
Abolition showed the “purity” of the New Zealand executive over all other political 
actors.  There had never been a written constitution, which could have made it legally 
and procedurally difficult to abolish the Council; there was no federal system that would 
in all likelihood judging from comparable examples in India, Australia and Canada 
make an upper a constitutionally stipulated part and thus cause institutional resistance to 
abolition; and now that the Statute of Westminster had been passed not even Imperial 
Westminster could intervene to save an institution they themselves had granted to their 
“loyal” offspring in the South Pacific.  New Zealand’s unabashed unicameralism was 
without comparison in the Westminsters.  Even Britain with its unitary and unwritten 
constitutional character could count on stronger conventions governing its executive, 
which was not as dominant, and had a well established upper chamber that was and is 
acknowledged as an integral part of the original Westminster.   
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Ironically, when one considers the debates over the Statute of Westminster in New 
Zealand, those who had been against the Statute due to its supposed “disloyalty” were 
now  the same politicians who were making a revolutionary constitutional change from 
the Westminster model – the first to do so of all the Dominions.  The Westminster 
model at the central level had always been bicameral.  Doidge who was now Foreign 
Minister had said for example in 1947 from the Opposition benches while attacking the 
Statute that ‘we are proud of the granite strength of our loyalty, proud of our British 
heritage enshrined as it is in the British throne’.803  Obviously he and others did not 
consciously consider the Westminster institutions or conventions “granite”, not even 
bothering to craft a new structure from the constitutional ruins of the Legislative 
Council.   
 
Not until Ceylon abolished its Senate twenty-two years later in 1972 did the 
Commonwealth have a successor to New Zealand’s brazen axing of bicameralism, 
though even this was done by a recently elected Socialist ministry that would soon 
declare the country a Republic804, rather than a conservative Empire loyalist party like 
National.  In the final debates on abolition in the Legislative Council, long-serving 
Councillor Sir William Perry, who was not a Labour appointment and was respected on 
all sides, pondered New Zealand’s impressive example and lead on many issues but 
added ‘there no doubt have been occasions when New Zealand has led the world, or 
tried to lead the world, in a wrong direction’.  Sir William wondered what the 
Commonwealth would think, especially the three new Dominions of South Asia, since it 
may ‘come somewhat as a shock to them to find that New Zealand, which – whether it 
be true or not I am not prepared to say – has always been proclaimed as the most loyal 
of His Majesty’s dominions, has adopted legislation of this kind [Abolition Bill], 
getting, or breaking again, further and further away from the moorings’ of the ‘Empire 
Parliaments’.805  
 
Few formal constitutional checks remained on prime ministerial delegative democracy 
power.  The Governor-General had the power and arguably the right to intervene not 
only on abolition, but on the issue of “swamping”.  Whereas Lords Onslow and 
Glasgow as Governors in the 1890s had balked at the suggestion of creating a dozen 
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councillors806, Freyberg is not recorded as even demurring and certainly there was no 
delay in assenting to over twenty-five councillors almost immediately, a number more 
than double the figure his predecessors thought excessive and was the greatest and most 
blatant example of “swamping” in the history of the Council’s near century of existence.  
Though the Government had a mandate to abolish the Legislative Council, they also had 
accompanied that position by pledging an alternative.   
 
Sir Ivor Jennings has argued that the Queen ‘would be justified in refusing to a policy 
which subverted the democratic basis of the Constitution’.807  Arguably as Lord Cooke 
hinted above there is some doubt as to the validity of Parliament to abolish the 
Legislative Council and therefore its abolition could be seen as arguably subverting the 
constitution.  The same argument could apply to the conspicuous “swamping” of the 
upper house, with the intent of abolition of a fundamental component of the 
constitutional structure.  Freyberg, arguably, would have been within his rights to insist 
on a planned alternative to replace the Legislative Council, which had been stated in the 
National Party Manifesto or possibly even demand an election.808  Freyberg instead 
chose to acquiesce to Holland’s command and not act as the guardian of the constitution 
and system.  His Royal Assent would change the country’s constitutional structure 
forever without hindrance or pause.  Not in complete hyperbole could Legislative 
Councillors question that as there seemed to be no checks or balances whether some 
future Government ‘might extend its life indefinitely, abolish the oath of allegiance and 
abolish the office of Governor-General’.809  
 
Holland did agree to the establishment of a select committee in September 1950 to 
examine possible alternatives.  However, it was instantly hamstrung by Labour’s refusal 
to participate, thus further eroding the already difficult possibility, of re-establishing a 
bicameral system, which had only just been abolished.  Fraser stated that the Labour 
Party wanted Holland to know that ‘as the Government decided to abolish the 
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Legislative Council as part of the work of the first session of Parliament after is 
assumed office, without any prior consultation with the Opposition in regard to any 
possible substitute or new form of revisionary body, they are of the opinion that the 
question is solely and entirely the responsibility of the Government’.810   
 
Holland could hardly be surprised and was in all likelihood pleased since it would 
detract from the influence of the bicameralists, who could not have bipartisan support.  
Labour in fact took little interest in the issue of bicameralism and further declined to 
debate the issue or report when it came out in 1952 since they had obtained the 
guarantee that National would not introduce a new upper house without public 
endorsement.811  The report was commissioned by Holland to ‘absorb the energies of 
the leading bicameralists of the National Party’ and to demonstrate the difficulty of 
finding a solution to suit everyone.812  The report allowed the fiction of finding “an 
alternative”, but without prime ministerial or Opposition support it had little chance of 
succeeding.   
 
Holland, acting as a delegated democracy leader, had no wish to be restricted by a 
constitution or senate as in the Australian system, which his Empire loyalist friend 
Robert Menzies warned him against.813  Holland also disagreed with the value of 
referenda, especially when as it was far from definite that it would secure the result he 
wanted and he no doubt recalled from his earlier research that examples from overseas 
showed that ‘most attempts to abolish by referendum had failed’.814  New Zealand’s ad 
hoc stumble into unicameralism had made the Constitutional Reform Committee’s job 
an heroic task.  Just as New Zealand had been the first Westminster to abolish, the 
Committee now ambitiously wanted the country to be the first to reinstate bicameralism 
– all by the same Government.  Algie, the Chairman, for all his genuine enthusiasm 
recognised the difficulty, which Holland no doubt appreciated when he consented to the 
Committee’s establishment. 
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We were asked in reality to blaze an entirely new trail for ourselves.  We had no 
case before us in which a fully sovereign, independent, and unicameral State – 
situated as we are today – had reverted to bicameralism of and by its own free 
will; we could find no instance in which a single Chamber Government had in 
modern times and circumstances like our own freely legislated in such a way as 
to re-impose a dual-chamber system upon itself.  To a very great extent this 
novel feature in the situation, and this entire absence of precedent, made it much 
more difficult for us to plan a satisfactory alternative to the former Legislative 
Council.815 
 
Gallantly the National Party bicameralists, including Marshall, argued in their 1952 
Report that the country should revert to bicameralism.  They proposed a fixed thirty-two 
member “Senate” (to avoid “swamping”), which would be totally appointed and 
proportionate to the relative strength of the parties in the House of Representatives.  The 
Government list would be decided by the Prime Minister, while the rest would come 
from the Leader of the Opposition.  The Senate would have the power to amend and 
initiate legislation and the power to delay for two months (but no veto).  Senators would 
have the same term as the lower house to avoid potential confrontation with changes in 
administration, but would be eligible for re-election.816  Interestingly there is no 
evidence of any proposal to have a Māori component in any of the proposals for an 
upper chamber, including Algie’s Report.817 
 
The Report was criticised at the time and beyond for providing ‘no remedy’818 to the 
problematic lack of checks and balances and the members were accused of failure since 
‘in all the history of man there can rarely have been proposed an institution so utterly 
powerless’.819  Such comments are unfair when one considers the problems the 
Committee faced.  They knew their leader’s disdain for bicameralism, and probably 
hoped that their proposal for a measured return to “nomineeism” would be more likely 
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to induce support from the Prime Minister than a rival popularly house, which many 
hoped.  At least a nominated upper house, that had learnt the lessons of past, could 
provide some limited form of accountability.   
 
As G. A. Wood argues ‘there is a role for an impotent upper house: unable to block, but 
able to advise, criticise, and publicise’ which the executive would find less threatening 
than a powerful elected chamber like the Australian Senate.820  The Report’s 
recommendations pleased few and unsurprisingly were never activated or put to the 
electorate.  Holland had a characteristically artless, though exceedingly honest, response 
to the Report.  When asked by senior journalists what he was going to do with Algie’s 
Report he replied with candour: 
 
I’m going to take it home, I’m going to bore a hole through the top left hand 
corner, and I’m going to put a piece of string in it and take it up and hang it in 
the outhouse.821 
 
And remembering Holland’s aversion to literature, that was that, and an upper house 
never returned to New Zealand’s unique Westminster parliamentary infrastructure. 
 
The issue did not completely die since there were still many in the National Party who 
believed it should be reinstated.  Figures like the Speaker, Sir Mathew Oram, hoped to 
convince the Prime Minister of the dangers of the unicameral system.  The Speaker 
argued a few years later in May 1956, perhaps appealing to Holland’s partisan instincts, 
that ‘while the possession of complete, absolute unfettered and unrestricted power in the 
hands of the Lower House may be quite safe and satisfactory while the present 
Government remains in power, it is not a state of affairs one would like to hand over to 
a Socialist Government should one succeed the present regime’.822  The spectre of 
defeat and possibility of losing his immense power had just the day earlier compelled 
Holland to fearfully confess the unthinkable to the National Party President: that 
perhaps after all an upper house would be useful. 
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If Labour came again into power it may enact legislation that would make it well 
nigh impossible for our Party to regain the Treasury benches for many years.  
For example, it may pass laws, and there would be nothing to prevent it from 
doing so, altering electoral boundaries to its own considerable advantage.  Or it 
may introduce some form of “Town Quota”.  Those are but two examples of the 
sort of fears that are being entertained.  One, but not the only purpose of the idea 
of setting up a new Second Chamber is to make such a course impossible.823 
 
Holland days later added that he did not want, like Labour had over the abolition of the 
“Country Quota”, to furnish the electorate with such political considerations, using the 
curious logic that it was ‘a constitutional matter and I’m not sure that an election policy 
is the proper place for it’, even though he had in 1950 promised to put any proposals for 
a reformed upper house to the voters.824 
 
Holland’s motivations were once again political rather than constitutional and his 
concern for bicameralism emerged only briefly with the possibility of losing power as 
Prime Minister.  The ailing Prime Minister825 believed that there might need to be 
greater institutional and structural accountability to mitigate the awesome powers 
delegated to the post-war New Zealand Prime Ministership than had otherwise existed 
during his own dramatic tenure for example, but only if the Opposition returned to 
power.   
 
Holland lost his short-lived zeal for the upper house by the end of May 1956, when with 
Cabinet he believed ‘that a more effective means of establishing desirable safeguards 
would be to provide by legislation that certain classes of proposals that might come 
forward, e.g. for extending the life of Parliament or varying the method of determining 
electoral boundaries, should be decided by referendum’.826  The National Government 
believed that “more effective” alternative would be stronger electoral laws through the 
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Electoral Amendment Bill 1956.  Marshall, now Attorney-General, piloted laws with 
Opposition acceptance, which purported to entrench sections guaranteeing the 
independence of the Representation Commission, electorate districts, extent of 
numerical deviation of population in forming electoral districts,  the adult franchise, 
secret ballots and the triennial life of Parliament and required a seventy-five per cent 
vote of Parliament or a full public referendum to alter.827  However the so-called 
entrenched sections were not entrenched themselves and New Zealand’s Westminster 
retained its substantial powers to do as it pleased as Marshall conceded, though with 
hopeful ideals to the House. 
 
The provisions we are making in this legislation could be repealed by the next, 
or any subsequent Parliament.  What we are doing has a moral sanction, rather 
than a legal one, but to the extent that these provisions are unanimously 
supported by both sides of the House, and to the extent that they will be 
universally accepted, they acquire a force which subsequent Parliaments will 
attempt to repeal or amend at their peril, against the will of the people.828 
 
Marshall reported privately to Holland the day before he retired as Prime Minster that it 
must be remembered that ‘in considering legislative safeguards for the electoral system, 
it must be understood that under our constitution Parliament cannot bind successive 
Parliaments, and each successive Parliament may amend any law passed by a previous 
Parliament’.829  The Electoral Amendment Act was a creative response from the 
executive that attempted to assure the electorate of their rights, but at the same time did 
not greatly remove the executive’s flexibility.   The Act, in the Government’s eyes, 
ended the need for any institutional change or reform that a new upper house would 
have caused; again showing the New Zealand preferment of relying on convention.  
Even Marshall himself later saw the limitations of the “moral sanction” and advocated 
greater reforms to safeguard Parliament and the constitution.830 
 
New Zealand voters grew increasingly disgruntled by their elective dictatorship, which 
the absence of an upper house assisted.  National and Labour governments could and 
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did force through legislation that did not have a mandate from the electorate, who were 
powerless to resist, as were the other limited institutional actors.  Largely as a result of 
the chaotic radical policies and events of the 1980s, the electors became restive and 
demanded change to the system to make the executive more accountable.  The radical 
restructuring of the welfare state through “Rogernomics” especially after the 1987 
election had occurred without being outlined in a manifesto, and thus the electorate 
were delegating full executive power without being pre-warned on the details or having 
any institutional avenue to check the executive.  It is tempting to wonder whether an 
upper house could have resisted such change since they could have utilised and adapted 
the British Westminster practice known as the “Salisbury Convention”, which allows 
the Lords the opportunity to legitimately reject legislation not explicitly mentioned in 
the ruling party’s manifesto, which therefore had not been endorsed by the electorate.831    
 
Due to the sparseness of New Zealand’s constitutional infrastructure the idea of an 
upper house was suggested in the early 1990s as a potential check on the executive.  
Interestingly it was a National Government fifty years on that advocated a senate to 
answer the ‘disquiet over the lack of checks and balances’ as a possible alternative to 
full proportional representation.832  The proposal never gained substantial public support 
and did not make it as an option in the 1992 referendum on electoral change, which was 
submitted in answer to years of elective dictatorship that had become established in the 
Fraser-Holland era with path dependent consequences.833  The sequence of political and 
constitutional events, such as the abolition of the Legislative Council, which followed 
from the adoption of the Statute of Westminster in 1947, demonstrated that though an 
underrated event, it “triggered” and allowed critical actions and opportunities for the 
path dependent personalist power of Prime Ministers.  New Zealand’s Westminster 
executive “purity” was conspicuously demonstrated by the abolition of the Legislative 
Council. 
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11 
New Westminsters Compared 
 
A Nation spoke to a Nation, 
A Queen sent word to a Throne: 
‘Daughter am I in my mother’s house, 
But mistress in my own. 
The gates are mine to open, 
As the gates are mine to close, 
And I set my house in order’, 
Said our Lady of the Snows.834 
 
With elements of flexibility, ease for local deviation and reliance on convention rather 
than enforceable rules, New Westminsters have always been notoriously difficult to 
compare with meaningful results, even before the advent of the independent non-settler 
cases.  However loyal, no New Westminster could completely replicate the parental 
Westminster, and nor could any New Westminster, however disloyal, completely escape 
the legacy of their constitutional forebears.  Whatever the intention all New 
Westminsters had their own inevitable peculiarities.  
 
Most would have agreed with James Stephen that any ‘analogy’ with the 
Westminster model was ‘formal and nominal, rather than real’.  Local forms 
‘must be matters of compromise and of adaptation to the particular conditions, 
character, wants and resources of the place’.  Moreover, even ‘the closest 
parallelism in forms’ would ‘often involve the widest deviation in substance’.835 
 
The New Westminsters of India, Ceylon and New Zealand all became sovereign states 
within months of each other in the late 1940s and give a unique opportunity for a 
triangular comparison to analyse their reaction and adaptation to the Westminster 
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system.  These three comparable countries provide an ability to assess the future impact 
of the critical executive choices taken or not taken during the crucial first ten years of 
independence.  The interrelated three-level theoretical approach of cultural conditions, 
horizontal accountability and path dependence allows a far reaching focus of executive 
power in these influential New Westminsters. 
 
Cultural Conditions Compared 
The New Westminsters of India, Ceylon and New Zealand became independent not only 
in different circumstances, but also with different attitudes and values concerning the 
Westminster system.  Bagehot’s ‘dignified’ and ‘efficient’ elements of the British 
constitution and political culture would be applied in varying degrees to the New 
Westminster.  The ‘dignified’ aspects of Westminster culture included symbols and 
practices that were directly attributable to monarchical and British cultural practices, 
while the ‘efficient’ parts related to the operating culture that surrounded Westminster 
institutions such as Cabinet and Parliament.  When analysing the three cases the 
distinction, though sometimes imprecise, between ‘dignified’ British culture and 
‘efficient’ Westminster culture is vital to comprehend the institutions and actions at the 
executive level.  The New Westminsters would need to decipher and determine what 
features of British Westminster they would incorporate into their adapted Westminster.   
 
India, soon to be a republic, did not want the ‘dignified’ culture of British Westminster 
and was ‘disconcerted by sundry importunate British proposals’ such as incorporating 
the Union Jack in India’s new flag since the country was ‘emotionally and 
psychologically’ wary of such symbolic British importations.836  India would have a 
President as representative of the people and not a Governor-General representing a 
foreign monarch.  However, B. N. Rau, Constitutional Advisor to the Constituent 
Assembly, was fully prepared to recommend cabinet government as practiced in Britain 
for India over any other model, which was readily endorsed by a Congress oligarchy 
that wanted the executive flexibility prevalent in the Westminster model.837  Though 
rejecting the monarchical ‘dignified’ Westminster culture India did not turn inwards to 
its own land for any institutional alternatives such as Gandhi’s idea of village 
democracy.   
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Nehru and Patel wanted Westminster-style ‘efficient’ and strong cabinet government 
and retained its identifiable western forms.  They even rejected the British Prime 
Minister’s proposal that they ‘draw from Indian history distinctive titles’ to replace the 
non-Asian names of Governor-General, Prime Minister, President and Republic.838  
India, like Ceylon, even pragmatically stipulated for their nascent lower chamber the 
use of standing orders as used in the House of Commons thereby emulating 
parliamentary practices as operated in Britain that they admired, avoiding the difficult 
task of having to formulate their own parliamentary rules.839  However, in contrast to 
New Zealand and Ceylon who lapped up British Honours, India explicitly banned such 
titles in their constitution seeing them as tools for ‘imperialistic purposes’.840  Nehru 
outwardly rejected British ceremonial culture, but actively utilised Westminster 
operational culture when dealing with Cabinet, Parliament and the Congress Party.  
 
Ceylon’s elite, unlike their Indian counterparts, were happy to continue the ‘dignified’ 
aspects of British monarchical culture.  For outside observers this seemed a “sham 
independence” as ‘Ceylon was claiming to be independent, but the Duke of Gloucester 
was opening the first Parliament of independent Ceylon, the colonial Governor had 
merely changed his title, and the Union Jack was flying all over the place’.841  The 
country’s leaders were happy for Englishmen to be their Governor-General and when 
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke became the first Ceylonese to hold the post he was diligent in 
maintaining the outward trappings of his office including the plumed hat and 
ceremonial swords of the colonial era.    Whereas India could not wait to break the 
shackles of its colonial past and become a republic, Ceylon waited till 1972, and even 
then many of the old symbolic practices were retained.  As one New Zealand diplomat 
remembered: 
 
It was somehow characteristic of the confusion between rhetoric and practice 
that the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka asked me to present my 
credentials in morning dress.842 
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The first ten years of independence showed the difficulty of practicing the ‘efficient’ 
culture of collegial party government in Ceylon when there was very little party 
political infrastructure in existence.  Political parties underscored the successful 
Westminster operation of Cabinet and Parliament.  This lack of well established and 
supported parties made Cabinets and Parliament more akin to the factionalism and 
nepotism of eighteenth-century Britain, which rendered the stability of ministries and 
genuine cabinet government difficult.843  After the death of the D. S. Senanayake, who 
commanded respect as the man who brought independence, Ceylon’s Prime Ministers 
were without the discipline and extensive political networks that the leaders of the 
Congress Party in India or the National Party in New Zealand commanded, making 
Ceylon’s system a factional and nebulous executive that dangerously relied on populism 
for strength to compensate for insufficient party support. 
 
New Zealand as a settler transplanted Westminster had natural ties with Britain that 
encouraged a ‘dignified’ acculturation.  New Zealanders generally read constitutional 
change as ‘disloyalty’ to Britain and unlike India saw this as a negative trait.844  Unlike 
the Ceylonese and Indian elite that dominated their nations at this time and were 
markedly different socially from their electorate, New Zealand leaders like Holland and 
Fraser ‘were adept at portraying their parties as representatives of “ordinary” New 
Zealanders…’845,which nation-wide meant loyalty to British culture.  Political leaders 
correctly assessed that they had been doing things their own way for years and did not 
seem embarrassed to deny passage to constitutional changes that would confirm such 
realities.  In contrast to India, and to a lesser extent Ceylon, New Zealand’s leaders were 
not receptive to breaking with Britain.  Rather than seeing adoption of the Statute of 
Westminster as providing independence from Britain, New Zealand believed the 
opposite. 
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All that the Statute does is to bring the legal forms into line with the established 
constitutional position.  The links with other members of the Commonwealth 
through common allegiance to the Crown and through kinship, tradition, 
partnership in war, adherence to the same democratic institutions and principles, 
and the beneficial interflow of trade still remain.846 
 
However, though New Zealand political leaders of varying ideological hues were all 
culturally and openly devoted to the British Monarchy, this was not necessarily 
translated to deference or political participation of the Sovereign’s Representative in 
Wellington.  New Zealand Prime Ministers for all their cultural affinity and ‘loyalty’ to 
Britain did not expressly see any great desire to replicate the full extent of the operating 
culture of checks and balances available in the Westminster system that could encumber 
their substantial ‘efficient’ powers delegated from the Crown.  Behind the vocal loyalty 
to Britain the New Zealand Prime Ministers of this era were able to exercise power to a 
greater extent than their British counterparts, whose powers were more circumscribed 
by stronger operating conventions surrounding their more pervasive Westminster 
institutions. 
 
Though it was not possible to examine every aspect of cultural conditions of this era, 
selected examples were chosen that illustrated the wider pressures and operation of 
executive power in this critical era.  In India the deliberations of the Constituent 
Assembly were fixated by the need for a strong executive with ‘efficient’ Westminster 
executive flexibility to deal with the consequences of Partition and need for territorial 
integrity.  The Congress oligarchs that dominated the proceedings felt comfortable with 
‘efficient’ cabinet government with a republican colour that could deliver more to 
India’s particular needs than more rigid models such as the American system.  The 
Ceylonese elite and their friends at the Colonial Office shared the belief that the British 
model was best and sought to impose it on to the wider Ceylon polity with little 
allowance for local conditions.  The Ceylonese Cabinets with their ‘dignified’ 
anglophile acculturation of the era were strongly in favour of the British way and were 
confident they could operate it with success.  This confidence was misplaced as they did 
not have the necessary party system apparatus needed to manage the Westminster 
system properly and by following so diligently the British Westminster, with its unitary 
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style that was blind to cultural heterogeneity.  They did not have any practicable 
institutional mechanisms to accommodate the growing tensions of communalism.   
 
New Zealand’s reactions to the adoption of the Statute of Westminster demonstrate an 
invaluable contrast with a country like India.  Both countries became independent in 
1947 and yet they had contrasting values and attitudes towards their status.  New 
Zealand’s parliamentarians were at pains to prove that the ratification of the Statue of 
Westminster merely was a bit of constitutional housekeeping and not a momentous 
occasion heralding a new era as in India.  Like Ceylon, foreign observers queried the 
independence of New Zealand’s constitutional status met by such conspicuous 
‘dignified’ symbolism that manifested a reliance on Britain.847   Despite New Zealand’s 
reluctance to change, it was critically dissimilar from other New Westminsters by its 
culturally and institutionally simplified constitutional structure that concentrated power 
at the executive level. 
 
For these three New Westminsters, the era chosen was crucial for the analysis of 
executive power. The cultural conditions evident in all three cases gave the executive 
actors considerable ability to impact their polity as few of their predecessors could,  
Though outwardly the evidence points to New Zealand refraining from glorifying in its 
new independence, the reality was that Prime Ministers in this era had power greater 
than before.  The formal ratification of the Statute of Westminster coincided with 
entrenchment of the post-war two-party system which lasted till the MMP era.  
Together they gave future Prime Ministers formal constitutional power and political 
power to command Parliament, Cabinet and, with New Zealand’s unwritten and 
uncluttered structure, the whole system itself to a level not seen in most New 
Westminsters.848     
 
In India the cultural conditions dramatically gave complete power for the first time to 
Indians themselves.  The Congress leaders and Nehru especially had the daunting task 
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of establishing the operation and conventions of cabinet government without formal 
British tutelage or constraint, while trying to forge a nation and strike a delicate balance 
between rejecting the ceremonial ‘dignified’ culture of British Westminster and 
adopting the operational ‘efficient’ Westminster culture.  India’s political elite had to 
accommodate the country’s massive pluralism institutionally and through constitutional 
protection, but retain central executive freedom and flexibility to keep the country 
together.   
 
The cultural conditions in Ceylon at the executive level in the first ten years 
demonstrate the difficulty that the elite had in creating a successful plural democracy.  
Though they faced similar social conditions to India, the peaceful and cosmetic ease of 
the transition from colony to independent state lured the inter-communal Ceylonese 
elite into thinking that they could politically prosper without any need for the 
institutional and constitutional safeguards for minorities that would have been very un-
British Westminster in style.  Those who warned against the desirability of a largely un-
edited Westminster implantation were ignored.  The relatively peaceful and prosperous 
conditions lulled Ceylonese leaders and their advisors into such subjects like whether 
the ‘dignified’ creation of a titled ‘Order of Sri Lanka’ might add to the lustre of Crown 
in Ceylon instead of its more serious communal problems.849 In contrast, India’s chaotic 
cultural conditions urgently compelled their executive to accepting the need to establish 
a unique form of federalism.  Adaptations to the Ceylonese Westminster such as power-
sharing or federalism could have mitigated the communal tensions that erupted in the 
latter part of the first ten years that proved the imprudence of the early confidence and 
showed the limited acculturation of Westminster conventions of the masses of Sri 
Lanka. 
 
The critical operation of these nascent political conditions was completely delegated to 
the local practitioners in the New Westminsters who held all the power regardless of 
their deference or diffidence to British culture.  The cultural conditions of the first ten 
years enabled the various executive actors vast opportunities to substantially impact the 
executive itself through their actions and inactions; consciously and subconsciously. 
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Horizontal Accountability and Delegative Democracy Compared 
Harold Laski, that early doyen of the British Labour Party’s intelligentsia, is reputed to 
have explained to the Soviets that ‘the British Constitution works according to rules, but 
when it does not work to suit the gentlemen of England, the gentlemen of England 
change the rules’.850  The same could be said of those “gentlemen” in the New 
Westminsters of the post-independence decade, endowed with delegative democracy 
power to actively shape and mutate their Westminster legacy. With different degrees in 
all three New Westminsters power, as is traditionally the case with the Westminster 
system, was concentrated in executive actors at the expense of the legislature.  For other 
branches of state as well and those within the executive, to be effective they needed 
independent power.  However ‘to be autonomous, institutions must have boundaries, 
these boundaries must be acknowledged and respected by other relevant actors, and still 
other actors must be available to defend and eventually redress those boundaries if they 
are transgressed’.851  The flexible convention based Westminster system where powers, 
roles and limits of the institutional actors within the state are commonly blurred and ill-
defined make this a highly difficult task.  Those to whom power is delegated dislike any 
‘unnecessary encumbrances to their “mission”’ that effective horizontal accountability 
could provide.852  According to delegative democracy theory those leaders entrusted 
with executive power often see other constitutional institutions like Parliament or 
Cabinet as ‘nuisances’ and in fact for delegative democracy leaders ‘[a]ccountability to 
such institutions appears as a mere impediment to the full authority that the president 
has been delegated to exercise’.853   
 
The leaders that emerged from the New Westminsters in the post-war period were united 
in the desire for a powerful state to implement their vision.  The cultural and 
institutional legacy of their Westminster inheritance availed the newly independent 
executives the auspices and capability of utilising old tools for new jobs.  In South Asia 
‘the national aspiration for a strong, unified state, ironically mimicking that of the 
colonial power, lay beneath the struggle for independence’854 and New Zealand was no 
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different in traditionally wanting a strong state with a ‘strong government’.855  The 
intra-executive actors consisting of the Head of State, Prime Minister and Cabinet were 
the political actors commended with the delegated power and it was the Prime Minister 
(in the Ceylon case in partnership with the Governor-General) who acquired the 
personalist power characteristic of delegated democracies. 
 
Head of State and Prime Minister 
D. A. Low has articulated the premise of executive power in the New Westminsters, 
which applies to the Republic of India in different terminology: 
 
Constitutional monarchy and parliamentary supremacy [is] conjoined with 
cabinet government, in which executive power is exercised in the name of the 
constitutional monarch by those who collectively enjoy the political support of 
the key elected chamber of the legislature.856 
 
Put another way this political symmetry that combines executive dominance of the 
elected legislature with the acquiescing assent of the Head of State often makes 
horizontal accountability difficult and can lead in Westminster systems to ‘elective 
dictatorship’ by the Prime Minister and Cabinet.857  The executive actors often wanted 
to ‘acquire an elevated position…to achieve their goals’ and extend their power ‘by 
reducing the ability of veto players to interfere’ with their objective of enjoying a large 
‘zones of autonomy’.858  In Westminster systems there are few formal “veto players” 
that can, or are willing to, exercise effective horizontal accountability on a determined 
delegative democracy Prime Minister.  The individuals involved are crucial in how they 
direct and interpret their role and relationship with the rest of the political structure. 
 
In all three cases the political leaders of the New Westminsters sought a Head of State 
that would emulate the British King.  In the person of George VI (and later his 
daughter) the Commonwealth statesman saw an ideal Head of State that was a careful 
considerate constitutional head, with influence not power, and above and unsullied by 
party politics.  The Ceylonese were explicit in their constitutional determination to be 
like Britain stating ‘All powers, authorities and functions vested in … the Governor-
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General shall … be exercised as far as may be in accordance with the constitutional 
conventions, applicable to the exercise of similar powers, authorities and functions in 
the United Kingdom by His Majesty’859 (similar provisions were not made on the Prime 
Minister).  Today even New Zealand is referred to as a ‘localised monarchy’ with the 
‘constitutional domestication of the Queen’ and her powers to her representative in 
Wellington.860  Even India’s republican leaders, committed to divest India of 
monarchical symbols, eagerly wanted the English way and rejected the American 
presidential model in the Constituent Assembly.  As the learned constitutional scholar 
Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar informed the Indian Cabinet: 
 
… there is no sort of comparison between the position of a President under the 
American Constitution and that of the President under the Indian Constitution 
who is in every way in the position of a constitutional monarch.861   
 
However, all three New Westminsters soon realised that it was impractical to import the 
British Monarch or any clone to their shores.  The British monarchy cannot be localised 
in its historical and political entirety especially since constitutional monarchy of the 
British variety with its unique ‘dignified’ and ‘efficient’ culture has taken over two and 
a half centuries to form.862  Not only was it unfeasible, it was undesirable to the political 
executive and the Prime Minister especially, to have an influential counter to their own 
power. It was also unattainable for the local Head of State to exercise monarchical 
powers without the security of hereditary tenure and historical acculturation, since the 
local version lacked the credence of customised consultation and involvement that the 
British Monarch historically inspires.   
 
The ambiguous powers of the Crown in the Westminster system rendered the influence 
of the Head of State as illusory and shifting; where the extent of authority was unknown 
and always critically difficult to decode and decide, especially so in the localised 
context bereft in the independence era of natural evolution and customary usages.  
Jennings stated in the early 1950s the difficulty of the transition: 
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The change of title, the elevation of the first lady to the rank of Excellency, the 
use of the gold crown on the blue field in place of the Union Jack, and the other 
changes in forms and ceremonies, are not enough to indicate that the Governor-
General is the representative of the Sovereign and not of the United Kingdom 
Government.  Nor, indeed is the difference between the Queen and the Queen’s 
Government understood: the Queen is still referred to in Ceylon and Pakistan as 
the ‘Queen of England’.  She is a foreign monarch, a symbol of Commonwealth 
relationship, no doubt, but a foreign symbol.863 
 
Thus it was left to the New Westminsters to formulate their own version, whether they 
consciously realised this or not.  The former Governor-General of Australia, Sir Paul 
Hasluck wrote in the early 1970s the duties of his former office: 
 
In normal times when customary practices and procedures are being followed 
and the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth [of Australia] are being 
scrupulously observed, the role of the Governor-General in Parliament would 
seem to be a matter of unbroken routine.  In abnormal times or in case of any 
attempt to disregard the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, or even 
the customary usages of Australian government, it would be the Governor-
General who could present the crisis to Parliament and, if necessary, to the 
nation for determination.  It is not that the Governor-General (or the Crown) can 
over-rule the elected representatives of the people but in the ultimate he can 
check the elected representatives in any extreme attempt by them to disregard 
the rule of law or the customary usages of Australian government and he could 
do so by forcing a crisis.864  
 
The Heads of State in all the New Westminsters in this era of uncertainty that came with 
constitutional independence were faced with situations where the ‘customary usages’ of 
their states had not been established making for constitutional ambiguity of the 
executive’s powers.  Also in that first decade all three countries faced ‘abnormal times’ 
constitutionally with various political crises that compelled exceptional reactions from 
the executive actors that would shape their roles and positions. 
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In South Asia this was particularly complex.  Apart from the obvious cultural 
dissimilarities as discussed above there was the danger that the Governor-General 
would act as a Viceroy or colonial Governor with higher expectation and opportunity 
for executive direction and involvement.  At the time of independence the British 
Cabinet and the King feared that there was a danger in South Asia of having ‘a regime 
of autocratic rule by the Governor-General dissimilar to that in other parts of the British 
Commonwealth’.865  As a clue to South Asian conceptions of the potential powers of the 
King’s Representative, Jinnah himself became Governor-General and not Prime 
Minister, but nonetheless was the undisputed power in Pakistan.  When cajoled by 
Mountbatten that as Governor-General Jinnah would be restricted and compelled to 
listen to responsible advice, when he instead he could have more power as Prime 
Minister, Jinnah replied ‘In my position it is I who will give the advice and others will 
act on it’.866 
 
In India, President Prasad, though not the King’s Representative, certainly believed he 
had more powers than the Constituent Assembly envisaged as the inheritor of the 
Viceroy’s Palace.  Rajendra Prasad realised the importance of being the first holder of 
the Presidency and told the Cabinet that he did not want to be a ‘costly non-entity’ and 
with the strength of being elected (indirectly) believed his position was ‘different from 
that of the King’ since ‘people do look upon him [President of India] also as a person 
having some authority in the governance of the country’ sworn to defend the 
constitution even in the face of Cabinet opposition as was shown over the Hindu Code 
Bill where the President believed he was entitled to involve himself in policy details and 
even reject legislation that was against the ‘dictates of my own conscience’.867  Nehru, 
as a Prime Minister can, applied political pressure that convincingly defeated Prasad 
and in doing so ended the President’s power to be an effective source of horizontal 
accountability on Indian Prime Ministers. 
 
Ceylon’s elite ridden polity relied on the Governor-General’s political involvement to 
an inordinate degree.  Lord Soulbury, a pillar of the Westminster establishment, still 
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saw fit to breach the high conventions of his homeland and appoint as Prime Minister a 
person who did not explicitly carry the confidence of his colleagues or Parliament.  By 
engaging in the personalist transaction of selecting Senanayake the younger to honour 
his pledge to Senanayake the elder over the claims of Sir John Kotelawala, the leading 
contender for post, Lord Soulbury ‘was violating not only the conventions of 
Westminster but the laws of Ceylon which supposedly “compelled the Governor-
General to act as a constitutional monarch”’.868  The precedent was made and the 
Ceylonese came to expect such extraordinary actions from the Queen’s Representative 
as was proved when Sir Oliver Goonetilleke took on astonishing powers during the 
Bandaranaike premiership, when emergency powers were actively exercised by the 
Governor-General and not the Prime Minister during the communal riots of the late 
1950s.869  The Ceylonese Governors-General joined with their Prime Ministers in 
exercising a personalist power partnership rather than functioning as a form of 
horizontal accountability on Prime Ministers.     
 
In India and Ceylon the Head of State was seen as the “guardian of the Constitution”.870  
The long tradition of prime ministerial power had blunted this interpretation for the 
Governor-General in New Zealand.  The Letters Patent 1917 however, and the 
accompanying Royal Instructions which were in commission till 1983, clearly provided 
the Governor-General of New Zealand with this responsibility.  Though a dormant 
power, the Governor-General was even empowered to reject the advice of the Cabinet: 
 
In the execution of the powers and authorities vested in him, the Governor-
General shall be guided by the advice of the Executive Council, but if any case 
he shall see sufficient cause to dissent from the opinion of the said Council, he 
may act in the exercise of his said powers and authorities in opposition to the 
opinion of the Council…871 
 
Sir Cyril Newall, unlike many of his predecessors and successors, believed a Governor-
General could use his ‘discretionary powers to refuse assent to a course of action 
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advised by his Ministers’ by virtue of being ‘the ultimate guardian of the Constitutional 
Government of the country’ even when ‘if he thinks that the course of action, while not 
offending against the letter of the law, is such as to offend against the spirit of 
fundamental principles of the Constitution’.872  Electoral changes surrounding the 
abolition of the “Country Quota”, which had not received the voters sanction, almost 
threatened the use of Newall’s powers, who openly disclosed his constitutional 
apprehension to the Prime Minister.  When changes to the New Zealand political 
landscape happened during the early 1950s, such as the proclamation of draconian 
emergency regulations, the “swamping” and subsequent abolition of the Upper House 
without the promised “alternative”, and the early dissolution of a stable Parliament, they 
did not excite any critical reactions or known concerns from Newall’s successor Sir 
Bernard (soon to be a Lord on Holland’s recommendation) Freyberg.  Freyberg, the first 
Governor-General of independent New Zealand established for his successors the 
political reality that the Governor-General of New Zealand was very much the agent of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, who were seldom diligent in indulging the Governor-
General’s right to consult, encourage and warn, making the Head of State an ineffective 
form of horizontal accountability on the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Weller has argued that ‘the test of prime ministerial power must be related to capacity 
and intent’.873  In the New Westminsters in their post-independence decade there was 
not only the ‘capacity’ and cultural expectation for the use of substantial political 
executive power through the flexible and adaptable Westminster system, there was also 
the ‘intent’ to exercise the full powers available to implement personalist policies and 
preferences that would shape the executive.  The Westminster system endowed an 
executive that had concentrated centralised power in the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
substantially derived from its majoritarian control and membership of the legislature.874 
 
The post-war era with its uncertainties and nascent constitutional opportunities for these 
New Westminsters placed considerable political burdens on the executive.  As De Smith 
has argued, the situation for these Commonwealth countries demanded ‘strong 
government, operating in an atmosphere of urgency.  A scrupulous devotion to the 
Queensberry rules or, for that matter, the Westminster rules, may prove a serious 
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handicap’ and so it was.875  The Prime Ministers and their Cabinets were faced with 
unprecedented circumstances.  Even New Zealand, though not having as conspicuous a 
break from Britain as India and Ceylon, had witnessed in this post independent decade 
the crucial entrenchment of two-party politics with the first ever rotation of power 
between Labour and National.  The leaders of these parties, Fraser and Holland, were 
amongst the first in New Zealand history to realise and sustain the full powers available 
to a Prime Minister with a disciplined and cohesive parliamentary party behind them.  
Both men were able to carry out fundamental constitutional change such as the abolition 
of the “Country Quota” and Legislative Council with minimal public involvement and 
deliberation, due to their power as party leaders to easily “command the confidence of 
the elected house”.  
 
Nehru, though idealistically a parliamentary democrat, had an impatience for India that 
in his mind compelled direct executive action.  With the almost anarchic and capricious 
social forces that clamoured over India, the first Prime Minister saw himself as having 
an almost divine task to keep India together, which required executive freedom.  Nehru 
dominated economic and foreign policy to propel his vision for India.  When his unique 
concept of “first among was equals” was challenged, Nehru retorted that the Indian 
Prime Minister ‘should have full freedom to act when and how he chooses’ as a 
delegative democracy leader.876  Patel, the powerful Deputy Prime Minister responded 
that such an interpretation was not only not ‘in accord with the UK practice’ but would 
‘raise the Prime Minister to the position of a virtual dictator’.877  Independent India was 
always concerned that their new country could be led not by a benevolent and just Rama 
but a frightening and totalitarian Ravana.878   
 
Whatever else, the Congress oligarchy, including Patel, instinctively pushed for ‘the 
strongest and most centralised government achievable in a democracy – the British 
cabinet system’879 that endeared the potential for a delegative democracy figure, which 
they had in Nehru.  Pandit Nehru was able to achieve this power only after Patel died in 
1950.  Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, had been the strongest and most able form of 
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horizontal accountability on the Prime Minister by virtue of his independence 
movement credentials, closeness to Gandhi and especially his pervasive influence 
within the Congress Party.  His death robbed Cabinet of its role as an accountability 
check on the Prime Minister.  Cabinet and party, now dominated by Nehru men, meekly 
delegated their powers to the Prime Minister.  Despite his genuine efforts to install key 
democratic collegial practices, Cabinet declined into the ‘weakest’ of India’s 
institutions.880 
 
Ceylon’s cabinet system was more complex.  Ceylon’s elite typified the naïve hope that 
they could replicate Westminster cabinet government without any conscious adaptations 
to their conditions.  As discussed above Ceylon, unlike India and New Zealand, lacked a 
robust party infrastructure that was requisite for the form of Westminster government 
they wished to copy.  Coomaraswamy has analysed that the problem with the 
Westminster inspired Soulbury Constitution was that ‘only a powerful but numerically 
small elite had been schooled in these customs and conventions.  With time the customs 
would ideologically lose legitimacy and would be the first to be discarded in the 
Machiavellian exercise of power’ since Ceylon was a society ‘where patronage is the 
handmaiden of power [and] commitment to an impartial technocracy becomes 
politically infeasible’.881   
 
Such developments occurred due to the inability of Ceylon’s elite to adequately 
generate from the masses a comprehensive institutional and political understanding of 
the prerequisites for the successful importation of the Westminster system.  The major 
party at the time of independence, the U.N.P., had only been in existence for seventeen 
months before 1948, showing the lack of political infiltration of parties, which had little 
in the way of organisation or country-wide integration.882  Ceylonese Cabinets were a 
series of factional alliances of convenience, not a tight disciplined party committee as in 
most Westminsters.  There were no heavyweights like Patel in India, or any collegial 
operational culture to constrain a Prime Minister’s personalism, nor any attempt to 
promote one, as Nehru had tried in India.  Without a true party system, Senanayake and 
his successors relied for power in Cabinet on feudal kinship ties and fellow members of 
the elite, as well as fostering politically opportune partnerships with the inhabitant of 
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Queen’s House.  Despite the trappings of democracy a few elite families and their 
leader-centric parties dominated the political scene for years to come.883   With such 
executive conditions Ceylon’s Westminster was more akin to the factional patronage-
elite based Westminster of George III than the disciplined party dominated Westminster 
of George VI. 
 
In New Zealand Fraser, as Prime Minister, bestrode the political scene like a colossus.  
Not only was this due to his political capabilities and ‘iron determination to rule’884 but 
it was also in no small part attributable to the paucity of effective horizontal 
accountability upon a post-war New Zealand Prime Minister.  As a New Westminster, 
New Zealand was unique in its simplified constitutional structure, which gave ‘purity’ 
to the executive.  In this small loyalist settler Dominion the executive was not troubled 
with any formal written constitution, federal or regional government and by 1951 not 
even a tame upper house.  The smallness of the elected House of Representatives 
allowed for an even more pronounced supremacy of the executive over the legislature 
than is traditionally expected in Westminsters.  Though there was more collegiality at 
the Cabinet table than in India and especially Ceylon, the New Zealand Cabinet with its 
tight party basis was dominated by the Prime Minister who had party and political 
power over them.  With the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1947 ending the 
nominal deference to the Imperial Parliament, Fraser was now undisputed master in his 
own land and with his wartime legacy able to dragoon Cabinet, party and Parliament, 
both politically and constitutionally.   
 
The impressiveness of his political legacy and the uncluttered nature of the New 
Zealand Westminster enabled his successor to activate the delegated democracy of a 
New Zealand Prime Minister and take drastic steps to further simplify the constitutional 
structure.  The ease with which Holland’s audacious constitutional manoeuvres ‘using 
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the cutlass rather than the rapier’885 increased and displayed his power is salutary in 
understanding the delegative powers available to a Prime Minister without sufficient 
checks.  The active use of emergency regulations during the Waterfront Strike without 
the calling of parliament; the subsequent snap election without ample constitutional 
validity; and relative simplicity in ensuring the abolition of a statutory component of 
Parliament are some examples during this era of personalist prime ministerial power, 
which detractors of the time labelled ‘fascist’ and ‘oppressive’.886 
 
New Westminster Prime Ministers were all capable of asserting their primus role in the 
political system.  Whether through prevaricating intrigue or blunt assertion, the Prime 
Ministers displayed in this era a conscious or subconscious desire to massage and 
extend the traditional boundaries of prime ministerial influence.  However, it must be 
said the position of Prime Minister has always lacked fixed parameters as an organic 
creature of convention, especially so in these polities removed from London’s historical 
embrace.  Despite India and Ceylon’s partial attempts to stipulate and codify the role of 
Prime Minister the Eastminster Prime Minister’s powers evaded definition just as well 
as their constitutionally unnamed cousin in Wellington.  The personalities and 
relationships on which the Westminster executive is dependent on can never be rigidly 
legalised, and thus is unwelcome to constitutional tabulation.  As Sir Ivor Jennings 
explained: 
 
It is much easier to draw a formal constitution putting into words the outline of 
the Westminster model than it is to create the environment and the complex of 
personal relationships which make the Westminster model work.887 
 
The New Westminster executives were faced with circumstances that demanded actions, 
and their actions obligated them to take a different approach from their historical 
progenitor at Downing Street.  Independence created a time where conventions could be 
changed by ‘deliberate abrogation’ or if the Westminster convention was ‘felt to be 
outdated or inconvenient’.  Indeed the very nature of conventions means that they ‘can 
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develop or extend in new directions by being applied to fresh political 
circumstances’.888  The New Westminsters of this era were fertile with the need for new 
conventions to deal with their unique political and cultural contexts.  What was not 
always realised by the executive at the time was that changes they made would often 
have long-term effects for better or for worse.  
 
Path Dependency and Critical Juncture Compared 
For Mahoney the ‘very definition of path dependence stresses the importance of early 
events for later occurrences’.889  The achievement of full constitutional sovereignty for 
these New Westminsters in the late 1940s was a ‘critical juncture period’ that provided 
‘initial conditions that ‘set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have 
deterministic properties’.890  The gaining of independence in the Eastminster countries 
of India and Ceylon was for them an obvious cultural and political ‘critical juncture 
period’ which gave the local political agents complete decision-making power for the 
first time.  For New Zealand the local ratification of the Statute of Westminster in 1947, 
just a few months after Indian independence, was less obvious and culturally 
significant, but nonetheless still a critical juncture period.  In path dependent theory ‘not 
only “big” events have big consequences; little ones that happen at the right time can 
have consequences as well’.891  The Statute formalised and increased the power of the 
local executive to have absolute control over their constitutional affairs and was a 
‘triggering event’ that aroused the necessary initial conditions to set off significant 
political and constitutional change such as the ability to abolish the Upper House.   The 
decisions taken or not taken in this crucial era surrounding the ‘critical juncture’ in 
regard to the executive ‘even – suboptimal ones – can become self-reinforcing over 
time’ making it difficult to change and ‘have major … consequences’ on the political 
and institutional culture.892 
 
It was not possible to examine every event in the first decade of independence that had 
path dependent outcomes; so the most arguably prominent issue or event was selected to 
illustrate the path dependence importance of this first era of constitutional autonomy.  
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The issue or events selected in all three of the New Westminsters were not appreciated at 
the time as being of critical importance for their nations’ future – a common feature in 
path dependence.  This thesis aims to show the importance of the path dependent 
subjects chosen and justifies them, but cannot, due to space and focuses, examine the 
future consequences in detail except to outline and intimate their later influence and 
show its relevance from the post-independent decade.      
 
In India the unique structural and social consequences and circumstances of federalism 
were analysed.  Federalism has been decisive to the endurance of India without any 
secession and the accompanying accommodation of the vast and varied multitudes than 
inhabit India.  Nehru, in contrast to some of Ceylon’s leaders, ignored the temptation of 
populist politics and the ‘expediency of the moment’ and instead implored his Chief 
Ministers in the states to maintain a national ‘integrity’ and eradicate the ‘narrow and 
parochial outlooks’ associated with caste, communalism, religion and language.893  The 
political and social environment in the 1940s and 1950s created the auspices for the 
distinctive form of federalism that India created.  Federalism’s origins were critical.  
The context of needing to incorporate the semi-autonomous Princely States and the 
vision of Partition, with its harrowing details, encouraged India’s political leaders 
towards federalism.   
 
However, that same context, unprecedented in the Commonwealth at the time, while 
admitting the need for federalism, also prompted the Constituent Assembly to have a 
strong and overriding Centre that could, when required, maintain and impose Delhi’s 
dicta on the states.  This power of “President’s Rule”, though envisaged as a last resort, 
would in fact be abused and later frequently used to inflict the Centre’s imprimatur on 
politically disobedient states.  The states were to have, however, extensive powers 
within their boundaries and through the agitations of many of the components of India’s 
plural communities Nehru, initially reluctant, allowed the process to begin of realigning 
the states on linguistic and ethnic lines, which was fundamental to maintaining the 
territorial unity of India.894  India’s inimitable form of federalism unquestionably 
prevented the communal strife seen in Ceylon (and later Sri Lanka). 
 
                                                 
893
 Nehru to Chief Ministers, 5 May 1957 in Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Vol. 
4 1954-1957, G. Parthasarathi (ed.), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp 483-485   
894
 See Kohli, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-
Determination Movements in India”, pp 325-344 
 274 
For Sri Lanka the issue of communalism is inescapable.  In the critical juncture period 
following independence in 1948 the problems of communalism were no where as 
prominent or violent as they are today.  However, it was still an issue that had a virulent 
history that obligated its attention in that relatively peaceful era.  Indeed, the 
negotiations for sovereignty with the Colonial Office hinged on the indigenous elite 
being able to convince the British of being able to ‘handle’ the situation who argued 
blithely that ‘once the constitutional question is settled, communal questions will cease 
to be relevant’.895  However, the platitudes of accommodation for minorities were not 
followed by necessary institutional and political safeguards that may well have 
alleviated the ethnic tensions on the island.   
 
The nonchalance and naivety of Ceylon’s elite, along with their British friends, 
effectively ignored the complexity and depth of communalism.  By believing that the 
British Westminster model could institutionally work for Ceylon without significant 
adaptation, and ignoring the suggestions of structural reform such as federalism or a 
more representative Senate, they failed in their task of crating a united nation.  Ceylon 
in this critical juncture period and before did not adequately utilise opportunities to 
institutionally and politically accommodate pluralism – it was a case of opportunity lost.  
By the end of the period politicians were moving towards sectional populist interests to 
gain ‘short-term horizon’ goals that antagonised other groups, which caused a descent 
into the present quagmire of communal violence. 
 
In ‘loyalist’ New Zealand the truncation of Parliament was one of earliest actions of the 
first National Government. The political executive was able to exercise new powers 
resulting from the constitutional emancipation from the Imperial Westminster with the 
passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1947.  This action not only had institutional 
consequences for New Zealand’s already simplified political structure, it also was a 
quintessential political exploit that illustrated a lack of institutional checks and balances; 
it verified the power available to a determined Prime Minister.  Holland was able to not 
only to bypass the wishes of the Upper House, but also those bicameralists in his own 
Cabinet by shrewd procedural chicanery in busying them in looking for an elusive 
                                                 
895
 Letter from Mr Senanayake to Mr Hall, 16 August 1945 in De Silva, British Documents on the End of 
Empire, Series B – Sri Lanka, Part II, Towards Independence 1945-48, p 39 
 275 
‘alternative’ – but only after his personalist objective of abolition had been 
completed.896   
 
Holland knew that by getting abolition first without agreeing to any alternative it would 
make it next to impossible for any case of bicameral reincarnation.  The abolition of the 
Legislative Council was a demonstrative act that showed the lack of institutional 
security of many of the components in New Zealand’s unwritten system.  The 
Legislative Council’s removal was more a convenient casualty in a partisan attack than 
a sombre and well-argued constitutional reform.  It also showed a lack of awareness 
from both politicians and the public on constitutional matters that was evidenced by the 
minimal public debate and meaningful parliamentary deliberation on the issue.  A 
delegative democracy Prime Minister was able with minimal difficulty to further 
simplify New Zealand’s Westminster system and advance the erosion of effective 
horizontal accountability due to the pliancy of the other executive actors.  This had the 
path dependent outcome of having an over powerful and largely unchecked Prime 
Minister. 
 
For all these three New Westminsters the issues of 1950s are still issues, even if 
indirectly, today.  Though it was not within the scope of this thesis to provide a full 
picture outside the post-independence decade of these path dependent actions, it is 
essential to view the broad impact in contemporary times.   Of the three cases Sri 
Lanka’s trial with its issue of communalism is the most conspicuous and dangerous.  It 
is interesting to note the recent Vitharana Report to Sri Lanka’s All-Party 
Representative Committee on constitutional reform has, consciously or not, revisited 
many of the proposals and options available from the 1940s and 1950s.  Not only does it 
advocate a return to a Westminster style parliamentary cabinet government (Sri Lanka 
has had a Gaullist executive Presidency since 1978), it also seeks to make crucial 
adaptations for Sri Lanka’s circumstances.  It argues for greater constitutional 
safeguards for minorities; the abolition of the executive presidency and return to 
parliamentary cabinet government; a constitutional court; executive offices like Cabinet 
should reflect the country’s pluralistic nature; a greater sensitivity on language issues 
and further facilitation of Tamil and Sinhala as equal national languages; the 
establishment of a Senate to comprise of representatives of the regions and as a check 
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on the lower house; and most importantly it advocates power-sharing and admits the 
need for practicable devolution to new provinces that address language and ethnic 
considerations.897 
 
The Vitharana Report seemed to be following the Indian Westminster model to deal and 
accommodate its plural society.  Interestingly, a non-Congress Government, perhaps 
wanting to cut the mire and complexity of India’s system, appeared at one stage of 
political instability in the late 1990s to want to endanger their federal structure by 
toying with the idea of following Sri Lanka’s Gaullist presidential model, with its 
unitary powers to more effectively direct the country over the head of Parliament.  
However, these ideas were never formally activated despite Government calls for a re-
examination of the Constitution, which roused fears from the Opposition, judiciary and 
academia.898   
 
As the new millennia arrived the President K. R. Narayanan, a respected former civil 
servant who began his career in the Nehru era, told Parliament on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Republic of India, in a speech not prepared by the Government, that 
‘our recent experience of instability in government is perhaps not sufficient reason to 
discard the parliamentary system in favour of the presidential or any other system’.  The 
President, in words that echoed those of Constituent Assembly oligarchs in wanting the 
flexibility of the Westminster system, stated: ‘In my opinion we should avoid too much 
rigidity in our system of government as in a very rigid system there is the danger of 
major explosions in society taking place’.899  And so the unique Westminster of India 
endures, not without problems, with its decisive and flexible use of federalism that 
derived from Britain’s colonial rule. 
 
New Zealand’s politicians of the era analysed took political actions that often had a 
‘short term horizon’ for populist or partisan means like their Ceylonese counterparts.  
The abolition of the Legislative Council and the active exhibition of personalist power 
from a delegative democracy Prime Minister had repercussions for the future.  New 
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Zealanders especially by the late 1970s had begun to question the considerable power 
delegated to the political executive without sufficient institutional or constitutional 
checks.  Prime Ministers were able to arbitrarily use these powers with minimal 
institutional scrutiny that could reverse or at least temper their actions.  The public were 
feeling disenfranchised from the political process, which caused the call for renovation 
to New Zealand’s Westminster in the 1990s.  The possibility of a Senate was advanced 
to act as not only a representative body, but also a check on the executive.  A reformed 
Senate may have mitigated, by delaying or amending, the drastic and radical policies of 
the 1980s and 1990s, which were often not foreshadowed in party manifestos giving an 
upper chamber justification to intervene in the public interest.900     
 
However, New Zealanders wanted greater change, and just as the ghost of the 
Legislative Council made its reinstallation difficult in the late 1950s, so it would be in 
the 1990s.  Just as it had been radical in ending its bicameral status in the 1950s, New 
Zealand again made a major deviation from the British Westminster by adopting MMP, 
a proportional electoral system that not only revolutionised representation, but also 
ended the two-party system, which had been a crucial source of Fraser and Holland’s 
powers.  The once all-powerful executive became ‘bridled’ though not as tightly as 
some would wish including current parliamentarians.901 
 
The New Westminsters today are still living with the legacy of the critical juncture 
period that followed independence.  This thesis had only scope to examine some aspects 
of the legacy, but has shown the importance of the post-independence decade as a 
critical juncture period.  The actions and inactions of the executives of the New 
Westminsters in that period over half a century ago, and their approach to the above 
issues with their remarkable application of Westminster conventions had deep 
ramifications.  Those New Westminster executives, who had the first taste of full 
sovereign constitutional power, caused path dependent determinants that have not 
dulled with time, though this has not always been appreciated.        
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Conclusion 
The Duke of Windsor, once Emperor of India, exclaimed, during a dinner party in the 
early 1960s, to Kennedy’s soon to be Ambassador to India, J. K. Galbraith:  
 
I hear you are going In-jea…A most interesting country…And you will find the 
people most agreeable in their own way.  They have been uncommonly decent 
to my niece.902 
 
In many ways India had also been ‘uncommonly decent’ to the political system that the 
Duke’s niece, Elizabeth II, symbolised.  India emerging from an often violent struggle 
to end colonial rule had, without forced imposition, taken on the cabinet parliamentary 
model central to the system of their former rulers despite the many alternatives, 
including indigenous ones, available.  India, however, like all the New Westminsters, 
symbolised and operated the Westminster system differently, by design or not, after 
leaving the constitutional chrysalis at the Palace of Westminster.  Though the paternity 
of their system was seldom in dispute the New Westminsters creatively adapted and 
mutated their inheritance due to the localised context that was removed from London.  
Well over a half a century later these countries are still dealing with this inheritance.  
The changes were not always obvious or intended at the time, and in many cases it is 
only now that they can be fully appreciated and assessed. 
 
This thesis has examined, using an inter-related three-level theoretical approach, the 
executives of India, Ceylon and New Zealand as they entered full constitutional 
independence.  The first decade provided a critical juncture period which would have 
cultural, political and constitutional resonance for latter years.  Through a selective 
analysis of events and issues, and applying theories surrounding cultural conditions, 
horizontal accountability/delegative democracy and path dependency, this thesis has 
provided evidence to demonstrate the importance of analysing this era as well as the 
comparable experience at the executive level of applying the Westminster system to 
foreign contexts.    
 
The Westminster institutions seemed to be installed with diligence in their new 
contexts.  Erskine May was thumbed, the Speaker’s gown was refitted and Sir Ivor 
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Jennings et al were consulted in person or in pages.  And yet the New Westminsters and 
their institutions and practices did not, and could not function as submissive 
simulacrums of the original.  The main reason for this was that the Westminster system 
unlike European or American models was based on conventions and flexibility, not 
rules and rigidity.  Bagehot’s ‘dignified’ and ‘efficient’ conventions and culture were 
applied in the New Westminsters, though not perhaps as he would have imagined.  
Westminster’s conventions have always allowed if not encouraged deviation, especially 
so in the New Westminster contexts that demanded ‘instant’ conventions as the polity 
had not had the benefit of centuries of evolution.  Therein lay the problem and the 
opportunity for the local executive. 
 
Once complete constitutional sovereignty from Britain was gained in India, New 
Zealand and Ceylon in the late 1940s and given the Westminster system’s predilection 
for convention and flexibility at the executive, the New Westminsters were delivered the 
prerogative to generate their own localised executive actions and conventions.  These 
New Westminsters took their responsibilities in different ways.  Ceylon sought to imitate 
British Westminster, since the local elite believed that what worked in Britain would 
work in Ceylon.  Ceylon did an impressive job in mirroring the ‘dignified’ and 
ceremonial of British Westminster.  The first years of peace and avuncular leadership of 
D. S. Senanayake even persuaded astute outsiders that that all was well.  New Zealand’s 
own premier mandarin, Sir Alister McIntosh, described Ceylon, on a visit there in 1950, 
as the ‘one exception’ of a well performing Eastern administration where ‘they have 
taken a grip of the situation’ and ‘well-trained Native officials appear to be running their 
show decently and well’.903  Appearances and the cultural conditions were deceptive in 
that they did not reveal the tenuous integration of the Westminster system with the 
masses and Ceylon’s plural society or the elites’ inability to foster Westminster 
operational culture at the executive level. 
 
India also had misleading cultural appearances.  The republican and nationalist 
politicians made headlines by ridding India of British Westminster ceremonial symbols 
such as unceremoniously removing the imposing statutes of British kings and their 
viceroys from the centre of the capital to a ‘macabre and leprous crescent’ on the 
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outskirts of the city as a lasting and gloomy graveyard to the old Raj.904  The Republic 
of India may have divested itself of many of the symbolic icons of British Westminster, 
but it retained, through the express wishes of Nehru and the oligarchs, the ‘efficient’ 
operational Westminster cabinet system culture that gave flexibility and executive 
opportunity. 
 
New Zealand alone of the selected New Westminsters culturally refused to acknowledge 
its independence, due to its vaunted loyalty to Britain, and this formed a mirage that 
cloaked a very real and active political independence.  In fact the executive practices 
and constitutional usages of Her Majesty’s New Zealand advisors were often contrary to 
those of her British advisors.   The belated adoption Statute of Westminster in 1947 did 
not greatly change New Zealand’s powers, but it did confirm and expand the 
constitutional powers of local executive, which were utilised by abolishing with alacrity 
and ease an upper house, something even the Queen’s British ministers would find 
difficult, if not constitutionally improbable due to convention. 
 
Various constitutionally dubious actions of the executive actors in these New 
Westminsters beg the question of the advisability of transplanting or implanting 
Westminster institutions to such different lands.  However, it is not as simple as 
blaming institutions.  With its emphasis on flexibility and the prevalent ambiguity that 
surrounds the executive’s powers, which are devoid of definition and regulation, the 
Westminster system places undeniable responsibility on the executive actors themselves 
to mould, operate, symbolise and sometimes ignore or abuse the very institutions and 
constitutions they were endowed with.  As Dr B. R. Ambedkar once candidly admitted, 
when introducing the draft of India’s new constitution with its deliberate Westminster 
executive features, ‘if things go wrong under the new Constitution, the reason will not 
be that we had a bad Constitution.  What we will have to say is that Man is vile’.905  The 
individuals that controlled the great offices of state and institutions associated with them 
in this period mattered.  In this constitutionally and culturally nascent era their impact 
was often irresistible. 
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In these New Westminsters the local executives were the first ones in the country to be 
vested with delegative democracy power and endured minimal forms of effective 
horizontal accountability.  Since the awesome potential power offered to the executive 
was guided by another country’s conventions, it created uncertainty and confusion, but 
also misuse and abuse.  Weller has rightly argued that ‘it would be incorrect to argue 
that the way the British Prime Minister works is the way Prime Ministers should 
operate’.906  However, that does not mean, despite the executive flexibility bequeathed 
from the Westminster system that New Westminster executives should function without 
restriction or concern.  
 
The massive arbitrary executive power mobilised during the 1947-51 period in New 
Zealand; the unique and collusive partnerships between the Governor-General and 
Prime Minister in Ceylon; and the noteworthy interpretation of the Indian Prime 
Minister’s august status with its increasing concentration of power and want of political 
“freedom” are examples of the dangerous elasticity and flexibility of the conventions 
that surround a Westminster executive to the cost of parliamentary democracy.  Even in 
the United Kingdom in 2007, Westminster’s birthplace, Gordon Brown, just a week 
after becoming Prime Minister, proposed in a Green Paper to codify or bring under 
statutory control the Crown’s powers as exercised by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to 
make ‘the executive more accountable’ and plans ‘immediate and specific changes … 
that will restrict the power of the Prime Minister and the executive’,907 perhaps to avoid 
the dangers of the past.    
 
The Prime Ministers and Cabinets of the New Westminsters exercised substantial power 
in this era without real controls that had ramifications for their successors.  Governors-
General and Presidents were often powerless to resist the political executive and would 
not or could not effectively activate the latent powers of their positions as the ultimate 
constitutional guardian.  To the Prime Minister, the local Head of State was variously 
seen as a nuisance, a non-entity or even an accomplice to their political objectives.  
Cabinet, due either to tight party discipline or being personally beholden to the leader, 
was not always capable of exerting collegial accountability on their chairman.  
Horizontal accountability on the Prime Minister from Cabinet or the Head of State 
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during this period was generally ineffective.  The executive actors and Prime Ministers 
especially, of this period had a deterministic impact, not always beneficial, on the 
executive customs of their countries.  Though their shrines have been neglected, these 
political idols still deserve, by their deeds and choices, inclusion into the pantheon or 
pagoda of Westminster deities, though many today would demur from genuflecting 
before the legacy of these rarefied figures. 
 
As has been established in this thesis, the time analysed in the New Westminsters was a 
critical juncture period that had path dependent resonance.  The wraith of Westminster 
could not be ignored as a factor during this consequential decade of constitutional 
independence.  The Westminster system was attributable, as a patron at least, to the path 
dependent outcomes.  Though it was not possible to isolate and determine every event, 
issue and action that had this quality, this thesis identified for each of the three New 
Westminsters a specific subject that not only affected the political character of the 
country, but also demonstrated the critical impact, not always appreciated at the time, of 
the local executive in this era on substantive areas of political importance for future 
generations. 
 
Ceylon’s latent communal tensions were generally hidden during the Colonial period, 
which encouraged the local elite, through that experience and their anglophile 
predilections to hail confidence in the British Westminster system as the one to promote 
a new civic nationalism without any institutional adaptations for their contrasting 
context.  Communalism was thus unable to be tempered by the Westminster way due to 
the lack of understanding at elite and mass level of the institutional and operational 
requirements of their country.  This neglect of these serious issues placed ethnic 
relations in jeopardy, which the Sri Lanka is still dealing with.  The misguided belief, as 
well as the inability to properly operate and adapt Westminster in Ceylon when it was 
possible and the country relatively peaceful had sorrowful consequences for Sri Lanka. 
 
New Zealand’s nonchalance over structures and institutions led to the careless 
abandonment of bicameralism to satisfy the whims of a Prime Minister.  Due to New 
Zealand’s executive ‘purity’ there was negligible political fuss and minimal 
constitutional difficulties in abolishing the Legislative Council.  An unprecedented 
action in the Commonwealth at the time, the event provided a crass demonstration of 
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the political power that can be wielded by a determined Prime Minister as seen 
especially in Sidney Holland, an example for his successors. 
 
India was compelled by its colossal social conditions to federalism.  However, this was 
not the only reason.  The spectre of Partition and the need to integrate the Princely 
States pushed the need on Nehru and the Constituent Assembly.  However, the same 
reasons and conditions pushed the privileged elite at the Assembly to reincarnate the 
British Paramountcy for the Republic, which meant a strong centre that could determine 
and direct the states.  Initially hoping that the cleavages of India would evaporate with 
independence, the Congress Raj soon, and critically, submitted to the need for states to 
be formed on ethnic and linguistic lines, which did so much to accommodate the 
country’s heaving multitudes and avoid secession or even disintegration. 
 
The constitutional, political and cultural legacy of the Westminster system weighed 
heavily on the New Westminsters.  India, Ceylon and New Zealand for all their rhetoric 
and remonstrance, both positive and negative, still have Westminster blood in their 
constitutional veins.  The variable viscosity and the difficulty of the transfusions of the 
1940s and earlier to these new conditions did not lead to an outright rejection of 
Westminster nor to its complete immunity from indigenous infections.  These New 
Westminsters evolved and had identifiable characteristics from both its British roots and 
its local environment.  Westminster was not lost; Westminster was regained. 
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Appendix 
 
Governors-General, Presidents and Prime Ministers of India, Ceylon and 
New Zealand of the Post-Independence Decade 
 
India 1947-1957 
Governors-General (1947-1950) 
Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma   1947-1948 
C. R. Rajagopalachari       1948-1950 
 
Presidents (1950- ) 
Dr Rajendra Prasad       1950-1962 
 
Prime Ministers 
Jawaharlal Nehru       1947-1964 
 
Ceylon 1948-1958 
Governors-General 
Sir Henry Monck-Mason-Moore     1948-1949 
Lord Soulbury        1959-1954 
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke      1954-1962 
 
Prime Ministers 
Don Stephen Senanayake      1948-1952 
Dudley Senanayake       1952-1953 
Sir John Kotelawala       1953-1956 
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike      1956-1959 
 
New Zealand 1947-1957 
Governors-General 
Marshall of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Newall   (pre-indepdence1941-1946) 
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Lt. General the Lord Freyberg     1946-1952 
Lt. General Sir Willoughby Norrie     1952-1957 
Viscount Cobham       1957-1962 
 
Prime Ministers 
Peter Fraser        1940-1949 
Sidney Holland       1949-1957 
     
 
 
   
 
 286 
Bibliography 
 
Unpublished Primary Sources 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London, United Kingdom 
• Sir Ivor Jennings Papers, ICS125 
D. S. Senanayake’s Broadcast, February 4 1948, Ceylon B3  
Note by the Prime Minister on Collective Responsibility, c. 1948, Ceylon B3 
Jennings to Mr Hingley (Secretary to the Governor-General), 28 March 1952, 
Ceylon B3 
Lord Soulbury to Jennings, October 5 1953, Ceylon B3 
‘The Royal Visit to Ceylon, 1954’, Ceylon B3 
‘Five Years of Independent India’, c. 1952, India C16 
Lord Cobham to Jennings, 2 July 1957 Miscellaneous C17.3 
Cobham to Jennings, 25 October 1957, Miscellaneous C17.3 
Jennings to Cobham, 2 November 1957, Miscellaneous C17.3 
  
Nehru Memorial Library and Museum, New Delhi, India 
• C. Rajagopalachari Papers 
Nehru to Rajagopalachari, 30 March 1948 
Nehru to Rajagopalachari, 11 April 1948    
Minutes of a meeting between His Excellency [Mountbatten] and the Governor-
General Designate [Rajagopalachari], 4 June 1948 
Nehru to Purushottam Das Tandon, 8 August 1950 
Nehru to Rajagopalachari, 15 September 1951 
President’s Enclosure for Cabinet, 15 September 1951 
 
• B. N. Rau Papers 
Confidential – Memorandum on the Union Constitution, 30 May 1947 
 
Archives New Zealand/Te Whare Tohu Tuhituhinga O Aotearoa, Head Office, 
Wellington, New Zealand 
• Letters and Notes at Government House  between October 1942 and October 1943 
in G 48 Box 21 P/5(3) 
 287 
• Letter to Governor-General from W.W. Mulholland (Dominion President of NZ 
Farmers’ Union), 1 November 1945, G48 Box 21 P/5(5) 
• Telegram from Richard Cobbe to Governor-General, November 2 1945, G48 Box 
21 P/5(5) 
• Minute by Sir Cyril Newall, 2 November 1945, G48 Box 21 P/5(5) 
• Governor-General’s Secretary to Mulholland, November 5 1945, G48 Box 21 P/5(5) 
• Minute by Newall, 16 March 1946, G48 21 P/6 
• Telegram from Newall to King’s Private Secretary (Sir Alan Lascelles), 6 
November 1945, G48 Box 21 P/5(5) 
• Peter Fraser to Mulholland, 7 November 1945, G48 Box 21 P/5(5) 
• McIntosh to all NZ Missions overseas re: Statute of Westminster, 19 September 
1947, Statute of Westminster 1927-1947, EA 1 159/1/5 Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• G. R. Powles to McIntosh, 30 September 1947, Statute of Westminster 1927-1947, 
EA 1 159/1/5 Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• Sir Cecil Day, Cabinet Offices, London to McIntosh, 7 October 1947, Statute of 
Westminster 1927-1947, EA 1 159/1/5 Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• Explanatory notes on Statute of Westminster, Statute of Westminster 1927-1947 
File, EA 1 159/1/5 Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• “Summary of Reasons for which New Zealand should adopt the Statute of 
Westminster”, 7 November 1947, Statute of Westminster 1927-1947, EA 1 159/1/5 
Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• “Notes on the purpose and effect of the adoption by New Zealand Parliament of 
Sections 2,3,4,5 and 6 of the Statute of Westminster and the New Zealand 
Constitutional Amendment (Consent and Request) Bill.  Circulated by the Prime 
Minister and Minister of External Affairs, Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser , 7 November 1947, 
Statute of Westminster 1927-1947, EA 1 159/1/5 Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• Notes [by an unnamed Civil Servant] on Frederick Doidge’s comments, Statute of 
Westminster 1927-1947, EA 1 159/1/5 Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• Personal Telegram from High Commissioner for New Zealand in London (Sir 
William Jordan) to Fraser, 2 December 1947, Statute of Westminster 1927-1947, 
EA 1 159/1/5 Part 4 IA 1 123/6 
• Appointment of Governors-General 1947-57, AAFD 811 232A 27/1/4 Part 2 
• Note of Meeting, 29 January 1948, Cabinet Papers of the Labour Administration 
1948-1949, AAFD 811 1A 1/1/1-1/7/1 
 288 
• Cabinet Minutes, 3 September 1948, Cabinet Papers of the Labour Administration 
1948-1949, AAFD 811 1A 1/1/1-1/7/1 
• Note by Cabinet Secretary, 15 September 1948, Cabinet Records 1948-57, AAFD 
811 175G 1/9/1 Part 1 
• McIntosh to Sidney Holland – 2 December 1949, AAFD 816/1A 10/1 
• Executive Council meeting, 13 December 1949, Change of Government 1949, 
AAFD 811 W4198/38 48/9/1 
• Copies of Letters in The Times, February 1950, between former Liberal leader Lord 
Samuel (formerly Sir Herbert Samuel) and former wartime Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Lord Waverly (formerly Sir John Anderson) in AAFD 811 176C 1/12/1 
• Cabinet Minutes, 18 January 1950, [CM (50) 1], Cabinet Minutes – Prime 
Minister’s Copies December 1949-June 1950, AAFD 808 1A (49) 1-(50) 39 
• Cabinet Minutes, 1 March 1950, [CM (50) 9], Cabinet Minutes – Prime Minister’s 
Copies December 1949-June 1950, AAFD 808 1A (49) 1-(50) 39 
• Cabinet Minutes, 16 June 1950, [unnumbered], Cabinet Minutes – Prime Minister’s 
Copies December 1949-June 1950, AAFD 808 1A (49) 1-(50) 39 
• Cabinet Minutes, 31 July 1950 [CM (50) 52], Cabinet Minutes – Prime Minister’s 
Copies June - December 1950, AAFD 808 2B (50) 40-88 
• Cabinet Minutes, 19 September 1950 [CM (50) 65], Cabinet Minutes – Prime 
Minister’s Copies June - December 1950, AAFD 808 2B (50) 40-88 
• Legislative Councillors – Privileges on Vacation of Office – 23 November 1950, 
(agreed by Cabinet 20 November 1950), IA 1 123/6 
• Telegram from the King to Government House, Wellington, 12 December 1950, 
Biography – Peter Fraser, ABHS 950 W4627 Box 1100 32/8/8 Part 1 
• Cabinet Minutes, CM (50) 86, 12 December 1950, Cabinet Minutes – Prime 
Minister’s Copies December 1949-June 1950, AAFD 808 1A (49) 1-(50) 39 
• Legislative Councillors, 1950-1951, AAFD 811 16H 42/5/3 Part 1 
• Minutes of the Executive Council, 13 January 1954, AAFD 811 W4198/39 48/12/1 
File No. 3 
• Prime Minister Holyoake to Walter Nash, 11 December 1957, Cabinet Records 
1948-57, AAFD 811 175G 1/9/1 Part 1 
 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand 
Sir Sidney Holland Papers, MS 1624 
 289 
• Undated notes, Legislative Council 1946-49, MS 1624-60/6 
• Notes 1946-47 in Opposition Papers 1940-49, Legislative Council 1946-49, MS 
1624-60/6 
• National Party biography on Rt. Hon. S.G. Holland, P.C., C.H., undated, MS 1624-
043/5 
• Holland to W. A. Bodkin MP, W. S. Goosman MP, G. H. Mackley MP, T. Clifton 
Webb MP and R. M. Algie (National Members of the Constitutional Reform 
Committee), 5 February 1948, Legislative Council 1946-49, MS 1624-60/6 
• Transcript of Trades Union Congress and New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Union 
Deputation to the Prime Minister on 27 February 1951, MS 1624-103/6 
• Holland to Maj. The Hon. N. A. Rattray, 22 July 1955, Second Chamber 1950-April 
1956, MS Papers 1624-093/3 
• Holland to Alex McKenzie, 30 April 1956, Second Chamber 1950 – April 1956, MS 
1624-93/3 
• Sir Mathew Oram to Holland, 1 May 1956, Second Chamber May 1956, MS 1624-
93/4 
• Holland to McKenzie, 7 May 1956, Holland Papers, Second Chamber 1950 – April 
1956, MS 1624-93/3 
• Holland to Theo Hills (National Party Secretary), 18 May 1956, Second Chamber 
May 1956, MS Papers 1624-093/4 
• Marshall to Holland, 19 September 1956, Holland Papers, Seconds Chamber, MS 
1624-093/6 
 
Sir Alister McIntosh Papers, MS 6759 
• Letter from Holland to prospective Councillors, June 1950, contained in A16 Papers 
Relating to the Abolition of the Legislative Council, MS 6759-051 
• Statement by Holland, 20 June 1950, contained in contained in A16 Papers Relating 
to the Abolition of the Legislative Council, McIntosh Papers, MS 6759-051 
• Letter from McIntosh to [now Sir Clifton] Webb in London, 11 June 1957, Personal 
Correspondence, Hon. Sir Thomas Clifton Webb Papers [within the McIntosh 
collection], MS Papers 6759-365 
 
Sir John Marshall Papers, MS 1403 
• Undated note on Governor-General’s powers, MS 1403-069/3 
 290 
• National Caucus Meeting, 11 August 1949, Caucus Notes 1947-1949, MS 1403-
016/5 
• “New Zealand National Party – Policy – General Election 1949”, Campaign Papers 
1949, MS 1403-562/3 
• National Party paper entitled “The Defeat of the Labour Government 1949”, 14 
August 1950, Campaign Papers 1951, MS 1403-563/4 
• Menu of State Luncheon, 11 January 1954, MS 1403-069/3 
• Prime Minister’s Office to Marshall, 30 May 1956, Copied from Cabinet Minutes, 
29 May 1956 [CM (56) 25, MS 1403-069/4 
 
Published Primary Sources 
Newspapers specifically used 
The New Zealand Worker, 27 June 1934 (Contained in the Marshall papers)  
Evening Post, 7 August 1947 
Evening Post, 3 November 1945 
Evening Post, 8 November 1945 
The Times of India, 25 January 2006 
Daily Mirror, 2 March 2007 
 
Official Publications and Documents 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, Report of the 
Constitutional Reform Committee, I-18, 1952 
 
Appendices to the Journals of the Legislative Council, Report of the Select Committee 
upon the Constitution of the Legislative Council, 1913 
    
British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B – Sri Lanka, Part II, Towards 
Independence 1945-48, K. M. De Silva (ed.) London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1997 
 
Colonial Office, Ceylon: Report of the Special Commission on the Government of 
Ceylon, Cmd. 3131, London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1928 
 
 291 
Colonial Office, Ceylon: Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Cmd. 6677, 
London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1945 
 
Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India – The Transfer of Power 1942-7, 
Volumes I-XII, Nicholas Mansergh, E. W. R. Lumby and Penderel Moon (eds.), 
London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1970-83 
 
Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952, Nicholas 
Mansergh (ed.), Volume I-II, London: Oxford University Press, 1953 
 
Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs 1952-1962, Nicholas Mansergh 
(ed.), London: Oxford University Press, 1963 
 
Independence Day Souvenir, Independent Ceylon – The First Year, issued by the 
Department of Information, The Government of Ceylon, 1949 
 
“Inquiry to Review New Zealand’s Constitutional Arrangements”, Report of the 
Constitutional Arrangements Committee, I.24A, August 2005 
 
Instructions Passed Under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor-General 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Dominion of New Zealand, created 11 May 1917 
 
Letters Patent Relating to the Office of Governor-General, created 11 May 1917 [New 
Zealand] 
 
New Zealand Foreign Policy – Statements and Documents 1943-1957, Wellington: 
Government Printer, 1972 
 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 
 
Quentin-Baxter, Alison, Review of the Letters Patent 1917 Constituting the Office of 
Governor-General of New Zealand, Wellington: Cabinet Office, June 1980 
 
 292 
Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918-1931 – From Self-Government 
to National Sovereignty, Arthur Berriedale Keith (ed.) London: Oxford University 
Press, 1938 
 
The Constitution of Ceylon, Sir Ivor Jennings (ed.) 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1953 
 
The Framing of India’s Constitution – Select Documents, B. Shiva Rao (ed.), Volumes 
I-IV, Bombay: The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1966-68 
 
The Governance of Britain, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Justice 
and Lord Chancellor by Command of Her Majesty, CM 7170, London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, July 2007 
 
The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp) 
 
The Role of Second Chambers: The Report of a Study Group of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association, The Parliamentarian – Journal of the Parliaments of the 
Commonwealth, Vol. LXIII, No. 4, October 1982 
 
“The Vitharana Report to APRC”, excerpts in The Morning Leader, Vol. 2, No. 28, 10 
January 2007 
Secondary  Sources 
Alexandrowicz, C. H., Constitutional Developments in India, Bombay: Oxford 
University Press, 1957 
 
Algie, R. M., “The Second Chamber in New Zealand”, The Parliamentarian - Journal 
of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. XLII, No. 3, July 1961 
 
Alley, Roderic, “The Powers of the Prime Minister” in New Zealand Politics in 
Perspective, 3rd edition, Hyam Gold (ed.), Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992 
 
Arasaratnam, S., “Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils”, in Sri Lanka- Collective 
Identities Revisited – Vol. II, ed. Michael Roberts, Colombo: Marga Institute, 1998 
 293 
 
Ashton, S. R., “Ceylon” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV - The 
Twentieth Century, Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001 
 
Austin, Granville, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1966 
 
Austin, Granville, Working a Democratic Constitution – The Indian Experience, New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999 
 
Austin, Granville, “Ain’t Broke So Why Fix It”, India Today, International edition, 31 
January 2000  
 
Bagehot, Walter, The English Constitution – With an Introduction by R. H. S. 
Crossman, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1978 
 
Barwick, Sir Garfield, Sir John Did His Duty, Wahroonga: Serendip Publications, 1983 
 
Bassett, Michael, Confrontation ’51 – The 1951 Waterfront Dispute, Wellington: A. H. 
& A. W. Reed, 1972 
 
Bassett, Michael, “The Essentials of Successful Leadership in Twentieth-Century New 
Zealand Politics”, Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 2, December 1999 
 
Bassett, Michael, and King, Michael, Tomorrow Comes the Song – A Life of Peter 
Fraser, Auckland: Penguin, 2000 
 
Basu, Durga Das, Introduction to the Constitution of India, 18th Edition, New Delhi: 
Prentice-Hall, 1998 
 
Basu, Durga Das, Constitutional Law of India, 7th edition, New Delhi: Prentice-Hall, 
1998 
 
 294 
Beaglehole, J. C., “New Zealand in the Commonwealth: An Attempt at Objectivity” in 
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Contemporary New Zealand – A Survey 
of Domestic and Foreign Policy, Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs, 1938 
 
Beaglehole, J. C., “The Statute and Constitutional Change” in J.C. Beaglehole (ed.), 
New Zealand & the Statute of Westminster, Wellington: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1944 
 
Beaglehole, J. C., “The Development of New Zealand Nationality”, Journal of World 
History, Vol. II, No. I, 1954 
 
Beaglehole, J. C., “New Zealand Since the War”, Landfall, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1961 
 
Belich, James, Paradise Reforged – A History of the New Zealanders From the 1880s to 
the Year 2000, Auckland: Allen Lane, 2001 
 
Benda, Harry J., “The End of Bicameralism in New Zealand”, Parliamentary Affairs, 
Vol. IV, No. 1, Winter 1950 
 
Benda, Harry J., and Brookes, R. H., “SPQR: A Note on the Proposed Senate”, Political 
Science, Vol. 4, No. 2, September 1952 
 
Bernard, Jean-Alphonse, “The Presidential Idea in the Constitutions of South Asia”, 
Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1992 
 
Bhave, Y. B., The First Prime Minister of India, New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 
1995 
 
Blake, Robert, “Mr Holland – The Energetic Accident”, Here & Now, No. 1, October 
1949 
 
Blundell, Sir Denis, “Some Reflections upon the Office of Governor-General in New 
Zealand”, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 10, 1980 
 
 295 
Bogdanor, “United Kingdom”, in David Butler and D.A. Low (eds.), Sovereigns and 
Surrogates – Constitutional Heads of State in the Commonwealth, New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1991 
 
Bogdanor, Vernon, and Marshall, Geoffrey, “Dismissing Governor-Generals” Public 
Law, 1996 
 
Bogdanor, Vernon, The Monarchy and the Constitution, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997 
 
Bongiorno, Frank, “Commonwealthmen and Republicans: Dr H.V. Evatt, the Monarchy 
and India”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2000 
 
Bose, Sugata, and Jalal, Ayesha, Modern South Asia – History, Culture, Political 
Economy, New York: Routledge, 1998 
 
Bose, Sumantra, “Decolonisation and State Building in South Asia”, Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004 
 
Brecher, Michael, Nehru – A Political Biography, Abridged Edition, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961 
 
Bradley, A. W., “Sir William Ivor Jennings: A Centennial Paper”, Modern Law Review, 
Vol. 67, No. 5, 2004 
 
Brass, Paul R., The Politics of India since Independence, 2nd edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001 
 
Brooker, Paul, Leadership in Democracy – From Adaptive to Entrepreneurial Initiative, 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 
 
Brookfield, F. M., “No Nodding Automaton: A Study of the Governor-General’s 
Powers and Functions”, New Zealand Law Journal, December 1978 
 
 296 
Brookfield, F. M., “The Reconstituted Office of Governor-General”, New Zealand Law 
Journal, November 1985 
 
Brown, Bruce, “Holyoake’s Precursors” in Holyoake’s Lieutenants, Margaret Clark 
(ed.), Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2003 
 
Brown, Judith M., and Louis, Wm. Roger (eds.), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire: Volume IV - The Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 
 
Brown, Judith M., Nehru – A Political Life, London: Yale University Press, 2003 
 
Brown, Judith, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the British Empire: The Making of an ‘Outsider’ 
in Indian Politics”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, April 
2006 
 
Burroughs, Peter, “Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire” in The Oxford 
History of the British Empire: Volume III - The Nineteenth Century, Andrew Porter 
(ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 
 
Butler, David, and Low, D. A. (eds.), Sovereigns and Surrogates – Constitutional 
Heads of State in the Commonwealth, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991 
 
Cannadine, David, Ornamentalism – How the British saw their Empire, London: 
Penguin, 2002 
 
Cartwright, Dame Silvia, “The Role of the Governor-General”, New Zealand Centre for 
Public Law, Occasional Paper No. 6, October 2001 
 
Catt, Helena, Harris, Paul, and Roberts, Nigel S., Voter’s Choice – Electoral Change in 
New Zealand?, Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1992 
 
Chakrabarty, Bidyut, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the Administrative Reconstruction in 
India: A Mere Imitation of the Past or a Creative Initiative?”, South Asia: Journal of 
South Asian Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, April 2006 
 
 297 
Chapman, Robert, “Political Culture: The Purposes of Party and the Current Challenge” 
in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 2nd edition, Hyam Gold (ed.), Auckland: 
Longman Paul, 1990 
 
Chehabi, H. E., “The Absence of Consociationalism in Sri Lanka”, Plural Societies, 
Vol. 11, Winter 1980 
 
Clark, Margaret (ed.), Peter Fraser – Master Politician, Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press, 1998 
 
Cleveland, L., and Robinson, A. D. (eds.), Readings in New Zealand Government, 
Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1972 
 
Cobham, Viscount, “The Governor-General’s Constitutional Role” in Readings in New 
Zealand Government, L. Cleveland and A. D. Robinson (eds.), Wellington: A.H. & 
A.W. Reed, 1972 
 
Cooke, Sir Robin, “Fundamentals”, New Zealand Law Journal, May 1988 
 
Cooke, Sir Robin, “The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown” in Essays on the 
Constitution, Philip A. Joseph (ed.), Wellington: Brooker’s, 1995 
 
Coomaraswamy, Radhika, Sri Lanka – The Crisis of the Anglo-American Constitutional 
Traditions in a Developing Society, New Delhi: Vikas, 1984 
 
Coomaraswamy, Radhika, Ideology and the Constitution – Essays on Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, Delhi: Konrak Publishers, 1997 
 
Cooray, L. J. M., “Operation of Conventions in the Constitutional History of Ceylon, 
1948 to 1965”, Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1973 
 
Copland, Ian, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997 
 
 298 
Copland, Ian, and Rickard, John (eds.), Federalism – Comparative Perspectives form 
India and Australia, New Delhi: Manohar, 1999 
 
Copland, Ian, and Rickard, John, “Introduction”, in Federalism – Comparative 
Perspectives form India and Australia, Ian Copland and John Rickard (eds.), New 
Delhi: Manohar, 1999 
 
Cowen, Sir Zelman, “The Crown and Its Representative in the Commonwealth”, 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin, Vol. 18, January 1992 
 
Cox, Nigel, and Miller, Raymond, “Head of State” in New Zealand Government and 
Politics, 4th edition, Raymond Miller (ed.), Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006 
 
Currie, A. E., New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster 1931, Wellington: 
Butterworth & Co., 1944 
 
Darwin, John, “A Third British Empire?  The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics” in 
The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV - The Twentieth Century, Judith 
M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 
 
Dasgupta, Jyotirindra, Language Conflict and National Development – Group Politics 
and National Language Policy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970 
 
Dasgupta, Jyotirindra, “India: Democratic Becoming and Developmental Transition” in 
Politics in Developing Countries – Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 2nd 
edition, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995 
 
Dasgupta, Jyotirindra, “India’s Federal Design and Multicultural National 
Construction” in The Success of India’s Democracy, Atul Kohli (ed.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001 
 
Dell, Edmund, The Chancellors – A History of the Chancellors of the Exchequer 1945-
90, London: Harper Collins, 1996 
 
 299 
De Silva, Chandra R., “Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic Rivalry: The Background”, in Robert B. 
Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (ed.), From Independence to Statehood – 
Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States, London: Frances Pinter, 
1984 
 
De Silva, K. M., “A Tale of Three Constitutions 1946-8, 1972 and 1978”, The Ceylon 
Journal of Historical and Social Studies, Vol. VII, No. 2, June-December 1977 
(published in 1979) 
 
De Silva, K. M., Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880-
1985, Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1986 
 
De Silva, K. M. and Wriggins, W. Howard., J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka – A 
Political Biography, Volumes 1-2, London/Honolulu: Anthony 
Blond/Quartet/University of Hawaii Press, 1988-1994 
 
De Silva, K. M., “Sri Lanka: The Bandaranaikes in the Island’s Politics and Public Life 
– Reflections on the Centenary of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s Birth”, The Round Table, 
Vol. 350, 1999 
 
De Silva, K. M., A History of Sri Lanka, (Special Sri Lankan Edition), Colombo: Vijitha 
Yapa, 2005 
 
De Smith, S. A., “Westminster’s Export Models: The Legal Framework of Responsible 
Government”, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1961 
 
De Smith, S. A., The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1964 
 
De Vota, Neil, “Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: 
Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, Spring 2000 
 
Dharmadasa, K. N. O., Language, Religion, and Ethnic Assertiveness – The Growth of 
Sinhalese Nationalism in Sri Lanka, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992 
 
 300 
Dion, Stéphane, “Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons 
from Quebec”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, April 1996 
 
Dua, Bhagwan, Presidential Rule in India 1950-1984: A Study in Crisis Politics, New 
Delhi: S. Chand & Company, 1985 
 
Dua, B. D., “The Prime Minister and the Federal System” in Nehru to the Nineties – 
The Changing Office of Prime Minister in India, James Manor (ed.), New Delhi: 
Viking, 1994 
 
Eden, Sir Anthony, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden K.G., P.C., M.C. – 
Full Circle, London: Cassell, 1960 
 
Fairburn, A. R. D., “Mr. Fraser’s Way of Doing Things”, Here & Now, No. 1, October 
1949 
 
Fernando, J. L., Three Prime Ministers of Ceylon – An Inside Story, Colombo: M.D. 
Gunasena & Co., 1963 
 
Fieldhouse, D. K., “Autochthonous Elements in the Evolution of Dominion Status: The 
Case of New Zealand”, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Volume 1, 1962 
 
Finlay, Martyn, “Opening Recollections” in Peter Fraser – Master Politician, Margaret 
Clark (ed.), Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998 
 
Freyberg, Paul, Bernard Freyberg V.C. – Soldier of Two Nations, London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1991 
 
Galbraith, John Kenneth, Ambassador’s Journal – A Personal Account of the Kennedy 
Years, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969 
 
Gamble, Andrew, “Theories of British Politics”, Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, 
September 1990 
 
Gandhi, Rajmohan, Rajaji – A Life, New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1997 
 301 
 
Gangal, S. C., Prime Minister and the Cabinet in India – A Political Study, New Delhi: 
Navachetna Prakashan, 1972 
 
Gilbert, Martin, Winston S. Churchill, Never Despair, 1945-65, Vol. VIII, London: 
William Heinemann, 1988 
 
Gledhill, Alan, The Republic of India: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, 
London: Stevens and Sons, 1951 
 
Gooneratne, Yasmine, Relative Merits – A Personal Memoir of the Bandaranaike 
Family of Sri Lanka, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1986 
 
Gopal, Sarvepalli, Jawaharlal Nehru – A Biography, Volumes 1-3, London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1975-84 
 
Gopal, Sarvepalli, “Nehru and the Commonwealth” in Retreat from Power – Studies in 
Britain’s Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, Vol. 2, David Dilks (ed.), London: 
Macmillan, 1981 
 
Gopal, Sarvepalli, Radhakrishnan – A Biography, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1992 
 
Gopal, Sarvepalli, “Churchill and India” in Churchill – A Major New Assessment of His 
Life in Peace and War, R. Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) London: Oxford, 1993 
 
Graham, B. D., “The Prime Minister and the Hindu Right” in Nehru to the Nineties – 
The Changing Office of Prime Minister in India, James Manor (ed.), New Delhi: 
Viking, 1994 
 
Graham, Sir Douglas, “Reflections on the Constitution”, New Zealand Law Review, 
1999 
 
Grant, David, “Anti-Conscription, Conscription and the Referendum” in Peter Fraser – 
Master Politician, Margaret Clark (ed.), Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998 
 302 
 
Gustafson, Barry, From the Cradle to the Grave – A Biography of Michael Joseph 
Savage, Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986 
 
Gustafson, Barry, The First 50 Years – A History of the National Party, Auckland: Reed 
Methuen, 1986 
 
Gustafson, Barry, “The Sorcerer and His Apprentice” in Sir Keith Holyoake – Towards 
a Political Biography, Margaret Clark (ed.), Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997 
 
Gustafson, Barry, His Way – A Biography of Robert Muldoon, Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 2000 
 
Gustafson, Barry, “Populist Roots of Political Leadership in New Zealand” in Raymond 
Miller and Michael Mintrom (eds.), Political Leadership in New Zealand, Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 2006 
 
Hailsham, Lord, Elective Dictatorship, The Richard Dimbleby Lecture 1976, London: 
British Broadcasting Corporation, 1976 
 
Hall, Peter A., and Taylor, Rosemary C. R., “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, Vol. XLIV, 1996 
 
Harrison, Selig, India, The Most Dangerous Decades, Madras: Oxford University Press, 
1960 
 
Hart, Henry C., “The Indian Constitution: Political Development and Decay”, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 20, No. 4, April 1980 
 
Hasluck, Sir Paul, The Office of Governor-General, Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1979, 
 
Hasan, Mushirul, “Memories of a Fragmented Nation: Rewriting the Histories of India’s 
Partition” in The Partition in Retrospect, Amrik Singh (ed.), New Delhi: Anamika 
Publishers, 2000 
 303 
 
Hayward, Margaret, Diary of the Kirk Years, Wellington/Queen Charlotte Sound: 
Reed/Cape Catley, 1981 
 
Hayward, Margaret, “Prime Minister: Power” in New Zealand Government and Politics, 
4th edition, Raymond Miller (ed.), Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006 
 
Helms, Ludger, Presidents, Prime Ministers and Chancellors – Executive Leadership in 
Western Democracy, Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 
 
Henderson, John, “Prime Minister” in New Zealand Government and Politics, 2nd 
edition, Raymond Miller (ed.), Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2001 
 
Henderson, Michael, “Setting India’s Democratic House in Order: Constitutional 
Amendments”, Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 10, October 1979 
 
Hensley, Gerald, Final Approaches – A Memoir, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 
2006 
 
Hobbs, Leslie, The Thirty-Year Wonders, Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1967 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in The Invention of Tradition, 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995 
 
Hodson, H. V., The Great Divide – Britain – India – Pakistan, London: Hutchinson, 
1969 
 
Huber, Evelyn, and Stephens, John, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: 
Parties and Policies in Global Markets, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001  
 
Hulugalle, H. A. J., Don Stephen Senanayake – First Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, 2nd 
edition, Colombo: Arjuna Hulugalle Dictionaries, 2000 
 
 304 
Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Conn. : 
Yale University Press, 1972 
 
Jacob, L. M., Sri Lanka – From Dominion to Republic, Delhi: National Publishing 
House, 1973 
 
Jackson, W. K. (Keith), The New Zealand Legislative Council – A Study of the 
Establishment, Failure and Abolition of an Upper House, Dunedin: University of Otago 
Press, 1972 
 
Jackson, Keith, “Cabinet and the Prime Minister” in Politics in New Zealand – A 
Reader, Stephen Levine (ed.), Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1978 
 
Jackson, Keith, “The Abolition of the New Zealand Upper House of Parliament” in Two 
Into One – The Politics and Processes of National Legislative Cameral Change, 
Lawrence D. Longley and David M. Olson (eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, 1991   
 
Jaffrelot, Christophe, “India and Pakistan: Interpreting the Divergence of Two Political 
Trajectories”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2002 
 
Jalal, Ayesha, “Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue”, Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1985 
 
Jalal, Ayesha, The Sole Spokesman – Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for 
Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, 1985 
 
Jalal, Ayesha, “Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of Communalism: Partition 
Historiography Revisited”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1996 
 
Jalal, Ayesha, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia – A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 
 
James, Colin (ed.), Building the Constitution, Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 
2000 
 
 305 
Jayaratne, B. C. F., “Abolition of the Senate of Ceylon”, The Parliamentarian – Journal 
of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. LIII, No. 2, April 1972 
 
Jeffrey, Robin, People, Princes and Paramount Power – Society and Politics in the 
Indian Princely States, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978 
 
Jeffrey, Robin, “The Prime Minister and the Ruling Party” in Nehru to the Nineties – 
The Changing Office of Prime Minister in India, James Manor (ed.), New Delhi: 
Viking, 1994 
 
Jeffries, Sir Charles, ‘O.E.G.’ A Biography of Sir Oliver Ernest Goonetilleke, London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1969 
 
Jenkins, Roy, Mr Balfour’s Poodle – People v. Peers, new edition, London: Papermac, 
1999 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, The Commonwealth in Asia, London: Oxford University Press, 1951 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution – Being Lectures 
given in the University of Madras during March 1952 under the Sir Alladi 
Krishnaswami Aiyer Shashtiabdapoorthi Endowment, Madras: Cambridge University 
Press, 1953 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, “D.S. Senanayake and Independence”, The Ceylon Historical 
Journal, D.S. Senanayake Memorial Number, Vol. V, Nos. 1,2,3 & 4, July & October 
1955 and January & April 1956 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, “Crown and Commonwealth in Asia”, International Affairs, Vol. 32, 
No. 2, April 1956 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1957 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, Cabinet Government, 3rd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1959    
 306 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, British Commonwealth of Nations, 4th edition, London: Hutchinson, 
1961 
 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, The Queen’s Government, London: Penguin Books, 1962 
 
Jiggins, Janice, Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976, 
Cambridge/Colombo: Cambridge University Press/K. V. G. De Silva & Sons, 1979 
 
Jupp, James, Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy, London: Frank Cass, 1978 
 
Kashyap, Subhash C., Jawaharlal Nehru and the Constitution, New Delhi: 
Metropolitan, 1982 
 
Kearney, Robert N., Communalism and language in the politics of Ceylon, Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967 
 
Keith, K. J., “Constitutional Change” in Thirteen Facets – Essays to Celebrate the 
Silver Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth the Second 1952-1977, Ian Wards (ed.), Wellington: 
Department of Internal Affairs, 1978 
 
Kerr, Sir John, Matters of Judgement – An Autobiography, Melbourne: Macmillan, 
1978 
 
Khairi, Saeed R., Jinnah Reinterpreted: The Journey from Indian Nationalism to 
Muslim Statehood, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995 
 
Khan, Hamid, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2004 
 
King, Michael, The Penguin History of New Zealand, Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003 
 
Kipling, Rudyard, The Five Nations, 7th edition, London: Methuen and Co., 1910 
 
 307 
Kohli, Atul, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of 
Self-Determination Movements in India”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2, 
May 1997 
 
Kohli, Atul (ed.), The Success of India’s Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001 
 
Kotelawala, Sir John, An Asian Prime Minister’s Story, London: George G. Harrap & 
Co, 1956 
 
Kumarasingham, Harshan, “The ‘New Commonwealth’ 1947-49: A New Zealand 
Perspective on India Joining the Commonwealth”, The Round Table, Vol. 95, No. 385, 
July 2006 
 
Kumarasingham, Harshan, “A Democratic Paradox: The Communalisation of Politics in 
Ceylon 1911-1948”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 37, No. III, November 2006 
 
Ladley, Andrew, “The Head of State” in New Zealand Politics in Transition, Raymond 
Miller (ed.), Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997 
 
Ladley, Andrew, “Who Should be Head of State?” in Building the Constitution, Colin 
James (ed.), Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 2000 
 
Lee, H. P., “Emergency Powers in Australian and Indian Federalism” in Federalism – 
Comparative Perspectives form India and Australia, Ian Copland and John Rickard 
(eds.), New Delhi: Manohar, 1999 
 
Levine, Stephen, “Parliamentary Democracy in New Zealand”, Parliamentary Affairs, 
Vol. 57, No. 3, 2004 
 
Lijphart, Arend, Democracies – Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984 
 
 308 
Lijphart, Arend, “The Demise of the Last Westminster System?  Comments on the 
Report of New Zealand’s Royal Commission on the Electoral System”, Electoral 
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, August 1987 
 
Lijphart, Arend, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation”, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 90. No. 2, June 1996 
 
Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy – Government Forms and Performance in 
Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999 
 
Lipson, Leslie, The Politics of Equality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948 
 
Low, D. A. (ed.), Constitutional Heads and Political Crises – Commonwealth Episodes, 
1945-85, London: Macmillan, 1988 
 
Low, D. A., “Introduction: Buckingham Palace and the Westminster Model” in 
Constitutional Heads and Political Crises – Commonwealth Episodes, 1945-85, D. A. 
Low (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1988 
 
Ludowyk, E. F. C., The Modern History of Ceylon, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1966 
 
Lyon, Peter and Manor, James (eds.), Transfer and Transformation: Political 
Institutions in the New Commonwealth, Cambridge: Leicester University Press, 1983 
 
McCraw, David J., “The Zenith of Realism in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy”, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2002 
 
McGechan, R. O., “Status and Legislative Inability” in J.C. Beaglehole (ed.), New 
Zealand & the Statute of Westminster, Wellington: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1944 
 
McGibbon, Ian (ed.), Undiplomatic Dialogue – Letters Between Carl Berendsen & 
Alister McIntosh 1943-1952,  Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993 
 
 309 
McGibbon, Ian (ed.), Unofficial Channels – Letters Between Alister McIntosh and Foss 
Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner 1946-1966, Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 1999 
 
McIntosh, Sir Alister, “The Origins of the Department of External Affairs”, Sir Alister 
McIntosh (ed.), New Zealand in World Affairs Volume I 1945-1957, Price Milburn, 
Wellington, 1977 
 
McIntosh, Sir Alister, (ed.), New Zealand in World Affairs Volume I 1945-1957, Price 
Milburn, Wellington, 1977 
 
McIntosh, Sir Alister, “Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime” in Peter Fraser – 
Master Politician, Margaret Clark (ed.), Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998 
 
Macintyre, Stuart, A Concise History of Australia, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004 
 
McIntyre, W. D., “Peter Fraser’s Commonwealth: New Zealand and the Origins of the 
New Commonwealth in the 1940s” in Sir Alister McIntosh (ed.), New Zealand in World 
Affairs Volume I 1945-1957, Price Milburn, Wellington, 1977 
 
McIntyre, W. David, Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907-1945, 
Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2007 
 
McKinnon, Malcolm, Independence and Foreign Policy – New Zealand in the World 
since 1935, Auckland University Press, 1993 
 
McLean, Gavin, “From Cocked Hats to Designer Frocks – The ‘Queen in Drag’ in 
Twentieth-Century New Zealand’ in Exploring the British World: Identity, Cultural 
Production, Institutions, Kate Darian-Smith (ed.), Melbourne: RMIT Publishing, 2004 
 
McLean, Gavin, The Governors – New Zealand’s Governors and Governors-General, 
Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2006 
 
 310 
McLeay, Elizabeth, The Cabinet & Political Power in New Zealand, Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1995 
 
McLeay, Elizabeth, “Cabinet” in New Zealand Government and Politics, 4th edition, 
Raymond Miller (ed.), Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006 
 
McLintock, A. H., and Wood, G. A., The Upper House in Colonial New Zealand, 
Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1987 
 
Macmillan, Harold, Riding the Storm 1956-1959, London: Macmillan, 1971 
 
Mahajan, Sucheta, Independence and Partition – The Erosion of Colonial Power in 
India, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000  
 
Mahoney, James, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” Theory and Society, Vol. 
29 No. 4, August 2000 
 
Malhotra, Inder, Dynasties of India and Beyond – Pakistan Sri Lanka Bangladesh, New 
Delhi: Harper Collins 
 
Mallaby, Sir George, From My Level – Unwritten Minutes, London: Hutchinson, 1965 
 
Manor, James, “The Demise of the Princely Order: A Reassessment” in People, Princes 
and Paramount Power – Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States, Robin 
Jeffrey (ed.), Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978 
 
Manor, James, “The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)”, Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 1, March 1979 
 
Manor, James “Setting a Precedent by Breaking a Precedent: Lord Soulbury in Ceylon, 
1952”, in D.A. Low (ed.), Constitutional Heads and Political Crises – Commonwealth 
Episodes, 1945-85, London: Macmillan, 1988 
 
Manor, James, The Expedient Utopian – Bandaranaike and Ceylon, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989 
 311 
 
Manor, James, “How and Why Liberal and Representative Politics Emerged in India”, 
Political Studies, Vol. XXXVIII, 1990, 
 
Manor, James (ed.), Nehru to the Nineties – The Changing Office of Prime Minister in 
India, New Delhi: Viking, 1994 
 
Manor, James “The Prime Minister and President” in Nehru to the Nineties – The 
Changing Office of Prime Minister in India, James Manor (ed.), New Delhi: Viking, 
1994 
 
Manor, James, “Centre-State Relations” in The Success of India’s Democracy, Atul 
Kohli (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 
 
Martin, John E., The House – New Zealand’s House of Representatives 1854-2004, 
Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2004 
 
Marshall, Geoffrey, Constitutional Conventions – The Rules and Forms of Political 
Accountability, Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford, 1986 
 
Marshall, Sir John, “The Power of Dissolution in New Zealand”, The Parliamentarian, 
Vol. LVIII, No. 1, January 1977 
 
Marshall, Sir John, “Introduction” in The Reform of Parliament – Papers Presented in 
Memory of Dr Alan Robinson, Sir John Marshall (ed.), Wellington: New Zealand 
Institute of Public Administration, 1978 
 
Marshall, Sir John, Memoirs, Volumes 1-2, Auckland: Collins, 1983-1989 
 
Massicotte, Louis, “Legislative Unicameralism: A Global Survey and a Few Case 
Studies”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001 
 
Menon, V. P., The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Calcutta: Orient 
Longmans, 1956 
 
 312 
Metcalf, Barbara D., and Metcalf, Thomas R., A Concise History of India, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002 
 
Miller, Raymond (ed.), New Zealand Government and Politics, 4th edition, Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2006 
 
Milne, R. S., Political Parties in New Zealand, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966 
 
Mitra, Subrata Kumar, “Introduction” in Subrata Kumar Mitra (ed.), The Post-Colonial 
State in Asia – Dialectics of Politics and Culture, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1990 
 
Mitra, Sumit, and Ahmed, Farzand, “Review Rift”, India Today, International edition, 
14 February 2000 
 
Moore, R. J., Liberalism and Indian Politics 1872-1922, London: Edward Arnold, 1966 
 
Moore, R. J., Escape from Empire – The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983 
 
Moore, R. J., Making the New Commonwealth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987 
 
Morris, Jan, Farewell the Trumpets – An Imperial Retreat, London: Faber and Faber, 
1998 
 
Morris, Jan, Stones of Empire – The Buildings of the Raj, reissued, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005 
 
Morris-Jones, W. H., Parliament In India, London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1957 
 
Morris-Jones, W. H., The Government and Politics of India, 2nd Edition, London: 
Hutchinson University Library, 1967 
 
 313 
Morris-Jones, W. H., “Shaping the Post-Imperial State: Nehru’s letters to Chief 
Ministers” in Imperialism, the State and the Third World, Mark Twaddle (ed.), London: 
British Academic Press, 1992 
 
Mulgan, Richard, “The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand” in New Zealand Politics 
in Perspective, 3rd edition, Hyam Gold (ed.), Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992 
 
Munshi, K. M., The President under the Indian Constitution, 2nd edition, Bombay: 
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967 
 
Namasivayam, S., The Legislatures of Ceylon, 1928-1948, London: Faber & Faber, 
1951 
 
Namasivayam, S., Parliamentary Government in Ceylon, 1948-1958, Colombo: K.V.G. 
De Silva & Sons, 1959 
 
Narayanan, President K. R., Address on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
Republic of India from the Central Hall of Parliament, 27 January 2000 in Seminar, 
Issue 487, March 2000 
 
Nariman, Fali. S., “The Office of the President”, Journal of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1-4, January-December 2002 
 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, An Autobiography, London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1936 
 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volumes 1- , S. 
Gopal (ed.), New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984- 
 
Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Volumes 1-5, G. Parthasarathi (ed.), New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985-89  
 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru, Volumes 1-2, 
Sarvepalli Gopal and Uma Iyengar (eds.), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003 
 
 314 
Northey, J. F., “The New Zealand Constitution” in J. F. Northey, The A. G. Davis 
Essays in Law, London: Butterworths, 1965 
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1998 
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Counterpoints – Selected Essays in Authoritarianism and 
Democratisation, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999 
 
Oliver, Peter C., The Constitution of Independence – The Development of Constitutional 
Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 
 
Oliver, W. H., “Sir Sidney Holland”, Comment, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1961 
 
Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek, “Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 
‘New Institutionalism’” in The Dynamics of American Politics – Approaches and 
Interpretations, Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994 
 
Palmer, Geoffrey, Unbridled Power – An Interpretation of New Zealand’s Constitution 
& Government, 2nd edition, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987 
 
Palmer, Geoffrey, New Zealand’s Constitution in Crisis – Reforming our Political 
System, Dunedin: John McIndoe, 1992 
 
Palmer, Geoffrey and Palmer, Matthew, Bridled Power – New Zealand’s Constitution 
and Government, 4th edition, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2004 
 
Pandey, Gyanendra, Remembering Partition – Violence, Nationalism and History in 
India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 
 
Panigrahi, D. N., India’s Partition – The Story of Imperialism in Retreat, Oxford: 
Routledge, 2004 
 
 315 
Parekh, Bhiku, Gandhi’s Philosophy: A Critical Examination, Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1989 
 
Patapan, Haig, Wanna, John and Weller, Patrick (eds.), Westminster Legacies – 
Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific, Sydney: University of 
New South Wales, 2005 
 
Patel, Vallabhbhai, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945-50, Volumes 1-10, Durga Das 
(ed.), Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1971-74 
 
Phillips, Jock, Royal Summer – The Visit of Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip to 
New Zealand 1953-54, Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1993 
 
Pierson, Paul, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, June 2000 
 
Pierson, Paul, “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change”, 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 13, No. 4, 
October 2000 
 
Pierson, Paul, Politics in Time – History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004 
 
Pierson, Paul, “The Study of Policy Development”, Journal of Policy History, Vol. 17, 
No. 1, 2005 
 
Poguntke, Thomas and Webb, Paul, “The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic 
Societies: A Framework for Analysis” in The Presidentialization of Politics – A 
Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (eds.), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 
 
Prasad, Bimal, “Jawaharlal Nehru and Partition” in The Partition in Retrospect, Amrik 
Singh (ed.), New Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2000 
 
 316 
Prasad, Rajendra, Dr Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents, 
Volumes I-XI, Valmiki Choudhary (ed.), New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984-1995 
 
Pylee, M. V., Constitutional Government in India, 3rd edition, Bombay: Popular Press, 
1977 
 
Quentin-Baxter, R. Q., “The Governor-General’s Constitutional Discretions: An Essay 
Towards a Redefinition”, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 10, 1980 
 
Rajashekara, H. M., “The Nature of Indian Federalism: A Critique”, Asian Survey, Vol. 
37, No. 3, March 1997 
 
Ramusack, Barbara N., The Indian Princes and their States, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004 
 
Ratnapala, Suri, “Federalism as a Response to Ethnic Regionalism” in Federalism – 
Comparative Perspectives form India and Australia, Ian Copland and John Rickard 
(eds.), New Delhi: Manohar, 1999 
 
Rau, B. N., India’s Constitution in the Making, Madras: Orient Longmans, 1960 
 
Rees, Sir Frederick, “The Soulbury Commission 1944-45”, The Ceylon Historical 
Journal, D.S. Senanayake Memorial Number, Vol. V, Nos. 1,2,3 & 4, July & October 
1955 and January & April 1956 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W., “Shackling the Leader?: Coherence, Capacity and the Hollow Crown”, 
in  Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis, R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.), The Hollow Crown – 
Countervailing Trends in Core Executives, London: Macmillan, 1997 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W and Weller, Patrick, “Westminster Transplanted and Westminster 
Implanted: Exploring Political Change” in Haig Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick 
Weller (eds.), Westminster Legacies – Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia 
and the Pacific, Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2005 
 
 317 
Richter, William L., and Ramusack, Barbara N., “The Chamber and the Consultation: 
Changing Forms of Princely Association in India”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 
34, No. 3, May 1975 
 
Richter, William, “Traditional Rulers in Post-Traditional Societies: The Princes of India 
and Pakistan” in People, Princes and Paramount Power – Society and Politics in the 
Indian Princely States, Robin Jeffrey (ed.), Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978 
 
Riddiford, D. J., “A Reformed Second Chamber”, Political Science, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
September 1951 
 
Roberts, Michael, “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Perspectives: Barriers to 
Accommodation”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1978 
 
Roberts, Michael, “Problems of Collective Identity in a Multi-Ethnic Society: Sectional 
Nationalism vs. Ceylonese Nationalism, 1900-1940”, in Michael Roberts (ed.), Sri 
Lanka – Collective Identities Revisited, Volume I, Marga Institute: Colombo: 1997 
 
Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sri Lanka- Collective Identities Revisited , Volumes I-II, 
Colombo: Marga Institute, 1997-98 
 
Ross, Angus, “Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter?  New Zealand and the 
Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years”, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, 1972 
 
Ross, Angus, “New Zealand Governors-General In the Inter-War Years” in W. P. 
Morrell: A Tribute, G. A. Wood and P. S. O’Connor (eds.), Dunedin: University of 
Otago Press, 1973 
 
Roth, Herbert, Trade Unions in New Zealand Past and Present, Wellington: Reed 
Education, 1973 
 
Roy, A., “The High Politics of India’s Partition: The Revisionist Perspective”, Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1990 
 
 318 
Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Rudolph, Susane Hoeber, In Pursuit of Lakshmi – The Political 
Economy of the Indian State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987 
 
Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Rudolph, Susane Hoeber, “Redoing the Constitutional Design: 
From an Interventionist to a Regulatory State” in The Success of India’s Democracy, 
Atul Kohli (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 
 
Russell, Meg, Reforming the House of Lords – Lessons from Overseas, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000 
 
Samarasinghe, Nina, Colonial Policy, Ethnic Politics and the Minorities in Ceylon 
1927-1947, London: Oxford University Press, 1989 
 
Santhanam, K., Union-State Relations in India, London: Asia Publishing House, 1960 
 
Sarkar, Sumit, “Indian Democracy: the Historical Inheritance” in The Success of India’s 
Democracy, Atul Kohli (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper Edition, 
1974 
 
Scott, K. J., The New Zealand Constitution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962 
 
Shastri, Amita, “Government Policy and the Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka”, in Michael E. 
Brown and Sumit Ganguly (ed.), Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and 
the Pacific, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997 
 
Shastri, Amita and Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, (eds.), The Post-Colonial States of South 
Asia: Democracy, Identity, Development and Security, Richmond: Curzon, 2000 
 
Shiva Rao, B., The Framing of India’s Constitution – A Study, Bombay: The Indian 
Institute of Public Administration, 1968 
 
Sheppard, Simon, “Ranking New Zealand’s Prime Ministers”, Political Science, Vol. 
50, No. 1, (50th anniversary issue), July 1998 
 319 
 
Shroff, Marie, “The Role of the Secretary of the Cabinet – The View from the Beehive”, 
New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Occasional Paper No. 5, July 2001 
 
Srinivasan, Krishnan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth, 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 
 
Sinclair, Keith, Walter Nash, Auckland: Auckland University Press/Oxford University 
Press, 1976 
 
Sisson, Richard, “Prime Ministerial Power and the Selection of Ministers in India: 
Three Decades of Change”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1981 
 
Slight, David J., “Refusal of Assent – A Suicidal Safeguard?”, New Zealand Law 
Journal, May 1987 
 
Som, Reba, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over 
Substance”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1994 
 
Steger, M. B., Gandhi’s Dilemma: Non-violent Principles and Nationalist Power, New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 2000 
 
Stewart, W. Downie, The Right Honourable Sir Francis H. D. Bell, P.C., G.C.M.G., 
K.C., His Life and Times, Wellington: Butterworth & Co., 1937 
 
Stockley, Andrew, “Bicameralism in the New Zealand Context”, Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review, Vol. 16, 1986 
 
Templeton, Malcolm, “Beginnings” in An Eye an Ear and a Voice, Malcolm Templeton 
(ed.), Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993 
 
Tennent, Sir James Emmerson, Ceylon – An Account of the Island Physical, Historical 
and Topographical, Vol. II, First Published 1859, 6th edition, Colombo: Tisara Press, 
1977 
 
 320 
Tizard, Dame Catherine, Crown and Anchor: The Present Role of the Governor-
General in New Zealand, Wellington: Friends of the Turnbull Library, 1993 
 
Tummala, Krishna K., “The Indian Union and Emergency Powers”, International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1996 
 
Tuteja, K. L., “Hindu Consciousness, the Congress and Partition” in The Partition in 
Retrospect, Amrik Singh (ed.), New Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2000 
 
Twaddle, Mark, (ed.), Imperialism, the State and the Third World, London: British 
Academic Press, 1992 
 
Uyangoda, Jayadeva, Questions of Sri Lanka’s Minority Rights, Colombo: International 
Centre of Ethnic Studies, 2001 
 
Venkateswaran, R. J., Cabinet Government in India, London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1967 
 
Vittachi, Tarzie, Emergency ’58 – The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots, London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1958 
 
Vowles, Jack, and Aimer, Peter, Voters’ Vengeance – The 1990 Election in New 
Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government, Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1993 
 
Walker, Ranginui, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou – Struggle Without End, revised edition, 
Auckland: Penguin Books, 2004 
 
Wanna, John, “New Zealand’s Westminster Trajectory: Archetypal Transplant to 
Maverick Outlier” in Westminster Legacies – Democracy and Responsible Government 
in Asia and the Pacific, Haig Patapan, John Wanna, and Patrick Weller (eds.),  Sydney: 
University of New South Wales, 2005  
 
Wards, Ian, “Peter Fraser – Warrior Prime Minister” in Peter Fraser – Master 
Politician, Margaret Clark (ed.), Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998 
 321 
 
Watkins, Tim, “Get it in Writing”, New Zealand Listener, Vol. 204, No. 3456, August 
5-11, 2006 
 
Wavell, Lord, The Viceroy’s Journal, Sir Penderel Moon (ed.), London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973 
 
Webb, Leicester, “Leadership in the Labour Party”, Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
September 1953 
 
Weerakoon, Bradman, Rendering Unto Caesar, Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2004 
 
Weerawardana, I. D. S., Government and Politics in Ceylon, Colombo: Ceylon 
Economic Research Association, 1951 
 
Weerawardana, I. D. S., The Senate of Ceylon at Work, Colombo: Ceylon University 
Press, 1955 
 
Weiner, Myron, Party Building in A New Nation – The Indian National Congress, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967 
 
Weiner, Myron, “The Wounded Tiger: Maintaining India’s Democratic Institutions” in 
Transfer and Transformation: Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth, Peter 
Lyon and James Manor (eds.), Cambridge: Leicester University Press, 1983 
 
Weiner, Myron, The Indian Paradox – Essays in Indian Politics, Ashutosh Varshney 
(ed.), New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989  
 
Weller, Patrick, First Among Equals – Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems, Hemel 
Hempstead: George Allen & Unwin, 1985 
 
Wheare, Sir Kenneth, Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status, 5th edition, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1953 
 
 322 
Wheare, Sir Kenneth, Federal Government, 3rd edition, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1956 
 
Wheare, Sir Kenneth, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1960 
 
Wickramasinghe, Nira, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age – A History of Contested 
Identities, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2006 
 
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, “The Governor-General and the State of Emergency, May 1958 
– March 1959”, The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 
1959 
 
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, “Ceylon Cabinet Ministers 1947-1959 – Their Political, 
Economic and Social Background”, The Ceylon Economist, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1960 
 
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, “The Role of the Governor-General in Ceylon”, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 2, 1968 
 
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, Electoral Politics in an Emergent State: The Ceylon General 
Election of May 1970, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 
 
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil 
Nationalism, 1947-1977, London: Hurst & Company, 1994 
 
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism – Its Origins and Development in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries, London: Hurst & Company, 2000 
 
Wilson, Graham, “The Westminster Model in Comparative Perspective”, in Ian Budge 
and David McKay (eds.), Developing Democracy, London: Sage Publications, 1994 
 
Wilson, Ormond, An Outsider Looks Back – Reflections on Experience, Wellington: 
Port Nicholson Press, 1982 
 
 323 
Wolpert, Stanley, Nehru – A Tryst of Destiny, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996 
 
Wood, Antony, “New Zealand” in Sovereigns and Surrogates – Constitutional Heads of 
State in the Commonwealth, David Butler and D. A. Low (eds.) New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1991 
 
Wood, G. A., “New Zealand’s Single Chamber Parliament: An Argument for an 
Impotent Upper House?”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 3, Summer 1983 
 
Wood, G. A. (ed.), Ministers and Members in the New Zealand Parliament, 2nd edition, 
Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1996 
 
Wood, F. L. W., The New Zealand People at War – Political and External Affairs, 
Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1971 
 
Wood, F. L. W., “Sir Sidney George Holland (1893-1961)”, rev., Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33942, accessed 12 July 2007] 
 
Woodward, C. A., The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon, Rhode Island: Brown 
University Press, 1969 
 
Wriggins, W. Howard., Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1960 
 
Yska, Redmer, All Shook Up – The Flash Bodgie and the Rise of the New Zealand 
Teenager in the Fifties, Auckland: Penguin, 1993 
 
Ziegler, Philip, Mountbatten – The Official Biography, London: Collins, 1985 
 
Zines, Leslie, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991 
 
